

ARUN SHOURIE

WILL
THE
IRON FENCE
SAVE
A TREE
HOLLOWED
BY
TERMITES?

DEFENCE IMPERATIVES
BEYOND THE MILITARY

SHOULD we put our trust in Musharraf's "*naya dil*"? Or should we look at the nature of the State and society in Pakistan? What is poured into children in *madrassas*? In "non-religious" schools in Pakistan? What is the relationship of the Islam-*pasand* parties, terrorist groups and the ruling establishment in Pakistan?

Over *sixty thousand* persons have been killed by terrorist-related violence in India in the last twenty years. What transforms a believer into a killing-machine? What lessons have we learnt in fighting terrorism?

Vast tracts of the country are being annexed by Bangladeshi infiltrators. What does this hold for the security of the country? What consequences have already come about for our elections? Who is knitting terrorist and Islamic organizations together in our Northeast? What danger does this spell? What danger does the unrelenting radicalization of Bangladesh itself hold for us?

Will China not translate its economic might into military might? Is it not already doing so? Why does it keep assisting Pakistan – with know-how about missiles, atomic weaponry? Myanmar has become a dependency of China. Bangladesh has entered into a defence pact with it. The relationship between Pakistan and China is described by them as between lips and teeth. Tibet has been militarized. What does this spell for us? What does China's new strategic doctrine mean for countries that lie on its rim – as India does?

Will the USA or Russia do our work for us?

Does the way that institutions of State are being hollowed not constitute the even greater, and immediate threat? Which is the idea that has not been proposed? What happens to recommendations that are "accepted", on which "action is taken"?

But how can even institutions of State be rectified when superciliousness becomes the ideology of the media?

With a wealth of evidence, ARUN SHOURIE spells out imperatives for defence beyond the military.

A must for our times.





WILL THE IRON FENCE
SAVE A TREE
HOLLOWED BY TERMITES?

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
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Will the iron fence
save a tree
hollowed by termites?

Defence imperatives beyond the military



ARUN SHOURIE

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
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In the sacred memory of my mother,
for my father,
for Malti Shukla,
for Anita,
for our Adit

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The occasions



National Treasures

Having supervised during Partition the evacuation of Hindus from Lahore where he had been the City Magistrate, my father was posted in Jalandhar. Because of his fearlessness, his organizational abilities, his indefatigable industry, he was appointed Director of Relief and Rehabilitation – to resettle the lakhs and lakhs who had been driven out of their homes and had to take refuge in India. I was a small boy of six.

Two visitors had come from Delhi to attend a wedding – Dr. M. Mujeeb, the then Vice-Chancellor of Jamia Milia, and Dr. Hansa Mehta, the well-known educationist, freedom fighter and social worker. Dr. Mehta had brought a tiny autograph book as a gift. And to set me off on my collection, she had secured the autographs of three eminent persons. Panditji's signature was on the very first page – neat, and perfectly aligned with the page: right at the centre, perfectly horizontal; General Cariappa's signature was on the next – I still remember the line under it rising with a flourish to the right; the third page bore the signature of Sir C.M. Trivedi, then Governor of Punjab: the nib of his pen had scratched the paper, he had crossed out the first attempt midway, and signed again.

That little book was one of my treasures for years. I misplaced it after college.

But the book, and those first three autographs have always remained in my mind – still a treasure.

I was, therefore, delighted when the Army asked me to deliver the Field Marshal K.M. Cariappa Memorial Lecture for 2002.

The Field Marshal was among the most loved and respected officers who have adorned our Defence Forces. His integrity; his punctilious attention to the tiniest detail; his devotion to the ordinary *jawan*; his devotion to the country; the way, since documented so well by Chandrashekhar Dasgupta in *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir*,

1947-48,¹ he, as Western Area Commander, dodged the then Commander-in-Chief, General Bucher, a Britisher, to ensure that our forces could drive the invaders out of the Valley – each and every one of these facets is a legend in the Army. As is the deep hurt he felt when political leaders halted the advance of our forces before they had retaken all of Kashmir; as is the hurt, equally deep, he suffered when political leaders returned the gains that our fighting men had secured for the country with their very lives in 1965; as is the even deeper pain he felt when – without binding Pakistan to lasting commitments: on Kashmir, and other issues – political leaders returned the 93,000 Pakistani prisoners and threw away the other gains that our Forces had secured in 1971.

Our country – specially the youth – needs role models. Few fit the bill as Field Marshal Cariappa does.

To be asked by the Army to speak in the honour of such a National Treasure was, therefore, a great honour in itself.

That the Lecture is held around the eve of Infantry Day made it doubly precious for me – this is the day on which our Forces landed in Srinagar in 1947, secured the airport, and from there began beating back the marauders Pakistan had sent across.

Chiefs of the three Services and other senior officers were in the packed hall.

Two years later, the honour was compounded. Mr. Vajpayee's Government had been replaced by a new Government headed by Dr. Manmohan Singh. I had reverted to writing books. The Armoured Corps invited me to deliver the Cavalry Memorial Lecture for 2004.

Our Cavalry is of course a pride of our country. Its units are among the oldest and most distinguished in our Army. Their valour is exemplary. I remember well the pride with which every heart swelled as our tanks held, and then vanquished the superior Patton Tanks of Pakistan at Khemkaran in 1965.

The Lecture had great significance for me for another reason too – the memory of General J.N. Chaudhuri is associated with it.

The country must not forget his great contributions. He was the first Indian officer to be given command of a Regiment in the Second World War – and that of the oldest unit of our Cavalry, the Sixteenth

¹Sage, New Delhi, 2002.

Light Cavalry. After 1947, because of his exceptional and manifest abilities, he got rapid promotions and came to command what was then our only Armoured Division. Soon he led our Forces into Hyderabad in "Operation Polo", and later helped administer the state once the secessionist rebellion had been quelled. Via a string of important assignments, he rose to become one of our most distinguished Chiefs of Staff. And this, at what was the most difficult juncture in the history of our Armed Forces – the wake of 1962 after General Thapar resigned. It was during his tenure as Chief that the strategy was formulated which became the beacon for our Forces in the 1965 war against Pakistan. How can the country forget such service? Conversely, what is the fate that awaits a country that does forget such service?

As one whose work is to read and write, I owe him special gratitude. He reached beyond his duty to inform our countrymen. What a thrill it was to learn that he was the one who had continued to write as a "Special Correspondent" of *The Statesman* even after rising to the highest ranks of the Army! How very *special* a correspondent!

And I remember his tenure in Ottawa for a distinctive reason that many even among his colleagues may not know. He was our High Commissioner in Canada. I had just begun my working life at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. Among our early friends at that time were Mr. and Mrs. Krishan Bhatia. He had been Editor of *The Hindustan Times*, and was posted as the paper's representative in Washington. He wrote a book during his stay there – *The Ordeal of Nationhood*. In one part, it divulged facts from the Henderson Brooks Report on 1962. From whom had he got the Report? From General Chaudhuri! Mr. Bhatia would travel to Ottawa, read and take notes from the Report. And I would be sitting in Washington following his expeditions with vicarious excitement!

Two facts about the Security Forces

We continue to exist because our soldiers, our airmen, our sailors give their lives that we may do so. So, on both occasions I spoke as one who feels deeply in debt to the Army and other wings of our Security Forces.

But I also spoke as one who feels that our Security Forces are profoundly wronged. They are the ones who have to pay with their

lives for our opportunism, for our negligence, for, I cannot think of another word, our foolishness.

It is a political leader – and one of the greatest we have had, Pandit Nehru – who decides to halt their advance as they beat back the invaders from the Valley, who, in spite of the counsel from Sardar Patel, decides to take the matter to the UN, who decides to agree to a plebiscite. And the Security Forces have to pay the price.

It is a political leader – and one of the greatest we have had, Pandit Nehru – who brushes aside the Sardar's warning about what China has done, and is doing. It has marched into Tibet. It has taken Lhasa. In Delhi, the Cabinet meets. A few members timidly express apprehensions about what this invasion bodes for India. Pandit Nehru brushes them aside: "Don't you realise that the Himalayas are there?"

Upset at what has transpired in the Cabinet meeting, the Sardar writes to Panditji on 7 November 1950. He recalls the brazen invasion. He recalls the extreme offensiveness with which the Chinese have brushed aside India's plaintive observations. He recalls the lengths to which our Ambassador in Peking has been going to find justifications for the Chinese takeover – "It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet," the Sardar observes in regard to these rationalizations. He recalls that all this while "outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into the U.N.O. and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims, in our discussions with America and Britain and in the U.N.O." And yet, the invasion, the rebuff to our representations, the continuing suspicion....

He turns to the future:

We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably all that was required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half century.

China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalaya in the north and northeast we have, on our side of the frontier, a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans or Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against Imperialism and that Communists are as good or as bad Imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no MacMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and Communist Imperialism are different from the expansionism or Imperialism of the Western Powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national and historical claims. The danger from the north and northeast, therefore, becomes both Communist and Imperialist. While our western and northwestern threats to security are still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and northeast. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of a superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with Communist China in the north and northeast – a Communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us....

The Sardar goes on to spell out the danger that will arise in Indian areas abutting Tibet. In Burma. In Nepal. In Bhutan.... He goes on to list a series of steps that have to be taken urgently. He concludes, "I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them."

K.M. Munshi records, "To my knowledge the meeting suggested by Sardar did not take place."¹

And the Security Forces pay the price – with lives, in self-perception and self-esteem, in record of service to the country.

¹Letter of Sardar Patel to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, 7 November, 1950, in K.M. Munshi, *Pilgrimage to Freedom*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1967, Volume I, pp. 175-81.

Nor does the story end there. It is the political class – led by the same great leader – that throughout the fifties shuts its eyes to what China is doing. It is a political leader, Krishna Menon – much lauded in his turn – who dismisses General Thimayya's warnings about the Chinese threat, who turns down his recommendations for equipment and supplies that would be needed for fighting in the mountains – he does so by dubbing General Thimayya “pro-West”. Officials in the concerned Ministries dub the General an “alarmist”. When as a result, General Thimayya resigns, the political leader – one of the greatest we have had, Pandit Nehru – first persuades him to withdraw his resignation, and then snubs him for making much of things that are “rather trivial and of no consequence.” The very leader who has been insisting, and is going to continue to insist for three years more that the Chinese are our friends, that there is no danger from them, turns around and reproaches General Thimayya for “wanting to quit in the midst of the Sino-Indian border crisis.” It is the political leadership that scotches the voice of the General by invoking principle: “Is the military to dictate to civilian authority?”¹ And the Security Forces have to pay the price in 1962.

Today, we have the statue of that political leader – of the sharp mind and the sharper tongue – next to Army Headquarters. We have innumerable statues of the great political leader all over the country. Few remember the General.

It is the political leadership, headed by the much-lauded Mrs. Indira Gandhi, which, after the glorious triumph in 1971, decides to take Zulfikar Bhutto at his word. It is the political leadership that repatriates 93,000 Pakistani soldiers without having Pakistan sign the clause – a clause that has been drafted – to convert the LoC into the international border.² And the Security Forces have to pay the price.

It is a handful of political leaders, headed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, thinking themselves very clever and Machiavellian, who decide to patronize Bhindranwale to outdo political rivals. And the Security Forces have to pay the price.

¹On all this see, for instance, Brigadier J.P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder*, Thacker and Co. Bombay, 1969, pp. 15-17, 46-49.

²See, P.N. Dhar, *Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 187-222.

It is the political class, with the Congress in the forefront, that encourages infiltration from Bangladesh for as sordid an objective as stuffing voters' lists with captive voters. It is the political class that patronizes ULFA. It is the political leadership that sets Assam aflame in the early 1980s. And the Security Forces have to pay the price.

Even as Kashmir has settled down, a clutch of political leaders headed again by Mrs. Indira Gandhi dismisses a duly elected Government there. The *Jama'at-e-Islami* and other pro-Pakistan elements get a free hand. And the Security Forces have to pay the price.

A clutch of political leaders, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, later Rajiv Gandhi, and their circle, decides to acquire a lever in the neighbourhood by patronizing the LTTE. Later, another clutch decides that it can be wiped out in a week. And the Security Forces have to pay the price.

It is the political class that for decades on end lets insurgency fester and burgeon in the Northeast, which just goes on pouring money into "development projects" there, deluding itself that, as it is apportioning those large sums, it is doing its job, but actually ends up financing the insurgents. The Security Forces have to pay the price.

It is the political class that, for entirely opportunistic reasons, for no greater reason than that its leaders are caught in the rhetoric they hurled when they were out of office, snatches from the hands of our defence personnel instruments that the latter need to fight those who are out to break our country – TADA one day, POTA the next, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act the third. And the Security Forces have to pay the price.

It is the political class that, as I write, has as good as given a free hand to Naxalites in Andhra, to ULFA in Assam. And the Security Forces will have to pay the price.

In a word, the political class allows fires to become conflagrations, often it lights the fires. And then sends the Security Forces in – certain that they will throw their bodies on the smouldering fire, that they will – without murmur – pour their blood on it, and thus douse it.

And all the while, the Security Forces must suffer abuse for "human rights violations".

So, I spoke as one who feels deeply in debt to the Forces. But also as one who feels scandalized that they are wronged so.

Two facts about this book

There is one other preliminary point that is so obvious that it need not be mentioned. But I mentioned it during the Lectures, and I do so again as a precaution. In delivering the Lectures, in writing what I have in this book, I speak for no one but myself. As this book is an extended version of the two Lectures, nothing in it should be taken to reflect in the slightest the view of the Government of which I had been a part. Two factors make it all the more necessary for me to stress this. One is the level to which public discourse has descended in India today. Every little scrap is picked up to score a debating point against a rival party. The second reason is diplomats! Sometimes it seems to me that they look for opportunities when they may feign anger, that they look for occasions when they may shoot-off their non-papers! A few of them, and I shall have occasion to cite an example or two as we go along, write fuming letters to the press also to let the world know that they disapprove, and incidentally also ensure that their head-offices notice that they are alert on their jobs. But alas for both sets – those in political debates as well as diplomats – the views and assessments expressed here are mine alone.

The second fact I would request the reader to bear in mind is about citations. Naturally, during my work in Government I received documents that could be taken to have a bearing on national security – what doesn't? But I shall not use any of these. Adhering to this rule has meant that I have had to adopt a round-about procedure on occasion. As I could not use the official documents that made a point, I have had to illustrate the matter by locating some publication that is available in the public domain – on the Internet, for example. As Americans put out more, for instance on China, citations from American sources outnumber others. On a few points I *have* cited a few official documents to illustrate the matter at hand – in some cases, these are documents the authors of which themselves wrote should be made public swiftly. None of these came my way during my tenure in Government, but even in regard to these, I have scrupulously avoided citing any fact that contains any operational detail.

The propositions that are listed could have been illustrated with materials ten times more extensive than the ones I have invoked: the literature on defence matters, even on any one of the topics

touched upon in this book, say China, is mountain-like. I have kept the references to the minimum – instead of confirming one reference by invoking ten others as could have been done with ease, I have cited just a handful. But from these, I have quoted extensively. Two reasons in particular have led me to do so: on the one hand, the details purvey direct evidence about stratagems and devices about which we should be concerned, and are not; on the other, and in spite of the fact that the reports and publications are all in the public domain, few in India are aware of them. I do hope, therefore, that the passages will lead the reader to scout for additional material on the subjects that have been touched upon in this brief book.

Substantial advances, and yet

Over the last few years India has achieved much, and events have taken several favourable turns:

- ❑ The world has reconciled itself to a step that we had to take for our security – the development of atomic weapons.
- ❑ The very countries that were so vociferous in condemning the 1998 tests are today engaged in “security dialogues” with India.
- ❑ The country’s advance in space technology and capabilities has continued.
- ❑ The victory that the valour and sacrifice of our Defence Forces wrested in Kargil has strengthened both – the will of the country as well as the confidence to fight back.
- ❑ Our foreign policy has been successfully refashioned since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
- ❑ Similarly, while the repeated crashes of MIGs – 50-odd in just the last three years – remind us how difficult it is to shake off dependence on one source, there has been a welcome diversification in our defence purchases – France, South Africa, Israel, etc., have become significant partners in equipping us for defence of the country.
- ❑ Indian manufacturing industry has reinvented itself on the shop-floor: in many areas it is world-class. This means that it is now in a much better position to undertake manufacture of equipment that we need for our defence.

- ❑ In the first round, events since 9/11 have bolstered our security capabilities:
 - Pakistan lost what it used to triumphantly proclaim to be “strategic depth” *vis-à-vis* India;
 - There was one area less – Afghanistan – where terrorists could be nurtured, in which they could take shelter;
 - Almost all countries came to recognize that Pakistan has been and is one of the epicenters of international terrorism;
 - Much success has attended our diplomatic efforts since 9/11 in convincing other countries – even the United States and Britain – that they cannot fight terrorism to the west of Pakistan and condone it to its east.
- ❑ Elections were conducted in Jammu and Kashmir in the face of every effort by Pakistan and its terrorists – elections that observers from other countries, and, even more significant, the people of the state regarded as free and fair. That these were completed just about the time that Musharraf enacted his farce of an election made the Kashmir elections all the more telling. In the months that followed, normal political activity – meetings, debates, contesting statements between rival political leaders – was resumed, and that in the face of an all-out effort by Pakistan to scotch it: witness the murders of moderate components of the Hurriyat.

In spite of these achievements and favourable turns, there is much to be wary about. We are faced not with adverse “possibilities”, not with mere “uncertainties”, not with mere security “problems”, not even with some security “threats”. We are confronted with current, continuing aggression, and, as we shall see, with a brooding, ever-swelling menace.

The situation around us

Look at what is happening around us.

Since 1989, more than *thirteen thousand five hundred* civilians and *five thousand three hundred* security personnel have been killed by terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir.

By contrast, over the same period, till December 2004, just *sixty two* have been indicted for terrorism in the state.

A symptom of the way things are. The courts won’t deliver. When

someone – at the greatest risk to his life – acts to save the country, a shriek is sent up, “Human rights violation.”

During the last twenty years about *sixty four thousand* have been killed in terrorist-related violence.

All of them have been killed *within the territory of India*.

By the end of 2004, two hundred and twenty districts, covering 40 to 45 per cent of the country’s territory, had come to be affected by insurgencies of one kind or another.

The three principal challenges that account for these killings are Islamic Fundamentalism, Left-wing Extremism, and what Mr. K.P.S. Gill calls “Ethnic Fundamentalisms” in the Northeast. It is more or less taboo to talk about the first. The second is explained away in fashionable circles as the counter to “state-terrorism”, as the consequence of “land reforms not having been implemented”! And the third is lauded as “the rise of consciousness among indigenous peoples”! A State in denial.

And the situation has worsened to an alarming degree over the last few months – with a fractured, confused, preoccupied Government.

The sponsor of Islamic Terrorism in India – Pakistan – has not changed its eventual goal. Peace lovers keep inventing signs of hope – eager visitors to cricket matches, talk of a pipeline. They draw attention to visits – the Pakistani Foreign Minister one day, the Prime Minister the next, the Chief Minister of West Punjab the third. And each time they are jolted – pleasantries over, each visitor declares, “Nothing will come of...., unless Kashmir....”

A few months ago, I was myself witness to an amusing instance. This was at the dinner that followed the *India Today Conclave*, 2003. Musharraf had been invited to give the Key Note Address via satellite from Islamabad. A “Who’s Who” crowd was present – a crowd among whom talk of peace is a fashion statement, much as exhaling “*wah-wah*” at anything that calls itself “Sufi music”. In eighty minutes, Musharraf mentioned Kashmir *seventy* times. His message – incessantly reiterated – was simple:

- ☐ Kashmir is a dispute between India and Pakistan.
- ☐ It is the key dispute. In fact, so central is it that if it is “solved” no other dispute would survive, and if it is not solved no other dispute can be resolved.

- And the only solution to the Kashmir dispute is that India give up its "rigid" stand and accept Pakistan's position.

The audience was at first non-plussed; then disappointed; then it gasped; eventually it was reduced to a sort of embarrassed tittering. For they had invested so much in peace!

Every week the terrorists kill security personnel through attacks in the Valley. The Chief Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, his daughter, Mehbooba, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, his son, Omar, have all just about escaped assassins. So many others have not.

The Hurriyat has stopped talking to Delhi. On the other hand, it makes a great show of talking to every Pakistani high up who comes to India. And look at what we have reduced ourselves to. The Foreign Secretary of Pakistan – and this particular one happens to have more poison against India in him than almost anyone I have met – comes to Delhi. Hurriyat leaders call on him for guidance and advice! This is duly published in the papers – with not the tiniest hint of censure. In Balochistan, in Pakhtunistan, in Gilgit-Baltistan, in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir there are strong movements to secede from Pakistan. Imagine the Indian Foreign Secretary visiting Islamabad. Would he be allowed to meet the leaders of these secessionist movements?

Is this contrast a sign of our "tolerant culture"? Is it a sign of our being a democracy? Is it a sign of confidence and strength? Or is it a sign of our being confused? Of our having been fed guilt, and of our having internalized it? While we will have occasion to return to the point later, a small typical incident will show the contrast that has congealed – to our immense disadvantage. Recall how firmly Deng Xiaoping reacted not just to the demonstrators in Tiananmen but also to countries and human rights groups that tried to bring China to book for what had been done. Addressing a Japanese delegation that had come to see him after the suppression, Deng said that the troubles had been executed by "so-called democrats" "who were in fact the scum of the Chinese nation." He went on to warn,

This turmoil has been a lesson to us. We are more keenly aware that first priority should always be given to national sovereignty and security. Some Western countries, on the pretext that China has an unsatisfactory human rights record and an irrational and illegitimate socialist system, attempt to jeopardize our national sovereignty. Countries that play power politics are

not qualified to talk about human rights. How many people's human rights have they violated throughout the world! Since the Opium War when they began to invade China, how many Chinese people's human rights have they violated! The Group of Seven summit meeting held in Paris adopted a resolution imposing sanctions on China, which meant they thought they had supreme authority and could impose sanctions on any country and people not obedient to their wishes. They are not the United Nations. And even the resolutions of the United Nations have to be approved by a majority before they come into force. What grounds have they for interfering in the internal affairs of China? Who gave them power to do that? The Chinese people will never accept any action that violates the norms of international relations, and they will never yield to outside pressure....¹

As for Left-wing Extremism, one of the foremost experts in India on terrorism, Ajai Sahni reminds me that according to official figures in October 2003, 55 districts in 9 states were effected by Naxalite activity. The same figures reveal that by November 2004, *one hundred and fifty six* districts spread across *thirteen* states had been effected. That is, *every week* Naxalite operations had come to cover two more districts.

Nepal provides a warning in more ways than one. First, the pace at which such insurrections spread. The Dang assault took place in November 2001 – just three years ago. At that time, only five districts in Western Nepal were affected. Today each of the 75 districts right across the country is in the grip of Maoist violence. Second, about our own condition. At a meeting, I asked the official who was testifying, and he is one of the seniormost of officials, "Have we received evidence that the Maoists are getting arms and other aid from China?" "Some arms may have come in from China through smuggling," he replied, "but there is no evidence that China is helping the Maoists." The implication of that should make us sit up. For that acknowledgement means that, apart from what they have seized from the Nepalese police and Army, the arms and ammunition that the Maoists are wielding in Nepal have come from, at the least they have

¹Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volumes I to III, edited by People's Daily Online, <http://english.people.com.cn/dengxp/>: "First priority should always be given to national sovereignty and security," 1 December 1989.

reached them through *India*, and from and through *Indian* groups. What does that say about the reach, the resources, the sway of these groups in India itself?

A vast swathe of a corridor has *already been* carved out – from Nepal to Andhra.

U.P. is next in line – just a few months ago, the Naxalites left their calling card in Chandauli through a brutal massacre. As I close this book, they have left that card in Karnataka.

Over vast stretches, these terrorists and insurgent groups are the government. They collect taxes. They decree “justice”. They dictate who shall get what contract; in this way, “development outlays” – which governments in Delhi project as proof of what they are doing for a region – have in fact become one of the principal sources of funds for insurgencies.

The recoveries that are made from the terrorist groups would shock anyone: lakhs in cash at a time, the most modern weapons and communication equipment. As are the discoveries: in Jharkhand, officials tell me, “bunkers” consisting of two to three storey high concrete structures have been found.

Our response? Abolish the instrument that our security personnel need – POTA. Our response? Bend to them, give in to their peremptory demand – “We will come to the table with our arms; thereafter we must be free to roam with our arms.” And then, having, as a newspaper put it, “rested and rearmed,” when the Naxalites declare that the ceasefire is over, the Government bends, genuflects, entreats them not to break “the peace process.”

Of course, none of this is inevitable. And India certainly has the potential to overcome the dangers that surround us. But doing so will take a lot of doing. And it will turn on factors about which one has to struggle to detect signs on which to build hope.

Indeed, we live enveloped in a false sense of security. Many factors contribute to this:

- ❑ One of our great advantages – size, to take one example, itself contributes to complacency. Manipur burns today, we acknowledge when pressed, only to add, “But Punjab is quiet.” And thereby we shut our eyes to the real peril, namely the slow, but certain rot – for instance, of institutions.

- We see the same effect of size from another angle. In many ways India has been successful with its soft, somewhat fumbling approach towards insurgencies. Accommodation in the case of Mizos. Attrition in the case of Nagas. Incorporation in the case of Dravidian separatism. Armed victory in the case of Khalistani separatists.... These have been notable successes. But in the end we prevailed because of relative size: the resources that the country as a whole could in the end direct at the insurgents overwhelmed them. And we are able to live with the cost as it was inflicted only on the Security Forces: and we have mastered the skill of distancing ourselves from what happens to them. But it is not just lives that were sacrificed because we did not attend to the problems in time. As much was paid in disruption, and, most important, the self-perception of the country. These deteriorations accustom us to worse and worse. They weaken us for the future.
- The nature of public discourse, to take another example. Everything has been reduced to a spectacle. To a spectator-sport – the media a disc-jockey, “neutral” between the arsonist and the fire-fighter. Superciliousness has become the reigning ideology – “Life-style” tidbits swamp life and death issues.

But the gravest danger comes from the paralysis, and perversion, of institution after institution. That in turn springs from the unimaginable deterioration in the quality of persons in public life. And no one is able to discover any method of reversing the slide from bad to worse in regard to this lot.

The iron railing

That is why, while the country has many achievements to its credit – even in matters pertaining to security – we are in danger in spite of the excellence and dedication of our Forces. In fact, the professionalism and strength of our Defence Forces do not just shield us. They lull us – and enable us to shut our eyes to the alarming pace at which the scaffolding of the State, the system of governance is deteriorating in vast stretches of the country.

But Defence Forces are to a country what an iron railing put around it is to a tree. In the end, howsoever strong the railing, howsoever

sturdy and well-polished it looks, it cannot protect a tree that has been hollowed by termites from within: the storm shall fell the rotten tree.

What is it that the Soviet armed forces could do which would have made up for the sclerosis that Communism had inflicted upon the country? Could the missiles, the atomic arsenal compensate for stagnation? Correspondingly, think of Bihar. A population, of 90 million – that is a population a third larger than that of Britain, of Italy, a population equal to that of Germany, and an area forty per cent as extensive as Britain. In this vast area, over this huge population governance has evaporated. If I were running the ISI, I wouldn't waste lives in Kashmir. I would just smuggle twenty-thirty thousand Ak-47s through Nepal and Bangladesh into the state – "That is fifteen-twenty thousand too many," says a security expert; "five-ten thousand will be enough." The caste-riven people would begin killing each other, and the country's Forces will get bogged down in restoring order.

And what about the adjacent areas? Have the institutions in Jharkhand started working better since its separation from Bihar? Is U.P. not going the way of Bihar? Which fool of an enemy will fail to put such fantastic opportunities to work?

Or take Pakistan and China. Only a policy conceived with the perspective of 20-30 years, only strategies *actually implemented* and that *without let for 20-30 years* can counter what is afoot. But if the horizon of the political class is the *bulla* of the day in the legislature, or the debating point that can be extracted from the headlines of the day, if it does not extend beyond the next bout of elections, how can any policy be sustained and implemented for 20-30 years?

For the same reasons, will the growing economic strength of China not get translated into military strength? And, will the growing economic *distance* between China and India not get translated into a greater *distance* between their capabilities at force-projection and ours at warding off such projection?

That is the central point of this short book. Salvaging the system of governance is the imperative to which all of us – those in the Defence Forces, ex-servicemen, ordinary citizens – must attend today.

In a word, the Armed Forces are in fine fettle. But we will not be safe unless we get general governance upto their standards.

The proximate threat



Why don't we hear them?

Twenty three killed one day in Doda. Thirty one killed the next in Himachal. Another nineteen killed in Poonch by afternoon.... And the usual ritual would be enacted in Parliament. "Our hearts go out...." "It is a shame that the Home Minister continues in office...." And the usual diagnosis would be proffered, "There has been a failure of coordination"; but even while proffering this no one would have anything particular to say about what specific type of coordination had failed, nor anything specific to say about what should be done to improve it. And finally there would be that standard demand, "The Home Minister must give an assurance that such incidents will not occur again" – that demand would be made by the very members who were saying simultaneously that the assurances of the Government were useless....

I saw that ritual enacted for six years. Of course, it had been going on for much longer – for fifteen years. Only the sides would change from time to time: the ones who were being heckled in one phase would be doing the heckling in the next. The fact is that every minister has to work with the same instruments – the same para-military forces, the same local administration – instruments which have been enfeebled over the last thirty years to the point of palsy.

Worse, even after a decade of killing by Pakistani armed terrorists, voices would continue to be raised in Parliament, in the press that could not have been better designed to hide Pakistan's deeds under dust: an ex-editor was forever narrating the sweet words he had exchanged on his most recent trip to Pakistan, how persons like him – with their candles at the Wagah border – had built "a small lobby in Pakistan" for peace with India; another editor proclaimed that Nawaz Sharif should be given the Nobel Prize for Peace, so hard was he trying for peace in the face of such enormous difficulties.... And they had an audience! For we just did not want to face the fact that Pakistan

was working to a clear, indeed to a singular aim – and that was to break India.

In Pakistan, on the other hand, papers and magazines were full of accounts of the glorious war their *mujabideen* were waging against India, of the victories they were scoring by packing off the *kafirs*, of the number of Army personnel they had butchered in the cause of Allah.... But this material would never get reproduced in India....

"Nearly 100,000 people listened in awed silence as a 60-year old shopkeeper from Bhawalpur addressed the gathering describing how both his sons, Abu Sufian and Abu Yasir, gave up their lives fighting in Kashmir," a typical account began. It was an account of the annual congregation of the *Jama'at-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad* at Muridke, this one being in the January, 1998 issue of one of Pakistan's leading, and bravest periodicals, *The Herald*. The magazine reported the shopkeeper, now known as Abu Shahidain, as telling the congregation, "When my first son was martyred in Kashmir, I went to my second son and told him it was his turn to sacrifice his life.... I too have received training and want to join my sons as soon as possible." "By this time many were moved to tears and sobbing could be heard from within the crowd," reported the magazine.

"This remarkable scene was played out at the annual meeting of *Markaz Jama'at-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad* (Center for Preaching), a religious organization based in the town of Muridke, some 30 miles north of Lahore," the awe-struck account continued. "Its activities are focused on two areas: education and *jihad*," said *The Herald* – in fact, the "education" the magazine talked of was only the brainwashing which intoxicates the recruit for *jihad*.

"The *Jama'at-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad* works to propagate an austere, 'purified' version of Islam and has set up schools across the country for this purpose," we were told. "Meanwhile its militant wing, the *Lashkar-e-Toiba* (Army of the Pure), is an organization of highly trained militants who are willing to go to war wherever and whenever the Amir (Commander) orders."

"A unique event by any standards, the Muridke gathering, held amid tight garrison-like security brings together young militants fighting inside Indian Kashmir and those who wish to do so," the correspondent reported. "Also attending the meeting in their

thousands are the relatives of *Lashkar* soldiers, as well as the families of men who have died in Kashmir. This year nearly 100,000 people attended the three-day event, a manifestation of the *Lashkar*'s increasing popularity and power." Little doubt about the power – it is this very organization and its headquarters that the Minister for Information and one of Nawaz Sharif's close counselors, Mushahid Hussain, had visited in a manifest demonstration of official approbation.

The Amir, said the magazine, distinguishes his organization from others in the field: "Many Muslim organizations are preaching and working on the missionary level inside and outside Pakistan," he declared, "but they have given up the path of *jihad* altogether. The need for *jihad* has always existed, and the present conditions demand it more than ever." The *Lashkar* is there to fill this lacuna.

And the focus of the organization had shifted, the publication reported: "....Although the *Lashkar* was initially involved in Afghanistan as well, its activities are now restricted to Indian Kashmir. Today it is Pakistan's largest so-called *jihad* organization. There are many other *jihadi* groups operating inside Kashmir, but their members are mainly local men, assisted by fighters from other countries, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. 'Eighty per cent of the *mujahideen* (holy warriors) in other *jihadi* groups operating in Kashmir come from that area,' an office-bearer of the *Lashkar* confirmed to the correspondent of the magazine. "But the case with the *Lashkar* is exactly the opposite," he added, explaining that "80 per cent of the *Lashkar*'s soldiers belong to Pakistan. The *Lashkar* prefers not to reveal the exact number of men it has currently deployed in Kashmir...."

And the reason this organization seemed to be "succeeding" in attracting larger numbers, according to the publication, lay in that it was outdoing the other groups in what it did to "stir outrage against the injustices meted out to Kashmiri Muslims." As the account put it, "Compared to other similar organizations, the *Lashkar* has proved to be a resounding success. Since its inception, it has managed to attract thousands of committed young men to its fold. The driving force behind its massive success in recruitment is deceptively simple: using its impressive organizational network, which includes schools, social

service groups and religious publications, to stir up outrage against the injustices meted out to Kashmiri Muslims, the *Jama'at-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad* creates a passion for *jihad*...."

The organization put recruits through rigorous military training, *The Herald* reported. The recruits were thoroughly brainwashed, they were put to various tasks – collecting funds, recruiting more "soldiers", and the like. The select, the ones who had fully internalized the poison were sent to Kashmir. *The Herald* informed us, "As a matter of policy, the *Lashkar* allows only those men to fight in Kashmir whose parents give them permission to do so. Recruits are also required to convince their families about the importance of their mission. It is perhaps for this reason that the death of a son in Kashmir is not usually met with sorrow. Such news is brought to the family by a group of senior *Lashkar* leaders who congratulate the family on the 'martyrdom' of their son. In nearly every case, rather than mourning, the family celebrates the occasion by serving guests with food and receiving congratulations."

The account spoke for itself. We need only remember that such poison feeds on itself, that it requires to be fed with poison of its kind. A picture of gore and blood, of Muslims being savaged in Kashmir is drawn up. This yields money by the trunkload. And recruits. To fire the recruits into giving up their lives, the fabrications are made even more gory, and to them are added myths – that by killing *kafirs*, by fighting in the cause of Allah, the *mujahideen* earn a place for themselves in Paradise, that they get in addition the right to nominate some of their dear ones to a place there, that by being killed they will become "martyrs", that martyrs go straight to Paradise. And then come the delights that Allah has prepared in Paradise for those who are martyred in His cause.

The deaths of these *mujahideen* serve the very worldly purposes of the controllers too. "Most of those who die in Kashmir are buried there, and Kashmiris are known to carry out the necessary formalities with the utmost respect and full honours," *The Herald* reported. "....In Pakistan, meanwhile, the last rites of *Lashkar* fighters are held in the absence of the body. For those devoted to the cause, the *ghaibana namaze janaza* (funeral prayer in absentia) becomes another occasion to hammer home the necessity of *jihad*. Indeed, every such funeral produces new recruits to the *Lashkar*. In many cases relatives

of the 'martyr' have been known to present the *Lashkar* with another young man from the family. In fact, it is not uncommon to find all the able bodied men of a single family joining the *Lashkar*...."

As the cause is Holy, as they are "striving in the way of Allah", the *mujahideen* regard cruelty as a virtue, or at the least the controllers of the *Lashkar* project their "soldiers" to be cruel, and proclaim this cruelty to be virtue. *The Herald* reported, "In the field of combat, however, it is said that *Lashkar* fighters give as good as they get. Since it is not possible to bring their captives back to Pakistan, and the Indian Government does not bargain for the return of hostages, all Indian prisoners are killed in the Valley. The *Lashkar* fighter usually executes an Indian soldier by slitting his throat. However, beheading and disemboweling are also common tactics, employed mostly for psychological reasons. In at least one case a *Lashkar* fighter, Abu Haibat, brought the head of an Indian soldier back with him to Pakistan. 'The Quran orders us to hit them on every joint,' says Abdur Rahman al Dakhil, commander of the *Lashkar* in Occupied Kashmir. 'We are instructed to treat the enemy the way they treat us.'"

"....He [al Dakhil] does not agree with the common argument that fighters from our side of the region are complicating the situation in Kashmir and causing problems for the local population," the magazine reported. "Nothing could be farther from the truth," he said. "The Kashmiris consider the *mehman mujahideen* (guest fighters) to be angels that bring God's blessing," he explained. "Their presence gives moral support to the Kashmiris and their woes are mitigated."

The publication described the kinds of speeches which are the staple of such congregations: "The three day annual meeting is divided into 12 sessions.... Most of the session, however, concentrates on the importance of *jihad*. In the fifth session, Abu Muslim Jarar, a *Lashkar-e-Toiba* fighter currently posted in Kashmir, delivers a speech through a wireless hook-up with Muridke. 'The Hindu Army is taking measures of extreme cruelty against the Muslims,' he warns. 'Sisters are being denuded in front of brothers. Has *jihad* not become mandatory?'"

"In a special session dedicated to speeches by soldiers and relatives of 'martyrs'," *The Herald's* account continued, "a young man, Abdullah, tells the crowd that he belonged to a Hindu family in Kashmir but converted to Islam after coming into contact with men

from the *Lashkar-e-Toiba*. 'I slaughtered five members of my family with my own hands because they were informers for the Indian Army,' he relates. 'I was a Hindu, yet I joined the path of *jihad*. What keeps you away from it?' Another fighter who addresses the meeting, Abu Bilal, was hit by five bullets but succeeded in returning to Pakistan. Sheikh Mohammed bin Saleh, Deputy Mufti of Saudi Arabia, and Abu Abdul Aziz, famed for his involvement in the war in Bosnia, also address the gathering via the telephone. 'Those who oppose *jihad* are not true to their claim of being Muslims,' Aziz admonishes the crowd...."

Such awestruck, often glowing accounts were the staple of Pakistan's press. And the organization described in this particular account was only one of the scores which had been spawned. Successive governments of Pakistan and its agencies made no bones about their own purpose, they made no bones about their view that these organizations were engaged in a cause which they – the Government and its agencies – too regarded just as Holy as did the organizations they had fathered. The killings of our people testified to their design, not just their cruelty. Our response? To shut our ears tight against what they are shouting over loudspeakers....

One thing is clear: no one can accuse the *Jama'at-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad* or its armed wing, the *Lashkar-e-Toiba* of camouflaging their aims. The *Lashkar* proclaims its "agenda" every morning, noon and night. In a pamphlet entitled "*Why are we waging jihad?*" it declares that the goal of its *jihad* includes the restoration of Islamic rule over all parts of India. It seeks to bring about a union of all Muslim majority regions in countries that surround Pakistan. Towards that end, it is active in Jammu and Kashmir, Chechnya and other parts of Central Asia, the pamphlet declares. It is well established that the organization assisted the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's *al Qaeda* terrorist network in Afghanistan during November and December 2002 in its fight against the Northern Alliance. *Lashkar's* controller and mentor, Professor Saeed and his associates are absolutely explicit in declaring the aims, the perspective, the "triumphs" of their organization and its members:

- The US can declare us terrorists, but even then, we will continue waging war in India... The military Government's biggest mistake

is that it is not taking its own people into confidence at this crucial juncture in the freedom movement in Kashmir... Pakistan must complete its nuclear programme and strengthen its defence missile system to apply pressure on India besides taking its own people into confidence... We must not toe the US line in Afghanistan as it would be our greatest support in case of war with India. Support from China and the Islamic world should also be sought in this regard....¹

- ❑ Muslims are being oppressed in Kashmir, Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya and India. Muslim women are being raped in these countries. *Jihad*, under such a situation becomes obligatory... *Jamaat* will not confront the [Pakistan] army, but continue to wage *jihad* in the world. War with the infidels will not end through negotiations but through fighting. There is no possibility of compromise with the infidels.²
- ❑ Allah has told us to make atom bombs. America is telling us not to. Who should we listen to O Muslims, Allah or America? Kashmir will not be solved by talks, not by American arbitration, not by its division but only by *jihad, jihad, jihad!*... The Hindus were terrorists yesterday, they are terrorists today and they will remain terrorists tomorrow. We are right in seeking revenge from these spawns of evil.³

And so on – we shall soon encounter the exhortations Professor Saeed delivers to this day. But for the moment let us return to accounts of those congregations.

To paradise

"Death is just an insignificant word for them," began another typical report. This one, in *The News* of 28 November, 1997, was about the annual gathering of the *Mujabideen-e-Toiba*. "Killing those who do not share their set of Islamic values is the only reality. The congregation was flooded with thousands of people with these

¹Speech at the Karachi Press Club, 11 May, 2001.

²Hafiz Abdul Salam, *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, Patoki, Punjab, during a three-day convention, December 2002.

³Taped speech played on "Kashmir Day," at the Jamia Mosque Ghousia, Rawalpindi, February, 2003.

beliefs...." "And the massive gathering of people delivered one message loud and clear," the paper reported, "there is no dearth of manpower in Pakistan for the fanatic forces to indoctrinate. 'If I die fighting, I will be greeted in heaven by Allah who will smile upon me,' said a 20-year old *mujahid* from Okra."

The paper reproduced at length the views and exhortations of Professor Saeed, the head of the organization which was conducting the congregation, the *Jama'at-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad*. He conveyed a simple message, the newspaper reported: "It was God who had ordered the establishment of the law of Islam everywhere in the world." He called for a *jihad*, said the paper, for ending the democratic system in Pakistan and turning it into "a pure Islamic State governed by strict Shariat laws." At the congregation he rejected democracy, proclaiming, "The notion of the sovereignty of the people is un-Islamic – only Allah is sovereign." [That has been the provision in each of Pakistan's three Constitutions since the Objectives Resolution was passed in 1949.] And these notions had gone home to the congregation, the paper reported: "The whole place was full of signboards with slogans like *Jamhoorial ka jawab, grenade aur blast*.'" "The *Dawa* chief said his organization's main interest in Pakistan was to pick people and train them to wage *jihad* in countries wherever an un-Islamic government was in power," the paper said. "God has ordained every Muslim to fight until His rule is established," he declared. "We have no option but to follow God's order."

As usual, the weapons and morale of the participants struck awe. "The mediamen covering the event were shaken when a *mujahid* addressed the gathering from Bosnia and another from Kashmir via satellite phone," *The News* reported. "The latest wireless sets were in abundance, as of course were modern weaponry in the hands of youngsters." The paper carried an account of a youngster from Canada who had joined up for *jihad*. "I would go to Kashmir as a volunteer but I have not yet been able to persuade my leaders to let me go," the paper quoted him as declaring, and added, "He shares the dream of martyrdom with thousands of others who attended the annual gathering of the *Mujahideen Lashkar-e-Toiba*, a militant wing of the group." "Rehman has no second thoughts about his decision to wage *jihad* against those who have enslaved Muslim brothers in the world.... Abdur Rehman agrees with his leader's doctrine that

democracy (sovereignty of the people) is anti-Islamic as it is against the basic principle of Islam that sovereignty belongs to Allah. He believes that it is the basic duty of every young Muslim to take up arms against those who do not believe in the Islamic system. 'We should fight against those who oppose the establishment of this system,' he states firmly. Muridke serves both as a headquarters for *Dawa* and a training ground for militants destined for Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya and the southern Philippines where Muslim communities are seeking self-determination. Rehman is ready to fight anywhere when he is needed. 'I know we are considered terrorists in the West, but I reject this title. A terrorist is someone who hates the world. We don't hate the world. I just want to bring about the system called for by God so that society can be happier,' he says."

In addition to the account of the gathering at Muridke, the January 1998 issue of Pakistan's *The Herald* carried a detailed interview with the Amir of the *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, Mohammed Khan. "There are Muslim organizations which preach and work on the missionary level inside and outside Pakistan," the Amir told the correspondent, "but they usually steer clear of *jihad*. However, not only has the need for *jihad* always existed, the present conditions demand it more than ever."

Nor was the Amir at all reticent in naming the targets of the organization's *jihad*. He told the publication,

Our *jihad* is confined strictly to non-Muslims, and particularly Hindus and Jews, the two main enemies of the Muslims. The Quran too has declared these two groups to be enemies (of Islam). These two powers are creating problems for Muslims and for Pakistan.

To my mind the Hindus are what the Quran calls '*mushriks*' (polytheists). This (Hinduism) is the worst form of *shirk* (polytheism) in which 30 million gods are worshipped. And from here *shirk* has been smuggled to other nations of the world. Hindus are creating problems for us directly. If God gives us the power we will enlarge the scope of *jihad* to include the Jews, who are the worst danger for the Muslims.

The Amir maintained that *jihad* is the cure for the sectarian strife which is tearing Pakistan – his cure for it, in a word, is to export the conflict! The correspondent asked the Amir for his reactions to the charge that organizations such as the *Lashkar* had fomented a militancy which had in turn given rise to sectarianism, violence and

crime. As one would expect, the Amir started with a conspiracy theory:

I feel that the opposite is true. For quite some time a conspiracy has been hatched against the Muslims. Shias and Sunnis have been made to fight each other, and Sunnis have been made to fight amongst themselves. A conspiracy has been hatched to encourage sectarianism, and its ill-effects are there for all to see. The conspirators did this to prevent Muslims from engaging in *jihad*.

The Jews have made this play in Egypt. They have made those people fight each other who could have fought against Israel. You find the same thing with the Shia-Sunni conflict. They (the conspirators) know that if Muslims are united, their wrath will be directed against the infidels.

If it really was the case that "if the Muslims were united, their wrath will be directed against the infidels," that would in itself constitute a complete case for fomenting the conspiracy which the Amir accused the infidels of having hatched! But there was a remedy, the Amir told the publication,

But if you study those people objectively – those who have been engaged in *jihad* either in Afghanistan, Kashmir or elsewhere – you will find that those who are making sacrifices have started coming closer together. Those who have joined *jihad* have been saved from sectarian conflict.

I see a large number of people who have left these useless things behind and are joining *jihad* in Kashmir. Neither the *Milli Yakjehti Council* nor Mr. Nawaz Sharif can succeed in putting an end to sectarianism. The credit goes to *jihad* in Kashmir.

Indeed, in the Amir's considered view, *jihad* was the medicine not just for sectarian violence. It was the way to kick-start Islamic peoples into the new technologies. The Amir said,

In fact, when the Muslims were engaged in *jihad*, in the early days of their history, they had a grasp over science and technology. It was when Muslims gave up *jihad* that science and technology also went into the hands of others. This is natural. The one who possesses power also commands science, the economy and politics. The Christians won this power after a long time which began with the Crusades. It is very obvious – the technology which was centered at the *Baitul Hikmat* [The House of Wisdom] in Baghdad has now been transferred to Europe. Today, if the Muslims really want to regain their former glory, it is not enough to do a Ph. D. in Europe, although there is no harm in doing so. But achieving real power is a necessity.

He was circumspect, but only a bit, about the relationship of the organization with the intelligence and security agencies of Pakistan. Asked about it, the Amir said,

If you wage *jihad* and that too against countries and organised armies, you cannot afford to make any mistakes. You must get help from wherever you can, whether it is from governments or individuals. Even if the Chinese Government agrees to help us against India, we should take the offer because, in order to break a target, you have to gather resources by all possible means. Despite the problems involved in outside funding, I feel that we should get help from wherever we can, from our Government or any other government which can help us against India.

The Amir was asked next for his views about democracy. He was explicit:

Democracy is among the menaces we inherited from an alien government. These are all useless practices and part of the system we are fighting against. Many of our brothers feel that they will be able to establish an Islamic system while working within this system. They are mistaken. It is not possible to work within a democracy and establish an Islamic system. This is trash, and you just dirty your hands dealing with it. If God gives us a chance we will try to bring in the pure concept of an Islamic Caliphate.

How convenient for Pakistan's military rulers! And how will the cadre be prepared for turning the system over? The Amir came back to his sovereign remedy, *jihad*:

Pakistan is an ideal place for us to work in. We enjoy freedom to carry out our work and our educational institutions are also located here. We will prepare *mujabideen* preachers and an alternative leadership. And through *jihad*, God will give this work success and countries will break. When change comes it will not be a small change. After making sacrifices for a long time, a point will come when those opposing Islam will be crushed and then comes the time when you have to take the field.

"By force?," asked the interviewer. "Yes," said the Amir, "that is a must."

The issue of *The Herald* carried a companion report about what it said was "the most widely circulated religious publication in the country," the *Majallah ad-Dawa*. The magazine sold about 5,000 copies in 1989, reported *The Herald*, now it sold around 70,000 copies. At Rs. 12 per copy. The publication was the organ of the *Jama'at-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad*. *The Herald's* account of the mind-set

of the editor and his team, as well as the contents of the magazine, was as telling.

"The magazine team, and its editor in particular," *The Herald* said, "have traveled far and wide – to shrines, temples, jails and even musical gatherings – in search of 'satanic' practices. Once uncovered, these goings-on are written about in detail." *The Herald's* account continued,

The enterprising editor, Amir Hamza, has traveled as far as Iran to uncover evil practices. During his travels to that country, he took the daredevil step of visiting its prisons and published a fascinating report, titled 'From Iran's jails and dungeons'....

In another such story, 'On the Tomb of the Homosexual Saint', the magazine reports from the annual festival of Madho Lal Hussain and informs its readers about the 'perverted ways' of the Saint and his followers. In a similar article on Riaz Gohar Shahi, another famous *pir*, the magazine traces his life-history in an attempt to prove that he was a fraud. However, no religious leader has received more attention from the *Majallah* team than Tahirul Qadri, Chief of the *Tehreek Minhajul Quran*, a Barelvi Sunni group. Members of the *Dawa* are Ahle Hadith, expounding an austere, Arabic version of Islam. To them, *Minhajul Quran's* brand of religion is tainted with the influence of Hinduism. The *Majallah* team is determined to 'purify' the Islam practiced in the subcontinent, and target Qadri so that 'those who do not know him may guard against his evil designs, and those who know him can nip the evil in the bud.'

Not only does *Majallah* take a hard-line against such 'evil designs', it is also severely critical of mysticism in Islam and considers this movement to be a deviation from the path of the Prophet....

Nor were the concerns of the *Majallah ad-Dawa* limited to merely religious observances. The editors were in the forefront of campaigns to exorcise from day to day life the Devil and his conspiracies, it turned out. *The Herald* mentioned a special crusade which it reported was glorified in a series of articles entitled, "Television murders". "Here the television set is evil personified, and the ritual 'murder' of television sets at the hands of young men, mostly fresh converts to the *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, are reported," *The Herald* informed us. "One such story reads: 'All the brothers and sisters were watching a film on the VCR when Nadim entered the room. His religious *ghairat* was stirred and, taking a brick in his hand, he broke the television set into pieces

with two or three blows.' Where entire families are in agreement over the danger of television, TV sets are smashed ceremoniously on a stage at *Lashkar* meetings...."

And, of course, the publication carried as regular features the statements, exhortations, wills of "martyrs" who had "sacrificed their lives" for liberating Kashmir. *The Herald* reproduced a typical letter from a "martyr":

My dear father, mother, brothers and sisters,
If you really love me, you should bear the news of my martyrdom with courage and be thankful to God. I request my mother and sisters to observe *purdah*, shun sin, say their prayers and pray to God to accept my martyrdom. I request my father to send my brothers for (military) training and also to educate others about *jihad*. It is an excellent path which leads straight to Paradise.

I request you to break your television set soon after reading my will so that our house is free from the influence of Satan, and God is pleased with us all. I request you again to be thankful to God for my martyrdom. You should know that your son has died the death of a martyr. He did not die while drinking alcohol, watching a movie or television. Rather, he died fighting against the enemies of God, and is alive in Paradise forever.

You should not pay heed to those who say that these people (the *Lashkar-e-Toiba*) get our children killed in Kashmir. You should read the Quran and Hadith and see how God has ordered *jihad* and what great gifts have been set aside for martyrs. The Prophet of God has said, 'On the Day of Judgment, every martyr will be allowed to take 70 persons to Paradise.' It is a big gift. Do pray for me.

(Signed) Abu Marsad

How convenient for the organization and its *jihad*! Not only had the man made himself available for a "cause" which the Amir had selected, he had made it all the easier for the Amir to acquire replacements by making his closest relatives feel guilty if they failed to supply the remaining brothers to the *Lashkar*. He had advocated the propositions that the *Lashkar* was urging – right down to destroying the TV set! And he had so thoughtfully absolved the *Lashkar* from all criticism.

The religious leaders were proclaiming all this every day of the week. The congregations were being held in city after city after city for years.

The accounts I have cited of the *Lashkar* and of the *Dawa* were typical. You could pick up scores of such accounts every month from Pakistani publications.

The *Dawa* was, and under its new name is but one of a host of organizations which are dedicated to exterminating the conspiracies of *Kafirs*, in particular to "liberating" Kashmir from India. The *Hizb-ul-Mujahideen*, which, despite its name, is projected as a "Kashmiri nationalist organization," is equally explicit – indeed, its proclamations and exhortations are indistinguishable from those of the *Jama'at-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad* and the *Lashkar*.¹ But why look at these organizations and the *madrassas* alone? The entire State-supported educational establishment, and a host of State-supported institutions – "think-tanks" and the like – have been propagating exactly the same ideology – beginning with school textbooks themselves, even those for children just beginning their education.

"But haven't things changed?"

"But haven't things changed? The interviews and accounts of meetings in the *Herald*, etc., are of 1997 and 1998." How ready, indeed how desperate we are to fool ourselves! The texts and seminars which indoctrinated these *mujahid*, have they changed? Why will those texts and seminars not propel the faithful on to the same path today? In any case, proof from how recent a date would be sufficient?

I have before me a video recording. It is of a meeting held in Muzaffarabad. The month is as recent as May 2004. The people and their leaders have gathered to commemorate the "martyrdom" of two commanders who have been killed while waging *jihad* in Kashmir.

Do read the extracts that follow. And notice:

- ☐ Such meetings are the staple in Pakistan.
- ☐ Large numbers flock to them.
- ☐ There is no way they could be held in a military State like Pakistan without the permission and active assistance of the authorities.

¹See, for instance, Ajai Sahni, "Pakistan-USA: an on-going failure of imagination," *South Asia Intelligence Review*, Volume 3, No. 2, 26 July, 2004.

- ❑ The *jihadi* organizations reap rich dividends from such gatherings – both in recruits and money.
- ❑ The message is driven deep as the speakers are able to lace it with verses from the Quran, as they are able to cite *hadis* of the Prophet to enflame their listeners.
- ❑ The speakers are emphatic: *jihad* shall continue till victory.
- ❑ It is the only way: Muslims have never been given their due through negotiations.
- ❑ Victory is certain as Allah has assured the faithful of His help.
- ❑ Kashmir is the first step – *jihad* will continue till Muslims all over India are liberated from the Hindu tyranny that oppresses them today.
- ❑ Hindus-Jews-Christians are indistinguishable in their enmity to Muslims.
- ❑ “Friendship with the Hindus is unprincipled, unlawful and undesirable.... The Holy Quran opposes it. Is the saying of the Prophet wrong?”
- ❑ On the other side, sufferings of the Muslim *ummah* anywhere are the common concern of the faithful.

The speeches are also instructive in other ways. They show that the operations against these so-called *mujabideen* are hurting them. They show that the “peace initiatives” have enraged the *jihadis*, against their sponsor, the Pakistani Government also. Exhortations that *jihadi* organizations must be rid of “hypocrisy, disputes, sectarianism” point to afflictions that have come to affect these organizations. They show the reliance on gross exaggerations and out-and-out falsehoods so characteristic of such organizations and leaders: notice what the speakers lead their listeners to believe about the conditions in India, about the elections in Kashmir, about the “more than 525,000 Kashmiri people who have sacrificed their lives in spearheading the Kashmir freedom struggle and in search of the blessing of freedom” – this from puppets of Pak intelligence agencies and its Army, this in an area that has not had an election even once during 56 years!

The extracts speak for themselves:

* * *

*Speeches at a "martyrdom" meeting in Muzaffarabad, May 2004**Speaker 1**Sheikh Aqil-ur-Rahman, District Chief, Jama'at-e-Islami, Muzaffarabad:*

In the name of Allah, the most gracious, the most merciful.

And say not of those who are slain in the way of Allah: "They are dead. Nay, they are living, though ye perceive (it) not."

Dear audience! We once again gather here with broken hearts. Nay brethren! This is not the first incident for us. This is a part of a series. The *mujahideen* have sacrificed their lives and have reached Allah. They have achieved their goals.... We will continuously follow the path shown by the martyrs and will enable this Movement to become a success....

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We would like to inform India.... that the Muslims are a nation which loves martyrdom and, by Allah's will, this journey will continue.

Rulers of Islamabad and India as well as those of America who are conspiring against *jihad* should understand that the Muslims cannot compromise with *jihad*. It is an integral part of our *Iman* [Faith]. We do not possess the same stature as the five lakh brethren who have sacrificed their lives for this purpose. We will also follow their paths and sacrifice our lives.

My brethren! Pakistan is strengthening relations with India. Delegations are being exchanged. *Samjhauta Express* is being run, hands of friendship are being extended. But what is the basis for these initiatives? On the restless dead bodies of Kashmiri people, on our ruined villages, on our robbed dignity?

Yet, the brazen-faced rulers of Pakistan are building up relations with India. This is a policy of the *Wardiwali* Government [the Government decked in the Army Uniform]. We condemn it. We inform Pakistan that we totally reject this agreement. This is not our policy. This is not the policy of the people of free Kashmir. This is not a policy of the Pakistani people.

We are with the people of Kashmir and we patronize the *jihad* in Kashmir. I assure our *Amir* that just as our youth sacrificed their lives in the past, so will our sacrifices also continue in the future. You should not be worried. You should not be tired. People of Kashmir as well as Pakistan are with you. We assure that, through our struggle, we, the Pakistani people, will divert our rulers to the real path of the freedom movement of Kashmir.

*Speaker II**Javed Iqbal, Jama'at-e-Islami, Muzaffarabad*

Our brethren have achieved the goals for which they left their homes and relatives. But, my brethren! The path which we have adopted is very tough

Nowadays especially, we have to face a lot of problems, troubles and trials on the way.

My brethren! This is our only way. We can achieve the world beyond this world only by following this path and by this struggle. The success of that world is true success. Life here is very short, and in this short life, we have seen many things and many great persons. They enjoyed themselves and then they died. But, my brethren! The real satisfaction and the real pleasure of the heart is in the way of *jihad* and in the fields of *jihad*. My brethren! Today, after 9/11, people all over the world are saying that the situation has changed, the *mujabideen* should learn their lesson and they should stop their activities. My brethren! If we believe in Allah, if we believe in the Holy Quran, if we are the followers of the Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him) and believe in him, then *jihad* is the destination of our lives.

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Jihad is our only path and we have to follow it. We have to choose the path of wisdom. By the will of Allah, the Kashmiri *mujabideen*, who have sacrificed a lot, will succeed. On behalf of the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* [association of religious parties allied to Musharraf] we will continue to provide Kashmiri *mujabideen* assistance on every occasion. The main objective of the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* is to support suppressed Muslims all over the world and to gain the will and pleasure of Allah.

Speaker III

My only message to Ansar and the Muslim *Ummah* of Pakistan and Kashmir is that they should not forget the sacrifices made by the martyrs and the sacred blood which they have shed....

Speaker IV

Sheikh Jamil-ur-Rahman, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

May Allah shine light on their graves and give the bereaved families fortitude.

These martyrdoms create a void not only in the organizations but also in the Movement. To fill this void is impossible. My brethren and my friends! These martyrs are the foundation of the nation, the wealth of the nation. By their sacrifices, fresh courage and passion are infused in the nation and new tales of courage and determination are penned. The blood of martyrdom provides new life in the body of nations. It is a reality that the blood of martyrdom never goes in vain. We are committed to the mission launched by the *mujabideen*. This is the purpose of gathering at this place. It is a reality that a nation which is determined to make sacrifices and achieve freedom and a nation which is ready to die, such a nation can never be defeated and no power in the world can prevent it from achieving freedom. But we must continue to have hope and faith despite being

subjected to storms from different directions. There is need for determination, patience and firmness. Our destination is very close. All we need is some more patience. The Hindus can never be our friends. The Holy Quran confirms it. In clear words, Allah also says that the Jews and Christians too cannot be our friends. Those who are initiating friendship between India and Pakistan are misguiding the nation. They are cheating the nation. Friendship with the Hindus is unprincipled, unlawful and undesirable. This friendship can never be in our favour. Those who talk about friendship between Pakistan and India should know that they are befriending those who are accused of demolishing the Babri Masjid, of killing Kashmiri people and of butchering Muslims in Gujarat. How is friendship possible with these cruel Hindus? If it was necessary to befriend India, then

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what was the need to create Pakistan? If we had to extend the hand of friendship with India, then what was the need to take this country to the abyss of the sea, where it is being tossed around in strong currents in search of its destination, while those standing on the shore are enjoying its predicament? This friendship is never possible. The Holy Quran opposes it. Is the saying of the Prophet wrong? The Prophet's saying can never be wrong. Friendship with the Hindus is impossible. If you do believe in the saying of the Prophet, then how can you believe in their [Hindus'] friendship? We should accept the reality that this meek treaty, which is being signed, is a conspiracy to disgrace and insult the Muslims. If you consider this meek treaty noble, then death for Muslims is better. This is actually a fire, and a spark from it can burn the whole of India. It is better for India that it should get out of this region today as soon as possible instead of tomorrow. The *mujabideen* have resolved that if India disgraces and insults the Kashmiri people, then they [the *mujabideen*] will not let India live in peace. I pay homage to our brethren....

Speaker V

We are united here as well as in the battlefield. Besides, all the *jibadi* forces are also united. This Islamic unity reveals that whenever one of our Commanders is killed, we, the *mujabideen*, face an examination. Through this meeting, I would like to urge India to rethink about the killing of our Commanders such as Inamullah Khan, Ghulam Rasool Dar and Shahabuddin. Because every death of a leader creates another leader, every death of a Commander creates another Commander, every death of a militant creates another militant, and every death of a daring young man creates another daring young man. This is an indication that we will get freedom only through *jihad*.

Dear friends! All the other ways are useless and utter nonsense. These methods have been experimented with in Palestine, but in vain. If a nation

desires freedom, then there is no other way, but the way by which young Shahabuddin sacrificed his life. India thought that by killing Ghulam Rasool there would not be a Shahabuddin, and thus we will not get freedom. But by the will of Allah, there is one after another, a new group after another. By following His path, we will liberate Jammu and Kashmir from India and it will become a part of Pakistan.

It is a war with a theory behind it. It is a war with a thesis behind it. It is not like Tamil Nadu's war. It is not LTTE's war. There is a thought behind this war. There is a theory behind this war. That thought, that theory was provided by Quran and Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him). Mr. Jamali, the Prime Minister, had announced a unilateral ceasefire. Since then, the *Jamiatul Mujahideen* has compiled a list of 33 militant Commanders who have been martyred till date. This martyrdom includes top level Commanders at the divisional and field level, from various organizations. We have borne this loss. Influential people of Pakistan, who have more understanding and observation than us, should consider this and decide their Kashmir policy with this perspective. If we unite and speak jointly in one language, then we will reach our destination very soon by the will of Allah.

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Speaker VI

*Mohammed Farooq Rahmani, Convener,
APHC (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir)*

Terrorism is on a high. We are missing Shahabuddin and Khatib Ansari, two renowned sons who are no more amongst us. Their martyrdom is a great loss not only to the *Hizb-ul-Mujahideen*, or to any single organization, but also to the worthy sons of Kashmir, the land of Kashmir and to the Kashmir Liberation Movement.

I believe that martyrdom and *jihad* are very revered in Islam. Only by recording *jihad* and martyrdoms, has Islam succeeded. Muslims gained strength, ruled the world and gave a message of humanity to the entire world. At this moment we should not grieve too much. We believe in the poetry of Allama Iqbal: "Martyrdom is the aim and the beloved of the *Momin*. The booty or dominion gained by war is not the aim." I believe that because of the history of this great Movement, Kashmir has become famous all over the world today. The greatness and sacrifices of Kashmir are saluted and respected even by its enemies. This is clear from the discussions that are being held all over the world about this journey of Kashmir, the freedom of Kashmir and the future of Kashmir. We must continue with our movement of resistance, freedom, *jihad* and history of sacrifices. Today, India has started state terrorism and we can overcome it and finish it only by our confidence and determination.

India has been damaged, weakened and Indian forces have been rendered helpless. They want to run from there. But we will not let them run until they stop state terrorism. I believe that Kashmir is not only a name for Kashmiri *mujahideen* but is also a name for the determination of the Kashmiris. We have to rededicate ourselves to this journey by our faith, confidence, determination and above all, by our unity. We have to prove "And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves." We must not get involved in hypocrisy, disputes, and sectarianism. We have to correct our behaviour. We have to evaluate our faults and mistakes. After this evaluation, our path will become clear and India will not hinder us through state terrorism. May Allah give our martyrs *Jannatul Firdaus*. And may Allah give us freedom.

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Speaker VII

Syed Salahuddin

You have gathered here to pay homage, to convey appreciation for the virtuous deed and to offer prayer in absentia for martyrs Ghazi Shahabuddin and his fellow-rider Khatib Ansari, Divisional Commander, Udhampur. May Allah reward you with the goodness of both the worlds. My dear youth! So far, more than 525,000 Kashmiri people have sacrificed their lives in spearheading the Kashmir freedom struggle and in search of the blessings of freedom. This movement has been watered by the blood of more than 525,000 martyrs. Neither I nor does anyone else believe that Allah, the Lord of the universe, will let the blood of so many martyred sons of the oppressed *Millat* go in vain. I assure you that Almighty Allah, by His will and tactics, is bringing the *jihad* Movement of Kashmir on to an attack that will liberate not only the oppressed people of Jammu and Kashmir but also crores of Muslims and other minorities in India oppressed by Brahmin rulers.

Jihad has invisible powers with the capacity to obliterate its opponents. Ex-super power USSR was scattered into pieces and states after states were liberated without any drop of blood.

Dear youth! The caravan of the resolute, the caravan of *Ghazis* and the caravan of martyrs will continue on the path of *jihad* until, by the will of Allah, success is achieved and each and every corner of Kashmir is liberated from the unlawful occupation of India.

Dear youth! On the surface, our hearts are injured, we are grieved and we mourn. It is a ground reality. No one can deny the reality that, one after another, such as Commander-in-Chief Ghazi Naseebuddin, Ghazi Burhanuddin, Ghazi Shahabuddin, Divisional Commander, Central Sector and thousands of *mujahideen* have been martyred. Apparently, it is a

matter of worry. But the last and final Holy Book of Allah proves, and the sayings of Prophet Mohammed, the messenger of Allah (peace and God's blessing be upon him) prove that martyrdom doesn't weaken any Movement, rather it strengthens it and it in turn gathers more momentum. That is because the death of a martyr provides life for the Movement, for all the oppressed *Millat* and the whole nation. The martyr's blood which has fallen on the earth is considered as equivalent to paying *zakat* on behalf of the whole nation. In this context Allah said "Martyrs are living." One can't realize how each and every drop of the martyr's blood brings life to thousands of dead bodies. But we have been observing by our very own eyes that

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despite the martyrdom of *jibadi* authorities, leaders and *mujabideen*, the Movement has not received a setback. On the contrary, when a ceasefire was declared along the border and India put a fence around the border costing Rs. 1,200 crore, India slept blissfully, content in the knowledge that it would fool the world that Kashmiri people will cast their vote in the elections, as it is a constitutional right. You might have heard, you might have read and you might have seen how people of Kashmir rejected this Indian hoax and conveyed a message to the world community that they are determined to achieve their goal of freedom even at the cost of the last drops of their blood. India held the wrong belief that Kashmiri *mujabideen* had no capacity to target the enemy, but the *mujabideen* carried out 23 operations during the first phase of elections in Baramulla and Kupwara constituency. The *mujabideen* carried out 13 operations during the elections in central constituency of Budgam, Srinagar. During the election in Islamabad [Anantnag] and Pulwama, 26 horrible and terrible operations were carried out, and this was admitted by even the Indian media. Yesterday, when votes were being looted in the high hills of Doda and Udhampur and voters were being forced by Indian forces to come to the polling booth, the *mujabideen* carried out 18 operations that shook the hills as well as the Indian Parliament. The *mujabideen* proved that they have the support and assistance of Allah. This is because Allah promised, "And those who strive in our (cause), we will certainly guide them to our paths." This means that one who comes out in Allah's way relying on him and seeking for His will, Allah will not leave him alone; rather Allah will support him at every step and send angels for his guidance as well as Himself assist the man. As we have been observing in the battlefield of Jammu and Kashmir, only one thousand empty-handed *mujabideen* are setting a very difficult task for more than 7,50,000 Indian forces. More than 4 Indian generals and more than 37,000 soldiers have been sent to hell till date. They have lost billions of dollars. Three Chiefs of their Army have said that there is no military solution for terrorism.

I agree with our brothers. Islamic history, the Holy Quran, the biography of

the Holy Prophet Mohammed, and his virtuous followers and the whole Islamic history prove that no Muslim issue could ever be solved on the negotiating table. Can anyone quote an example and tell me whether any Muslim issue has been solved in their favour according to their will on the negotiating table? Disputes have been solved only on the battlefield. On the table? Yes, we were cheated. Don't go far, ask the Palestinian people how they were cheated in the Camp David agreement. Afghan *mujahideen* were cheated in the Geneva Agreement. If the *mujahideen* had not tackled the problem through their *Iman*, then today Russia would have stabilized its position.

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Our dear youth! We have been seeing Indian imperialism for the past 56 years, especially the Brahmin's imperialism, the imperialism of Vajpayee, the imperialism of Advani which believes "Muslims have no right to live on the territory of India." And who till now caused riots killing 37,000 Muslims. They shed the blood of Muslims in every street of India. They didn't forgive Salman Jafri and his 22 family members were burnt alive. This Salman Jafri, who throughout his life, Salman Jafri was a leader having belief in Mahatma Gandhi and considered his safety in the worship of the Mahatma. He was not forgiven because his name was Salman. Then how can they forgive a Kashmir Muslim who offers *Namaz*? This is impossible.

Most humbly and respectfully, I request the leadership of my base-camp and the political leadership of the God-gifted state [Pakistan] whether they are in power or in opposition, in politics or in religion, "Take not for friends unbelievers rather than believers." Jews and Hindus were neither your friends earlier nor can they be today, especially the present Brahmin imperialists. Read the election manifesto of the B.J.P. In its election manifesto, the B.J.P. is seeking votes from Indian voters on the basis of two promises. First: We will make India a super Nuclear power. Second: We will liberate the land of free Kashmir occupied by Pakistan illegally and we will make the dream of united India come true. I say, confidently and believing that Allah is omnipresent, if Pakistan had not experimented its atomic technology in the hills of Chagai, and if the *mujahideen* had not launched a resistance movement, then today there would not be an Azad Kashmir. The war, which we have been waging today, on Kashmir's high hills, in its valleys strewn with flowers, on the Dal Lake and river Jhelum, would have instead been waged here in the streets of Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi because the existence of this God-gifted country is yet to be accepted by Indian imperialists. India is not ready even now to acknowledge and recognize the existence of this God-gifted country. That is why we consider *jihad* the way of Allah.

We don't want to liberate a piece of land. What will we gain if we liberate a piece of land? Even if we liberate the whole of Kashmir what compensation can be given to the 17 year-old commander of *Hizb-ul-Mujabideen*, Major Gul, whose 19 family members were slaughtered in one night? Yes, he will be given compensation after Kashmir is liberated with all its resources, its assets and its 26,000 patrons, and it joins the God-gifted state, Pakistan. And, hence, the God-gifted Pakistan will emerge as a prosperous Islamic, nuclear and Islamic country that can listen to the cry for help of the empty-handed, innocent child *mujabideen*, the humiliated mothers and sisters in Palestine. There is no Salahuddin Ayyubi or Nooruddin Zangi in the entire Muslim world who can prevent the blood of helpless Muslims being shed like rivers in the hills of Afghanistan, in the deserts of Iraq, in the sky-high mountains of Kashmir or in the Chechnya valley strewn with flowers. There are 56 Muslim countries, 56 organized Muslim forces and all of them have surrendered to the devil's forces. They are defeated and helpless.

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Dear Youth! Allah bless you. Allah has chosen you by His own powerful hand. He has chosen you for protecting the honour of Islam. Who is there today? Where have Saddam's 5 lakh forces and 80,000 members, the Republican Guards, gone? Who is present today to challenge the imperialist powers? Who is defeating the allied forces in the deserts of Arabia and Iraq, and who is breaking the pride of America? Who is causing trouble in the hills of Afghanistan and for the 750,000 forces of Indian imperialists in Kashmir Valley strewn with flowers? Who is attacking the Generals in Chechnya? Dear youth! They are none other than the *mujabideen*, the successors of the Holy Prophet Mohammed. In this context, Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) said: These are the *mujabideen* who teach a lesson to all forces of the devil, who will make Allah's religion achieve eminence, and who will protect the honour of the oppressed *Millat*. They are the *mujabideen* about whom it was said that on Judgment Day Allah will weigh all the treasures of the earth and the sky on one side and a day or a night in the life of the *mujabideen* on the other side.

Our armed struggle will continue until each and every corner of Kashmir is liberated from India. Kashmiri people too have a sense of honour. They are brave and are earnest and enthusiastic. In 1989 they were provided guns. From 1947 to 1989, this freedom-loving people had been teaching a lesson to the Indian imperialists with pebbles, hatchets, sticks and stones. Allah's support is with us. We are undertaking the same *jibad* which is the supreme *jibad* in the light of the sayings of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him), about which Abu Hurairah said:...

I want to take a promise on your part that after the martyrdom of Nasiruddin, Burhanuddin, Shams-ul-Haq, Saifullah Khalid and Azharuddin, is there any decline in your yearning for martyrdom?

* * *

Can the terrorist leaders be more explicit? And can anyone excel us in the way we have stuffed our ears to block out their declarations?

In spite of this mountain of evidence,

- ❑ Why did the world pay no heed to what the controllers of these organizations, indeed controllers of the Pakistan State were proclaiming over loudspeakers?
- ❑ In particular, why did *we*, the ones these leaders were openly saying are the targets of their murderous plans, refuse to believe them?
- ❑ How come such information was, *and is to this day* shut out from our main-line media?

By what were, and *till today are*, these religious leaders able to inflame youth to kill and be killed?

And remember the point that Professor Saeed advanced in the passage we encountered earlier: in their sights Kashmir is but the first step, a sort of spring-board to leap at the rest of India. The leaders repeat this to the faithful day after day. Indeed, till Muslims all over the world are united into and brought under one *dar ul Islam*, they will continue to be persecuted, till then the Allah-enjoined duty of *jihad* will not be over, they declare. Pakistani publications are full of declarations to this effect. Saeed continues to exhort his audiences in the same words to this day. To take just one issue of the heap lying on my desk, I find the *Voice of Islam* report of the speech of the Professor, during the "Stability of Pakistan Conference" – not in some out of the way place but at the *Minar-e-Pakistan*, Lahore in March 2004. He declares, "*Jihad* in Kashmir will continue and no power in the world can check it. The *mujabideen* will continue to dispatch body bags of Indian soldiers until Junagarh, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad, Deccan, Gurdaspur, Manawadar and Kashmir become part of Pakistan."¹ "The problem of Indian Muslims is actually the problem of Pakistan," he declares. "However, Muslims have to do everything on

¹ *Majallah ad-Dawa* and *Voice of Islam*, April 2004.

their own to protect their religion and themselves. As far as the riot-hit areas of Gujarat and other Indian provinces are concerned, it is the duty of the Muslims of other Indian provinces and Pakistan to extend maximum help to them. We hereby demand that if Muslims of Gujarat want to migrate to Pakistan they should be allowed.... We think that as Pakistan has been created on the basis of two-nation theory, its ideological basis demands that the Muslims of the sub-continent be provided protection, Indian Muslims have their right on Pakistan. They are facing these consequences because they had taken part in the creation of Pakistan."

The *Voice of Islam* lifts Saeed's rationale to an even higher level – that of the Quran itself: "It is obligatory on Pakistani Muslims to take *Qisas* [revenge] for the massacre of tens of thousands of Muslims in Kashmir and Gujarat. Allah has ordained this in the Quran."

The issue carries a proposal that India should implement – as repentance, so to say: "...General Musharraf should ask Prime Minister Vajpayee that now is the time for a just partition of the subcontinent. The area adjacent to Pakistan and Bangladesh and where Muslims are in majority should be annexed with these states. To atone for the wrongs done with 280 million Muslims of India at the time of partition in 1947, the state of Deccan in the south of India should be handed over to Muslims as a Muslim state. Then you shall see that Vajpayee will flee back to Delhi. What matters is foresight of a faithful and commitment of a *Mujahid*."

And here is an account of the "Kashmir Solidarity Conference" that was held at the *Masjid-e-Shubaada* (the Mosque of Martyrs) in Lahore on 5 February 2005. The formal organizer was the *Jamaat-ud-Dawa*. "Apart from Lahore, bus loads of people arrived from Kasur, Sheikhupura, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Sialkot and various other places," the account begins. "They were reciting the *Kalmah Tayyebah* while holding flags aloft on swords." It continues,

In his address to the congregation, the interim chief of JuD, Hafiz Abdul Salaam Bhatvi said that the Government of Pakistan has realized that India can be taught a lesson only by the *mujahideen* and no one else. The Pakistan Government has realized its mistake and was abolishing Article 144, which prohibited the gathering of more than 5 people. However, it is ironical that in spite of recognizing the solemnity of the Kashmir Conference, Pakistan allowed 13 bus loads of Indians to enter Lahore

on February 5. Pakistan wants to appease both the God and Satan but God does not approve of this two-faced policy. He said that the Kashmir issue affects all the Muslims of the entire sub-continent. No one should misunderstand that, by supporting the Kashmiris, we are doing them a favour as the Kashmiris are waging a war for our defence. Kashmir would never attain freedom without *jihad*. It is only through *jihad* that Pakistan's sovereignty is guaranteed.

In his address, *Jamaat-ud-Dawa's* central leader and administrator for political affairs, Professor Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki stated that the Pakistani people who indulged in the festival of *Basant* have no standing in the eyes of the public. They are in a minority while the rest of the country is together with the Kashmiri Muslims. *Jihad-e-Kashmir* has opened doors for success. We don't have any political dispute with anybody and harbour no illusions of forming any government in Islamabad, he told the congregation. Neither do we aspire to don the military uniform of President Musharraf nor do we desire to tear the waistcoat of the civilian Prime Minister. But we demand to know from the Pakistani Government and the politicians whether they are for *jihad*. The Government should clarify its position pertaining to *jihad* and that is all that we ask. Let us embark on the path of *jihad*! Do not be a victim of Indian conspiracies! He went on to extol the various *jibadi* organizations operating in Pakistan, all of whom have offered sacrifices against Indian terrorism. He demanded that all restrictions imposed on these organizations be removed. He demanded that the Pakistan Government release the lions of *jihad* so that they can teach India a lesson.

Ex-Chief of ISI and military intellectual, General Hamid Gul in his address also demanded that the Pakistan Government should remove the curbs on the *jibadi* organizations. There was no reason for the Government to clamp down on these *jibadi* organizations. Our policy on Kashmir has totally failed. He added that though the Government has made its mistakes, it was time to rectify them. If NGOs working against Pakistan are allowed to operate freely and collect donations, then the *jihadis* should be allowed to wage *jihad* in Kashmir. He added that for the last one year, Pakistan has been trying to negotiate with the Indians but has failed miserably and India, instead of resolving the issue, is trying to add to Pakistan's woes. General Hamid Gul stressed the fact that India and Pakistan have only one relation – and that is of enmity. He went on to say that because of the *jihad* that is being waged in Kashmir, the Kashmiris are on the verge of freedom but, due to American intervention, the Pakistan Government was forced to change its policy. He added that the Brahmin rulers of India would have been forced not only out of Kashmir but out of India itself. Nobody but the *jihadis* can teach India a lesson!

*"Kashmir
Solidarity
Conference"*

Another leader of JuD, Maulana Amir Hamza during the course of his address said that if the Kashmiri *mujahideen* are terrorists then George Washington, Nelson Mandela, Chou-en-Lai and Mohammed Ali Jinnah were also terrorists. If *Jihad-e-Kashmir* is terrorism, which was ordained by Jinnah, then would the Pakistan Government also refer to him as a terrorist? He added that those who raped Shazia Khaled should be hanged in the local square.

President of *Jama'at-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan*, Engineer Salimullah Khan stated that the Pakistan Government is trying to remove the spirit of the Holy Prophet from the hearts of the youth of the country. Pakistan has mortgaged its faith and honour. At times, by removing the religious column from the Pakistani passport, the Government was pleasing the Qadianis and granting them constitutional security and, at other times, by promoting *Basant* and festivities of spring, it was encouraging indecent behaviour. Till such time that the institutions of the country do not come under the influence of the Quran and the *Sunnat*, Islam cannot be enforced in the country.

In a special recorded broadcast, Syed Ali Shah Geelani stated that the struggle waged by the Kashmiri Muslims is not sectarian in nature nor is it geared to break up any country. The basic aim of the struggle of the Kashmiris is to bring to the notice of the world community that the right of self-determination should be granted to the Kashmiris so that the Kashmiris can decide on their own future. Geelani said that thousands of women in J&K have been raped and countless young men have been arrested; over 50,000 are languishing in Indian torture cells. He appealed to the Muslims of the world stating that the immortal sacrifices offered by the Kashmiris should be a wake up call for the 1 billion 70 crore Muslims around the world. He lamented the fact that the conscience of the international community is dead. He stated that the Kashmir Solidarity Conference was being observed not only in Kashmir but all over Pakistan which indicated that the entire nation was in support of the Kashmir cause....

That account is of a meeting held on 5 February 2005. How much more recent should the event be for us to believe it? The meeting was not held in some remote village in the tribal mountains of the Northwest: it was held in Lahore. Who can miss the fact that the declarations are saturated with, that they are based on deeply ingrained religious beliefs?

I glance through a pile of translations from recent Pakistani publications. They are full of venom against India, against Hindus, they proclaim the imperative of *jihad*.... Here are the barest few, but entirely representative passages.

The editorial in the *Zarb-e-Taiba*, July, 2004:

It is the joint conspiracy of RAW, Israel and the US to create misunderstanding and hatred between the Pakistan Army and the *jihadis*. The Pakistan Army and the *jihadis* are one entity. They cannot be separated from each other. The excuse of *Al Qaeda* is being used by RAW, Israel and the US to break the bond between the Pakistan Army and the *jihadis*. To this end, RAW, Israel and the US masterminded the attack on the Karachi Corps Commander.

Let us reject the rulers' foreign policy and adopt the foreign policy of Allah, i.e. *jihad*. Let us kill the Hindu bastards who dream that they will rule Pakistan through the US and Israel. Let us bleed Israel through *jihad* so that it can never stand up against the Muslim world. If we do not do so, we will become slaves of America, India and Israel, and life will be worse than a dog's life.

Ghazi, August, 2004, carries an extensive interview with Major General (retired) Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi. In the course of this interview, while talking about Kashmir, the General observes:

The Hindus are very cunning. They won't give you a clue about their thinking. Hindus never deviate from their agenda. Hindus will never abandon Kashmir. I have studied the Hindu mind in great detail. I have written research articles on the Hindu mentality. Hindus will always cheat you on Kashmir so that *jihad* can be suppressed. The biggest threat to India is *jihad* in Kashmir. It wants to finish this on a priority basis. In my opinion, there is no solution to the Kashmir dispute except *jihad*...

Nawaiwaql, September, 2004, carries an analysis:

Pakistan is arresting the so-called "terrorists" of *Al Qaeda* at the behest of the US. These "terrorists" were *mujabideen* till yesterday. The Zionists' devil brain has masterminded 9/11 to force Pakistan to take a U-turn on Afghanistan and Kashmir because India is not capable of crushing the militancy. 9/11 benefited India – it has fenced off the LoC. It has constructed a wall like the Berlin Wall but *jihad* will demolish this wall. It is time for Pakistan to reconsider its Kashmir policy; demand of India that it vacate Occupied Kashmir and hand it over to the Pakistan Army so that peace can be established in the region....

Kashmir belongs to Kashmiris and India has occupied it illegally through force. India claims Kashmir as its "*atoot ang*" and is not sincere about bringing peace in the region. Therefore, to hold talks with India is just waste of time....

Majjallah ad-Dawa, September, 2004, states,

The summer is a blessing for *mujabideen* because most of the *jihadi* battlefields are located in the cold areas. In the summer, snow melts and paves the way for *jihad*. The situation is the same in Occupied Kashmir. After the snow melts, *mujabideen* encircle the Indian Army and murder them. In the recent summer, *fedayeen* of *Kitab-o-Sunnat* [*Lashkar-e-Toiba*] attacked the information ministry in Srinagar and gave the Indian Army a signal that the fence cannot stop them. Israel provided India material for the fence and sophisticated material to track down *mujabideen*, but nothing has worked. *Mujabideen* have proved that the fence project was useless and thus India has just wasted its \$ 12 billion. In the last three months, *mujabideen* have killed 145 Indian soldiers. This proves that they can strike at any time.

Friday Special, September 16, 2004:

The Founder of Pakistan *Qaid-e-Azam* Mohammad Ali Jinnah stated that the Hindu and the Muslim cannot be one nation. The Hindus would worship cow and the Muslims would slaughter and eat it. Unfortunately, we have forgotten the lesson taught by our leader. Our rulers have bowed their head before the Hindus under US pressure. They have been forced to befriend their eternal enemy at any cost. The government and the NGOs are bending over backwards to bring Hinduism into Pakistan through cultural exchanges and food festivals.

Recently an Indian food festival was held in Pearl Continental, Lahore. It was an open invasion by Indian culture. The hotel management handed over its "Marco Polo Hall" to the festival management at a very heavy price. The latter converted it into an Indian temple. The hall was decorated with a big bell and photos of idols like Ganesh, Saraswati, Krishna, Durga, etc. were put up. Youngsters in Indian dresses holding Indian flags welcomed the guests. Songs and dances were also performed to please the guests. Wine was also served and alcohol was sprayed on the food. The opening day ceremony was attended by the Deputy Indian High Commissioner, T.C.A. Raghavan, Punjab Provincial Minister Mian Aslam Iqbal, and elite of the city. They all admired the festival.

On the one hand, we are hobnobbing with the Hindus and heading towards Hindu-Muslim brotherhood. On the other hand, the anti-Muslim feelings in India are at the peak.... Our rulers are unable to understand the dangers of Indian culture.

Voice of Islam, September, 2004: Amir Hamza, the intellectual head of *Jama-at-ud-Dawa* says:

Our elders had to go through a blood bath for Pakistan. The Pakistan movement was in fact a *jibadi* movement that is still continuing.

A section of our society wants us to follow the secular path of Emperor Akbar. But that is not our goal. Our goal is *jihad* in the entire world. A clash of civilizations has already started with the infidels' attack on Afghanistan and Iraq. We are being told that our progress lies in acquisition of technology. No, this is not true. The British had snatched our technology from us. The war has begun and Allah Almighty has chosen the timing for this war. We have to fight this war.

The Kashmir *jihad* is going on successfully. It is time that the rulers support it and not bow before the Indians.

Voice of Islam, September, 2004:

Monthly activities of the brave *fedayeen* of the *Kitab-o-Sunnat* [militants of *Lashkar-e-Toiba*] who fight against the cruel Indian Army in Occupied Kashmir to help the innocent Kashmiri people:

Between June 29 and August 15, 2004, the *mujahideen* consigned 250 Indian soldiers to hell. This is a great victory, and the *mujahideen* will keep it up. They can perform better if they are supported by Pakistan.

Majallah ad-Dawa, September, 2004, carries a letter and "will" of a "martyr", much like the one we encountered in those accounts from the late '90s:

Dear Parents:

When you will be receiving this piece of paper, I would have reached the Paradise of Allah – by the grace of God!

Dear parents! *Jihad* is the most important duty. The biggest *jihad* is against India because it has been ordered by the Holy Prophet.

The Holy Prophet said that *shirk* [the act of not subscribing to the belief that Allah is one] is the biggest sin and Muslims should wage *jihad* against such people who commit the sin of *shirk*. The Hindus are the biggest *musbrik* [the ones who commit *shirk*].

It is our duty to murder all the Hindus and free the Muslim Kashmiris. If I die while doing this *jihad*, then please forgive me so that I can enter Paradise.

My advice to you is that you should pray five times a day and prepare my brother for *jihad*. He should not let my gun catch rust.

Sincerely,

Abu Usman

Ghazwa, October 14, 2004, carries on its front page declarations of Professor Hafiz Saeed, Amir, *Jamaat-ud-Dawa*:

Mujabideen make their independent decisions. They don't take dictation from Bush. India is pressurizing Musharraf through the US. That is why, *mujabideen* are facing sanctions. But listen, O! Manmohan Singh and Bush! *Jihad* will never stop. It will increase day by day. The Manmohan-Musharraf meetings will not settle the Kashmir dispute. The *jihad* in Kashmir is at its peak. The Kashmiris along with our *mujabideen* are giving their blood for the life of *jihad*. In the near future, *jihad* will start in Hyderabad Deccan and Junagarh....

Jasarat, October 17, 2004: Commenting on the visit of Pakistani journalists to the Kashmir valley, an analyst writes:

Pakistani journalists are fond of wine and women. The Indians offer them these two things and then make fun of them saying, "Look at these Muslims. They want Kashmir on the basis of Islam. They are alcoholics and womanizers. That is how Indians spread propaganda against Islam and Pakistan to mislead the Kashmiris. Indians tell the Kashmiris that they want accession with Pakistan because they think it is a Muslim country. Then the Indians present pictures and video films of Pakistani journalists to the Kashmiris and tell them that they should see with their own eyes the sinful Pakistanis....

Often times, Pakistani journalists copy the Indians. They will drink and dance with them. They forget that Pakistan cannot beat India in terms of drinking, womanizing and dancing because these things – wine, women and dance – are part of the Indian religion and culture. So we should stop acting like a copycat and represent true Islam with our deeds.

Ghazwa, October 21, 2004, on its front page says:

The Indian agency RAW has masterminded the recent terrorist attacks in Sialkot and Multan. There is nothing like Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan. Muslims of all the sects are united. Some foreign powers want to divide this unity. India is the gang-master of these powers. India's new agenda is to disrupt the unity of religious outfits so that *jihad's* strength can be weakened. Muslims should understand this move and unite for *jihad* against India. Nations come into being only through *jihad*.

Majallah ad-Dawa, October, 2004:

The only solution to Kashmir is the path of *jihad* that the *mujabideen* have chosen. In the month of September, the *mujabideen* of *Lashkar-e-Toiba* hunted 101 Hindu dogs [Indian soldiers] and consigned them to hell.

On September 2, the *mujabideen* confronted the Indian Army in Kupwara and killed two Indian dogs – one was a Major and the other a soldier. On September 4, the *mujabideen* killed three Indian pigs who belonged to the Border Security Force....

In August, a gang of 8 Indian Army officers had raped three sisters in Baramulla. The *mujabideen* had vowed to take revenge. On September 29, a group of four *fedayeen* entered the camp of Major Ashok who was the gang-leader and butchered him. Then, they barged into the tents of other Army officers and slit all of them. Thus they killed these bastards who had been raping our Kashmiri mothers, sisters and daughters....

Ghazwa, November 11, 2004, on its front page has Hafiz Saeed declaring:

Pakistan's importance is known in the world by virtue of *jihad*. Pakistan should maintain its *jibadi* identity. If the rulers do not change their anti-Pakistan policies, then we will murder them the way we murdered the Hindus to please Allah....

Majallah ad-Dawa, November, 2004:

The *mujabideen* of *Kitab-o-Sunnat* [*Lashkar-e-Toiba*] celebrated their Eid by consigning 85 Indian dogs to hell. On September 14, Abu Mohib, Abu Hinzila and Abu Talha attacked a camp of the Indian Army in Bandipura and killed five Brahmin soldiers. On October 23, a young girl approached the *mujabideen* of KOS and told them that previous week a few Indian soldiers barged into her house and raped her. The *mujabideen* vowed to take revenge. On October 25, they attacked an Army camp in Poonch and abducted three Indian soldiers. The *mujabideen* asked the girl to identify the one who had raped her. The girl identified the two rapists. The *mujabideen* killed all three in front of the girl and promised that they would also find the rest of the rapists and kill them in similar manner.

Islam, December 6, 2004, carries a piece on the new Chief of the Indian Army:

Joginder Jagjit Singh has been nominated as the new Army Chief of the Indian Army. General Singh is the first Sikh to be the Chief of Army Staff of India. He is extremely anti-Pakistan. His career is full of assignments that aimed at destabilizing Pakistan. In 1999, he was Brigadier and he fought against the holy warriors of Kargil....

General Singh is extremely biased against Pakistan. He spent his entire life in making military plans against Pakistan. We are providing the Sikhs a lot

of facilities in Pakistan. But we should not forget that the Sikhs are also our enemies. They massacred Muslims in 1947. They raped thousands of Muslim women. They destroyed thousands of mosques. East Pakistan disintegrated due to a Sikh General. General Singh is the worst enemy of the two-nation theory. We should never forget the atrocities committed by Sikhs against Muslims. Instead of giving them facilities at Nankana Sahib, Panja Sahib, etc., we should give them tit-for-tat lessons for their cruelty....

Takbeer, December 8, 2004:

If religious seminaries are producing *jihadis* then we should be proud of that. It is a proven fact that seminaries are the breeding ground of *jihadis*. *Jihad* is something that the Holy Prophet has himself fought. He fought around 80 battles. It is the religious duty of the seminaries to preach *jihad* and produce *jihadis*. Otherwise, our survival will be in danger and we could be easily conquered by the Hindus....

Jasarat, December 9, 2004, reports a speech of *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* chief, Hafiz Saeed, has delivered at a public meeting in Lahore:

The best *jihad* is *jihad* against India because the Hindus negate the existence and oneness of Allah. The Hindus are the worst enemies of Islam. Therefore, killing them is the best *jihad*...

Ghazwa, December 16, 2004, carries an account of the Friday Sermon of Hafiz Saeed on its front page:

India wants to impose war on Pakistan. It wants to turn the green holy land of Pakistan into a desert by constructing dams on its rivers. India cannot dare to fight with us if we are ready for *jihad*. We should be ready for sacrifice. Our enemy is cunning. The Hindus are cowards. Their blood is thin. They are not powerful like us. The pure blood that is filled with the spirit of faith runs in our veins. Dirty and thin blood runs in the veins of the Hindus. Therefore, a Hindu cannot fight a Muslim. Even four muscular Hindus cannot fight a feeble Muslim who has full faith in Allah. The Hindus know that they can never defeat the Muslims. Therefore, they have started another kind of war with Pakistan, i.e. the war of water. By constructing dams on the River Kabul and Chenab, India wants to push Pakistan into a war. But the *mujahideen* of *Lashkar-e-Toiba* will foil such efforts.

Majallah ad-Dawa, January, 2005:

India is a mad-country. In fact, it is a mad animal. The best treatment for a mad animal is to shoot it. India should be shot through *jihad*. India does

not understand the language of love. It understands only one language, i.e. *jihad*. There is only one way to bring India to sense, i.e. cut the throat of India; inflict it with so many wounds that it dies for want of blood. The *mujabideen* of *Kitab-o-Sunnat* [*Lashkar-e-Toiba*] consigned 224 Hindu dogs to hell in December.

Ghazwa, January 20, 2005, observes in its editorial:

Jihad is the order of Allah. It is not restricted to "Kill or be killed." The politics of Muslims and their role in international relations depend on *jihad*. *Jihad* is so important that big powers like the US give it special importance in their foreign policies. American policies are a reaction to *jihad*. Muslims have realized that without *jihad* there is no respect for them in this world. *Jihad* is our weapon that protects us. Quran directs that we wage *jihad* to establish the writ of Allah in the world. Nobody can deny the Quran. The Government should accept this injunction. The Jews and the non-Muslims are the worst enemies of Islam. These two powers – India and Israel – are committing atrocities against Muslims. They cannot be fought on the 'tables'. They can only be fought in the 'battlefields'. A Muslims never loses when he wages *jihad* because either he will win or embrace martyrdom. In both cases, the victory is his. But abandoning *jihad* is hypocrisy....

Baglihar Dam is not the issue with India. The issue is that we have to take revenge for the murder of 90,000 Muslims that India has slaughtered. We have to take revenge for the rape of thousands of Muslims that have been murdered in the Gujarat and Babri Mosque riots. We have to take revenge for thousands of women that have been raped in Kashmir....

And here are a few representative excerpts from the book of Amir Hamza, the intellectual head of the *Majallah ad-Dawa*, *Hinduism: The Murderer of Humanity*

Lashkar-e-Toiba is fighting *jihad* with the Hindus, therefore, we should link *jihad* with religion and in this target Hinduism....

Hinduism is the enemy of Islam. Hindus are the enemy of Muslims, whereas Islam is the friend of its enemies. It extends hands of friendship to them but the friendship is impossible unless the enemy comes into the fold of Islam....

The Hindu confectioners would think that they would become polluted and defiled if they would be touched by a Muslim. They would not take money by their own hand from Muslim customers. They would use a wooden pot that would have a handle. They would ask the Muslim buyers to put the money in the pot. One day, my hand touched the hand of the Hindu confectioner. He became furious and started abusing me. From that

day on, I decided never to buy anything from any Hindu shopkeeper.... The festival of *Holi* teaches the Hindus the lesson of oneness of Allah but the so-called preachers of Hinduism have distorted the true message of *Holi*. The festival of *Holi* is celebrated to commemorate Pehlak who fought with a tyrant ruler Harnakash. The latter put Pehlak into fire but he remained safe. In fact, Pehlak in the Hindu mythology is the Prophet Ibrahim who was put into fire and he remained safe....

Hindus celebrate *Holi* with red color. In fact, they would like to celebrate *Holi* with the blood of Muslims. They have been celebrating *Holi* with the Muslims' blood since Pakistan's creation. They massacre Muslims in riots. They are massacring Kashmiri Muslims in Occupied Kashmir....

Now look at the difference in the treatment given to minorities in the two countries. In India, the Muslim minority is being slaughtered, whereas in Pakistan the Hindu minority enjoys full rights and freedom. In Sindh I have several friends who are very rich businessmen. I eat with them and they tell me that Hinduism is a biased religion and the class difference is the master-mind of the so-called custodians of Hinduism....

A book
on
Hinduism

The Hindus have been tampering with their religious book. Allah has sent a holy messenger with a holy book to every tribe. Allah also sent a messenger and a book to the Hindus but the so-called custodians of Hinduism tampered with it to further their vested interests. The Hindus hated their enemies and declared them *shoodar* [untouchables]. The holy book that Allah gave to the Hindus was Vaid which was badly tampered. It now has four versions! The then rulers bribed the religious figures and they changed the teachings of Vaid. The original Vaid discusses the Holy Prophet, oneness of Allah, etc. At the rulers' behest, the religious figures masterminded the class system in Hinduism. Earlier, Hinduism was just like Islam....

The Hindus believe that as long as they don't murder all the non-Hindus in the subcontinent, they cannot please their god. Or, if they cannot murder all of them, they should bring all into the fold of Hinduism. But the converted Hindus will always be *shoodar*....

The Hindus believe that the partition of the subcontinent has chopped their god into several pieces. Pakistan consists of the hands of their god. Afghanistan consists of the legs of their god. And it is their duty to collect all the chopped parts of their god to give it the old shape. Therefore, it is extremely essential to conquer all the countries in the subcontinent. That is why they started hatching conspiracies against Pakistan soon after August 1947. They have masterminded Pakistan's disintegration....

Some temples of Hindus have maps of India. One of the temples in Benaras shows Pakistan as part of India in the map. The Hindus worship this map. Some Hindus sacrifice human beings to please their gods. The

Hindus of Madras and Calcutta buy a human being and then slaughter him. They drink his blood and eat his flesh to please their gods. This rite is called *Marhati* and it is performed twice a year. It has been banned now but it is still widely practised secretly....

The names of India's missiles reflect their enmity and malice against Muslims. For example, its *Prithvi* missile means that it will be thrown on that enemy who has divided the holy land of the Hindus. *Agni* missile means fire. The Hindus use fire to burn their enemies. The enemies are Muslims. The *Trishul* missile is for making cuts on the enemy's body. This is the mentality of a country that claims to be secular.... [Pakistan's missiles are named *Ghauri*, *Ghazi*...]

The Hindus consider the land as their mother and god. They consider it very holy. But they shit on it! They will plough it! What kind of absurd belief is this!....

Since 1947, the Hindus have killed 250,000 Muslims in India. Property worth 350 billion of Muslims has been torched. Around 12,000 mosques have been demolished including the Babri Mosque. Attacking Muslims with a knife is a routine that the Hindus go through to celebrate *Holi*....

We should raise weapons against the Hindus who are hell-bent to establish Hindu rule in Pakistan. We should destroy India that is playing *Holi* with the blood of innocent Muslims. As long as Brahmin imperialism is not destroyed, peace will not prevail in the region....

The Hindus are dirty and filthy people. They take a bath in the holy water of Ganges. This river is extremely polluted. One can only become more dirty and polluted after taking a bath in this river. The Hindus urinate into the water of Ganges and then take a bath in it. The environmentalists in India are clamouring about the increasing pollution in Ganges....

The Hindu *sadhus* are so filthy that you cannot imagine. They drink in the skulls of human beings that they use as cups. Nothing is forbidden in their belief. They drink urine and eat shit. They also eat the flesh of human beings. They are nudists....

Shri Krishan was a rascal.... [I omit the rest on Lord Krishna, as also what Hamza says about the beliefs, character and religious practices of Hindu women as it passes the limit of vulgarity and filth.]

"But aren't these 'ideologues' and 'Professors' just the lunatic fringe? Pakistan is not the *madrassas*."

Really?

From differentiation to hatred to *Jihad*

We comfort ourselves in the belief that the terrorists and their organizations alone spout the sorts of poison we have read. In fact those kinds of toxins continue to be poured into children even in "non-religious," government schools. Even a casual glance at a handful of examples awakens one to how saturated in poison and prejudice a child who has taken the texts to heart would be by the time he leaves school. And that realization should awaken us to how deep are the roots that have to be treated before we can expect the average Pakistani to view India in a normal, relaxed way. A volume can – and actually should – be filled with what the children are being fed in Pakistan – and that from Class 1 up! To keep the examples to the barest minimum, I will confine myself to just two studies. The first is a survey by one of Pakistan's leading historians, K.K. Aziz. Professor Aziz has based his volume, *Murder of History in Pakistan*,¹ on sixty six textbooks which have been authored by "scholars" from all over Pakistan, whetted and approved by boards and published under the imprimatur of governments of different provinces in the country.

Here are some of the things – reproduced verbatim – which this thorough study reports students are fed, and on the ability to regurgitate which they are graded.

The books state again and again that *India was an uncivilized place, a place mired in cruelty, superstition and the rest till Islam came and civilized it*. It is Islam which brought the country "a clean and elegant culture and civilization."

Next, the Hindus are cunning, they are ungrateful, say the textbooks, they are consummate conspirators; their conspiracies account for the misfortunes which have befallen Pakistan. *Mu'asbrati*

¹Vanguard, Lahore, 1993; Renaissance Publishing House, Delhi, 1997.

Ulum, the textbook for Class 4 children in the NWFP says in a typical passage: "The Muslims treated the non-Muslims very well [when they ruled the province, NWFP]. Yet the non-Muslims nursed in their hearts an enmity against the Muslims. When the British invaded the area the non-Muslims sided with them and against the Muslims. So the British conquered the whole country." "According to the 1881 Census of the NWFP," Professor Aziz notes, "out of every 10,000 persons 9,184 were Muslims; when the British conquered the area some years earlier this proportion would have been even greater.... The non-Muslims of the territory were Hindu and Sikh migrants engaged in business and commerce. They were not a martial class. Did this tiny community of money-makers fight on the side of the British with such desperate valour as to decide the final outcome? We have no evidence of such a thing having taken place. I suspect that this accusation against the non-Muslims has been made with a view to offering a pretext for the Pathan defeat: the Pathans would not have been vanquished but for the treachery and machinations of the non-Muslim group...."¹

Mu'ashrati Ulum the textbook in Punjab for Class 5 children teaches, "In the beginning, the British purchased cotton cloth from the sub-continent and sold it in Britain. So they came here for the purpose of trade. Gradually they noticed the weakened state of the Muslim government and thought of taking over its territories.... To achieve this they made the Hindus join them, and the Hindus were very glad to side with the British.".... "In 1965, the Pakistan Army conquered several areas of India, and when India was on the point of being defeated she requested the United Nations to arrange a cease-fire.... After the 1965 war, *India, with the help of the Hindus living in East Pakistan, instigated the people living there against the people of West Pakistan*, and at last in December 1971 herself invaded East Pakistan. The conspiracy resulted in the separation of East Pakistan from us. All of us should receive military training and be prepared to fight the enemy." *First Steps in Our History*, textbook for Class 7: "Over a crore" of the population of East Pakistan was Hindu, and it was "*not loyal to Pakistan*." The *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan*, the textbook

¹K.K. Aziz, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

for B.A. of the Allama Iqbal Open University instructs, "Enemy forces were busy in Pakistan. *The Hindu elements did not want any proper agreement to be arrived at between the two wings of the country....*"

But it isn't just that Hindus are *cunning conspirators, they are mean murderers: the killings after the Partition were all done by these Hindus and Sikhs:*

- ❑ *Mu'ashrati Ulum (Tarikh wa Shahriat)*, textbook for Class 6: "On the communal riots of 1947," Professor Aziz remarks, "the book is blatantly partial, mentioning only Hindu and Sikh massacres of 'unarmed Muslims', and giving the impression that the Muslims did not even fight back in self-defence."
- ❑ *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan*, textbook for Classes 9 and 10: as soon as Independence was declared in 1947 "Hindus and Sikhs started an unhindered [*be daregh*] massacre of Muslims in India" – "there is no mention of the riots in Pakistan," Professor Aziz notes.¹
- ❑ Another text with the same name – *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan* – for the same set of classes: "After the establishment of Pakistan the Hindus and Sikhs created a day of doom for the Muslims in East Punjab."

"Didn't the Muslims create a similar day of doom for the Hindus and Sikhs in the West Punjab and Sindh?" Professor Aziz asks. "The first communal killing on a large scale took place in Rawalpindi and it was the work of Muslims, the Sikhs being the victims."²

- ❑ *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan*, textbook for Higher Secondary in NWFP: "After the partition of the sub-continent the Hindus and Sikhs started a properly planned campaign of exploiting the Muslims generally in the whole of Bharat and particularly in East Pakistan, as a result of which the Hindu and Sikh enemies of mankind killed and dishonoured thousands, nay hundreds of thousands, of women, children, the old and the young with extreme cruelty and heartlessness."

Wholesale concoctions are fed into the students. Aziz gives a pile of examples:

¹ *ibid.*, p. 33.

² *ibid.*, p. 35.

- ❑ *Tarikh-i-Pakistan*, textbook for Higher Secondary in Punjab and elsewhere: "By the Lucknow Pact the Congress accepted the Muslims as a separate nation and the Muslim League as its [sole] representative" but then "with much cunning the Hindu put an end to the Muslim majority in [the legislatures of] the Punjab and Bengal and procured a majority for himself."

"Under the Lucknow Pact the Congress neither accepted Muslims as a separate nation nor acknowledged the Muslim League as their sole representative," Professor Aziz notes, and adds, "and if the Pact, because of Hindu cunning, deprived the Punjabi and Bengali Muslims of their majority in the provincial legislatures, why did Jinnah and the Muslim League accept the forfeit? Was it Hindu cunning or League shortsightedness?"¹

- ❑ And the same text a little later: "As soon as the division of the country was announced bloodshed on a large scale [*khooon ki boli*] followed.... Muslim localities were attacked. Their villages were set on fire. Extreme cruelties were inflicted on them, till they were forced to abandon their homes and leave for Pakistan." "He [the author] is quick to put all the blame for the 1947 massacres on the non-Muslims," Professor Aziz observes, "but does not explain why the non-Muslims living in West Pakistan were attacked, forced to migrate to India or murdered."²
- ❑ In 1947 "the Hindus in order to wreak their vengeance for the partition of the country and to punish the Muslims for having demanded Pakistan, indulged in large-scale looting, rapine, arson, murder and destruction."

Such assertions – India was an uncivilized place inhabited by a people and culture that was unclean; the Hindus are cunning conspirators; they are murderers and rapists.... – these are just the foundational faith, so to say.

Always the victim of conspiracies!

Professor Aziz's survey shows that students in Pakistan are taught that *in fact, not just the Hindus, everyone else is also always conspiring*

¹*ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

²*ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

against the Muslims, in particular against Pakistan as they see it as the fortress of Islam:

- ❑ *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, textbook for Class 4: "The Hindus wanted to control the government of India after independence. *The British sided with the Hindus*. But the Muslims did not accept this decision...."
- ❑ *Tarikh-i-Pakistan*, textbook for Higher Secondary: in the 1965 war "Pakistan inflicted ignominious defeats on India on all fronts and broke its back," seeing this "India's *American and Soviet friends*, after a great deal of strenuous effort, arranged a cease-fire on 23 September through the United Nations."
- ❑ *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan, Lazmi*, textbook for the B.A. degree: "After having been a part of our country for a long time, East Pakistan separated from us in December 1971. This was a very great tragedy for Pakistan. In fact, *it was the result of an international conspiracy in which the USSR openly and the USA indirectly proved that they were the enemies of Pakistan*. India used her armed and political force for this purpose. Some Pakistani rulers also made serious mistakes, and the Big Powers took full advantage of it, and the situation went out of control. Anyhow, Bangladesh came into existence."

That half sentence about mistakes having been committed by some Pakistani rulers is an exception. One of the features of the textbooks is that everything that goes wrong does so because of the perfidy of the Hindus and others; the Muslims, in particular the Pakistanis, are never really responsible!

- ❑ *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, NWFP textbook for Class 8: on the breakup of Pakistan in 1971: "The death of Quaid-i-Azam was followed by several political changes in Pakistan. *Internal and external enemies used every method to injure it. As a result of these enmities and conspiracies* in 1971 East Pakistan separated from us."

Note the passive voice: *They* separated, we had done nothing!

- ❑ *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, Sindh textbook for Class 8: "After Jinnah's death many political changes occurred in Pakistan, *internal and external enemies tried to damage the country in every possible*

way, and as a result of these conspiracies East Pakistan separated from us in 1971.... but now Pakistan has become so strong that the Islamic countries consider it as the fortress of Islam, and God willing soon Pakistan will be counted among the countries of the first rank in the world."

- *Rahbar-i-Mutala-i-Pakistan (Lazmi) barai Tulaba wa Talibat Degree Classes Engineering wa Medical wa Commerce aur Zar'i University*: textbook for Degree classes: "The population of the eastern wing of Pakistan was larger than that of the western wing. Therefore, the idea was put ['by whom?' asks Professor Aziz] in the mind of the Bengalis that the language of the majority area should have the status of the national language. Keeping in view the delicate situation then obtaining in Pakistan, such problems should not have been brought to the public view [*manzar-i-am par*]. But it provided a golden opportunity to the Hindus, who wanted to see another problem added to the already existing ones. Even if we consider the demand of the Bengalis as reasonable, this was not the opportune time to put it forward; moreover, sometimes national requirements demand self-sacrifice."
- "Enemy forces were busy in Pakistan. *The Hindu elements did not want any proper agreement to be arrived at between the two wings of the country....*" – Army intervention, hatred follow; Pakistani leaders lack diplomatic skill and an organized machinery to explain the country's stand at the international fora; India conspires, invades; Pakistani forces fight valiantly but, hemmed in and not having an experienced and quick-to-react leadership, have to surrender....

As Professor Aziz points out there is not the slightest acknowledgment of the systematic manner in which East Pakistan's role – not just in the culture of Pakistan, even in the formation of Pakistan and the opposition to the British – was throughout buried. The textbooks themselves, Professor Aziz shows, are excellent examples of this systematic tendency – there is not a word about the neglect of the eastern wing in the development plans of the united Pakistan, and of course not a word about the atrocities of the Pakistani army under General Tikka Khan which sealed the issue. The break is portrayed as the result of Indian, specifically Hindu conspiracies, strengthened as

these were by the conspiracies of the enemies of Pakistan in the USSR and the USA, of some Bengalis raising a demand at an importune time....

Professor Aziz shows that these myths are fortified by complete inventions, and by equally brazen and systematic suppression of facts. The Congress is invariably portrayed as a body that had been set up by Hindus, to protect Hindu interests, as a body that in fact acted only to further the interests of these Hindus:

- ❑ *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, Punjab textbook for Class 6: "In 1885 the Hindus founded their own political party, the Indian National Congress...."
- ❑ *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, Sindh textbook for Class 6: "In 1885 the Hindus founded the Congress," [though also, three pages later, "In 1885 an Englishman, Mr. Hume, founded the Indian National Congress"!]
- ❑ *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, NWFP textbook for Class 8: the Congress was founded "to organize the Hindus politically."
- ❑ *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan*, NWFP textbook for Higher Secondary: the Congress "strove for the rights of the Hindus."

The *Jadid Mu'asbrati Ulum*, a textbook for Class 2 students, asks "How did Jinnah come to think of creating Pakistan?", and supplies the answer for the students to learn by heart, "The people of India were demanding freedom from the British. *Pandit Nehru said that after independence there will be a government of the Hindus in India.* The *Quaid-i-Azam* said that Muslims also lived here [and] Muslims should have a separate government."

Along with this, "Everyone is always conspiring against us," and "We are the victims of conspiracies," there is a triumphalism – based on wholesale inventions. The 1965 war with India becomes a glowing victory:

- ❑ *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, NWFP textbook for Class 4: so devastating were the advances of the Pakistani Army that "at last frightened [*dar kar*] of the Pak Army and the people of Pakistan, Bharat sued for peace."
- ❑ *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, Punjab textbook for Class 5: in 1965 "the Pakistan Army conquered several areas of India, and when India

was on the point of being defeated, she requested the United Nations to arrange a cease-fire.... After the 1965 war, India, with the help of the Hindus living in East Pakistan, instigated the people living there against the people of West Pakistan, and at last in December 1971 herself invaded East Pakistan. The conspiracy resulted in the separation of East Pakistan from us....”

- *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, (*Tarikh wa Shahriat*), West Pakistan textbook for Class 5 – the print order is stated to have been 170,000 copies: in the 1965 war India “suffered great losses” and “her casualties [dead, not just wounded] were ten times those of Pakistan.”

In the Higher Secondary level textbook, *Tarikh-i-Pakistan*, even 1971 becomes a grand triumph: “The Pakistan armed forces created new records of bravery, and the Indian forces were defeated everywhere” – “If in 1971 the Pakistan Army showed such bravery, and the Indians were beaten everywhere,” Professor Aziz asks, “why did the victorious Pakistan Army surrender to India in Dacca?”¹

Along with these wholesale fabrications, indeed as proof of these, go wholesale suppression and wholesale appropriation!

The area that is today covered by Pakistan, of course, comes not only to have had a distinct culture – distinct and separate from the rest of India – throughout history, it turns out to have been evolving towards an Islamic consummation from the dawn of history, and, in particular the current State of Pakistan is the outcome of struggles of a hundred years! The *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, published by the NWFP Textbook Board and prescribed for the students of Class 8 has this to say about the 1857 outbreak:

The British gave it the name of mutiny and called their opponents “rebels”. But this war was the first united Indian effort against the British government. The Muslims were in the forefront in this war. Granted that it did not result in the winning of independence, but the failure produced a new zeal and enthusiasm in the hearts of the Muslims, and as a result the State of Pakistan came into being.

“The thought of connecting the revolt of 1857 with the creation of Pakistan,” observes Professor Aziz, “is a contrived caricature the absurdity of which takes one’s breath away....”² Sir Syed Ahmad,

¹*ibid*, p. 53.

²*ibid*, p. 30.

whose advocacy on behalf of the British and for the continuance of their rule, whose admonitions to Muslims to desist from having anything to do with the Congress and to continue to be steadfast in their loyalty to the British, are legion, he too is said to have worked for the creation of Pakistan! "Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Allama Iqbal and other Muslim leaders," the *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, published by the NWFP Textbook Board for Class 6 instructs the students, "began to underline the necessity of a separate State for the Muslims."

And in doing so, they had penetrating foresight, transcendental vision! The *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan* for Degree courses published by the *Ilmi Kitabkhana*, Lahore, instructs students,

The Muslims knew that if they won the freedom in the sub-continent their new *mamlakat* [State] would prove to be the centre of the hopes of the Muslims of the entire world and also a fortress to protect Islam. This country would unite the Muslims of the East and the West, and thus the Muslims would become so strong that they would be able to liberate those Muslim areas which were still under the non-Muslims.

The pre-destined consummation of History

Professor K.K. Aziz's survey shows that, Jinnah notwithstanding, students in Pakistan are taught that from the earliest stirrings of the movement against the British, in fact from decades preceding that movement, efforts of Muslim leaders were directed towards the singular aim of creating not just Pakistan, but creating Pakistan as an Islamic State. Indeed, Jinnah himself had always had in mind the objective of constituting Pakistan into an Islamic State, they tell us. Thus,

- ❑ *History of Pakistan*, for Classes 11 and 12 has been authored by the Professor of History at what Professor Aziz lists as "the most prestigious college in Lahore." It teaches students that "Many of the European and Hindu writers have tried to paint him [Aurangzeb] as a religious zealot, which he was not. He.... followed most of the policies which were really originated during the reign of Akbar.... Even his enemies admit that he was tolerant, large-hearted and accommodating." And that "The present Martial Law Government [of Zia ul-Haq] decided to enforce honestly the Islamic system of government as promised by the *Quaid-i-Azam* to the nation."

- *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan (Compulsory)* for the Allama Iqbal Open University has chapters written by an array of Doctors and Professors, and revised by as many Doctors and Professors; its account speaks of clear vision with some unfortunate flaws in implementation: "One aspect of the history of Pakistan is not enviable: it has not achieved political stability and till now, in spite of the experiment of parliamentary system, presidential system and military rule, we as a nation have not found agreement on the system suitable for an ideological State like Pakistan. We have also not decided on the political system which can help us in the implementation of Islamic *shariah* and Islamic way of life. But it is a matter of satisfaction that all sections of the country, despite their differences, are unanimous on the point that Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam, and therefore it must exist as a fortress of the Islamic system." But step by step Destiny works its wonders! "In March 1977," the textbook teaches the students, "all the opposition parties joined together and adopted the *Nizam-i-Mustafa* as their election manifesto.... During the election campaign because of the awakening of the sentiment of faith, the movement later started by the opposition became a revolutionary movement. Thus it was proved that this agitation against the Government in power was not a simple political action but a means through which the masses of Pakistan were providing a proof that they had accepted in every way and from their hearts the election programme of the opposition, that is the *Nizam-i-Mustafa*, and under no conditions would they allow the movement to be ignored." And then Allah decreed the decisive step: the 1962 Constitution, Professor Aziz reports the textbook as saying, had several clauses which were opposed to the sacred *shariah*, for example "polygamy, divorce, *khula*, and inheritance by the grandson"; "whoever came to power failed to implement Islam in the country because his own mind was incapable of understanding the blessing of the law of God. The blessed day on which the law of God was imposed on the country of God came on Saturday, 10 February 1979, and General Zia ul-Haq was chosen by destiny to be the person who achieved the distinction of implementing Islamic law;" "In short, the real objective of the creation of Pakistan was achieved when the Islamic Ordinances

were issued" by the Martial Law Government of General Zia ul-Haq.

- ❑ *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan (Lazmi) barai Degree Classes* is no less discerning; it too sees the clear design of Allah: "Soon after the creation of Pakistan," it says, "authority passed into the hands of people who were not sincere in enforcing Islam, and they tried to turn the country's ideological direction [*pablu*] towards secularism [*la-dinial*].... In this heinous [*mazmum*] action these people were guided by some foreign powers." But then came the turn: "History cannot show the parallel of the *Nizam-i-Mustafa* movement launched in March 1977 against the former Government," the textbook proceeds. "It fully reflected the wishes and desires of the masses that now they were not prepared to spare any effort in [the achievement of] an Islamic way of life. The present Government is well aware of these sentiments of the people.... Today considerable progress has been made towards the enforcement of the Islamic system."
- ❑ The *Tamir-i-Mutala'a-i-Pakistan Lazmi for B.A., B.Sc. and other competitive examinations* appropriates Jinnah as decisively. Jinnah was embarrassingly irreligious; in his Opening Address Jinnah emphatically told the Constituent Assembly that Pakistan was not going to be a theocratic State, but the textbook says: "It was a great misfortune that after the Partition there was no one in Pakistan, except *Hazrat Quaid-i-Azam* and some of his old companions, who wanted to enforce an Islamic system in the country. The overwhelming majority of the Constituent Assembly wanted to make Pakistan a *ladini* [irreligious] State."

Institutions and movements are appropriated, provided they were Muslim, martyrs are conjured up. From their inception the Aligarh institutions of Sir Syed were intended to instill in Muslims undying loyalty to the British rulers, and to properly Islamize them. The Jamia Millia Islamia was set up to counter the Aligarh school. It was set up, as its charter and the statements of its founders affirmed repeatedly, to mould nationalist Muslims who would fight alongside their countrymen to free India from British rule. But in the textbooks, in 1920 the Muslims of India "felt a great need for the promulgation and propagation of Islamic teachings on a very large scale. To achieve this,

the Jamia Millia Islamia was founded...." The Deobandis also opposed the Muslim League: not because they were less committed to the cause of Islam, but because they felt that, by demanding Pakistan, the Muslim League was going to confine the sway of Islam to one part of the sub-continent, when in fact the whole of it was open territory; they lampooned Jinnah personally for his non-Islamic ways. But in the textbooks they too are yoked to the Pakistan movement: "The services of the Dar-ul-Ulum of Deoband in the cause of the Pakistan movement," the *Mutala'a-i-Pakistan (Lazmi) barai Degree Classes* declares, "are unforgettable."

An Islamic *ummah* is conjured up with retrospective effect: "Before the creation of Pakistan," declares *Pakistan Studies for Secondary Classes*, "Saudi Arabia had great sympathy for the freedom movement of the Muslims in India," in regard to which Professor Aziz observes, "The students are entitled to a proof and some examples of this 'great sympathy'. Abject flattery of a country which backed General Zia's illegal government should have no place in a textbook, in fact in any book...."

Martyrs materialize. "It is declared that the Muslims of India made 'tremendous' sacrifices to win their freedom," Professor Aziz records and remarks,

The fact is that, apart from the brief years of 1858-60 and 1920-22, Muslims suffered little hardship between 1857 and 1947. It is forgotten by everyone that Muslims League's search for protection and safeguards (in the early years) and its struggle for an independent country (in the later years) were strictly constitutional efforts, peaceful campaigns and political fights, conducted through petitions, memoranda, requests, discussions, elections, parliamentary debates and negotiations. The battles were fought and ultimately won on the hustings. No Muslim League leaders languished in prisons. No Muslim masses faced British bullets. The many people who died or suffered horribly in 1947 were running away from their homes because their life was in danger, not because they were fighting for the creation of Pakistan. They were casualties of communal riots, not of anti-British warfare.¹

Like an international *ummah* supporting it, like martyrs, the new nation is given a *lingua franca*! "Gradually," says the *Mu'asbrati Ulum*, the textbook for Class 6 students published by the NWFP

¹*ibid*, p. 197.

Textbook Board, "Urdu made so much progress that it became the spoken language of the entire South Asia." The lesson is reinforced in the textbook for Classes 9 and 10: "Before independence, Urdu was the language of the masses in the northern part of South Asia, and it still is." The textbook published for students of the same level by the Sindh Textbook Board gilds the concoction, declaring

The special feature of Urdu is that it is spoken not only in every nook and corner of South Asia but people who know and understand it are found in the whole world.... Gradually Urdu has developed to a stage where now it is considered one of the more developed languages of the world. Not only that, but next to Arabic, Urdu is the only language which has no equal in the world. The fact is that even English and French languages are losing their popularity and importance before the Urdu language.

In Classes 11 and 12, students learn not only that Urdu has all these virtues which other languages do not possess; that not only is it and has been the *lingua franca* of Pakistan, "in fact it was the *lingua franca* of the sub-continent and may perhaps even now be serving India as such." In actual fact, as Professor Aziz points out, when Urdu was declared the national language of Pakistan in 1948, it was the mother tongue of *about 2 per cent* of the population of the country, that even according to the Census of 1981 – that is, ten years after the separation of Bangladesh – it was the mother tongue of *only 7.6 per cent* of the population of Pakistan!¹

Professor Aziz draws attention to many other, equally delectable features: how the textbooks completely erase the pro-British attitudes and manoeuvres of the Aligarh school and the Muslim League; how they completely erase even the name of groups such as the Red Shirts of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan; how their appraisal changes with the all-too frequent changes in Pakistan's governments; how they glorify military rule and war – the latter being always against the land of *kufir*, India, of course. The contribution of regions other than Punjab and the erstwhile United Provinces, the contributions of East Bengal in particular are entirely obliterated.

Implications

It is often said in India that the generation of Pakistanis which harboured hatred for India and Indians has in effect passed, that the

¹*ibid*, p. 184.

affairs of Pakistan are now in the hands of a new generation which has no particular animus against India, and that, therefore, it is time to reach out, to go the extra mile. The effect of the new generation being at the helm may well be the contrary. The generation which created Pakistan had close connections with India and Indians. The results of what they wrought would by now have awakened them to the falsehoods on which they had built their case, they would have by now been compelled to acknowledge how fabricated was the rage to which they had worked themselves up. The generation which now controls Pakistan has had little contact with Indians and India. What they know, and, therefore, what they believe is what has been drilled into them for half a century. By now these myths, these prejudices – about India, about Hindus, about the perfidy of foreign powers – have all become part of the national psyche. And the “mode of reasoning” that flows from these prejudices and presuppositions has become the standard: witness the falsehoods and myths Musharraf pedals about Kargil.

It is a fashion among many in India to condemn the slightest show of reluctance from India, to insist that we must repose faith in Pakistani leadership, that we are the ones who must go the extra mile. What a service they would do the country were they to take any event of their choice involving India and reproduce what the Pakistani press said about it. What a service they would do were they to pick up textbooks which are used in Pakistan and educate us to the picture which Pakistani children are fed about India and Indians. They travel so often to Pakistan, they have extensive contacts there. They are heard there, their writings are published there. How come they have never undertaken these elementary exercises before counseling India?

As these beakers of hate have been poured into students in Pakistan for fifty seven years, as these concoctions are what they know to be “facts”, those who come out of “non-religious” educational institutions, and not just those who come out of *madrassas* and the like, are ready catchment for every ruler and preacher who wants to instigate them against India. There is no move as yet towards anything better or more balanced.

Indeed, things have got much worse over time.

From differentiation to hatred to jihad

An excellent recent study by Pakistani academics, *The Subtle Subversion: The state of curricula and textbooks in Pakistan*,¹ shows that the content of textbooks has become much, much more venomous since K.K. Aziz's pioneering study.

"*Madrassas* are not the only institutions breeding hate, intolerance, a distorted worldview, etc.," the authors report. "The educational materials in the government run schools do much more than *madrassas*. The textbooks tell lies, create hatred, inculcate militancy, and much more...."

A fundamental principle in writing textbooks, to quote the instruction set out by the *Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V, 1995*, is, "In the teaching material, no concept of separation between the worldly and the religious be given; rather all the material be presented from the Islamic point of view."²

As a consequence the reviewers find that

Four themes emerge most strongly as constituting the bulk of the curricula and textbooks of the three compulsory subjects:

1. that Pakistan is for Muslims alone;
2. that Islamic teachings, including a compulsory reading and memorization of Qur'an, are to be included in all the subjects, hence to be forcibly taught to all the students, whatever their faith;
3. that Ideology of Pakistan is to be internalized as faith, and that hate be created against Hindus and India; and
4. students are to be urged to take the path of *Jehad* and *Shahadat*.

I do hope that the reader will download the report and read it in its entirety. Five of the themes bear on what those who go through these textbooks and classes will be predisposed to believe about India, and, consequently, the policies and stratagems that they would be predisposed to support, if not champion towards us. These are:

- The proposition that for more than a millennia Muslims of the

¹*The Subtle Subversion: The state of curricula and textbooks in Pakistan*, Urdu, English, Social Studies and Civics, A.H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim, (eds.), Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, 2002, at www.sdpi.org.

²*Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V, 1995*, p. 41.

sub-continent as well as those living beyond it have striven to create Pakistan, that History itself has worked towards this consummation;

- ❑ The proposition that Pakistan is a State created as an Islamic State for the fortification and glory of Islam; as such it not just necessarily stands in contradistinction to non-Islamic States, it is the target of such States;
- ❑ India in general, and the Hindus in particular are perfidious, cunning, treacherous; that they have always been and continue to be out to do in Muslims and Islam in general, and Pakistan in particular;
- ❑ *Jihad* is the sacred duty of every Muslim, *shahadat* the great boon for which he must aspire;
- ❑ These themes are laced with vainglorious accounts that lead the student to believe that Pakistan has routed India, and that it can do so at a moment's notice any time.

Even in regard to these I will reproduce only a few of the host of examples that the reviewers cite in the hope that these few will propel the reader to access the full report.

On *Pakistan having been the aim of all Muslims from times immemorial*, governmental instructions about preparing textbooks, and so naturally the textbooks themselves attain farcical heights! As a result, the textbooks conjure up what the reviewers call "a unique view of Pakistan." It becomes a sort of consummation of history, and Muhammad bin Qasim "is declared," to use the phrase of the reviewers, "the first Pakistani citizen"! And through these centuries of arduous labour, the Hindus assist and wish Allah-speed to the project because the Muslim rulers – starting with Muhammad bin Qasim and including in particular Aurangzeb – are ever so kind to them, and because their own society and religion and rulers have been so very oppressive!

- ❑ The Muslims knew that the people of South Asia were infidels and they kept thousands of idols in their temples. The Sindhi king, Raja Dahir, is described as cruel and despotic. "The non-Brahmans who were tired of the cruelties of Raja Dahir, joined hands with Muhammad-bin-Qasim because of his good

treatment." (*Civics, Classes IX and X*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2001, pp. 19-20.)

- ❑ The conquest of Sindh opened a new chapter in the history of South Asia. Muslims had ever-lasting effects of their existence in the region.... For the first time the people of Sindh were introduced to Islam, its political system and way of government. The people here had seen only the atrocities of the Hindu Rajas.... The people of Sindh were so much impressed by the benevolence of Muslims that they regarded Muhammad bin Qasim as their saviour.... Muhammad bin Qasim stayed in Sindh for over three years. On his departure from Sindh, the local people were overwhelmed with grief. (*ibid.*)
- ❑ As a matter of fact, Pakistan came to be established for the first time when the Arabs led by Muhammad bin Qasim occupied Sindh and Multan in the early years of the eighth century, and established Muslim rule in this part of the South-Asian sub-continent. Pakistan under the Arabs comprised the Lower Indus Valley. (*A Textbook of Pakistan Studies*, compulsory, by M.D. Zafar, Lahore, p. 4.)
- ❑ during the 11th century the Ghaznavid Empire comprised what is now Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the 12th century the Ghaznavids lost Afghanistan, and their rule came to be confined to Pakistan.... By the 13th century, Pakistan had spread to include the whole of Northern India and Bengal.... Under the Khiljis Pakistan moved further southward to include a greater part of Central India and the Deccan.... Many Mongols accepted Islam. As such Pakistan remained safe for Islam.... During the 16th century, Hindustan disappeared and was completely absorbed in Pakistan.... Under Aurangzeb the Pakistan Spirit gathered in strength. This evoked the opposition of the Hindus.... After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the process of the disintegration of Mughal Rule set in, and weakened the Pakistan Spirit.... The shape of Pakistan in the 18th century was thus more or less the same as it was under the Ghaznavids in the 11th century. (*ibid.*, pp. 4-8.)

"This is not the end," the reviewers write. "The author continues":

- ❑ Shah Waliullah accordingly appealed to Ahmad Shah Durrani, the ruler of Afghanistan and "Pakistan" to come to the rescue of the Muslims of Mughal India, and save them from the tyrannies of the Marhattas... Ahmad Shah Durrani died in 1773, and with his death things became dark for the Muslims both in "Pakistan" and Mughal India. In the "Pakistan" territories the Sikhs raised their head in the Punjab and became a great headache for the successors of Ahmad Shah Durrani... In the "Pakistan" territories, where a Sikh state had come to be established, the Muslims were denied the freedom of religion. The *mujabideen* set up an Islamic state in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) which was a manifestation of Pakistan Spirit... Thus by the middle the 19th century both "Pakistan" and Hindustan had ceased to exist; instead British India had come into existence.
- ❑ Although Pakistan was created in August 1947, yet except for its name, the present-day Pakistan has existed, as a more or less single entity, for centuries. (*ibid*, pp. 9-23.)

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As Muslim rulers and Muslims themselves have struggled to create Pakistan for a thousand years and more, there can be no doubt about *the nature of the State of Pakistan* in which the students have the great good fortune to live today. It is an Islamic State. It is a State of Muslims, for Islam. The reviewers cite instruction after instruction through which governmental boards direct that this nature of Pakistan be driven deep into the students:

- ❑ To nurture in children a sense of Islamic identity and pride in being Pakistani. (*National Early Childhood Education Curriculum* (NECEC), Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, March 2002, p. 4.)
- ❑ A feeling be created among students that they are the members of a Muslim nation. Therefore, in accordance with the Islamic tradition, they have to be truthful, honest, patriotic and life-sacrificing *mujahids* (*janbaz mujahid*). (*ibid*, p. 41.)
- ❑ To educate and train the future generations of Pakistan as a true practicing Muslim. (*National Curriculum English (Compulsory) for Classes XI-XII*, March 2002, p. 7.)

- ❑ To develop a sense of pride in being Muslim and Pakistani. (*National Curriculum Civics for Classes XI-XII*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, Curriculum Wing, Islamabad, March 2002, p. 10.)
- ❑ [The textbook is to ensure that the student] Knows that national culture is not the local culture or local customs, but that it means the culture the principles of which are laid down by Islam. (*Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V*, 1995, p. 52.) SDPI, Islamabad study
- ❑ Our country is Pakistan. We live in our country. Pakistan is an Islamic country. Here Muslims live. Muslims believe in the unity of Allah. They do good deeds. (*Meri Kitab, for Class II*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, October 2001, p. 36.)
- ❑ Who am I? I am a Muslim. I am a Pakistani. I love my country and I love my people. ... You know that you are a Muslim and your religion is Islam. (*English Class 6*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, pp. 35-37.)
- ❑ Be proud of the Islamic way of life, and try to acquire and adopt Islamic teachings. (*Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V*, 1995, p. 48.)
- ❑ Should try to adopt principles of Islamic way of living. (*Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V*, 1995, p. 52.)
- ❑ To participate in *Salat ba Jamat* in mosques, to develop a sense of respect for Muezzin and Imam. (*National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing) Islamabad, March 2002, p. 8.)
- ❑ Read Qur'an, and respect it. (*Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V*, 1995, p. 48.)
- ❑ Listen to the events from Islamic history and derive pleasure from them. (*Curriculum Document*, p. 48.)
- ❑ Should try to adopt principles of Islamic way of living.
- ❑ Respect for Islamic beliefs and practices.
- ❑ Study religious books in order to understand Qur'anic teachings
- ❑ Respect Islamic or national customs and urge others to do the same.
- ❑ To love Islamic traditions.

- ❑ In the textbooks, such subjects be included in sufficient numbers that emphasise..., the importance and greatness of Islam.
- ❑ Arrange functions/events on Islamic and national themes, and students be asked to memorize such poems, ..., etc., that express national and Islamic sentiments.

“And the list is unending,” write the reviewers giving further examples:

- ❑ To make the Qur’anic principles and Islamic practices as an integral part of curricula so that the message of the Holy Qur’an could be disseminated in the process of education as well as training. To educate and train the future generations of Pakistan as a true practicing Muslim who would be able to usher in the 21st century and the next millennium with courage, confidence, wisdom and tolerance. (*National Curriculum English (Compulsory) for Classes XI-XII*, March 2002, p. 7) SDPI,
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- ❑ To create love for religion and respect for personalities.
- ❑ Must have belief in the Unity of God, and know that Allah is the creator of the universe.
- ❑ Must regard Islamic ways as the best of all.
- ❑ Must have reverence for all the messengers of God, Prophet Mohammad (pbuh), His family members, His companions, the Imams and the leaders, and must try to know their teachings and adopt their ways.
- ❑ Must maintain affinity (love) with the Islamic world.
- ❑ Must respect the leaders, books, places of worship of other religions.
- ❑ Must be aware of the blessings of *Jehad*, and must create yearning for *Jehad* in his heart. (*Urdu Curriculum (first and second language) for Classes VI-VIII*, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1986, p. 13.)

All this is presented as the foundational principle of something called “The Ideology of Pakistan.” This “Ideology” “is a post-Independence construction,” write the reviewers, “devised to sanctify the politics of those political forces which were initially inimical to the creation of

Pakistan.” They recall what Justice Munir had written in his famous report – that the phrase was not known before 1947 at all, that it was used for the first time in 1962 by a legislator! But now, instruction after instruction makes it mandatory that those writing textbooks as well as teachers must accept this Ideology as “reality” and it must “be never subjected to discussion or dispute; it “should never be made controversial and debatable”; that the textbooks and teaching must be such that “the Ideology of Pakistan could permeate the thinking of young generation”; the textbooks and teaching must “demonstrate an appreciation of the Ideology of Pakistan”; the student must “find pleasure in the protection of....”; he must “Understand Islam and Ideology of Pakistan, and feel them deep in heart”; the student must develop “love for,” “deep love for” the Ideology of Pakistan; “Care be taken in the composition and editing of the essays that there ought to come out an angle of propagation of Islam and the Ideology of Pakistan”....

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Next, to quote the reviewers, “Associated with the insistence on the Ideology of Pakistan has been an essential component of hate against India and the Hindus.” “The objects of hate in Pakistani educational material are Hindus and India,” write the reviewers, “reflecting both the perceived sense of insecurity from an ‘enemy’ country, and an attempt to define one’s national identity in relation to the ‘other’.” “The first serves the military,” they note, “and the second the political Islamists.”

□ Urdu, Classes IX-X, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, May 2002

○ Nazariya-e-Pakistan (Ideology of Pakistan) pp. 8-20:

- a. When the British, in the guise of traders, started to establish their rule over the region, the Hindus of higher castes collaborated with them, at times overtly and often covertly. Hindus had a large hand in the defeat of Sirajuddaulah and Tipu Sultan.
- b. After the defeat of Bahadur Shah Zafar and the war of independence of 1857, cooperation between the British and the Hindus further increased, because both of them hated Muslims.
- When the rule of the British was established, Hindus were quick to learn the English language, and became tools in the strengthening of the British rule, and simultaneously continued to foster their traditional hatred towards Muslims. And this way they prepared a plan to make Muslims their slaves for ever.

□ Urdu, Class V, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, May 2002, p. 108:

- They [Muslims] knew that the Hindus have always been their enemy. If they get to rule here, then the Muslims will not be able to live in accordance with the tenets of Islam. After getting rid of the slavery of the British, Muslims will get tied into the slavery of the Hindus.

The reviewers came across passage after passage of what they characterize as "Hate Material":

- The Hindu has always been an enemy of Islam. (*Urdu, Class V, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 108.*)
- The Sultans of Delhi were tolerant in religious matters. They never forced the non-Muslims to convert to Islam, The Hindus embraced Islam due to the kind treatment of the Muslims. *SDPI, Islamabad study*
- [A story "The Enemy Pilot", "about a captured Indian pilot, presumably of Hindu faith," explain the reviewers] He had only been taught never to have pity on Muslims, to always bother the neighbouring Muslims, to weaken them to the extent that they forget about freedom, and that it is better to finish off the enemy. He remembered that the Hindus tried to please their Devi Kali by slaughtering innocent people of other faiths at her feet; that they regarded everybody else as untouchables. He knew that his country India had attacked Pakistan in the dead of the night to bleed Pakistani Muslims and to dominate the entire sub-continent. (*Urdu, Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 221.*)
- The Hindus treated the ancient population of the Indus valley very badly. They forcibly occupied their land. They set fire to their houses and butchered them. Those who escaped were forced to become slaves. After defeating the ancient people of the sub-continent the Hindus started fighting among themselves. They got divided into castes. They would not intermarry with others or eat with them.... The Hindus did not believe in one God but worshipped the numerous idols in their temples. (*Social Studies for Class V, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, 1987, pp. 1-2.*)
- The Hindus who have always been opportunists cooperated with

the English. (*Social Studies, Class VI*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 141.)

- ❑ The Hindus praised the British rule and its blessings in their speeches.
- ❑ The Hindus had the upper hand in the Congress and they established good relations with the British. This party tried its best to safeguard the interests of the Hindus. Gradually it became purely a Hindu organization. Most of the Hindu leaders of the Congress were not prepared to tolerate the presence of the Muslims in the sub-continent. They demanded that the Muslims should either embrace Hinduism or leave the country.
- ❑ The party was so close to the Government that it would not let the Government do any work as would be of benefit to the Muslims. The partition of Bengal can be quoted as an example. (*Social Studies, Class VI*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 143.) SDPI,
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- ❑ ...but Hindus very cunningly succeeded in making the British believe that the Muslims were solely responsible for the [1857] rebellion. (*Social Studies, Class VIII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 90.)
- ❑ The British confiscated all lands [from the Muslims] and gave them to Hindus. (*Social Studies, Class VIII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 91.) ["This is stated despite the fact that all the large feudal lords in the part that later formed Pakistan were Muslims," observe the reviewers.]
- ❑ In December 1885, an Englishman Mr. Humes ... formed a political party named Indian National Congress, the purpose of which was to politically organize Hindus. (*Social Studies, Class VIII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 94.)
- ❑ Therefore in order to appease the Hindus and the Congress, the British announced political reforms. Muslims were not eligible to vote. Hindu voters never voted for a Muslim, therefore, ... (*Social Studies, Class VIII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, pp. 94-95.) ["A sheer distortion, and a blatant lie that the Muslims were ineligible to vote," write the reviewers.]
- ❑ Nehru report exposed the Hindu mentality. (*Social Studies, Class VIII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 102.)

- ❑ The Quaid saw through the “machinations” of the Hindus. (*Social Studies, Class VII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, p. 51.)
- ❑ Hindus declared the Congress rule as the Hindu rule, and started to unleash terror on Muslims. (*Social Studies, Class VIII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 104.)
- ❑ At the behest of the government [during the Congress rule], Hindu goondas started killing Muslims and burning their property. (*Social Studies, Class VIII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 104-105.) SDPI,
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- ❑ The Hindus always desired to crush the Muslims as a nation. Several attempts were made by the Hindus to erase the Muslim culture and civilisation. Hindi-Urdu controversy, *shudhi* and *sanghtan* movements are the most glaring examples of the ignoble Hindu mentality. (M. Ikram Rabbani and Monawar Ali Sayyid, *An Introduction to Pakistan Studies*, The Caravan Book House, Lahore, 1995, p. 12.)
- ❑ The British, with the assistance of the Hindus, adopted a cruel policy of mass exodus against the Muslims to erase them as a nation.
- ❑ The British adopted a policy of large-scale massacre (mass extermination) against the Muslims.
- ❑ The Muslim population of the Muslim minority provinces faced atrocities of the Hindu majority.
- ❑ [The Muslims] were not allowed to profess their religion freely.
- ❑ Hindu nationalism was being imposed upon Muslims and their culture.
- ❑ All India Congress turned into a pure Hindu organisation.
- ❑ The Congress was striving very hard to project the image of united India, which was actually aimed at the extermination of the Muslims from the Indian society.
- ❑ The two Hindu organisations [Congress and Mahasabha] were determined to destroy the national character of the Muslims to dominate and subjugate them perpetually. (*National Curriculum English (Compulsory) for Classes XI-XII*, March 2002, pp. 6, 13, 31, 45, 7, 25, 8, 46, 48, 50.)
- ❑ While the Muslims provided all type of help to those wishing to leave Pakistan, the people of India committed cruelties against the

Muslims (refugees). They would attack the buses, trucks, and trains carrying the Muslim refugees and they were murdered and looted. (*National Early Childhood Education Curriculum* (NECEC), Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, March 2002, p. 85.)

- ❑ The Hindus in Pakistan were treated very nicely when they were migrating as opposed to the inhuman treatment meted out to the Muslim migrants from India. (*Social Studies, Class IV*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, p. 85.) SDPI,
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- ❑ After the Cripps Mission, Congress raised the "Quit India" slogan, which meant the British should leave, handing over the rule to Hindus. (*Social Studies, Class VIII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, p. 110.)
- ❑ After 1965 war India conspired with the Hindus of Bengal and succeeded in spreading hate among the Bengalis about West Pakistan and finally attacked East Pakistan in December 71, thus causing the breakup of East and West Pakistan. (*Social Studies (in Urdu), Class V*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, p. 112.)
- ❑ The British took along the Hindus in their endeavour to conquer India. The Hindus very happily joined the British because they did not like Muslim rule. On the other hand, the British very cleverly bribed some Muslims to join them against other Muslims... These conspiracies and intrigues enabled the British to establish their dominion over India. (*Social Studies for Class V*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, 1987, p. 89.)
- ❑ The Hindus colluded with the English and assured them of their loyalty. In return for this, the English opened the gates of their services to Hindus and gave them commercial and political concessions. As a result, the Hindus began to progress in every sphere of life while the Muslim national life lost all its vigour and vitality and they were engulfed by fear and despair. (*Pakistan Studies for Classes IX-X*, Balochistan Textbook Board, Quetta, 2002, p. 19.)
- ❑ The Hindus praised the British rule and its blessings in their speeches. The Hindus had the upper hand in the Congress and they established good relations with the British. This party tried its

best to safeguard the interests of the Hindus. Gradually it became purely a Hindu organization. Most of the Hindu leaders of the Congress were not prepared to tolerate the presence of Muslims in the sub-continent. They demanded that the Muslims should either embrace Hinduism or leave the country.

- ❑ In addition to Urdu-Hindi controversy, Hindus started so many other anti-Muslim movements. The hue and cry made by Arya Samaj in South India in 1877 was a clear indication of Hindu mentality. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan became sure that Hindus wanted to destroy the valuable cultural heritage of the Muslims so that they lose their separate identity. (*Pakistan Studies for Classes IX-X*, Balochistan Textbook Board, Quetta, 2002, p. 23.) SDPI,
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- ❑ Syed felt a lot of pain at this. The Hindus wished to ruin Muslim civilization and culture by destroying Urdu. This enmity of the Hindus convinced Sir Syed that in order to live an honourable life, the Muslims should claim that they were a separate nation. He thought that it was necessary for the Muslims to receive western education to compete with the Hindus. (*Social Studies for Class VI*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, January 2002, p. 142.)

Next comes the operational proposition. Pakistan having been created as an Islamic State, every student must be taught to live by the principles of Islam, the governmental education boards direct. Among the essential pillars of Islam, he must be taught, is *jihad*. Developing an aspiration for *jihad* and *shahadat* is particularly necessary as Pakistan, being the fortress of Islam, is the target of India, of the Hindus in particular.

The reviewers cite instruction after instruction, passage after passage, "activity" upon "activity" that the student must be made to engage in so that he develops the aspiration for *jihad* and *shahadat*.

"There was no mention of these in the pre-Islamization period curricula and textbooks," the reviewers record, "and the post-1979 curricula and textbooks openly eulogize *Jehad* and *Shahadat* and urge students to become *mujahids* and martyrs...." They give pages full of examples:

- ❑ Learning Outcome: Recognize the importance of *Jehad* in every

sphere of life. (*National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing) Islamabad, March 2002, p. 34.)

- ❑ Learning outcome: Must be aware of the blessings of *Jehad*. (*Urdu Curriculum (Compulsory, Optional and Easy Course), Classes IX and X*, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Islamabad, 1988, p. 8.)
- ❑ Must be aware of the blessings of *Jehad*, and must create yearning for *Jehad* in his heart. (*Urdu Curriculum (first and second language) for Classes VI-VIII*, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1986, p. 13.) SDPI,
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study
- ❑ Concept: *Jehad*; Affective objective: Aspiration for *Jehad*. (*Social Studies Curriculum for Classes VI-VIII*, National Curriculum Committee, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Islamabad, 1984, p. 16.)
- ❑ Love and aspiration for *Jehad*, *Tableegh* (Proselytization), *Jehad*, *Shahadat* (martyrdom), sacrifice, *ghazi* (the victor in holy wars), *shabeed* (martyr), ... (*Social Studies Curriculum for Classes VI-VIII*, National Curriculum Committee, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Islamabad, 1984, p. 21.)
- ❑ Simple stories to urge for *Jehad*. (*Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V*, 1995, p. 56.)
- ❑ Activity 4: To make speeches on *Jehad* and *Shahadat*. (*Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V*, 1995, p. 154.)
- ❑ To make speeches on *Jehad* (*National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education. (Curriculum Wing) Islamabad, March 2002, p. 33.)
- ❑ Evaluation: To judge their spirits while making speeches on *Jehad*, Muslim History and Culture. (*National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing) Islamabad, March 2002, p. 35.)
- ❑ Concepts: *Jehad*, *Amar bil Maroof* and *Nahi Anil Munkar*. (*National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing) Islamabad, March 2002, p. 34.)

- ❑ Importance of *Jehad*. (*National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing) Islamabad, March 2002, p. 34.)
- ❑ Affective objective: Concepts of Ideology of Pakistan, Muslim *Ummah* and *Jehad*. (*National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V*, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, (Curriculum Wing), Islamabad, March 2002, p. 35.)
- ❑ Stories: eight lessons; Folk tales (mythical, moral, Islamic, travel and adventure, *Jehad*). (*Urdu Curriculum (First language) for Classes IV and V*, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, March 2002, p. 18.) SDPI,
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study
- ❑ *At the completion of Class V, the child will be able to*
 - Understand the Hindu and Muslim differences and the resultant need for Pakistan.
 - Acknowledge and identify forces that may be working against Pakistan.
 - Demonstrate, by action, a belief in the fear of Allah.
 - Demonstrate a desire to preserve the ideology, integrity and security of Pakistan.
- ❑ *Objectives, contents and activities*
 - Objective 1: Understand the Hindu and Muslim differences and the resultant need for Pakistan.
 - Content 1: Hindu Muslim differences in culture.
 - Content 3: Ideology of Pakistan.
 - Content 4: India's evil designs against Pakistan (the three wars with India).
 - Activity 4: To make speeches on *jehad* and *shahadat*.
 - Activity 5: To listen to special programs broadcast on Muslim history and culture.
 - Activity 6: To participate in the congregational prayers.
 - Activity 7: To prepare speeches on Islamic republic and Muslim brotherhood.
 - Important personalities: contents: Muhammad bin Qasim, Mahmood Ghaznavi, Shah Waliullah, Syed Jamaluddin Afghani, Moulana Obaidulah Sindhi, Ahmed Shah Abdali, ... (*Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Class V*, 1995, pp. 151, 154, 160, 164.)

The *National Curriculum for Social Studies* for Classes I to V, that the Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing), Islamabad, has released

specifies among "Cognitive objectives", "Develop understanding of the Hindu Muslim differences and the need for Pakistan;" among "Concepts" that students must acquire, "Ideology of Pakistan; Muslim *ummah*....; *Jehad*;" among "Contents" that the textbooks and teaching must cover, "Hindu Muslim differences in cultures; Ideology of Pakistan; India's evil designs against Pakistan; need for security of Pakistan"; as the "Activities" in which the students must be engaged, "Involvement in group discussions and listening to talks on Pakistan Ideology and Kashmir Issue; participation in congregational events; to make speeches on *Jehad*..." The "learning outcomes" that the textbooks and teaching must ensure are that the student must be equipped to

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- ☐ Identify the events in relation to Hindu-Muslim differences, which laid the foundations for Pakistan's emergence.
- ☐ Identify the behaviour patterns for a Pakistani which may preserve the ideology and....
- ☐ Specify the nature of Kashmir Issue.
- ☐ Evaluate the role of India with reference to wars of 1956 [???", inquire the reviewers], 1965 and 1971 A.D.

As to how the students are to be evaluated, the instruction again is that teachers grading the students are "To judge their spirits while making speeches on *Jehad*, Muslim History and Culture."

Recall that *these directions are for students in Classes I to VI*

The *Social Studies Curriculum for Classes VI-VIII* put out by the National Curriculum Committee, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, lists "*Jehad*" among the "Concepts" in which the student must be groomed. As the "Affective Objective" that the textbooks and teaching must seek to attain it records, "Aspiration for *Jehad*."

The *Urdu Curriculum for Classes VI-VIII* lists among "Details of the objectives of teaching Urdu,"

Must be aware of the blessings of *Jehad*, and must create a yearning for *Jehad* in his heart.

Furthermore, the objective of teaching the language is, "To create sentiments for the protection of the Ideology of Pakistan, love for the country," and to this end, the student "must believe that Pakistan came into being to safeguard Islamic beliefs and culture....,"

he "must know that the real basis for the strength of Pakistan is Islam...."

The *Urdu Curriculum* for the next two Classes – IX and X – directs that the texts and teachers ensure that the student "Must love the Islamic world; Must be aware of the blessings of *Jehad*...."

The Urdu Curriculum for Classes IV and V directs that the students be taken through, "Simple stories to incite for *jehad*." (*Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V, 1995, Urdu Curriculum, Classes IV-V, p. 56.*)

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Among "activities" it prescribes is,

Objectives, contents and activities

Activity 4: To make speeches on *jehad* and *shahadat*. (*ibid*, p. 154.)

It directs that students be given instruction about "Important personalities: Contents: Muhammad bin Qasim, Mahmood Ghaznavi." (*ibid*, p. 164.)

The *National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V*, (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, Curriculum Wing, Islamabad, March 2002, p. 34) lists as a subject,

Concept: *Jehad*

Contents: Importance of *Jehad*

The *Urdu Curriculum (First Language) for Classes IV and V*, (National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, March 2002, p. 3.) prescribes that the textbooks and classes cover,

❑ Concept: *Jehad*

Activities: To make speeches on *Jehad*

Learning outcome: Evaluate the role of India with reference to wars of 1948, 1965 and 1971 A.D.

Evaluation: To judge their spirits while making speeches on *Jehad*.

Under "Muslim History and Culture", it directs that, students be taught

❑ Concept: *Jehad*

Contents: Muhammad bin Qasim, Mahmood Ghaznavi

It declares that the "National Objective" to be attained by this instruction is that

The sense be created among students that they are members of the Islamic *Millat*. Therefore in accordance with the Islamic tradition, they ought to develop into true, honest patriot, servants of the people and *Janbaz Mujahid* (life giving *mujahid*).

As the student gets to Classes VI-VIII, the Curriculum prescribes that he be instructed in, and be made to develop an aspiration for not just *jehad* but in addition *shahadat*. (*Urdu Curriculum (first and second language) for Classes VI and VIII*, SDPI, Islamabad study (National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1986, p. 38.) It directs that students studying Urdu "Must be aware of the blessings of *jehad*, and must create yearning for *jehad* in his heart." (*ibid*, p. 13.) The instruction is to be repeated in Classes IX and X, and the textbook writers and teachers are to ensure that the student "Must be aware of the blessings of *Jehad*." (*Urdu Curriculum (Compulsory, optional and easy course), Classes IX and X*, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Islamabad, 1988, p. 89.)

The same subjects are prescribed in the Social Studies courses – right from the first time Social Studies enters the Curriculum.

A sample of results recorded by the reviewers:

- ❑ *Curriculum Document, Primary Education, Classes K-V*, (1995, p.56):

Simple stories to urge for *Jehad*.

Activity 4: To make speeches on *Jehad* and *Shahadat*. (*ibid*, p. 154.)

- ❑ *National Curriculum, Social Studies for Classes I-V*, (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing), Islamabad, March 2002, p. 33):

To make speeches on *Jehad*.

Learning Outcome: Recognize the importance of *Jehad* in every sphere of life. (*ibid*, p. 34.)

Evaluation: To judge their spirits while making speeches on *Jehad*, Muslim History and Culture. (*ibid*, p. 35.)

- ❑ *Social Studies, Class IV*, Pakistan Textbook Depot, Lahore, Author: Mohammad Tariq Malik, Pak Publishers, Urdu Bazaar Lahore:
Pages 112 to 113: India and Hindus as all bad and started all wars, war pictures, idea of how bravely Muslims defeated them, war glorified.
- ❑ *Social Studies, Class VII*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, January 2002:
Page 22: war and expansionism are promoted; "widen your range of conquest";
Page 28: Conquest and war are glorified.
- ❑ *Civics, Classes IX and X*, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2001:
Page 114: the military's role in East Pakistan glorified.
- ❑ *Civics of Pakistan, Intermediate Classes*: Author: Mazhar-ul-Haq, Fourth Impression, 2000:
Page 257: the Makkah Declaration of 1981 is discussed and *Jehad* is pledged as a first principle.

And so on.

The propositions that are drilled into students thus far are that for a millennia Muslims and leaders and rulers of Muslims have striven to create Pakistan; that it has been created as a fortress to exemplify, protect and advance Islam; that India, in particular Hindus are out to crush Pakistan and Muslims; that for all these reasons, and even more so because *jihad* is one of the pillars of Islam, that because *shahadat* is the great blessing for which every Muslim must aspire, students must realise the value of these, they must engage in activities that inculcate the aspiration for these, they must be judged by "the spirits" they display in expounding these.

The education is completed, so to say, by convincing the student that, when he engages in *jihad* against a community like the Hindus, against a country like India, he is bound to win. This is achieved by vainglorious accounts of fictional victories in wars with India.

Pointers

We must bear in mind that

- ❑ This material starts getting drilled into the child from the very beginning of his schooling – from the first class;
- ❑ That textbooks and teachers drive it deeper and deeper at each level as the student advances from class to higher class;
- ❑ The curricula that have been surveyed in this report of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute are not the curricula of *madrassas*; they are the curricula of *government* schools as prescribed by *governmental boards* of education;
- ❑ What the curricula spell for non-Muslims in Pakistan, for neighbours like India, for the *kafir* communities like Hindus in India requires no imagination;
- ❑ On the other hand, the curricula are of inestimable value in fortifying the hold over Pakistan of the Army, the intelligence agencies as well as the controllers of Islam-*pasand* groups.

Only three further points need to be borne in mind:

- ❑ The curricula have become progressively more virulent since the late 1970s – every civilian ruler, from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto onward, when he has been in trouble, and of course each military ruler has lunged for Islamization of the educational system;
- ❑ The curricula are the ones that are in use today;
- ❑ One event after another testifies to how deep the malaise is now. Three typical events illustrate the state of affairs:
 - Explaining the reasons for the work they had undertaken, the Sustainable Development Institute team had noted as one of the reasons, “None of the earlier studies appeared to have had any impact either on government policies or the public discourse on education.” What has been the fate of their report? The editorial of *Newsline* notes, “Musharraf’s education minister said the report had been rejected by the 15-member review committee because it represented an ‘extremist viewpoint’ – a claim disputed by the SDPI which maintains that the report was endorsed by a vote of 9 to 6.”¹ “Who voted how” apart, the test is not the votes polled in a committee but whether the instructions issued for writing textbooks and for

¹<http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsMay2004/editornoteMay2004.htm>

what is to be taught in classes in fact contain what the report lists.

- Ajai Sahni writes, "The Federal Public Service Commission, which selects the country's senior bureaucracy, in its competitive examination (according to Rules issued on August 25, 2003) also prescribes a compulsory paper on *Islamiat* with a full 100 marks, which includes the concept of *Jihad* among the 'Fundamental Beliefs and Practices of Islam.'"
- "Early in March, the fundamentalist alliance, the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA) disrupted the National Assembly and staged a walk-out on the grounds that a certain reference to *jihad* as well as other Quranic verses had been 'excluded' from the new edition of a state prescribed *biology* textbook. Later, the Punjab Teachers Union announced its decision to launch a protest movement from Gujranwala, commencing April 15, if the verses were not 'reinstated'. On March 30, 2004, however, Education Minister Zobaida Jalal clarified that no chapter or verses relating to '*jihad*' or '*shahadat*' (martyrdom) had been deleted from textbooks, stating further that the particular verse referring to *jihad* had only been 'shifted' from the biology textbook for intermediate students (Classes XI & XII) to the 'matriculation level courses' (Class X). The education ministry in Pakistan has not found it expedient to inquire - as most people familiar with the discipline of biology would - what references to *jihad* were doing in the *biology* curriculum in the first place. This is unsurprising, since it is the Ministry of Education, and its subsidiary Curriculum Wing, that put these references there."¹

What should one conclude will be the result of what everyone says should be done, of what everyone takes to be a sign of progress and "human development" - namely of increasing outlays on this educational system?

As this system serves the interests of the controllers of Pakistan State and society so well, what are the prospects that it will be altered?

¹See Ajai Sahni, "Why do they hate us?," *South Asia Intelligence Review*, Volume 2, No. 38, 5 April, 2004, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/2_38.htm#assessment2.

As this is what is poured into wards in “normal”, government schools, do they not completely fool themselves who think that the problem lies only in the *madrassas*?

But there is another fact that we in India must remember. As in the case of the abuse and violence that are hurled between Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan, as in the wrath which is being heaped on the Ahmadiyas, the concoctions which these books feed students in Pakistan are not merely of Pakistan manufacture. They are the standard fabrications which the *ulema* have been putting out – before and after Partition – in India as much as in Pakistan. That the Hindus are unclean, that they are not to be befriended, that they are devious and untrustworthy; that India was a land of wild, uncivilized people till Islam came and brought it the light of culture and civilization; that it is Muslims who sacrificed the most in fighting the British, that they are the ones who led and manned the Independence Struggle – these are the staple of Islamic volumes published in India as much as they are in Pakistan.¹ And we should also remember that the *madrassas* in which this poison is poured into the young – the Binauri mosque and *madrassa*, to take one instance – are “*Deobandi madrassas*,” the “Deoband” in that expression referring to the Dar ul Uloom, Deoband – which is very much in India!

The problem thus is two-fold:

- ❑ The general mass – even “the general educated mass” – has had vile prejudice poured into it against India; that is consequential enough – every ruler of Pakistan can tap into these wells of internalized hatred, and work up campaigns against India. What the terrorist leaders and ideologues are saying is just an extension of, a sort of candid-version of what underlies the textbooks of “normal” schools. From those textbooks to the declamations of Professor Saeed is a continuum. The adult who has been through the schools and colleges in which these texts are used may not himself pick up the gun – as he is liable to belong to a social and economic class whose members do not risk going across borders

¹For examples see my, *The World of Fatwas*, ASA, 1995, HarperCollins, 1997: on *kafirs*, pp. 165-217, 554-75; on Muslims having led and manned the Freedom Struggle: pp. 272-77; on Islam civilizing India: p. 272, and my *Indian Controversies*, ASA, 1993, HarperCollins, 1997, pp. 401-10.

to maim and kill. But they would be a ready audience – well conditioned to believe the falsehoods that the terrorist preachers and ideologues proclaim. Where they can – for instance if they happen to be in the State apparatus – they would be well conditioned to think it to be their duty to provide “moral and material support” to the Great Cause.

- ❑ The terrorists are just a bit farther along – they are prepared to put those lessons to practice; they are out to “kill and be killed” for the Great Cause.

And that leads us to the next two questions:

- ❑ How is it that Jinnah’s admonition to the assembled legislators notwithstanding, Pakistan has marched inexorably to becoming a bucket of hate, to becoming the University of Terrorists?
- ❑ We have glimpsed the mind-set that has been created in Pakistan. How is it that the combine – *ulema*, the agencies, the military rulers – is able to foment it? Why are liberals among Muslims not able to deal with the doctrine propagated by the combine? Why have the liberal critiques of fundamentalist Islam, even of terrorism in such societies, never got anywhere?

Lethal ingredients

The access of terrorists to arms, to money, etc. is important, and we shall turn to these soon enough, but even more consequential is the creed of the terrorists. This is what fires them. By internalizing this they become killing machines. And, irony of ironies, it is this creed that beguiles ordinary by-standers into seeing some justification, at the least some “explanation” for what the zealots are all about. That creed is visible most vividly today in the terrorists who have been sent across from Pakistan. But, as we have just seen, it is not limited to them. Therefore, more than anything else, this ideology must be exhumed.

To exhume it, there are four things to shun, and six to do.

1. *Shun pseudo explanations.* “Unemployment, especially among the educated youth” – each time terrorism erupts, it is attributed to some figment such as this. Unemployment was much, much lower in Punjab than elsewhere in the early 1980s – terrorism erupted there and not in, say, Bihar, because Pakistan saw and seized the opportunity that the lunacy of our local politicians had presented: to gain a leg over the Akalis, Congress leaders had patronized Bhindranwale; he went out of hand; Pakistan took over the bunch around him. Similarly, unemployment is no less in Punjab today than it was then, but there is no terrorism – because Pakistan’s design was crushed. What spurred terrorism in Punjab, what spurs it today in Kashmir, in the Northeast is not unemployment – but *opportunity*. We have created an open, unobstructed field for the enemy. A country seeing that the one it views as its enemy has blinkered its eyes, that it has tied its hands, shackled its legs, sealed its lips – as we have – shall not let the opportunity pass: “Victory is at hand,” it will convince itself. Recall that when terrorism in Punjab ended, not a single so-called “Sikh grievance” had been addressed, nor had a single social, political or economic factor been altered in favour of the supposedly aggrieved Jat Sikh community. As one set of

commentators noted, "Little change was noticed in the objective conditions, and none of the adduced reasons or causes of the rise (of terrorism) appear to have been removed.... Once the movement collapsed, one was left wondering how could it disappear so suddenly and without leaving a trace of cultural sympathy for the 'fighters'."¹ Similarly, social and economic "deprivation" can scarcely explain the expansion of Naxalite influence in the coastal region of Andhra – after all, this is the most prosperous part of the state.

2. For the same reason, *shun pseudo-remedies*. "But we must get to the roots of their anger," many an analyst writes today. And deduces that India, Israel or Russia just must make some concession or the other on Kashmir, Palestine or Chechnya. But the "anger" has not been triggered by issues of this kind. It is the result of indoctrination, its roots lie not in Chechnya and Kashmir but in lines plucked from the Quran, the *hadis*, in what is drilled into their wards by government schools as much as *madrassas*. Similarly, on the assumption that it is inadequate development which is fueling terrorism in an area – say, Kashmir or the Northeast – governments are apt to conclude that the remedy is to pump more money into the region, or give further incentives for industrialists to open units there. The money just goes to the terrorists. The people, and even more so the rulers of the area, sense that terrorism brings lucre: they develop an immediate, mercenary reason for keeping the area in ferment. A crushing defeat, not more money is the remedy.

3. *Beware of rationalizers*. They come in two sets: the liberals, and the professional propagandists. The latter's efforts are well known, though liberal societies invariably underestimate the sophistication of their techniques, as well as their gall: in reading their tracts, for instance, the average person is liable to think that he has insulated himself by discounting their claims a bit; confident that he has taken the requisite prophylactic, he becomes all the more susceptible to the 100 per cent fabrication. The liberal apologists are much more destructive: they are more numerous; and as they are "people like us," their formulations and rationalizations are more readily believed. "No religion teaches the killing of innocents," says the liberal apologist

¹Harish K. Puri, Paramjit Singh Judge and Jagrup Singh Sekhon, *Terrorism in Punjab: Understanding Grassroots Reality*, New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 1999, p. 51.

today – a cliché that turns on what is meant by the word “innocent”, a meaning the liberal never spells out with reference to the Text, to *The Text* by which the terrorists swear. For instance, is the person to whom the doctrine of that religion or of that group has been offered, and who does not embrace it, “innocent”? Innocent not in the eyes of the liberal apologist, but in the eyes of that religion or text. “God says in the holy book,” the liberal says, “‘To you your religion, to me mine’; God declares, ‘There is no compulsion in religion’.” But what is to be inferred when those two lines are but a microscopic fraction of what the text says? Nor does the liberal ever recall the very specific context in which such – stray – phrases occur in the text. Recall the efforts of the apologists for Communism to whitewash the Stalinist reality with essays about “the Early Marx”, about “the Paris Manuscripts”.

4. *Shun political correctness*. Few things have prevented the West from waking up in time to the dangers that Islamic terrorism today constitutes for it as notions of what is politically correct. These notions have stifled scholarship, they have choked discourse. They have led the West to shut its eyes to the ideology by which the terrorists are being fired up. The verbal terrorism by which notions of what is correct and what is not have been enforced by the dominant intellectual group in India – the leftists – has disabled the ruling groups, and, through them, the country to the point of paralysis. Standing up to that verbal terrorism, liberating discourse from those naive notions is the first requisite of fighting the war against terrorism – in India, as much as elsewhere.

Corresponding to these four “don’ts”, are six “do’s”.

1. *Believe what the ideologues and organizations of the terrorists say*. The one thing for which ideologues and organizations can be credited is that they are absolutely explicit about their aims and objectives. The fault – the fatal fault – is that of liberal societies: to this day they continue to shut their eyes to what these organizations proclaim to be their aim: domination, conquest, conversion of the *dar al-harb* into the *dar al-Islam* – exactly as they had shut their eyes to Hitler in the 1930s and to Stalin later. Read their press, reflect over their books and pamphlets, and act in time – that is, *before* they have wreaked the havoc they proclaim they will.

2. *To combat a belief-system one must have a thorough knowledge of the scriptures of that ideology.* During the early 1980s, propagandists started asserting, "Sikhism is closer to Islam than to Hinduism." How could one counter the poison unless one had deep and intimate knowledge of the *Granth Sahib*, unless one knew what the Gurus fought for and against whom they fought? Later, commentator after commentator would refer to the Taliban as "Deobandis"; he would recount how they had been minted at the Binauri *madrassa* in Karachi. But unless we know what the *Dar ul Uloom* in Deoband has been churning out, we will be easily deflected from grasping what is being forged in those factories of hatred. Similarly, unless we have liberated ourselves from the shackles of political correctness to broadcast what these "religious seminaries" have put out, and *are* putting out to this day, how will we awaken citizens to the danger that faces the country?

3. *Go by what the scripture as a whole says, not by what a stray passage plucked from it says* – what will determine the outcome is the mind which the scripture, the tradition creates; and this will be determined by the teaching as a whole, not by a stray passage.

4. *Go by the plain meaning of the scripture, not by the construction that apologists and commentators contrive to put on it* – again, it is by the plain meaning of the scripture that the faithful will proceed, not by the gloss put on it by some well-meaning liberal: will the ward in the Binauri *madrassa* go by the Quran or by Maulana Azad's *Tarjuman al Quran*?

5. *Go by what those who are recognized by that group as authorities say about the ideology* – the faithful go by what the CPSU in Stalin's Russia, the *ulema* in Islamic groups and States say; not by what some columnist or retired politician says. Often great effort is expended in securing press statements to support the anti-terrorist campaign – on occasion even a *fatwa* has been procured to that effect! These are useless. Those who issue them are dismissed as "*sarkari sants*"; their statements are rejected as command performances. This rejection reflex is deeply, and consciously instilled into members of such groups, indeed into the communities themselves. If someone who is not a member of the group – if he was not a Communist yesterday, if he is not a Muslim today – voices criticism, his critique will be rejected automatically: what else can you expect from that "agent of

imperialism" in one case, from that "enemy of the Faith" in the other? On the other hand, no believer will raise questions of any consequence – neither about the basic approach of the group nor about, to take the current context, the individual act of destruction. If he does so, his critique will be dismissed as swiftly, and as much by reflex: "He has crossed the barricades" – that was the refrain about fellow-travellers who at last spoke up; "He is an apostate" – that has been the refrain in Islam for centuries about the rare Muslim who has dared to raise even the slightest question that touches fundamentals.

6. *To gauge the true content of that ideology and its potential for evil, see what these authorities do when they are in power:* to ascertain what Communism actually meant it was foolish to have been lulled by the act that Communists have had to put up in a free and open polity such as ours; see what their gods did in Stalin's Russia, in Mao's China; to gauge what their ideology means, see what Muslim rulers did in medieval India, what Iran went through under Imam Khomeini, what the Taliban were doing in Afghanistan.

Terrorism is just a weapon; it is just one among an array of weapons. To expect that by killing one band of terrorists, smashing one network, or even by reclaiming one country from the grip of an extremist band, one has taken care of the problem is suicidal. The aim of the terrorist is not to trigger one explosion; his fulfillment is not in carrying out one assassination. The explosion and assassination are *instruments*. The terrorist is himself an instrument, he sees himself as an instrument – of history in Marxism-Leninism, of the Will of Allah today. For this reason, the fixation with one bin Laden, with one *al Qaeda* is valid only to the extent that these individuals and organizations become symbols, and therefore defeating them is necessary for that reason – to convince potential recruits, for instance, that they shall not prevail. But the real root is the ideology. A bin Laden may be killed; an *al Qaeda* may be smashed. Others will rise in their place – till the ideology itself is discredited.

For the same reason, to think that by giving in over Chechnya, by making concessions to Hamas, by handing Kashmir to Pakistan-dispatched terrorists, one will effectively deal with "the causes of Muslim anger" is to play the fool. For the believer, the "problem" is not Chechnya or Kashmir. The "problem" is that fourteen centuries having passed, the world has not yet accepted his creed – Marxism-

Leninism, or Islam as the case may be. His object is not the real estate of Chechnya or Kashmir, or Jerusalem. His object – indeed, the *duty* which has been ordained for him – is to convert the *dar al-harb*, the land of war – that is, the land the people of which have not yet submitted to that creed – into the *dar al-Islam*. The believer *cannot* remain true to his faith unless he prosecutes the war till this consummation is achieved.

Ideologues and propagandists have a well-practiced division of labour in this regard. The directors of the ideology intoxicate believers with visions of how affairs will be *ultimately* – of how total domination will be secured over the whole world. The propagandists addressing the rest of the world, on the other hand, focus a narrow beam – *on the next, single objective*: Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya. The beam is as blindingly intense as it is narrow: the aim is to convince ordinary folk that if only this one concession is made, all problems will cease. This exclusionary focus and implicit suggestion are accompanied by a systematic campaign – through front-organizations, intellectuals, fellow travelers – that raises an “intellectual” debate, and thereby foments doubts in the minds of the victims about the moral rights of the issue.

The assault has two prongs. On the one hand, violence and terror: these aim at tiring out the victims by inflicting death and carnage. Simultaneously, doubts are fomented in the victims about the rightness of their cause – these ripen into a rationale for capitulation: “Why not yield a bit on?; after all, this one gesture will ensure peace, and we will be free to go our way after that; in any case, the world is not entirely convinced of our case....” That was the refrain on Punjab in the early 1980s; that was the refrain on Kashmir in the late 1990s.

Victory on that one item in its pocket, the group commences the same sequence *vis-à-vis* the next target: and doing so is but natural, for the issue – Kashmir, Chechnya – was just an instrument.

Fundamentalism

Believers will inevitably come to internalize this mindset – of unremitting violence – whenever the ideology has the following ingredients:

- ❑ Reality is simple;
- ❑ It has been revealed to one person;
- ❑ That person has put it in one Book;
- ❑ Every syllable in that Book is divine, it is the ultimate truth; anything that contradicts what is in the Book is not just false, it is a device of the Devil, a device to mislead and waylay the believer; nothing that is not in the Book is of consequence;
- ❑ The Book is difficult to fathom;
- ❑ Therefore, believers require an intermediary – the Party, the Church, the *ulema*;
- ❑ Once all humans embrace the way of life that the Book prescribes, eternal peace and prosperity will break out; unless all embrace it, that dawn will not come;
- ❑ It is, therefore, the duty of that intermediary to invite you to accept the Faith – the *dawat al Quran*, and its secular equivalents;
- ❑ The truth of the message is so vivid that if, in spite of the invitation, you do not embrace the faith, that is itself proof that you are inherently evil; it is, therefore, the duty of that intermediary, indeed it is the duty of every ordinary adherent of the faith to put you out of harm's way: for you are then blocking the march of History – in Marxism-Leninism, you are blocking the Will of Allah, you and your obstinacy are thwarting the dawn, and manifestly you are doing so because of the evil in you;
- ❑ As this is a duty ordained, it is but right that the agent – of History, of Allah – uses whatever means are required to ensure that the Cause prevails.

Unless the rest of humanity, having become totally docile, has come to embrace the revelation blindly, these propositions inevitably entail violence – the forms of violence that come to mind when we talk of terrorism being just the weapon of choice for a particular circumstance, a particular locale.

The faith has three further ingredients:

- ❑ It forecloses alternatives to inevitable, protracted, indeed eternal, and violent struggle. Allah, for instance, repeatedly declares that unbelievers are congenitally perverse, that nothing the faithful

can possibly do will bring them round – for, He says, I have Myself made them turn their faces away from Me; indeed, He tells believers, I have deliberately put them in your way to test you. They have but one aim, He tells believers: to turn you away from your faith, to beguile you into becoming like them, to deceive you into giving up your duty.

- ❑ The faith drugs the faithful into believing that victory is not just inevitable, it is imminent. Recall, the “imminent collapse of capitalism” theses that were the staple of Communist pamphleteering and Party Resolutions.
- ❑ But as victory eludes the believers, the Faith provides consolations, indeed rationalizations for failure. It conditions the believer – in this case the terrorist – to persevere in either event, in the face of defeat as much as upon succeeding. When he succeeds, he is fortified in the belief that Jehovah in the Old Testament, Allah in the Quran, History in the Marxist texts, is on his side. When he fails, the indoctrination leads him to believe that Jehovah, that Allah, is just testing him – Allah wants to assess whether his faith in Him will falter in the face of the setback. In the alternate “secular” religion, the adherent is conditioned to believe that, as History moves dialectically, the setback will itself create the conditions for eventual success.

The greatest error in preparing to combat such groups is to believe that they will act “normally”, “rationally”. On a rational calculus, killing a few hundred or even a few thousand is not going to break a country like India. But the fanatic is conditioned to believe the opposite: that he is merely carrying out Allah’s command, and that Allah will in turn live up to *His* word – the promise that *He* will complete the job. Rationally, successive defeats should lead the fanatic to discard violence. But he is conditioned to wish-away every defeat: “Allah is testing us through these setbacks.” A rational being skirts death. But the fanatic yearns for *shahadat*, and the boons that await him in Allah’s environs. One of the problems is that people like us – living in open societies, given to free, rational discourse – just cannot comprehend the *jihadi* milieu; we cannot imagine the environment which makes parents hand over their sons to murderous organizations to “Kill and be killed,” we cannot comprehend the

conditioning that makes a young man blow himself up to kill those who just happen to be in the vicinity. A "Security Doctrine" that does not provide for this "*irrationality*" will be found wanting.

For one thing, when its adherents are saturated with such hallucinogens, terrorism cannot be snuffed out merely by beheading a particular terrorist group, not even by eliminating that particular group entirely. For the ideology will find new adherents – equally zealous, just as ready to give their lives for the boons of the hereafter.

Ajai Sahni correctly emphasizes that terrorist violence has always been preceded by long processes of ideological mobilization, and that such ideological mobilization has largely gone unchallenged. Indeed, States just do not seem to feel that they have to craft a focused ideological response to terrorism, or to begin imagining the character, content and instruments of such a response. He cites the telling example of Kashmir:

As with much of South Asia, the culture and religious practices of the Muslims of Kashmir had little in common with the rigid and distorted version of Wahhabi Islam – with its ideological source in Saudi Arabia – that is the dominant ideological force among contemporary extremist Islamists. Kashmiri Islam was steeped with the mysticism and values of the devotional Sufi order, and the Kashmir Valley was, indeed, held up as a unique and inspirational example of secular values at the time of Partition and Independence, and in the decades that followed. The emergence of terrorism in the State was preceded by decades of religious mobilization and reorientation centered primarily in the mosques in the Valley. When terror broke out in the late 1980s, the mosques and the *madrassas* are the ones that provided the motivation, the moral sanction, and the initial impetus, not only to the violence, but to the near-complete ethnic cleansing of the Valley of its Kashmiri Pandit minority. It is interesting that, among the priority targets of the terrorists was the network of secular schools, most of which were shut down under threat, especially in rural areas. This progressively forced the children into the only surviving "educational" institution – the *madrassa* – the "schools of hate," as Jessica Stern calls them, that created new "supply lines" for *jihad*....

The Kashmir example illustrates two related points. First, once the virus enters, it spreads rapidly: as was the case in Kashmir, the Islam of Indonesia, of Philippines, of Malaysia and Singapore was held up as a model of moderation and syncretistic culture – indeed, it used to be

held up as living proof of the proposition that Islam is a tolerant and open religion; within moments, Islam in these regions, as in Kashmir, has taken the very hue it was said to be proof against.

Second, the opportunism and shortsightedness of politicians are what have provided the occasion for this lunge from moderation and openness to extremism. It is because Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her immediate circle thought it clever to put up Bhindranwale as a counter to the Akalis that the entire history and ethos of Sikhism was turned upside-down – and within six months. It is because Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her immediate circle could not reconcile themselves to having been defeated in an open, fair election in Kashmir, it is because they then dislodged a popularly elected Government that the sequence was set in motion which handed the Valley to the *Jama'at-e-Islami*, and through it opened the door for Pakistan.

It is, of course, true that *whichever* ideology has the features listed above will mutate into violence and extremism. Islam is not the only ideology that has been trans-created into an extreme form today – Naxalism in India, Maoism in Nepal are among examples of “non-religious” ideologies which have taken the same form. It is also true, as is often remarked, that in practice Islam is of many hues. There are, after all, the teaching and legends of the Sufis. But it is equally true, and independent of what was visited upon the Sufis themselves in Islamic countries in the heyday of Islam, that the moderate versions of Islam are under siege everywhere – not from non-Muslims but from the advocates of “authentic Islam.”

Nor is it just a question of the moderates mustering courage to stand up to extremists. Once extremist formulations enter the air, the moderates have to locate answers from *within the canonical corpus*. After all, the entire edifice – say, the State of Pakistan – has been constructed in the name of, and for the triumph of Islam. The extremist cites chapter and verse from the texts. These texts are the final authority. *That* is the problem with which reformers have struggled for seventy years in South Asia. *That* is the problem to which Muslims who want the moderate version of Islam – as “the religion of peace, love and brotherhood” – to prevail have to find an answer.

It is in this light that we must immerse ourselves in what is being taught at *madrassas* all around us.

Twenty years of this

"According to the Interior Ministry, there are some 20,000 *madrassas* in the country with nearly three million students. Of these 7,000 *madrassas* belong to the *Deobandi* sect from which most of the militant cadre is derived. Approximately 700,000 students, aged four years and older, study in the *Deobandi* religious seminaries. It is estimated that, at the current rate of growth, by the year 2010 the number of *madrassas* will be equal to the government-run primary and secondary schools in Pakistan.

.... According to those with links to the *Deobandi madrassas*, their students are basically taught the Quran, and its interpretation until they become '*baaligh*' (the age of puberty, judged by the appearance of facial hair), and it is after this that they are motivated for *jihad*. By this yardstick, say sources, there are at present some 300,000 men being motivated for *jihad* in the *madrassas*...."

Newsline, Karachi, November, 2001

"Every one of the boys bobs his head up and down as he recites a verse and then another verse and another.... They are memorizing the entire Koran though they do not yet know its meaning.... ('That will come later... when they are taught to use the Koran as their life guide.')

It is still morning and we are told that the group will spend three hours at this – without a break. They will log another three hours in the afternoon. Six hours of rote memorization and no one is complaining...

After a long discussion... about the merits of the Koran, I ask the students how many want to be engineers or doctors when they finish school. Two hands are raised.

'How many of you want to fight *jihad* when you grow up?' Every hand shoots up into the air. And most of them are kids under the age of 10."

A television broadcaster on what he observed in a madrasa on the outskirts of Peshawar. Cited in Shankar Sharan, "The madrasa question and terrorism," Gandhi Marg, April-June 2002.

"They were outlawed and their training camps were dismantled, but Pakistan-based Islamic groups fighting India's rule in Kashmir have resurfaced and are openly calling for *jihad* in the disputed state.... Saeed

officially quit the leadership of the *Lashkar-e-Toiba* weeks before the group was outlawed last year. But he and his followers say they have regrouped under a new banner, the *Jamaat-ud-Dawa*... 'Lashkar wages *jihad* in Kashmir but in Pakistan it has no presence now,' said *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* member Abu Mujahid Nadeem. 'There is no need for it. We only preach religion. We read to the people the Quranic verses which call for *jihad*.'"

Amir Zia, Reuters, "Outlawed Pak-based militants rise, call for *jihad*,"
The Asian Age, 28 March, 2003

Picture a child who at the age of 4 or 5 is inducted into the closed, tightly controlled world of a *madrassa*. From then for 10-12 years he spends hours and hours every single day drinking in edicts and passages that he is made to believe come from the Highest of the high. He memorizes passage after passage that declares that those who do not believe what he is memorizing have but one aim: to deceive him into abandoning his religion, indeed to erase him and his religion altogether. He memorizes that they are *najas*, filthy – not just in body but in their very being. He has it drilled into him that he must have but one purpose: to strive to bring into being the Order that Allah has ordained for the world. This Order shall remain unfulfilled, the texts tell him, till the last of the unbelievers has either embraced the teaching he is learning by rote or has been vanquished, but that, once they accept it or are crushed, peace, plenty, beatitude will break out.

"The worst of beasts"

"For the worst of beasts in the sight of Allah," the child memorizes, "are those who reject Him: they will not believe." [8.55]¹ "They are the worst of creatures," the child memorizes again and again as he takes in the Quran. They shall be in Hell-fire, to dwell therein forever. [98.6] It is not that they do not know. They know, especially the people to whom Allah has already sent the Book, *they*, in particular, know. But they deliberately refuse to believe: "Those to whom We have given the Book know this as they know their own sons," Allah says. But as they have lost their souls, they refuse to believe. [6.20]

¹From this point to "Too weak a word" on page 117, numbers within square-parentheses refer to verses of the Quran.

Do not be misled by their outward professions, the child memorizes. They will tell you that they believe, but in their hearts they harbour unbelief:

Of the people there are some who say: "We believe in God and the Last Day;" but they do not (really) believe.

Fain would they deceive Allah and those who believe, but they only deceive themselves, and realise (it) not!

In their hearts is a disease; and Allah has increased their disease: And grievous is the penalty they (incur), because they are false (to themselves). [2.8-10]

Allah affirms this fact – about a disease having been sown in their hearts, about His having planted this disease in their hearts Himself – repeatedly. [For instance, in 5.52; 8.49; 33.12, 60; 47.20, 29.]

Their undying enmity

The child repeats what Allah has stated – that these others have the most evil intentions towards him, towards all Muslims, towards the religion itself. "They only desire your ruin: Rank hatred has already appeared from their mouths: What their hearts conceal is far worse," the child is instructed by Allah. "We have made plain to you the Signs, if ye have wisdom." [3.118] And again, "Ah! Ye are those who love them, but they love you not, though ye believe in the whole of the Book. When they meet you, they say, 'We believe': But when they are alone, they bite off the very tips of their fingers at you in their rage. Say: 'Perish in you rage; God knoweth well all the secrets of the heart.'" [3.119] And yet again, "If aught that is good befalls you," Allah warns, "it grieves them; but if some misfortune overtakes you, they rejoice at it..." [3.120]

"The Evil One has got the better of them," the child learns by memorizing the declarations of Allah "so he has made them lose the remembrance of Allah. They are the party of the Evil One. Truly, it is the Party of the Evil One that will perish!" [58.19] As they are the votaries, agents, indeed as they are the phalanx of Satan, surely all means are justified in destroying them.

The speech of such a one may dazzle you, the child learns on the authority of Allah Himself. To beguile you, that sort of a person may call Me to witness what is in his heart, "Yet he is the most contentious

of enemies. When he turns his back, his aim everywhere is to spread mischief through the earth and destroy crops and cattle...." [2.204-05]

Those who fail to embrace Islam fight in the cause of evil, the child memorizes from the Quran. They are the army of Satan. For Allah declares, "Those who believe fight in the Cause of Allah, and those who reject Faith fight in the cause of Evil. So, fight ye against the friends of Satan: feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan...." [4.76]

The child memorizes Allah's stern characterization of these people – who deliberately refuse to believe. In spite of Our clear warnings to them about what is certain to befall them because of their unbelief, Allah says, they do not fear to meet Us on the Day of Judgement. "Indeed, they have an arrogant conceit of themselves, and mighty is the insolence of their impiety." [25.21]

They are the cause of "tumult and oppression," he memorizes. They prevent access to the path of Allah. They deny Allah. [2.217] "The unbelievers spend their wealth to hinder (men) from the path of Allah," the child memorizes from the Quran, "and so they will continue to spend." "In the end they will have (only) regrets and sighs," Allah assures the *talib*, the student. At length they will be overcome:

And the unbelievers will be
Gathered together to Hell;
In order that Allah may separate
The impure from the pure,
Put the impure, one on another,
Heap them together, and cast them
Into Hell.... [8.36-37]

Jews, Christians, Pagans

"Strongest among men in enmity to the believers," the student learns as he memorizes the Quran, "you will find the Jews and Pagans." [5.82] "And nearest among them in love to the believers," the student learns, "will you find those who say, 'We are Christians': because amongst these are men devoted to learning, and men who have renounced the world, and they are not arrogant." [5.82]

But that concession turns out to be momentary. For simultaneously the child imbibes the warning of Allah:

O ye who believe!
Take not the Jews
And the Christians
For your friends and protectors:
They are but friends and protectors
To each other. And he
Amongst you that turns to them
(For friendship) is of them.
Verily Allah guideth not
A people unjust. [5.51]

You would have begun to notice how these admonitions and characterizations form the very warp and woof of the speeches of extremist leaders we encountered in Chapter 2 above. "Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied" with you, Allah warns the student and all Muslims, "unless you follow their form of religion...." And what would happen if you do so? "Were you to follow their desires after the knowledge which has reached you, then would you find neither Protector nor Helper against Allah." [2.120] The student is taught how the perversity of these unbelievers crosses over into blasphemy: these unbelievers conceal the testimony they have received from Allah. [2.140]

To further their wrong faith, they have perverted the Message Allah sent them, the Quran tells the student, they have breached the Covenant. [5.14] They have perverted what Jesus himself told them, the student learns, for he told them to worship Allah, not him. [5.116-18] They are forever bent on deceit, he learns. [5.13] They falsely claim that earlier prophets were Jews or Christians when in fact all of them were Muslims. [At several places in the Quran, for instance 2.149.] They try to lead you astray. [3.69] They "clothe Truth with falsehood, and conceal the Truth." [3.70, 71]

Their very beliefs are blasphemy upon Allah, upon the Prophet, the student is taught. They "blaspheme" Allah by saying that Christ is God and should be worshipped. [3.69; 5.17, 72, 116, 117; 9.30-32] They blaspheme Allah by saying that Jesus is the Son of God. [5.72; 9.30; 19.36] – and Allah's Curse is upon them for saying so. [9.31; 10.68-69; 4.171] They most certainly blaspheme Allah by saying He is, not one, but a Trinity. [4.171; 5.73]

They are "contentious people." [43.58] Christ was just an apostle; he was "no more than a servant (of Allah)." [5.75; 43.59]

The conclusion that the *talib* internalizes from all this about Christians is no different from what he has learnt about others who have failed to embrace the true Faith: if they accept the Quran and its teaching and repudiate their falsified faith, well and good; otherwise, you must fight them as you must fight other unbelievers, you must fight them until they are subdued, and acknowledge that they are subdued.

That is what is declared, not by some sundry *alim*, not by some sundry scholar but by Allah Himself.

"Those who believe (in the Quran), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians," Allah declares, "and who believe in Allah, and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord: on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve." [2.62; reiterated at 5.69] But if they do not embrace total belief in the Quran and its teachings, that is if they do not repudiate Christianity and become Muslims, the command which the child makes a part of his being is as unambiguous as it is uncompromising:

Fight those who believe not
In Allah nor the Last Day,
Nor hold that forbidden
Which has been forbidden
By Allah and His Apostle,
Nor acknowledge the Religion
Of Truth (even if they are)
Of the People of the Book,
Until they pay the *jizya*
With willing submission
And feel themselves subdued. [9.29]

"If they were to get the better of you," the student learns from the Quran, "they would behave to you as enemies, and stretch forth their hands and their tongues against you for evil; And they desire that you reject the Truth." [60.2]

By the design of Allah Himself

Invite them to the true Faith, offer them the *dawat-wal-Quran*, Allah

admonishes the student. But He tells him simultaneously that doing so is futile. Allah awakens the student to an insuperable hurdle, a hurdle that Allah has Himself placed in the way: Allah tells him that *He has Himself* decreed, *He has Himself* so arranged affairs that the unbelievers will *not* accept the doctrine. He repeats again and again that He has planted a disease in the hearts of unbelievers – a disease on account of which they just will not accept the True Faith: “As to those who reject Faith, it is the same to them whether thou warn them or do not warn them; they will not believe.” [2.6]

The same deduction follows from what Allah states throughout the Quran: that He is the Author of everything; that nothing happens, not a leaf moves but at His command. That some do not embrace Islam thus cannot but be the result of Allah’s Will. That deduction is by itself sufficient for the believer. But in fact, in regard to unbelievers, Allah is even more specific: they do not believe, Allah declares again and again, because *I* have decreed that they shall not believe. And so He demands of every believer as He did of the Prophet, “Would you guide those whom Allah has thrown out of the Way? For those whom Allah has thrown out of the Way, never shall you find the Way.” [4.88] “And those whom Allah leaves to stray, no one can guide.” [13.33] “Say, ‘I do but warn you according to Revelation,’” Allah tells the faithful, and immediately reminds them of the futility of doing so, “But the deaf will not hear the call, (even) when they are warned.” [21.45] “Were they to see a piece of the sky falling (on them),” Allah scoffs, “they would (only) say: ‘Clouds gathered in heaps!’” [52.43-46]

“In their hearts is a disease,” the child memorizes, “and *Allah has increased their disease*: And grievous is the penalty they (incur), because they are false (to themselves).” [2.10] It is *Allah Himself* who “took away their light and left them in utter darkness so they could not see. Deaf, dumb, and blind, they will not return (to the Path).” [2.17-18] And again, “Let not the Unbelievers think that our respite to them is good for themselves: *We grant them respite that they may grow in their iniquity*: But they will have a shameful punishment.” [3.178] And yet again, “Of them there are some who (pretend to) listen to thee; but *We have thrown veils on their hearts*, so they understand it not, *and deafness in their ears*; if they saw every one of the signs, not they will believe in them; in so much that when they come to thee, they (but) dispute with thee; the Unbelievers say: ‘These are nothing but tales of

the ancients.” [6.25] And yet again, Allah declares His design and what He has done to accomplish it: “And We have set none but angels as Guardians of the Fire; and We have fixed their number only as a trial for Unbelievers, in order that the People of the Book may arrive at certainty, and the Believers may increase in Faith, and that no doubts may be left for the People of the Book and the Believers, and that those in whose hearts is a disease and the Unbelievers may say, ‘What symbol doth Allah intend by this?’ *Thus doth Allah leave to stray whom He pleaseth, and guide whom He pleaseth*: and none can know the forces of thy Lord, except He and this is no other than a warning to mankind.” [74.31]

If it had been My intention to do so, Allah declares, I “would surely bring them, one and all, to the guidance.” [6.25, 35-36]

Be warned, the student learns from Allah as he memorizes the Quran, “Of the people there are some who say: ‘We believe in Allah and the Last Day,’ but they do not (really) believe. Fain would they deceive Allah and those who believe, but they only deceive themselves, and realise (it) not.” [2.8-9]

Why are you divided into two camps when it comes to moving against these hypocrites?, Allah demands of believers. “Allah hath upset them for their evil deeds,” He declares. “*Would you guide those whom Allah hath thrown out of the Way?* For those whom Allah hath thrown out of the Way, never shalt thou find the Way. They but wish that ye reject Faith, as they do....” [4.88-89]

It is by My Plan, Allah declares, that they have taken false gods. [6.107] “Thus have We placed leaders in every town, its wicked men, to plot (and burrow) therein. But they only plot against their own souls, and they perceive it not.” [6.123]

I Myself open to Islam the breasts of those whom I will guide, Allah says, and I Myself close and constrict the breasts of those who I will to leave straying. [6.125]

When you recite the Quran, Allah tells the faithful, “We put, between thee and those who believe not in the Hereafter, a veil invisible,” “And We put coverings over their hearts (and minds) lest they should understand the Quran, and deafness into their ears....” [17.45-46]

Allah tells not just him – the ordinary believer – he tells the Prophet himself, “If thou art anxious for their guidance, know that *Allah will*

not guide him whom He would lead astray, neither shall they have any helpers." [16.38-39] *"Just now is our sentence against most of them,"* Allah declares, *"therefore, they shall not believe. On their necks have We placed chains which reach the chin, and forced up are their heads. Before them We have set a barrier and behind them a barrier, and We have shrouded them in a veil, so that they shall not see. Alike is it to them if thou warn them or warn them not; they will not believe."* [36.6-10]

I gave them a bounty in return for their pledge to embrace Islam, Allah recounts. But they broke the Covenant. *"So He hath put as a consequence hypocrisy into their hearts, (to last) till the Day wherein they shall meet Him...."* [9.76-77]

"They swore the strongest oaths by Allah," the child memorizes, "that if a warner came to them, they would follow his guidance better than any (other) peoples: but when a warner came to them, it has only increased their flight (from) righteousness – on account of their arrogance in the land and their plotting of Evil...." [35.42-43] The reason? *"Verily We have set veils over their hearts lest they should understand this, and over their ears, deafness. If thou callest them to guidance, even then will they never accept guidance."* [18.57]

We sent signs to them, Allah declares repeatedly, but they did not believe.

Indeed, trying to convince them about the truth of the Message will only increase their impudence, Allah warns: "It is the revelation that cometh to thee from thy Lord that increaseth in most of them their obstinate rebellion and blasphemy. But sorrow thou not over (these) people without faith." [5.68] And yet again,

Whenever there cometh down a *sura*, some of them say: "Which of you has had His faith increased by it?" Yea, those who believe, their faith is increased and they do rejoice.

But those in whose hearts is a disease, it will add doubt to their doubt, and they will die in a state of Unbelief. [9.124-25]

What can possibly come of your efforts?, Allah admonishes the believer. They spurned Allah Himself: *"We put terror (and warning) into them, but it only increases their insubordinate transgression."* [17.60]

"Seest thou not," Allah demands, "that *We send the Satans against*

the infidels to urge them to sin?" [19.86] The result has already been ordained by Allah, the student memorizes: "Verily, *they against whom the decree of the Lord is pronounced shall not believe*, even though every kind of sign comes to them, till they behold the dolorous treatment. *But if thy Lord had pleased, verily all who are on earth would have believed together.* What! Wilt thou compel men to become believers? No soul can believe but by the permission of Allah: and He shall lay His wrath on those who will not understand." [10.96-99]

The reason Allah has planted the disease in unbelievers

But why has Allah devised this dichotomy? If it had been My will, Allah says, I could well have exacted retribution from the unbelievers Myself. But I let you – the believer – fight them, "*in order to test you, some with others.*" [47.4-6]

And given that Allah has instituted the dichotomy, given that the unbelievers are just not going to be persuaded by merely presenting the excellence of the Revelation to them, what must the believer do?

Waste no grief on them

First, do not waste any grief on them, the child imbibes from Allah again and again: "Let not those grieve thee who rush headlong into Unbelief," Allah admonishes. [3.176] "O Apostle! Let not those grieve thee who race each other into Unbelief," He reiterates. [5.41] "But grieve not over them, nor distress thyself because of their plots," He emphasizes yet again. [27.70] Get rid of the illusions and concern that may impel you to bring them to the light, Allah says: "If any one's trial is intended by Allah, thou hast no authority in the least for him against Allah. For such – it is not Allah's will to purify their hearts. For them there is disgrace in this world, and in the Hereafter a heavy punishment." [5.41] Shed all grief on their count – both because they cannot eventually cause harm to Allah and His Cause, and because what befalls them is their due, it is in accordance with the decree of Allah Himself: the punishment which will surely be visited on them is what they have invited upon themselves. [3.176; 5.41; 27.70; 31.23; 36.76]

Never trust them, do not befriend them

Second, never trust them; never take them as friends or helpers. "O ye

who believe!," Allah warns, "Take not into your intimacy those outside your ranks." [3.118] Even if they are your brothers and fathers, do not trust them to shield you: "O ye who believe! Take not for protectors your fathers and your brothers if they love infidelity above Faith: if any of you do so, they do wrong. Say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your mates, or your kindred; the wealth that ye have gained; the commerce in which ye fear a decline: or the dwellings in which ye delight – are dearer to you than God, or His Apostle, or the striving in His cause – then wait until God brings about His decision: and God guides not the rebellious." [9.23-24] Indeed, Allah is minatory:

Turnest thou not thy attention to those who turn (in friendship) to such as have the Wrath of God upon them? They are neither of you nor of them, and they swear to falsehood knowingly.

God has prepared for them a severe Penalty: evil indeed are their deeds. They have made their oaths a screen (for their misdeeds): thus they obstruct (men) from the Path of God: therefore shall they have a humiliating Penalty.

Of no profit whatever to them, against God, will be their riches nor their sons: they will be Companions of the Fire, to dwell therein (for aye)!

One day will God raise them all up (for Judgment): then will they swear to Him as they swear to you: And they think that they have something (to stand upon). No, indeed! they are but liars! The Evil One has got the better of them: so he has made them lose the remembrance of Allah. They are the Party of the Evil One. Truly it is the Party of the Evil One that will perish! Those who resist Allah and His Apostle will be among those most humiliated. [58.14-20]

Allah warns the *talib* again and yet again, He commands him again and yet again, "Take not My enemies and yours as friends, offering them (your) love even though they have rejected the Truth that has come to you, and have (on the contrary) driven out the Prophet and yourselves (from your homes) (simply) because you believe in Allah your Lord...." Do not take them as friends, "holding secret converse of love (and friendship) with them: for I know full well what you conceal and all that you reveal. And any of you that does this has strayed from the Straight Path." [60.1] "O, you who believe," the student memorizes Allah's repeated warning, "Turn not (for friendship) to people on whom is the wrath of Allah. Of the Hereafter they are already in despair, just as the unbelievers are in despair about

those (buried) in graves.” [60.13] What is it that you seek in befriending unbelievers rather than believers?, Allah asks every believer. “Is it honour they seek among them?” – for you cannot get any spiritual advantage in any case by being friends with non-believers. Is it then some worldly advantage you seek? Allah asks, and answers: “Nay – all honour is with Allah” [4.139] Thus, believers are certain to get nothing by being friends with non-believers except perdition in the Hereafter and dishonour in the world here.

Be patient

Third, prepare, and wait: “They reject (the warning) and follow their (own) lusts,” Allah counsels the faithful, “but every matter has its appointed time.” [54.3-8] Give them a final warning, He says. Tell them, “If (now) they desist (from unbelief), their past would be forgiven them.”

And then slaughter them

And when they still do not succumb, as is their ingrained nature?

Slaughter them – that is the command that Allah has given, the command that the student is made to memorize. And Allah has given the reason for slaughtering them – they cause “tumult and oppression”, and slaughtering them is the lesser evil, because, Allah explains, “Tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter.” “Nor will they cease fighting you,” Allah warns him and all the faithful, “until they turn you back from your faith if they can.” [2.217] “They but wish that you should reject Faith, as they do,” Allah declares, “and thus be on the same footing (as them),”

So take not friends
From their ranks
Until they flee
In the way of God
(From what is forbidden).
But if they turn renegades,
Seize them and slay them
Wherever you find them;
And (in any case) take
No friends or helpers
From their ranks.... [4.89]

except those, Allah exhorts the believer, who enter into a covenant with you, and give up their ways!

"But if they persist, the punishment of those before them is already (a matter of warning for them). And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah altogether and everywhere." [8.38-40] If they repent and embrace Islam, open the way for them. When they persist in *kuf* even after the period of grace that has been given them, as the Prophet gave them in the instance during the holy months, "then fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)." [9.5]

At times it may be that some tactical treaty has to be entered into with them – recall, Musharraf's allusion in his January 2002 Address to the people of Pakistan to the Treaty of Hudaiba that the Prophet signed with the Jews: the Prophet signed this treaty with the Yehudis, Musharraf said, *so that the forces of Islam may strengthen themselves in the meanwhile, and thereby vanquish the unbelievers in time*. But when circumstances compel you to enter into such an arrangement, remember two things, the *talib* memorizes Allah's warning: first, keep to the terms of the treaty only as long as the pagans remain true to them; second, remember that this temporary arrangement is only with the few who have sworn to abide by it; it is not with, it *cannot* be with pagans in general. "How (can there be such a league)," Allah asks, "seeing that if they get an advantage over you, they respect not in you the ties either of kinship or of covenant? With (fair words from) their mouths they entice you, but their hearts are averse from you; and most of them are rebellious and wicked." And not just to you: "The signs of Allah they have sold for a miserable price, and (many) have they hindered from His way: evil indeed are the deeds they have done." [9.7-9]

The *talib* thus takes in three "truths":

- ❑ The unbelief of non-Muslims is what is thwarting Allah's reign on earth;
- ❑ But this unbelief has been implanted in them by Allah Himself;
- ❑ His duty as a Muslim is but one: to ensure that the entire earth becomes the *dar al-Islam*.

The conclusion is inescapable. "Strive hard against the unbelievers and hypocrites and be firm against them," Allah mandates. "Their abode is hell – an evil refuge indeed." [9.73] "Therefore, when you meet the unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks," Allah commands. It is only when you have "thoroughly subdued them" that you are to "bind a bond firmly (on them)." Only "thereafter is the time for either generosity or ransom, until the war lays down its burdens." [47.4-6]

The bargain

"Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their goods," the child intones as he learns the Quran by rote, "for theirs (in return) is the garden (of Paradise): They fight in His Cause, and slay and are slain." You do your bit, and Allah will certainly stand by His part of the bargain for "who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah?" "Then rejoice in the bargain which ye have concluded," the student reads Allah saying, "that is the achievement supreme." [9.111]

And what is the bargain? That the *talib* kill and be killed for the Cause of Allah, and Allah, in turn, will lift him into the Garden of Paradise. Strike that bargain, the student memorizes: on the one hand, it will stave off the "grievous penalty" – for your sins will be pardoned, all except debt, the Prophet says; and on the other, Allah will "admit you to Gardens beneath which rivers flow, and to beautiful mansions in Gardens of Eternity." Not just that, Allah will bestow another favour "which ye love" – "help from Allah and a speedy victory." [61.11-13] "Nay, Allah is your Protector, and the best of helpers," the student memorizes. "Soon shall We cast terror into the hearts of the unbelievers...." [3.151]

"Truly Allah loves those who fight in His Cause in battle array," the student intones, "as if they were a solid cemented structure." [61.4] "Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead," the intern intones while he is alive, as do his relatives after him. "Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the Presence of their Lord; they rejoice in the Bounty provided by Allah: and with regard to those left behind, who have not yet joined them (in their bliss), the (Martyrs) glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor have they (cause to) grieve. They glory in the Grace and Bounty from Allah, and in the fact that Allah suffereth not the reward of the faithful to be lost (in the least)." [3.169-71]

As fear or some alternate prospect makes him falter, the *talib* remembers Allah's urgent admonishment: "O ye who believe! What is the matter with you, that, when ye are asked to go forth in the Cause of Allah, ye cling heavily to the earth? Do ye prefer the life of this world to the Hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the Hereafter. Unless ye go forth He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye will not harm in the least. For Allah hath power over all things." [9.38-39] Pause a moment and recall the speeches we encountered in Chapter 2: are they not mere elaborations of the verses and lines that we are reading now?

By fear of ending up in hell-fire, by the prospect of being forever in the Gardens of Paradise, by promises of Allah's assistance for a swift victory, the *talib* is steered into the singular course: he memorizes Allah's declaration, "Fighting is prescribed upon you." You dislike it, Allah says, adding "but it is possible that ye dislike a thing that is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you" – for instance, *jihad* which ostensibly takes your life here but actually ushers you into Paradise; "but Allah knoweth, and ye know not." [2.216]

Hence, let not unbelievers think that they can get the better of you. Indeed, "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom you may not know, but whom Allah doth know. Whatever you shall spend in the Cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly." [8.60]

And again, "Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, with your goods and your persons, in the Cause of Allah. That is best for you, if ye (but) knew." [9.41]...

Too weak a word

The *talib* "memorizes", his relatives "memorize", I have written. In fact, "memorizes" is too weak a word for what is done in the *madrassas*. Having children memorize the Quran is just one device. Hagiographies of *shahids*, peer group pressure, unremitting reinforcement in the closed world of the *madrassa*, blocking out the rest of the world – soon it isn't just that the child knows little else, he

is conditioned to shut out everything other than that which reinforces what has been drilled into him.

"But these *ayats* came down in specific contexts. You are quoting them out of context," charge the liberal apologists. The argument can have only one possible explanation: either these apologists are completely ignorant of the origins and status of the Quran, or they assume that their interlocutor is totally ignorant. *Every* verse of the Quran was revealed to the Prophet on some particular occasion: when he was seized by some personal problem or dilemma, when he was confronted by adversaries, during or after an engagement, etc. If each verse is assumed to have been relevant only to the occasion on which it was revealed or for the question in response to which it was revealed, what is left of the claim that it is a Book with a message for all times? What is left of the claim that it is but a reproduction of the original which lies preserved as a gold tablet in heaven? The commands and characterizations cited above were indeed conveyed to and by the Prophet on specific occasions, but they are eternal commands; the characterizations are true for all times and all occasions. In fact, that is the central point of belief in the Quran.

So the message is eternal, its commands are for all circumstances. That message and those commands are drilled that much deeper by another factor: the method of teaching in the *madrassas*, and of fundamentalist rhetoric in general. Every single word from the Quran is in the eyes of the believer a peremptory command. *Maulvis* and later the religio-political motivators have, therefore, to cite but one bit of one *ayat*, and the Will of Allah crystallizes in the heart of the believer. There is no "context" to the verses or lines. Every verse, every fragment of every verse is an eternal truth; it is a command in perpetuity, a command that holds for every occasion, in every circumstance.

The commands of Allah are reinforced; they are amplified by the pronouncements of the Prophet.

The commands of the Prophet

"By the Being in whose Hand is Muhammad's life," the child memorizes the Prophet having declared, "I love to fight in the way of Allah and be killed, to fight and again be killed and to fight again and be killed." Again, "By the Being in whose hand is my life, I love to be

killed in the way of Allah; then I should be brought back to life and be killed again in His way...."¹ And yet again, "By Him in whose Hands my life is! I would love to be martyred in Allah's Cause and then get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected again and then get martyred."² The Prophet is certain that his followers will be suffused with this love for martyrdom, that "a section of my community will continue to fight for the right and overcome their opponents till the last of them fight with the Antichrist."³

The child commits to heart the Prophet's assurance: "Allah has undertaken to look after the affairs of one who goes out to fight in His way believing in Him and affirming the truth of His apostles. He is committed to his care that He will either admit him to Paradise or bring him back to his home from where he set out with a reward or (his share of) booty. By the Being in whose hand is the life of Muhammad, if a person gets wounded in the way of Allah, he will come on the Day of Judgment with his wound in the same condition as it was when it was first inflicted; its colour being the colour of blood but its smell will be the smell of musk...."⁴

So delectable are the rewards that Allah will shower upon the one martyred in *jihad*, so great the honour that Allah will bestow, the child is assured by the Prophet, that "Nobody who enters Paradise will (ever like to) return to this world even if he were offered everything on the surface of the earth (as an inducement) except the martyr who will desire to return to this world and be killed ten times for the sake of the great honour that has been bestowed upon him."⁵ "The souls of the martyrs live in the bodies of green birds who have their nests in chandeliers hung from the throne of the Almighty," the child memorizes the Prophet having reported. "They eat the fruits of Paradise from wherever they like and then nestle in the chandeliers." So complete is their bliss, but also so eager are they to kill and be killed in *jihad*, that "once their Lord cast a glance at them and said:

¹ *Sabih Muslim*, 4626, 4631.

² *Sabih al-Bukhari*, 52.54; similarly, *Muwatta' Imam Malik*, 974, 986.

³ *Sunan Abu Dawud*, 2478.

⁴ *Sabih Muslim*, 4626; similarly, *Sabih al-Bukhari*, 52.46, 59; *Muwatta' Imam Malik*, 950, 976.

⁵ *Sabih Muslim*, 4635; similarly, *Sabih al-Bukhari*, 52.53.

'Do you want anything?' They said: 'What more shall we desire? We eat the fruit of Paradise from wherever we like.' Their Lord asked them the same question thrice. When they saw that they will continue to be asked and not be left (without answering the question), they said: 'O Lord we wish that Thou mayest return our souls to our bodies so that we may be slain in Thy Way once again.'" It is then that the Lord saw that the souls of martyrs were in complete bliss, and He left them to continue to enjoy Paradise.¹

Nor is the boon confined to the martyr himself – he and his relatives are assured. For, declares the Prophet, "The intercession of a martyr will be accepted for seventy members of his family."² Recall the "will" that the *Lashkar* recruit sent his parents, and you will glimpse the hypnosis which the *madrassa* induces using such assurances.

There are grades in Paradise, the child learns the Prophet having said, and the distance between one grade and the next "is equal to the height of the heaven from the earth." And there is one deed which elevates the position of a man to one hundred grades higher. What is that deed?, the companion asks the Prophet. "*Jihad* in the way of Allah! *Jihad* in the way of Allah!," declares the Prophet.³

The very act of killing an infidel guarantees heaven, the child learns, for the Prophet has said, "An infidel and the one who killed him will never be brought together in hell."⁴ The proposition is the simplest algebra. As the infidel is consigned to hell in perpetuity, the faithful one who has killed him is guaranteed a place in heaven in perpetuity.

Even the most fleeting *jihad* confers unequalled benefits: "By Him in whose hand Muhammad's soul is," the Prophet declares, "a morning or an evening expedition in Allah's path is better than the world and what it contains, and for one of you to remain in the line of battle is better than his prayers for sixty years."⁵ "To guard Muslims from infidels for one day," the Prophet declares, "is better than the

¹*Sabih Muslim*, 4651; similarly, *Mishkat al-Masabib*, Book XVIII, Volume II, pp. 817-18.

²*Sunan Abu Dawud*, 2516.

³*Sabih Muslim*, 4645; similarly, *Sabih al-Bukhari*, 52.48; in *Mishkat al-Masabib*, the Prophet reiterates the expression not twice but thrice: Book XVIII, Vol. II, p. 817.

⁴*Sunan Abu Dawud*, 2489.

⁵*Mishkat al-Masabib*, Book XVIII, Volume II, p. 817; *Sabih Muslim*, 4639-43.

world and whatever is on its surface, and a place in Paradise as small as that occupied by the whip of one of you is better than the world and whatever is on its surface; and a morning's or an evening's journey which a slave (person) travels in Allah's Cause is better than the world and whatever is on its surface."¹ Indeed, even a man who kills a Muslim while the latter is waging *jihad*, can enter Paradise, declares the Prophet: provided that, having killed the Muslim, the murderer embraces Islam and is himself martyred in *jihad*.²

Who is the best of men? the child learns the Prophet was asked, and is made to commit to heart the Prophet's answer: "A man who fights in the way of Allah spending his wealth and staking his life."³

The child learns of the man who asked the Prophet, "Instruct me as to such a deed as equals *jihad*," and the Prophet's unequivocal answer, "I do not find such a deed."⁴

Indeed, the Prophet explained the boons that come upon a man who keeps a horse for the purpose of *jihad* "tying it with a long tether on a meadow or in a garden"; "whatever it eats from the area of the meadow or the garden where it is tied will be counted as good deeds for his benefit, and if it should break its rope and jump over one or two hillocks then all its dung and its footmarks will be written as good deeds for him; and if it passes by a river and drinks water from it even though he had no intention of watering it, even then he will get the rewards for its drinking." And again, even more generally, "If somebody keeps a horse in Allah's Cause motivated by his belief in His Promise, then he will be rewarded on the Day of Resurrection for what the horse has eaten or drunk and for its dung and urine."⁵ For this assurance too the child finds proof positive from Allah Himself. For Allah declares,

Those who believe, and suffer exile and strive with might and main, in God's cause, with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of God: they are the people who will achieve (salvation).

Their Lord doth give them glad tidings of a Mercy from Himself, of His

¹ *Sabih al-Bukhari*, 52.142.

² *Sabih Muslim*, 4658-60.

³ *Sabih Muslim*, 4652, 4653; similarly, *Muwatta' Imam Malik*, 952.

⁴ *Sabih al-Bukhari*, 52.44.

⁵ *Sabih al-Bukhari*, 52.44, 49, 105; similarly, *Muwatta' Imam Malik*, 951, *Mishkat al-Masabih*, Book XVIII, Volume II, p. 822.

good pleasure, and of gardens for them, wherein are delights that endure: They will dwell therein for ever. Verily in God's presence is a reward, the greatest (of all). [9.20-22]

"Surely," the child hears the Prophet having declared, "The gates of Paradise are under the shadows of the swords."¹ And he is taught to emulate the example of the man who, faced by the enemy, asked the Prophet, "Where will I be if I am killed?" and when told by the Prophet, "In Paradise," "threw away the dates he had in his hand and fought until he was killed (that is, he did not wait until he could finish the dates)."²

By contrast "the one who died but did not fight in the way of Allah," the child learns the Prophet having declared, "nor did he express any desire (or determination) for *jihad*, died the death of a hypocrite."³ Again, the Prophet declares, "He who dies without having fought or having felt fighting (against the infidels) to be his duty will die guilty of a kind of hypocrisy." And yet again, "He who does not join the warlike expedition (*jihad*), or equip a warrior, or look well after a warrior's family when he is away, will be smitten by Allah with a sudden calamity." Hence, commands the Prophet, "Use your property, your persons and your tongues in striving against the polytheists."⁴ Congregations in which money is collected for the "*jihad*" in Kashmir hear these admonitions every few minutes.

The child learns too that, while providing for a *jihadi* earns merit, it is but a fraction of the merit that accrues from waging the *jihad* oneself. "He who sends a contribution towards Allah's path and stays in his house will have seven hundred dirhams for every dirham he contributes," the Prophet declares, "but he who fights in person and contributes towards that expedition of his will have seven hundred thousand dirhams for every dirham he contributes." Having pronounced thus, the Prophet repeats the Quranic verse, "And Allah multiplies to whom He will."⁵

And remember, the child is taught, *jihad* is ordained forever, till the last of the infidels, and the last of the polytheists has capitulated and

¹ *Sahih Muslim*, 4681; similarly, *Sahih al-Bukhari*, 52.73; *Mishkat al-Masabih*, Book XVIII, Volume II, p. 817.

² *Sahih Muslim*, 4678; similarly, *Muwatta' Imam Malik*, 988.

³ *Sahih Muslim*, 4696.

⁴ *Sunan Abu Dawud*, 2496-98.

⁵ *Mishkat al-Masabih*, Book XVIII, Volume II, pp. 818-19.

embraced Islam. "I am commanded to fight with men," the Prophet declares, "till they testify that there is no god but Allah, and that Muhammad is His servant and His Apostle, face our *qiblah*, eat what we slaughter, and pray like us. When they do that, their life and property are unlawful for us except what is due to them."¹ Then and then alone will they have the same rights as the Muslims. And, by definition, they will also have the same responsibilities – among them being the duty that they too strive to convert whatever remains of the *dar al-harb* into the *dar al-Islam*.

How can the child schooled on the Quran and the *hadis* not applaud someone like Osama bin Laden when the latter proclaims that his mission is to get the Jews and Christians out of the Arabian Peninsula? Has the *talib* not memorized what the Prophet has himself declared again and again – on occasion addressing the Jews and Christians directly? "If you Jews accept Islam you will be safe," the Prophet tells them. "Know that the land belongs to Allah and His messenger, and I intend to deport you from this land; so if any of you has property, [he cannot take it away] he must sell it." "Expel the polytheists from Arabia," the Prophet declares, "and reward deputations as I did." "I will certainly expel Jews and Christians from Arabia so as to leave only Muslims in it," the Prophet declares yet again. In fact, on occasion the Prophet is even more comprehensive. He does not limit his command to Arabia; he talks of the whole earth. Addressing the Jews, he says, "You should know that the earth belongs to Allah and His Apostle, and I wish that I should expel you from this land. Those of you who have any property with them should sell it, otherwise they should know that the earth belongs to Allah and His Apostle (and they may have to go away leaving everything behind)."² "You (i.e., Muslims) will fight the Jews till some of them will hide behind stones," the Prophet declares. "The stones will (betray them) saying, 'O Abdullah (i.e., slave of Allah)! There is a Jew hiding behind me; so kill him.'"³ Can the child, having memorized such commands, have any doubt whatsoever about the validity of the mission that an Osama bin Laden pursues?

¹ *Sunan Abu Dawud*, 2634-2636; in 2636 instead of "I am commanded to fight with men," the words are "I am commanded to fight with *polytheists*."

² *Sahib Muslim*, 4363-67; *Sunan Abu Dawud*, 3023-24; *Mishkat al-Masabih*, Book XVIII, Volume II, pp. 865-66.

³ *Sahib al-Bukhari*, 52.176, 177.

These being the commands, what is the answer?

When these are the clear, emphatic commands of Allah, when these are the unambiguous proclamations and exhortations of the Prophet, how is the liberal reformer to counter what the ideologues assert? By what verse or *hadis* is one to dissuade the young intern in the Binauri *madrassa* in Karachi to shun Abu A'la Maududi when he proclaims,

- ❑ The prayer, Fasting, Almsgiving and Pilgrimage are so important that they are described as the pillars of Islam. They are not, however, like the worship rites in other religions. This we must understand clearly. Nor are they meant to please Allah by their mere outward observance. These acts of worship have in fact been ordained to prepare us for a greater purpose and to train us for a greater duty... The prayer, Fasting, Almsgiving and Pilgrimage, all prepare you for *Jihad*.¹
- ❑ The Prayer, Fasting, Almsgiving and Pilgrimage at their deepest level provide preparation and training for the assumption of just power. Just as governments train their armies, police forces and civil services before employing them to do their job, so does Islam, the *Din* given by Allah. It first trains all those who volunteer for service to God before allowing them to undertake *Jihad* and establish God's rule on earth.²
- ❑ The *Din* of Allah, like any other *Din*, does not allow that you merely believe in its truth and perform certain worship rites. If you are a true follower of Islam, you can neither submit to any other *Din*, nor can you make Islam a partner of it. If you believe Islam to be true, you have no alternative but to exert your utmost strength to make it prevail on earth: you either establish it or give your lives in this struggle.³
- ❑ The objective of Islamic *Jihad* is to put an end to the dominance of the un-Islamic systems of government and replace them with Islamic rule. Islam intends to bring about this revolution not in one country or in a few countries but in the entire world. Although initially it is the duty of every member of the Muslim

¹Maulana Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi, *Fundamentals of Islam*, (Ed. Khurram Murad), New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers, 2002, p. 285.

²*ibid*, p. 291

³*ibid*, p. 300.

Party to work for revolution wherever he lives, the final purpose is nothing but a world revolution.¹

Or when the preacher in the mosque, the *alim* at the seminary, or the head of the *Jama'at-ud-Dawa wal-Irshad* recalls what Sayyid Qutb declared?

- ❑ The Islamic *Jihad* has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way in which it is conducted. The causes of Islamic *Jihad* should be sought in the very nature of Islam and its role in the world, in its high principles, which have been given to it by God and for the implementation of which God appointed the Prophet – peace be upon him – as His Messenger and declared him to be the last of all prophets and messengers.²
- ❑ Since the objective of the message of Islam is a decisive declaration of man's freedom, not merely on the philosophical plane but also in the actual conditions of life, it must employ *Jihad*.³
- ❑ The reasons for *Jihad* which have been described in the above verses are these: to establish God's authority on the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of one man over others, since all men are creatures of God and no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws for them. These reasons are sufficient for proclaiming *Jihad*.⁴
- ❑ The reason for *Jihad* exists in the nature of its message and in the actual conditions it finds in human societies, and not merely in the necessity for defense, which may be temporary and of limited extent. A Muslim fights with his wealth and his person "in the way of God" for the sake of these values in which neither personal gain nor greed is a motive for him.⁵

¹Maulana Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi, *Come Let Us Change This World*, Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers, Delhi, 1995, pp. 106-107.

²Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers, Delhi, 2000, pp. 102-103.

³*ibid.*, p. 113.

⁴*ibid.*, p. 127.

⁵*ibid.*, p. 129.

Moreover, this being the case, is *Jihad* to end in the near future? Will the "reasons" that Sayyid Qutb gives not continue to be valid till the entire world has been brought under the sway of Islam – in fact, under the sway of the version of Islam *which they approve?*

By what device is the liberal modernist to answer Professor Saeed or Salahuddin when the latter invoke Hasan al Banna?

- ❑ By *Jihad* I mean the obligation which will continue till the Day of Judgment. And about which Prophet Muhammad said: "A person who dies without having fought in a *Jihad* (for the sake of Allah) and not having any longing to do so, dies in a state of *Jahiliyah* (the ignorance preceding Islam).
- ❑ The lowest degree of *Jihad* is to reject falsehood (*Batil*) by heart and the highest degree is to sacrifice one's own life in the way of Allah.¹
- ❑ Let this also be clear that the Call to Islam can never be alive without *Jihad*. The *Jihad* will gain importance if the Call is high and multidimensional. To make this Call protracted and sustainable, we will have to pay a high price. On this consideration, those who work will deserve the greatest divine benefits and rewards. So, O Muslim brethren! Do *Jihad* in the way of Allah and do not show any deficiency. After this clarification perhaps you would have fully understood the meaning of your permanent slogan, "*Jihad* is our path."²

Is the liberal reformer closer to what the canonical texts say or is the Pakistani Brigadier closer when says in his widely circulated *The Quranic Concept of War*?

- ❑ Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means; it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is *the decision* we wish to impose upon him.³

¹Quoted in Professor Saeed Hawwa, *Ikhwan-al-Muslimoon*, Urdu Translation by Obaidullah Fahad Falahi, Hindustan Publications, Delhi, 1996, pp. 222-223.

²*Ibid.*, p. 223.

³Brigadier S.K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War*, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, 1986, p. 59.

Or when he invokes Allah Buksh Brohi to the effect,

Many Western scholars have pointed their accusing fingers at some of the ... verses in the Qur'an to be able to contend that the world of Islam is in a state of perpetual struggle against the non-Muslims. As to them it is sufficient answer to make, if one were to point out, that the defiance of God's authority by one who is His slave exposes that slave to the risk of being held guilty of treason and such a one, in the perspective of Islamic law, is indeed to be treated as a sort of that cancerous growth on that organism of humanity, which has been created "*Kanafsin Wabidatin*" – that is, like one, single, indivisible self. It thus becomes necessary to remove the cancerous malformation even if it be by surgical means (if it would not respond to other treatment), in order to save the rest of Humanity.... The idea of *Ummah* of Mohammad, the Prophet of Islam, is incapable of being realised within the framework of territorial states much less made an enduring basis of viewing the world as having been polarised between the *world of Islam* and the *world of war*. Islam, in my understanding, does not subscribe to the concept of the territorial state....¹

Four Questions

The problem, as we see, is not any shortage of evidence. The problem is that we just don't want to believe the mountains of it that stare us in the face.

And the reason we do not want to believe the evidence is not far to seek: were we to believe it, we would have to change our conduct; we would have to give up our easy-going, somnolent ways.

That is the one thing we don't want to do.

In large part because of the ignominy that its support to Taliban had brought it the world over, but also because what the *jihadi* culture was doing to the country at home had become so injurious, Pervez Musharraf's Government announced a series of measures to rein-in the *madrassas*. Hence, the question: What would be the reaction in India if some government here announced steps to rein in the *madrassas* here? The answer to that simple question bares how enfeebled 50-years of "secularist" discourse has left us.

Second, there is much talk of "modernizing" the curricula of the *madrassas*. Grants to them are being increased in the expectation that once computers, etc. are introduced, and a few modern subjects, the

¹Allah Buksh K. Brohi, "Preface", in Brigadier S.K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War*, op. cit., pp. xix-xx.

mind-set that emerges after schooling in them will be different. But surely, no "modernization" of the textbooks or subjects can ever replace the edicts of Allah and the *badis* in such institutions. Hence, the question: What will be the result when modern technology is combined with the sorts of commands and characterizations that we have glimpsed above?

Third, remember that the commands that have been cited above are from the Quran and from the canonical collections of the *badis*. They are not interpretations or constructions of some *alim*. Hence the question: By what argument will secularists persuade the faithful to repudiate or act contrary to these commands?

Fourth, in view of these unambiguous commands, in view of the fact that these commands are repeated scores and scores of times in each text which the wards internalize in *madrassas*, what should one make of the assertions of apologists who tell us that *jihad* as we know it is only the "lesser *jihad*", and that what Allah wants from the faithful is the "greater *jihad*"—which these apologists say is the inner directed struggle to purify one's self?!

And a fifth one

Hence, the question of questions: how will we even get to know the mindset that institutions such as the *madrassas* foment if, because of the inhibitions imposed by notions of political correctness, out of intellectual cowardice, often out of plain laziness, we do not look up the texts? How will we get our country to contend with persons who have been indoctrinated by these notions if, out of the same cowardice and notions of propriety, we do not ever make those texts the subjects of public discourse?

And the chilling fact

There is one final point to bear in mind — one that is just as chilling in its implications for our security as is the man who has been hypnotized by the sort edicts we have encountered above. Terrorists who think they are out to convert the world into a *dar al-Islam* are not the only ones who can be hypnotized into becoming killing machines. Dhanu who blew herself up in assassinating Rajiv Gandhi was no Muslim. The Maoist youth who are today creating chaos in Nepal are no Muslims. In a word, the elements of indoctrination that we have glimpsed in this chapter are but one of several possible sets.

Not a counsel of despair

The extremism of the ideology, of course, itself yields one ally for the civilized world. The terrorist can be motivated to carry out such deeds only by an extremist ideology. But once such an ideology comes to suffuse a group, once it becomes even merely the rationale for the existence of that group or State, it triggers a search for the "pure". Leaders, factions, cabals denounce, depose and kill each other – on the charge that the rival leader, faction, cabal has deviated from the ideology. The purges and splits in dozens of communist States and parties are recent examples of the sequence. Terrorist groups and fundamentalist States are bound to trigger the same "search for the pure", they will make the ideology as lethal a weapon.

Four features ensure that such ideological-States and "parties" and groups shall go on splintering.

The moment the degree to which one is adhering to a text, to a set of pronouncements, the moment proximity to a person have been set up as the measures of fidelity, the hunt for purity commences. And it never ends – first the Shias are outside the pale, then various hues of Sunnis; first the Ahmadiyas are declared by law to be non-Muslims, in no time the demand grows that Shias be declared non-Muslims; then that the Ismailis be declared non-Muslims; the needle of impurity points one day to recent converts, the next to converts who have migrated to an Islamic State.... The more committed a group is to ensuring purity, the more swiftly it gravitates to violence: one has only to recall the mushrooming in Pakistan and the murderous ferocity of organizations like the *Sipah-e-Sahaba* and *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* from the Sunni side; the *Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan* and the *Sipah-e-Muhammad* of the Shias. Not only have the cadre of one set been killing members of the other set; in each set, one organization has sprung from a bitter and violent split.

The second cause of splintering is none other than the feature that seems at first to testify to the strength of the extremist organization. Funds pour in. Properties are acquired.... The more extreme the beliefs of the organization, the more Spartan the followers, the greater the amounts that pour in, the higher the assets pile up. As the reach of the organization extends, as its functions multiply, more and more "posts" come to be created and they have to be filled.... Soon, quarrels start for control over funds and properties. Charges of

nepotism fly. Disputes arise over women – second marriages have caused dire cleavages in the *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, as has the elevation of a brother-in-law of the Professor!

The third spark for schisms is the combining of *piri* and *miri* – secular power with religious authority. As is well known, and as the *ulema* never tire of pointing out, the Prophet founded both – a religion and a State. But the State is controlled by one person or faction – he controls it and runs it in the name of Islam. His rule is based on the claim that he is the best guarantor, indeed the only guarantor of the interests of Islam. But rulers and ruling factions breed opponents. And, given the crucible in which the State has been set – of Islam, of Marxism-Leninism – the opponents can oppose the ruler and his faction on only one charge: that the latter are harming Islam, that they are deviating from it, that they are endangering it. So, the fight for a very mundane objective – power over the State – cannot but become a fight between contending “versions” of Islam. The struggle – fanned now by fanatical belief, by commitment to the Faith – becomes brutal. On the other side, the Faith splinters.

Finally, while these passionate ideologies claim to subsume particular identities that preceded their advent – the identities of the period of *jahiliyyat*, so to say – they have never been able to erase them. In many ways, they exacerbate them. For when the jostling and struggles ensue for capturing the State, the factions get organized along the *jahiliyyat* identities – along tribes, kinship, language, region.

We see this in the history of Islam from the moment of the Prophet’s death, literally the *moment* of his death, to the sectarian killings in Pakistan today. The result is as evident as it is inevitable: “More Muslims have been killed by Muslims,” Salim Mansur laments, “more Muslims continue to be victimized by Muslims, and more Muslims are in danger of dying at the hands of Muslims than non-Muslims.”¹ When the Communist States were still around, we could have replaced the word “Muslims” in that observation with “Communists” and we would have been just as accurate!

¹Salim Mansur, “Muslim on Muslim violence: what drives it?,” The Center for Security Policy, Washington, DC, Occasional Paper Series, June 2004; <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org>.

Hence, in spite of the ferocity of the terrorist, in spite of the certainty of his belief, we need not despair. There are many fault-lines. We should spot the symptoms, and “give History a helping hand”: instead of denouncing the ideology for being extremist, we should hold it to its extreme exactions, and thereby intensify the “ideological struggles”, we should garner evidence of “lapsing”, we should give grounds for each leader and faction to prove that the fidelity of the other to the teaching is deficient.

But to put any of this to work, the targeted victims

- ❑ Must know the opiate; broadcast it before hand; and thereby provide the spectacles through which the believer will view the event;
- ❑ Having forged the spectacles, the targeted victims must not just sit back and hope that the believers will see events through them. In the wake of the engagement, especially when the terrorist group has been subjected to a setback, they must show up the hollowness of the rationalizations that the believers had internalized.

Of course, the group will have its ways of shutting out the evidence of defeat. But even as it does so, it will be weakening the hallucinogen on which its edifice is built. Till the other day, Pakistani intellectuals and *ulema* were projecting the Taliban as masterly success. The Army and the ISI have secured “strategic depth” for Pakistan, they were proclaiming. A great victory for Islam, they were writing – rulership of pure, idealist youngsters has been established, a rulership that the people love as it has brought peace, as it has pulled them back from the abyss of immorality and licentiousness. That was the refrain – day in and day out, for years. And then suddenly Pakistan was being told that joining the campaign to crush the very same Taliban was a masterstroke. Cleverness entails costs. The somersaults that the Comintern used to execute under Stalin seemed so clever at the time. Soon, they delegitimised the ideology itself.

In a word, the creed by which the terrorists are ignited is the most potent weapon of all. Even so, the rest of the world can proceed with confidence – provided it examines the creed, exhumes it, and broadcasts the results of the examination.

Terrorism

Much of the terrorism that we have had to face in the last few years has been sponsored, financed, equipped, directed by Pakistan. But by now it has also acquired a dynamic of its own – as is evident from the spread of Islamic fundamentalism across half the world: from Algeria through Pakistan and Bangladesh, and thence through Malaysia and Indonesia to the Philippines. We have been contending with it for two decades. That struggle has thrown up several lessons – many of which are self-evident axioms, and yet some of even the most obvious ones are ones that we just refuse to learn, far less act on. Here are a few of them.

1. The terrorism that the world has been awakened to is not a war that “started on December 1” and will “end on March 2”. It is “permanent war”. As such, the first requisites are perseverance and attention to each follicle. The image we should bear in mind is of Chanakya. Chandragupta was passing by a field, it is said. He saw a man in the distance bending low, pouring something into the ground, straightening, bending over again.... He went over. The man was Chanakya. Chandragupta asked him what he was doing. Chanakya explained that he was pouring curd into the root of each blade of grass in the field so as to kill it. But why? Because one of the blades had the temerity to cut my foot.... Each of the four italicized words, thus: the *root* of *each* blade in the *entire* field to be *completely* killed....

2. By now many, many groups have taken to terrorism.

They are increasingly intertwined: in India, as well as the world over. A trade such as that in drugs just cannot continue and flourish without close, day-to-day help from those running financial operations – say, the *hawala* operators; from the police; from politicians and bureaucrats; from the magistracy itself. Therefore, when the terrorist plugs into one of these networks – the gang

running the local drug trade – he in effect plugs into these webs of the State itself. Thus, he ruptures the State in ways other than, and to an extent far greater than the deaths that result from his explosions: he punctures holes in the State. The gangs themselves get intermeshed as the years roll by. Two decades ago, gangs and groups that were engaged in, say, smuggling gold and those that were smuggling drugs were different, one from the other; both sets kept far from those who were running guns or were killing people for political objectives. But now the various groups overlap. This has immediate operational consequences: by plugging into any one of the groups, ISI or any other similar organization can acquire access to an array of interlaced networks – for recruitment, for logistical support, for the operations themselves. It does not need to send RDX for the Bombay blasts through a terrorist network – a gang smuggling gold will ferry it just as willingly, and as efficiently. Similarly, look at the range of locations from which persons were picked up in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The knitting together comes about in many ways. Groups in India are encouraged by agencies hostile to India to coordinate their activities: for instance, the ISI has been putting Naxalite groups, as it has been putting the various groups operating in the Northeast in touch with each other. Often the groups are brought together by “natural” factors: for instance, both groups may be running drugs – they may become couriers, suppliers, customers of each other; they may be securing arms from the same arms supplier – and through him they may get to know each other; they may be using the same agents or routes for money laundering....

5. There is no “front” in this war, no “rear”. Terrorists select targets on a variety of criteria – the terror they can create by one act, the ease of getting at the person or place, etc. But no particular settlement or structure is immune. For one thing, terrorists are ever so mobile. For another, installing high security gadgets at, say, a few metropolitan airports can be brought to naught by the terrorist – he can get onto the plane, equipped for his mission, at Raipur; with equal ease, a terrorist being chased in Delhi can disappear into the black-hole of Bihar’s ungoverned hinterlands. Nor does the terrorist make any distinction between civilians and combatants: the explosive detonated in a market makes no distinction; civilians may be killed because, on the

terrorist's reckoning, they are collaborators or informers; they may be killed because killing them helps create the terror that is indispensable to the terrorist's purpose; they may be targeted because they are the easier, and when it comes to extracting ransom, the more lucrative target than the military man; they may be targeted because "taxes" of the kind that groups collect in the Northeast can be extracted more easily from them than from men in uniform. Of course, eventually such targeting alienates the very people whose support – at the least, whose tacit acquiescence – the terrorist group needs. But that "eventual" point is ever so often beyond the terrorist's horizon.

6. The terrorists will use *all* weapons that they can lay their hands on – a belt of explosives if that will do, or biological viruses if those are available. To win against them, the country has to be able to counter the entire range of weapons and technologies. To what extent do we have antidotes to contaminants, to viruses? Do our Forces have the clothing they will need to enter an area into which chemical agents have been let loose? Are the vehicles even of our defence or paramilitary Forces sealed sufficiently to be able to enter the effected area soon after a virus or chemical agent has been spread through it? To what extent can our computer systems survive electromagnetic surges? How often do we test the vulnerability of our equipment, of our infrastructure, of our troops, of the population at large to such weapons? After all, they must be able to survive the attack, *and* have the capacity to inflict a level of damage on the offending group or country that is beyond the level it can bear.

7. Mercifully, thus far terrorists operating in India have not unleashed biological weapons. But for several reasons the day cannot be far off when such weapons will be deployed:

- ☐ The viruses can be produced using commercially available incubation and fermentation equipment and cell cultures;
- ☐ They are very easy to transport;
- ☐ They can be developed by the smallest band in mobile facilities – in this they differ, for instance, from even "suitcase" nuclear weapons;
- ☐ Once produced, they can be left to replicate on their own;
- ☐ The source may be impossible to pinpoint – for instance, the terrorist group or country may unleash the virus having

engineered an incubation period of three-four weeks in it: by the time the virus erupts, it would have infected thousands and the perpetrators would be far away; indeed, it would be very difficult in the initial stages to be certain that it is an attack and not just another "natural" pathogen gone out of hand – the group or country, knowledgeable persons point out, could "design stealth pathogens by cloning virulence factors into otherwise nonpathogenic microbes";

- The biological agents need not target humans alone – they could as well be aimed at crops, for instance.¹

Moreover, we cannot afford to forget that huge stockpiles of such weapons are known to have been accumulated by a number of States – not all out of bounds for terrorist groups. A paper presented to the US Air Force War College as far back as November 1999 – by a former Soviet scientist who had worked for twenty years on the Soviet Union's biological weapons programme – reported that the Soviet Union had stored over 100 tons of Anthrax, and had the capacity to manufacture thousands of tons more every year; that it also had stockpiles of about 20 tons of weapons to trigger outbreaks of small pox and plague.² Citing the Office of the US Defence Secretary's *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, January, 2001; a RAND study further observes, "It has been widely reported that North Korea possesses 2,500 to 5,000 tons of Chemical Weapons, that Iran possesses thousands of tons, and that Russia has had some 40,000 tons of Chemical Weapons and potentially thousands of tons of biological agents."

¹On all this see in particular the Gilmore Commission's report, *First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction*, December 1999. The Report covers both the inherent difficulties in making biological weapons that would cause massive deaths as well as the difficulties in guarding against such weapons with absolute certainty. For a swift read see, for instance, James J. Valdes, "Vulnerability to biological weapons in non-traditional warfare," in William R. Schilling, *Nontraditional Warfare*, Brassey's Inc., Washington D.C., 2002, pp. 43-49, at p. 48.

²Kenneth Alibek, "Biological Weapons," USAF Air War College, November 1999; see also his testimony to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, 20 May 1998; and to the US Senate Committee on Appropriations, 29 November 2001.

In a word,

- ❑ The country has to be ahead *in the relevant technology* of terrorist groups and the power backing them;
- ❑ It must always bear in mind that a key stratagem that will be employed even more frequently in future wars will be to create immense confusion, demoralization and resentment among the *non-military population behind* the frontier; to foment these in many regions of the country *simultaneously*: biological agents that destroy a vital crop, that cause a large enough outbreak among citizens of even a conventional disease, such a weapon used in conjunction with other non-military weapons – weapons that we will encounter as we turn to Chinese concepts of “unrestricted warfare” – are ideally suited for creating the necessary confusion, resentment, demoralization that strategists counsel as necessary ingredients of, indeed in some circumstances as substitutes for armed assault.

As for preparedness, given that we are not able to stem the ingress even of lakhs from Bangladesh, one does not have to wonder how equipped we are to detect a lethal biological virus that someone may set out to transport across our borders.

8. The technologies and stratagems that terrorists and their sponsors can deploy are clearly beyond the ken of conventional military men. We cannot demand of persons trained in conventional military tactics and weapons that they acquire the requisite knowledge in fields as diverse as biotechnology, chemical engineering, information technology and the rest. Defence structures must, therefore, ensure regular cooperation and interaction of defence planners with professionals from the relevant industries – chemical industries, pharmaceuticals, computational sciences....

9. Most societies, when confronted with terrorism, deploy the regular Forces – first the police, then the para-military forces, and eventually the Army. But, as experts have repeatedly pointed out, the challenge that the terrorist group poses is completely different from either maintaining law and order or the conventional invasion across the borders of that country. Special Forces are what the country needs to combat the challenge – Forces that hunt the terrorists by the

tactics and organizational techniques and camouflage of the terrorists themselves: small units, mobile to the point of being nomadic, equipped with arms and surveillance devices appropriate to the specific terrain in which the hunt is being conducted. Contrast these requirements and training with the vulnerability of the fixed camps of a conventional Force that the terrorists in J&K are able to repeatedly pierce and assail.

10. Moreover, each such Special Force has to be as different from others of the same genre as the challenges are – the Sikh terrorist of the early 1980s was ever so different from the Naxalite of the 1970s; the Islamic terrorist operating in J&K is ever so different from the followers of Bhindranwale.

11. Once a terrorist group takes root, it is extremely difficult to root it out – look at the difficulties we have been having with just the Naxalites: they are just a handful, there can be no illusion that their original plans of a Maoist revolution in India would ever come to prevail, and yet successive governments at the Centre and in the states have not been able to smoke them out of their pockets.

12. In our particular case that last sentence points to another imperative. In a continental country – and, therefore, a continental target, it is not enough to have a specialized Force at the Centre to deal with terrorism. The police of each state also has to be equipped and trained to combat the terrorist. Today, the Forces in our states just do not have the capability.

13. The technology of inflicting large-scale violence is becoming easier to obtain, and – per quotient of lethality – less and less expensive. In contrast to conventional weapons – field artillery, bombers, tanks – this technology costs little. Much of it can be acquired from open sources – including the Internet. And the weapons can be produced in small, isolated shacks, even mobile vans.

This in turn yields two lemmas:

- a. The target country has to be equipped to counter the entire spectrum of violence; to take the recent examples from attacks unleashed in a single country, the United States – the assaults that it has had to face have ranged from aircraft being used as missiles, to anthrax, to suicide bombers driving trucks into buildings, to sea borne assault on a ship, to the lone sniper, to guerrillas.

- b. It is almost impossible in an open society to block a determined lot from acquiring the technology they want by blocking the technology itself – the only practical way is to always keep ahead of the technology the terrorist is liable to acquire.

All this is certain to cost the target country a great deal – but that is the price one has to pay to survive in the world of today; to cavil at it is to be like the elderly couple that grudges the locks that have to be put on doors in a city marred by crimes against the elderly.

14. Nor is it enough to build the capacity – in the sense of weapons, etc. – to counter the entire spectrum of violence. The structure – of the armed Forces, of weaponry, even more important the structure of command, and most important the structure that takes decisions in regard to each of these elements – must have as one of its core capabilities, *adaptability*. It must be able to swiftly shift gears and plan for what it had *not* hitherto envisaged. That we know the enemy as he is will not be enough – though even this we do not know well enough: at the least, our perception of him is clouded by wishful thinking, by the blinkers of political correctness. We must know how he will respond to what we do, to what happens independently of both him and us. That is, we must know how he will respond to interactions – between him and us, between him and the allies on whom he has hitherto depended, between him and other adversaries he may have; we must know how he will respond to unexpected developments in technology. And our structures – in the field, at command headquarters, in the higher civilian establishment that in societies such as ours decide responses – must be adaptable enough to respond to *unexpected* outcomes and developments.

15. As the technology of violence has become more and more lethal and as it has been miniaturized, the final act can be done by just a handful, indeed just by an individual acting alone. That individual can bide his time. He can select his target. He can choose his place. He has to succeed just once. For that reason, it is not possible to completely insulate a country from his depredations. Terrorism is an extreme application of “asymmetrical warfare” that we shall encounter when we consider Chinese strategic doctrine – a single individual, a mere handful can wound and disorient a huge, technically superior power like the USA. Superior intelligence is obviously the key to making things more difficult for the terrorist. But as it will not be possible to

forestall him even with the best intelligence, what the targeted society does *in the wake of the attack* is just as important: overwhelming, and visibly overwhelming reprisal alone will deter others from emulating the terrorist who gets through. And the retaliatory measures are meaningful only if they personally impact potential recruits, as well as the controllers of organizations and countries that backed the terrorist.

16. While the final act can be executed by even a single individual, the terrorist requires, terrorism as a means cannot do without an extensive network: from nurseries that indoctrinate youngsters and forge them into lobotomized killing machines; to safe-houses; couriers, informers, suppliers of weapons and explosives; to those who will move money; to those who will carry on businesses to earn the money needed for ammunition and arms; to informers within the State apparatus; to those who can insinuate "lines" in the media. Accordingly, as important as getting at the terrorists, as important as getting at the State which patronizes them, is to get at their networks. Terrorists have established numerous fronts: mosques, *madrassas*, "research institutions", "charity foundations". The range of persons and organizations against whom the US and other countries had to move after the September 11 attacks – from those that had been involved in managing finances; to those who had been providing safe houses; to the "masterminds" – gave a glimpse of how the networks, even of just one brand of terrorism, now stretch across the globe. The terrorists will set up or suborn educational and religious institutions, health clinics, charities – anything and everything that can be a useful cover. Two factors ease their way. First, whatever their immediate objective, institutions of this kind are liable to have enthusiasts in them who are more amenable to being suborned than the ordinary citizen: the one who gives up an average career to devote himself to a life of service is liable to be more prone to be swept by calls of fighting injustice and the like; doubly so if the institution has been set up by a religious band – and the ring-leaders can project the notion that the religion itself is under attack. And so, religion and "religious bodies" get converted into fronts: Bhindranwale's conversion of the Golden Temple into a headquarters for terror, eventually into a fortress; the use of "charities" in Pakistan for raising and laundering funds for *jibadi* groups; the orchestrated appeals from across the globe that the

Americans suspend bombing during Ramzan.... For a society to survive, it must have the gumption to tear these veils apart, expose the fronts for what they are, and demolish them.

17. The *sine qua non*, of course, is human intelligence – all the more so because a *very* tiny group, even an individual can cause devastation, and because penetration into such groups is very difficult as they are impelled and brainwashed by ideologies that they have internalized. Intelligence becomes all the more important as weapons are miniaturized and as they become more and more lethal. The one way to deal with the stocks of biological and chemical weapons that an adversary may possess, for instance, is to have intelligence about them – and destroy them *where they are stored*, thereby ensuring that the maximum harm they inflict is on the adversary himself.

The asymmetry in weapons preparedness – that the side planning aggression can target a date and leapfrog while the “status quo power” has to be prepared all through – has a parallel in intelligence. A country like India which is defending itself against a relentless terrorist campaign and simultaneously against conventional enmities, has to have intelligence across the board – from satellite imagery to assets on the ground in hostile countries. The terrorist, on the other hand, has to have intelligence that may be strictly local, and only in regard to the moment he has to sneak in, park his car, and trigger the explosives. The Saddam loyalist does not have the US’ capacity to beam pictures from the ground to satellites, to bounce them to Australia, to send them to command centres in the Virginia hills, to send them thence to the commander of a ship in the Indian Ocean who then gets his crew to direct the missile to the chosen target that the man on the ground had spotted. The terrorist does not have any of these capabilities. And he does not need them. All he needs is the capacity to get the message to the next link in the chain.

A country such as India has to rely primarily on its own resources. But it is in our interest to ensure – and, as others have felt the sting of terrorism, this is a good moment to work for – enhanced international cooperation in this field. Look at the diverse nooks in which cells of even a single organization – *Al Qaeda* – are being discovered today. Look at the diverse places which for a single operation – 9/11 – the terrorists chose for learning to pilot aircraft.... In 1988 a cell of Abu Nidal was unearthed, in 2001 a clutch of Pakistani terrorists was

discovered in, of all places, distant Peru; Basque and Irish terrorists were captured while training in Columbia.¹ Look at the varied origins of the *Al Qaeda* lot – Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan, Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, UK.... We know from our own experience how so many of the terrorists operating in the Northeast use Bangkok as a safe haven, as a meeting place, as a transit point.... But it is only now after the eruptions in southern Thailand that the Government there has been given a glimpse of what it has been unwittingly inflicted on others by its “liberal” attitude. Central Asian Republics are vital for the same sort of reasons. The collapse of Soviet power in Central Asia led to a substantial resurgence of Islam in these Republics – the lid had been blown off. The sudden freedom, the collapse of the economies, repression by the successor regimes, the breakdown of governance, all enabled extremist elements to commence their proselytization, recruitment, etc. Moreover, the extremists quickly acquired control over the heroin trade in these regions – an acquisition in which they were helped by the fact that they had been relied upon by the Americans, among others, in the fight against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. We have a good basis for collaboration as the regimes in these countries consist of ex-Communists and are, therefore, well disposed to cooperating with others to crush militant Islam – after all, Islamic extremists are an immediate, substantial danger to the regimes themselves.

Accordingly, four areas in particular would repay efforts:

- ❑ Strengthen bilateral cooperation for exchanging intelligence information with such countries;
- ❑ Strengthen Interpol and other related organizations;
- ❑ Strengthen the international mechanisms for extradition of suspects and offenders;
- ❑ Champion a movement to impose international sanctions on countries that harbour terrorists or give any form of assistance to terrorism.

Organizational improvements, networking, etc. are vital, of course. But they are just instruments – the end is intelligence. And, given the

¹*Combating Terrorism, Strategies of ten countries*, Yonah Alexander (ed.), University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2002, p. 114.

kind of “warnings” that are passed up governmental ladders – “The possibility that terrorists may strike in Delhi and important state capitals during the Republic Day Celebrations cannot be ruled out” – the lessons that an Israeli expert lists are ones that we must bear in mind. What is needed is precise, accurate, tactical intelligence, not another essay, not general “the possibility cannot be ruled out” “cover our ass” memoranda. Reviewing Israeli experience, Shlomo Gazit writes,

Intelligence in the service of the war against terrorism is very much like that needed by the police in their dealings with criminals. Intelligence has to be extremely specific (providing names, addresses, vehicles, routines, *modus operandi*, and so on). It has to be perfectly accurate, detailed, and up-to-date. Israel has learned time and again that the shelf life of any piece of information dealing with terrorist activities is extremely short lived.

We have learned that, in order to serve an operational purpose, intelligence has to be almost exclusively of a tactical nature. While it has always been of interest to learn about the political goals of the various Palestinian terrorist organizations, their ideological differences, and their ties to and cooperation with neighboring Arab countries, such information has served only very limited immediate operational needs, if any.

Israel’s most important intelligence source has always been HUMINT. Because of strict compartmentalization among terrorists, and particularly because of the strict ideological and fanatic character of the Islamic extremist organizations, we have found it extremely difficult to penetrate each and every terrorist cell and recruit their members as our sources. What’s more, the data gleaned from such sources have always been extremely limited in scope.

It is widely known that the life expectancy of any intelligence source is quite short. In the case of a HUMINT source, it is extremely short. In most instances, the source completes its life expectancy after it has provided its first piece of operational information.

A rich source of intelligence, based on the long and ongoing Israeli experience, is the apprehended terrorist. We have learned that it is extremely important to capture terrorists alive. We have had constant conflict between our intelligence agencies – which wanted the terrorist alive, considering him or her to be one of our best potential sources of information – and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) commanders and troops or the police who, motivated by strong feelings of hatred and vengeance, only wish to see him or her dead....

While we normally extract intelligence from live terrorists, those killed in action are no less important. Identifying the dead, their families, and their

villages has, in many cases, led us to the arrest of other members of the same terrorist group....¹

18. The diaspora of a society or country often comes to play a lethal role in fomenting terrorism – the Khalistanis in California and the UK, the overseas Sri Lankan Tamils.... Several factors result in this role. The guilt that many a poor society fomenters in those who leave it, and do well abroad. The higher incomes and wealth that they come to possess – these afford them the luxury of advocating extreme solutions, “solutions” by which they are not going to be effected. The liberal laws and discourse of societies in which they are residing – those societies revel in free speech, freedom of association, etc. for their own citizens, they are reluctant to deny it to others, indeed it is so much easier to allow others to hurl such speech as they will – after all, it is being hurled at distant societies, the money being raised is for distant causes. Allowing them this sort of license can in fact become a safety valve – witness the Saudi Arabian Royalty’s calculations. It can become a salve for one’s conscience. The advocates in California of revolutions in Punjab come to acquire respect and to command awe in the diaspora....

19. Among the technologies which terrorists have mastered is that of using the mass media. They use these to arouse sympathy for their cause – look at the shrewd way in which *Hamas* in Palestine, the terrorists, their controllers and agents in Kashmir generate revulsion at what their opponents do by giving selective access to Western media to photograph civilian casualties. Recall the way Bhindranwale and his associates used the media to build him up and create a mystique around him, how they used “civil liberties” organizations to put the Punjab police in the wrong. In addition, they create the echo-effect that so often scares policy makers from taking stern measures. That is why it is ever so important to pinpoint the techniques and front organizations they are using for this purpose. And that is why not to have heeded the counsel of Mr. K.P.S. Gill – that we swiftly nail who was behind and who was financing the numerous “civil liberties organizations” that produced “report” after concocted “report” to

¹Shlomo Gazit, “Israel,” in *Combating Terrorism, Strategies of ten countries*, Yonah Alexander (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 227-59, at pp. 240-41.

incite the people of Punjab against policemen who were fighting to save the country – is a dereliction for which the country pays to this day.

20. "They are wrong-headed," many in Punjab used to say of Bhindranwale and his men, "but you can't deny their idealism, their readiness to die for what they think is right." The reality is altogether different. Terrorism has become lucrative business: in the Northeast, for instance, joining one of the terrorist organizations is a sure way to rake in a fortune – the proceeds from the "taxes" the organizations collect, the ransom they extract from kidnapping. Terrorists strive hard to cover their loot under the cloak of ideological, even idealist rhetoric: recall the religious declamations of the terrorists in Punjab, and the reality behind it – what they were doing to young girls across the state, the properties that their leaders had amassed. Just as the terrorists strain to hide their loot, the State, and – specially – the media must bare the truth about them.

21. To de-fang the terrorists, the country has to move on many fronts: their sources of money; those who give them facilities to stay and stage their operations; their sources of weapons and explosives; the network of their couriers. And the moves against these multiple targets have to be carried through simultaneously.

22. For these measures to succeed, all institutions of the State have to act in the same direction; they have to work in concert. For the police to capture terrorists and for the courts to function the way our courts do; for them to process the cases at their customary pace; for them to go on using norms devised for quieter times – the Indian Evidence Act, the provisions of the CrPC; for the Army to track down caches of explosives while the customs men let in RDX.... all this is the sure way to hand victory to terrorists.

23. The lemma is inescapable: we cannot run a super-efficient anti-terrorist operation while being a flabby State, a somnolent society. That no one gets convicted for the Bombay blasts for a decade and a half is certain to encourage scores to sign up. Customs officers who take bribes for letting in gold one day are certain to overlook arms' consignments tomorrow. Police personnel who let Bangladeshis smuggle themselves across the border in return for bribes will constitute no obstacle to agents of the ISI making their way into the country.

Imagine what would happen if Osama bin Laden slipped out of Afghanistan. If he made his way into Iran or China, the international alliance would be confident that he can be executed without any one knowing. If he went to one of the Central Asian countries, the allies would be confident that, if they wanted him for trial, he would be handed over. If he escaped into Pakistan, the allies would be confident that Pakistan could deliver either solution – hand him over or have his vehicle fall off a cliff in an “accident”. But what if he escaped into India? Acrimonious debates would explode. Should he be tried under the Indian Evidence Act or under the provisions of some other law? By ordinary courts or a Special Court? Is the Government not acting under American dictates as to what we should do? His rights as an under-trial..... Another hijacking Obsessive media focus on the wailing of relatives of the passengers.... Released in exchange for letting the passengers go.....

Almost the most damaging thing that Pakistan can do is to hand over the twenty who have been named by India as terrorists responsible for large-scale killings here. Given the state of our investigating agencies, given the procedures of our courts, and the skill of our lawyers, I would be astonished if we could get even one of them convicted.

24. Not just the formal institutions of the State, society must act to that end – that is, the overwhelming number of individuals must be acting in concert independently of, as well as in support of what the State is doing. The State apparatus on its own can no longer stem the Bangladeshis' demographic invasion. It can only be stanchd by creating that atmosphere in the Northeast which will convince the potential infiltrator that he better stay away from this region as it is hostile territory, a territory in which he is certain to lose life and limb.

25. Not just society in general, the ordinary, individual citizen too must be acting in concert with the authorities. The passenger who kicks up a fuss when he is frisked at an airport, the house-owner who insists that being advised to inform the neighbourhood police station about the new tenant is an intrusion into his private affairs – such individuals unwittingly help terrorism: on the one hand, the terrorist has an easier time establishing the safe-house from which he will carry out his next explosion; on the other, the average policeman is discouraged from doing his assigned duty.

26. For any of this to happen, the balance of discourse has to be reversed, literally *reversed* in India. Under the Ordinance that was issued to combat terrorism, and the Act that was passed later, POTA, the terrorists' lawyer was to have the right to meet him during interrogation. Under them a policeman doing his duty could be tried on the charge that he had misused his authority and he could be imprisoned for up to two years – even if he was not convicted in the end, rushing from court to court, as the Punjab policemen are doing today, would be enough. Such were the provisions, and yet the Ordinance and the Act were pilloried out of shape. Esoteric distinctions were the order of the day when the law was being finalized. The Ordinance provides that the terrorist's property can be seized, it was argued. "But that provision should read, 'property acquired by him *from the proceeds of terrorism*.' After all, it would be unfair to seize property that he or his relatives may have acquired by legitimate means." How will we fight terrorism with this mind-set?

27. Temporary expedients will boomerang: giving handsome amounts to the SULFA (Surrendered United Liberation Front of Asom) cadre, giving them jobs, allowing them to retain weapons – these steps have resulted in Assam now having not one set of extortionists – ULFA – but two – the ULFA cadre that remain underground, and the cadre that has gone through the motions of surrendering. For the same reason, when western countries deliver \$ 20 billion to a State as heavily Talibanised as Pakistan, they only compound the problem – for neighbours of Pakistan in the immediate future, and for themselves eventually. Events have repeatedly thrown up this lesson, and yet few heed it. One reason surely is that those who have a resource – say, money – or are particularly good at one thing – say, technology – instinctively think that *that* particular resource is what will do the trick.

28. The terrorist must be defeated at every turn, in every engagement. While contending with the IRA youth, Mrs. Thatcher rightly said, "Publicity is the oxygen on which the terrorist lives." Success is the food on which he multiplies: the strikes against the World Trade Center Towers will live in terrorist mythology for decades; they will lure recruits to lethal organizations for long. Success of the terrorists ensures further success in another way also: the society gets numbed into rituals; and, the rituals having been gone

through, the society sinks back into its day-to-day obsessions – till the next strike, when the rituals are gone through again, except that they are a notch more mechanical this time round. For years and years, a routine set in: a session of Parliament would commence; the terrorists would organize another massive kill somewhere in Kashmir; the opposition would bay for the Home Minister's head; Government would promise to ascertain the facts and make a statement the following day; the next day, the usual rhetoric would flow – “cowardly”, “dastardly”, “killing innocent women and helpless children like this.... inhuman, against the canons of all civilizational norms, against the principles of every religion....” And the speakers would disperse to have coffee.... The system would remain exactly as it was.

The lesson is put well by Shlomo Gazit. Reflecting on the experience of Israel, he writes,

While the claim that there is no strictly military solution to the problem of terrorism is valid, it is important to note Israel's unequivocal policy, which claims that there is no strictly political solution. What's more, it is imperative to initiate operations which will debilitate the terrorist organizations in every possible manner....

The most important weapons in this long war are patience, determination, and cunning and not necessarily, firepower, military prowess, or operational and tactical daring. Within the strategic objective, Israel should also have included restraint and the ability to absorb blows....

It is highly doubtful whether there is any other form of warfare wherein Israel finds that the ratio between the energy invested in offense is so clearly favourable compared to the investment in defensive action. The more Israel invested in defense and security the more it served the terrorists' interests and objectives. This was typical in cases of terrorist acts launched from across the Jordanian, and later the Lebanese, borders. In some extreme cases, the terrorists were able to achieve their goals without doing a thing. On the other hand, based on the clear assumption that the terrorists' resources are always quite limited, the more the Palestinian terrorists were pursued, finding themselves fleeing in search of hiding places and sanctuary, the more their operational capability was affected. This was due to the fact that they consequently found it difficult to recruit new members to their ranks, properly organize them, train their people, and find new resources....¹

¹Shlomo Gazit, “Israel,” in *Combating Terrorism, Strategies of ten countries*, Yonah Alexander (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 227–49, at pp. 248–39.

For these and similar reasons, when the terrorist is able to execute an operation successfully, he, his organization, their sponsors must be subjected to punitive retaliation of such an order that all of them down the line and up feel the costs of having inflicted the violence they did. In this matter, we must remember what General Weyand pointed out in another context,

- There is no kind way to prosecute a war; war is death and destruction, it is blood and gore.

Those who recoil from what war entails should mobilize the people at the first sign of extremist ideology so that the terrorists are forestalled, and the State does not ultimately have to move against them – in fact, the kind who shout the loudest once war begins are the kind, often the very ones who in the preceding years have lent a verisimilitude of legitimacy to the fabrications of such groups. There is a related lesson that General Weyand stressed and which we must bear in mind:

- No war has been won by deploying “minimum force” – the undefined quantum that liberals grant when the terrorist leaves them no option but to allow that something just has to be done. Wars are won by over-powering the opponent with overwhelming force. And so it must be in the case of terrorism, and of the States that sponsor it: not “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”; for an eye, both eyes; for a tooth, the whole jaw.

29. The next lesson too is so obvious that its disregard can only be taken to be deliberate: it is a fatal error to judge what needs to be done in an area or in times infested by terrorists, by standards honed from normal places and quieter times. No judge, no human rights organization that today gives lectures about the conduct of the Police in Punjab has set out how the Police was to prosecute the war when the entire judicial system had *literally* evaporated: magistrates were in mortal dread of terrorists, witnesses – even the ones who had seen those dearest to them being gunned down in front of their eyes – would not, they *could* not come forth to testify unless they had decided that they might as well get killed themselves. Far from falling prey to such specious assumptions, such habitual hectoring, we should beware of the oft-proclaimed device of extremist groups and movements: to use the instruments of democracy to destroy

democracy. We should bear in mind Hitler's "legality oath" – he had sworn that the Nazis would use only legal means to attain power; he stuck to the oath. We should declare openly: "Yes, we will heed the rights of terrorists – but only to the extent to which *they* heed the rights of their victims." The Task Force on Internal Security which we will encounter later put the matter precisely:

It can hardly be disputed that war or rebellion or other serious internal disturbances cannot be dealt with by applying the principles of Magna Carta. The management of public safety being a matter of the highest concern, in times of grave disorder caused by external aggression or internal disturbance, the stability of a State becomes the primary consideration and the liberty of the individual stands subordinated to the larger interests of the State.

30. The country, and now that terrorists have extended their operations beyond national boundaries, the international community too must beware of do-gooders. Each time some mediator steps in or some human rights group, it gives heart to the terrorist organization. It enables the ring-leaders to convince their followers, "We are succeeding. All we have to do is to hold on for a while. Just a few more sacrifices, and our cause will prevail." And conviction of that sort – that the country and its government will not compromise with violence – cannot be drilled into terrorists and would-be terrorists by just a few ringing statements. Only when we stand firm for decades and inflict unbearable costs for decades will we carry conviction.

31. The lethal potential of these ideologies is now compounded by the fact that States such as Pakistan have adopted terrorism as an instrument of State policy. Musharraf put this in so many words, "*Jihad* is an instrument of State policy." For such States this is a particularly attractive proposition: it is war on the cheap. The ideology that goes with adopting such means, the spread of the gun-culture that invariably accompanies such a strategy, eventually boomerangs – as the Talibanisation of Pakistan shows. But in the meanwhile, the decision of a State to adopt terrorism as an instrument is certain to inflict enormous costs on its neighbours. What was said of Mussolini's goons is doubly true of terrorists: "They were nothing without the State, but with it they were unstoppable." In a shrunken world, all countries are the "neighbours" of such a State – as the US was reminded by the September 11 attacks. The State that patronizes such

governments or States should wake up to the consequences its patronage will foment. In any case, the immediate neighbours must.

32. We in India certainly do not need to be reminded that these groups have the patronage of many a State – from Sudan to Pakistan. But we have to remember that such groups flourish not only in areas where they have the active assistance of governments. For them, tracts where governance has become weak and thin are also handy. And in our vicinity such areas abound – large stretches of Bangladesh, of Myanmar, of Bhutan, of Nepal, to say nothing of large swathes within India itself. Islamization, a factor to which we shall return later, and its relations with Pakistan and China apart, this looseness of the structures of governance in Bangladesh itself makes it a source of trouble for India's security. Vast tracts of the country and numerous activities are in the hands of "mafia dons", one of the senior-most diplomats of that country tells me. Our police and army are as corrupt as yours, he says. You can buy a Bangladeshi passport off the street in Dhaka for Rs. 10,000, he adds. This *looseness*, rather than an active conspiracy against India, is what accounts for the ease with which ULFA leader Paresh Barua and such elements are able to move in and out of, and loiter around our country, he maintains. The same consequence is evident from another fact: the mountains of illegal arms. Estimates of the number of illegal firearms floating around in Bangladesh range between 200,000 and 250,000. They come from a number of sources. Bangladesh is situated between the Golden Triangle of drug-producing countries and the Golden Crescent, the arms-producing sub-region. Well-established drug-running networks are also used to run guns. In addition to cross-border trafficking, many arms come to Bangladesh through its shipping ports. On April 2, 2004, in the largest ever arms and ammunition seizure reported in Bangladesh, troops recovered 10 truckloads of submachine-guns, AK-47 assault rifles, other firearms and bullets at the Karnaphuli coast in Chittagong. Finally, there is a thriving cottage industry of gun manufacturers. Arms producers reassemble stolen weapons and trafficked firearm components in temporary factories set up in abandoned houses and small workshops. In the greater Chittagong region there are more than 50 arms producing workshops, which primarily make handguns. The Chittagong international seaport and the coast of Cox's Bazaar are the main sea routes for the shipment and

trans-shipment of weapons by international smugglers. Chittagong itself is reported to have nearly three dozen arms smuggling organizations. In a word, one source of troubles for us from Bangladesh is active assistance by ISI, DGFI, and the Bangladesh Army, by the Islam-*pasand* groups – after all, it isn't just that Paresh Barua forays in and out of Bangladesh; he lives there, he runs businesses: how could he do all this without active assistance from Bangladeshi authorities? The other is ineffective governance. Indonesia is another example next door of the same phenomenon: divisions among politicians and political parties, paralysis of institutions, the consequential breakdown of governance have prevented the country from moving effectively against Islamic terrorist groups and those waging war to establish an independent, fully Islamic State in the region. The story is no different in the Mindanao province of the Philippines. And, as the Maoists' success has demonstrated, no different in Nepal.

The case of India itself provides dire warning. Even in dealing with ordinary criminals, and even more so in dealing with terrorists and the organized mafia – who can pursue and finish off magistrates and public prosecutors as easily as they can dispose of potential witnesses, the criminal justice system has collapsed. The weakness does not afflict the Courts alone. It is evident in the entire structure of policing, documentation and investigation, and the failure to improve forensic and scientific processes of investigation, as well as in the inability to bring the wide range of data that becomes available through modern technology into the ambit of "admissible" evidence.¹ On the other hand, several states in India have established a number of processes of negotiation with, and surrender-schemes for, terrorists that effectively reward terrorism, and provide opportunities for terrorists to secure a short cut to influence and power and lucre within the "legitimate" system.²

¹For illustrative cases of prominent criminals who had been extradited after years of effort, and against whom cases have collapsed, see Saji Cherian, "Flight to Freedom", *South Asia Intelligence Review*, Volume 3, No. 2, July 26, 2004, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/Archives.htm>.

²For representative instances, see, Ajai Sahni and Bibhu Prasad Routray, "SULFA: Terror by Another Name", *Faultlines*, Volume 9, ICM-Bulwark Books, July 2001, pp. 1-38.

In a word, the Government must function as a government. For decades, Delhi has followed a sort of sub-contractor model for handling the Northeast and J&K: the model that the local leader be allowed to do what he wants so long as he keeps up the appearance of governance. This method has run its course. The sub-contractors have so completely lost the confidence of the people of the regions that they are now not able to keep up even the facade of governance. The pre-requisite therefore is that the local rulers must be able to provide, and be interested in meeting at least the elementary aspirations of the people – for education, health, sanitation, etc.

There is, of course, another requisite. For the Forces to succeed against terrorists, it is vital that people stop giving sanctuary to terrorists, that instead they give information to the Forces. This they will do only when they are convinced that the State is able to protect them – that it is in a position to do so both continuously and indefinitely. If all that is going to happen is that, when the soldiers leave, the terrorists will return, the villager or even the far more anonymous town dweller is unlikely to come forward and volunteer information.

33. As “looseness” of governance in neighbours such as Nepal and Sri Lanka converts into costly threat to us, irrespective of the orientation of the governments there, we must help in every possible way to strengthen the security apparatus in non-hostile countries in our region.

34. In part because we think we have outgrown the irrationality embedded in, for instance, the exhortations to *shahadat*, we think of persons who get inflamed by them as being somewhat backward, as being in some earlier stage in civilization. 9/11 was a vivid demonstration, as are the daily strikes of terrorists with an array of ingenious devices in so many distant parts of the world, of the willingness and ability of these groups to use modern technology and concepts. Nor are the different types of explosives they use, the way they hurled aircraft as missiles in 9/11, the only evidence of the expertise that terrorist groups have acquired in modern technologies. The sophistication with which they have been using the Internet to communicate; to raise, launder and transfer funds; to disseminate how-to manuals – from preparing explosives, to poisons, to carrying out assassinations, to picking targets, to encrypting data; the way

they have been using the Internet to mould public opinion; to steal – for instance, to manufacture and use fake credit cards – all bear testimony to their “modernity”. Indeed, the terrorists display great proficiency in several of these technologies – a study recalls that it took US investigators almost *two years* to uncover the data in a computer that had been captured from a terrorist hide-out in Manila – so cleverly had it been encrypted. Terrorist groups have been going out of their way to recruit engineers, computer specialists, encryption experts and persons trained in other sciences into their networks. They run a few hundred websites. (Incidentally, in these websites, as in the declamations of Pakistani terrorist leaders, the US, Israel and India are depicted as the common, hyphenated enemies.) The professionalism with which these sites are laid out; the alacrity with which they are kept up to date; the way they are linked; the way they mutate into other sites so as to keep ahead of those who are trying to block them; the way data and messages are buried into other, legitimate sites; the sophistication with which messages that are said to be translations into English of what appears alongside in Arabic softens the text – all these should alert us to the lethal combination that modern terrorism represents: of fanatic zeal and mastery of modern technologies.¹ All these as much as their most skillful manipulation of the media testify that these persons, though saturated with and hypnotized by primeval exhortations and notions, are as fluent in the technologies that matter to them as they are in verses from scriptures that will serve their purpose. Similarly, their organizational abilities could well be the envy of management *gurus*. And that stands to reason. A charged-up lemming will not secure that succession of successes which alone will ensure the succession of fresh recruits.

35. We have seen how very difficult it has been to awaken the world to the “proxy war” *via* terrorists that Pakistan has waged against India. For twenty years as people were being killed in their thousands

¹For a summary presentation of some representative facts regarding one technology gleaned from open sources such as testimony in courts, computers captured from terrorist hide-outs, Congressional testimony, etc., see, *Examining the Cyber Capabilities of Islamic Terrorist Groups*, Technical Advisory Group, Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College, November 2003/March 2004, at www.ists.dartmouth.edu.

here, delegations coming from the USA and countries in Europe would ask us for proof that would establish that Pakistan was behind the terrorists. That sanctimoniousness was punctured only by the terrorists who struck the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Imagine how much more difficult it will be for us to mobilize others when the attacks are with weapons which one cannot trace to anyone in particular: a computer virus that knocks out the national power grid; a virus that lies dormant for two-three years and then empties the servers handling air-traffic control systems; a nano-weapon that is placed in the integrated circuits at the time of manufacture and is activated by an electro-magnetic pulse three years later; beetle-sized robots that trip turbines in hydro-plants and civil aviation control systems in airports simultaneously.... We may be convinced that Pakistan or China is behind the attack. But how will we convince a world that, as we know from bitter experience, desperately wants *not* to believe? There is another, all-too-familiar asymmetry here: the USA did not have to satisfy anyone on the proof it had about the 9/11 attacks having been executed by Osama bin Laden and his crew before launching its missiles on Afghanistan; it provided no proof that Saddam Hussain had Weapons of Mass Destruction. But weaker States will be held to such proof!

36. These features – hypnotized minds, intermeshing of groups, patronage by states such as Pakistan, weak and evaporating governance in large stretches in our vicinity, fluency in modern technology, the progressive miniaturization of that technology itself – together portend grave danger: we can be almost certain that in the coming decades these fanatic groups will acquire and be able to bring into the country weapons that will wreak destruction *en masse*. No consideration of the thousands that will die will deter them for a moment: they would have been drugged into believing that terrible destruction to be service, if not prayer. Nor is actual killing the only use of such weapons: they will be very effective instruments for blackmail. And how prepared we are as a society to stand up to such blackmail can be glimpsed from the way we had to surrender to the demands of terrorists when they were using the most elementary of such weapons – the mere hijacking of a plane to Kandahar.

37. Again, there is a murderous convergence. The terrorist is in any case conditioned by his faith, and those medieval texts to look

upon cruelty as valour. And modern technology makes the killings ever more impersonal – indeed, the operation becomes a television spectacle. Recall the images of 9/11: are the images that come to mind the bodies of persons killed or of the Towers tumbling down?

38. Terrorism constitutes a threat to all: what is being inflicted on one country today can be inflicted on another tomorrow. It is worse than imprudent, therefore, for a State to consort with States that patronize, finance, train, arm, give sanctuary to terrorists. For the same reason, and as the evil are so well knit, States should share their resources, in particular intelligence to combat terrorism. That is what should be. In the real world, a country such as India must remember that no one else is going to fight our war for us.

39. The very first lesson that has been listed above is that this is not a war that began on a particular date and will end on a particular date. It is self-renewing, “permanent war”. No victory against it is forever. Therefore, we must avoid getting exhausted. We must avoid repeating successes – for the virus mutates at every turn. We must avoid routinization.

40. For terrorism is a “learning virus” – just as viruses have mutated to neutralize antibiotics, terrorists mutate and adapt: the Americans are being taught this bitterly in Iraq.¹

41. For fighting that war the *sine qua non* is: when the battle has been won, do not forget those who delivered you – as, to our shame and misfortune, we in India are in the habit of doing.

42. But there is an even more potent weapon, as we have seen, that the controllers of the terrorists deploy. It is precisely the weapon that liberal societies shy away from even acknowledging. One of the secrets of success of terrorist groups is that they are very loosely organized. The death of a few in them – even of those who have been proclaimed by their opponents as the keystones – does not finish them. But this foundational weapon – the ideology, the texts on

¹The literature on terrorism is voluminous. Two journals in particular are mines of information and analysis about terrorism in South Asia: *Faultlines*, K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni, editors, The Institute of Conflict Management, New Delhi; and *Aakrosh, Asian Journal of terrorism and international conflicts*, Major General (Retd.) Afsir Karim, editor, Forum for Strategic and Security Studies, New Delhi. For a wealth of data see also, Sushant Sareen, *The Jihad Factory, Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the making*, Observer Research Foundation, Har-Anand Publications, New Delhi, 2005.

which that ideology rests; and the vast infrastructure that gets built up to propagate the message – the thousands of *madrassas* and “seminaries” that have come up in Pakistan and Bangladesh and along our borders; the extent to which the message has been introduced into the very marrow of the systems of “normal” education of a country like Pakistan – ensure that even if one terrorist organization – an *Al Qaeda* – is totally crushed, or a series of them is pulverized, terrorism will survive.

All the more so, when there are rulers to patronize it as “an instrument of State policy,” and when those out to fight terrorism are dependent on those very rulers!

“Our arch enemy” or the “*naya dil*”?

The collapse of the Soviet Union threw our foreign and defence policies into a spin. With great, and invisible skill Mr. Narasimha Rao landed these on their feet. He initiated the first steps for India to “look East”. He strengthened relations with Iran. He opened a line to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan....

But as a sort of iron-ball tied to legs, Pakistan continued to hold both our foreign and defence policies down. Not just that: even as it continued to send terrorists to kill and maim in India, it continued to be propped by its patrons – the US, China, Saudi Arabia. This immobility is what confronted Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee and his senior colleagues as they took office. They saw that as long as India remained tied down to Pakistan it would not be able to play any significant role in world affairs – that whatever it said even on Pakistan, for instance about cross-border terrorism, was liable to be discounted – “O, that is the usual stuff – just India and Pakistan making allegations against each other.”

They decided on a many-pronged response:

- ❑ Accelerate growth, in spite of what Pakistan is doing – apart from other things, this *will* in the end register with the people of Pakistan.
- ❑ Strengthen relations with a number of other countries and regions – Central Asian Republics, ASEAN, others.
- ❑ Ensure continued military superiority so that, should Pakistan lunge at India, it can be roundly defeated.

But the backing that Pakistan received from the US and China remained – of course, it also got much succor and morale boosting from countries in the Middle East: but these would in the end be influenced by what the US did. It was, therefore, necessary not just to

outgrow and out-gun Pakistan, India had to outflank it.

Three judgements, and a set of fortuitous events set the course.

The first point was evident: Pakistan is a dependent State. It cannot function without the help of the US, China, etc. The second insight seemed more of a conjecture at the time: while the US today remains transfixed by China, the reasoning went, sooner or later it will begin to see that the main threat to it fifteen-twenty years hence will come from China – it will, therefore, look for possible counters to the growing power of that country. The third point concerned China itself: ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, its apprehensions have centered around the US – it has long been convinced that the US is out to “contain” it, and that countries like India are the ones the US will yoke as instruments for this purpose.

Hence, the reasoning went,

- ❑ Engage the US.
- ❑ That will get China to re-examine its stance towards South Asia.
- ❑ These tectonic shifts will narrow Pakistan’s options.

The fortuitous events that helped were 9/11, and the continuing attacks by Pakistani terrorists in India. The US experienced first hand what India had been saying for so long – that Pakistan had become the University of Terrorism; that Taliban and terrorists of other hues were not the *cause* of what was happening; they were the *result* of the progressive Talibanization of Pakistan’s State and society over fifty years. We had been repeating all this for years. To little avail. Secure in distant lands, American policy makers couldn’t care two hoots. I well remember, as I mentioned in the context of terrorism, and the day is not that long ago, when visiting diplomats and security and intelligence personnel from the USA, told about the way Pakistan was arming, training, financing, giving sanctuary to terrorists to kill and maim in India, would ask, “But where is the proof?” I would sigh with the poet,

*Ai baad-e-balaa unko bhi zaraa, do chaar thapede halke se
Jo log abhi tak saahil se toofan kaa nazaaraa karte hain....*

[O, strong and contrary wind, a blow or two, gently, to them too, Who from the comfort of the shore survey the storm....]

9/11 changed the standards of proof that were necessary!

As a result, events have taken the course that was envisaged by Vajpayee and his core team.

Over the last five years, important segments of the US policy establishment have begun to voice the apprehension that fifteen-twenty years from now China will indeed be a potential threat to US interests, and that a country like India is among the few that can be a counter-weight in this region to an ever-stronger China – *Mapping the Global Future* put out by the National Intelligence Council¹ is representative of such assessments.

On the other side, the steps that the US and India took towards dialogue and cooperation indeed registered in Beijing. It has in turn made a few overtures to ensure that India does not make itself available to the US as an instrument in the way that, in China's assessment, it had made itself available to the USSR.

The result is the Musharraf of the changed heart. "*Phir wohi dil nahin laya boon*," he said during his visit to Delhi in April 2005. "*Main naya dil laya boon*."

Our press was, as usual, swept off its feet: "Man of the match: Musharraf"; "Laid bare: Perrez's 'new heart'"; "Sunday win for both, one-day win Pak bonus"; "General peaces it together"; "Musharraf hits it out of Kotla."

This was customary hyperbole. But there was some incidental confirmation – from the ideologues of *jihad* in Pakistan we have encountered above, even from some of the mainline commentators.

Musharraf "has crossed all limits in appeasing India," Professor Hafiz Saeed, the founder of the *Lashkar-o-Toiba* told *Nawaiwaqt* and the staff of his own *Jama'at ud-Dawa*. The so-called confidence building measures that Musharraf is taking depart from the "principled position" that Pakistan has maintained on the Kashmir issue all through, he charged. The statement that Musharraf has agreed to disregards the UN Resolutions which have been the very foundation of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. Apart from everything else, the steps to build confidence and the statement foment distrust between the Kashmiri and Pakistani people, Saeed maintained. Building confidence with India while fomenting distrust with our

¹*Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project*, http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html.

own people is not wisdom, he said. Four militant groups declared in a statement that Musharraf has "sold out Kashmir for trade and tourism." "This is the first time in Pakistan's history that a Head of State has given in to India," they declared. "We will not give up *jihad* till Kashmir becomes free." General Hamid Gul was as upset. He declared:

The Indo-Pak joint statement indicates that our Government has lost its destination and position on the Kashmir issue. The text of the statement says that we are ready to hand over even Azad Kashmir to India instead of acquiring Kashmir. It seems that Azad Kashmir will be destroyed.... We have deviated from our position. It will yield a dangerous result....

It is very sad for us that this decision has been taken by a ruler who is an Army-man. This is the Army which has kept the Kashmir issue alive to achieve self-determination. But by ignoring the sacrifices of the Pakistani Army and the Kashmiri people, pro-Indian decisions are being accepted now. This declaration neither represents the aspirations of the Kashmiri people nor does it reflect the sentiments of the Pakistani people. It is nothing but a fraud.

Aijaz Afzal, the head of the Jama'at-e-Islami in POK was no less minatory. He said that "Musharraf plans to finish the National Kashmir Policy." "One man is handing Kashmir to India without seeking confidence of Parliament." Parliament's Kashmir Committee should explain what Pakistan's policy on Kashmir is, he demanded. The *millat* of Pakistan has had no role in the change of policy that Musharraf has engineered, he pointed out, and warned, "If political parties remain silent for the sake of power, then accession of Kashmir to Pakistan will be very difficult." Afzal maintained that "India has come to the negotiating table because of the sacrifices of and determination of the Kashmiri people. It is neither a miracle of Musharraf nor is it a diplomatic achievement." "If we neglect the role of the *mujahideen*, past record shows that India will consider cunning and lie-telling as sacred deeds," he declared. Options such as joint control and division of Kashmir are products of Musharraf's imagination. They are impractical as well as dangerous.... The *Jasrat*, affiliated to the Jama'at-e-Islami, gave "credit" to "India's successful policy and defence of its stance so much so that, without displaying the slightest flexibility, India has managed to push Pakistan away from its principled stand on Kashmir." The *Nawaiwaqt* complained,

"Pakistan is willing to accept any and every step that is in India's interest, every step which will push Kashmir into the background, and transform the 'core' issue into the '*korrh*' [leprosy stricken] issue...."

Even some main-stream commentators were furious. Much to the surprise of readers in India, Ayaz Amir lamented in *Dawn*,

Going to war over Kashmir? Of course not. Folly in the past, it is not even an option now. But saying farewell to Kashmir like this, and dancing to India's tune in the process, abandoning the Kashmiris to their fate, and getting nothing in return – not even an undertaking to settle Siachen or solve the dispute over the Baglihar Dam, this surely is a novel way of waging peace.

We may have beaten India in cricket but the self-inflicted thrashing Pakistan is receiving in the diplomatic field is a higher plane of endeavour altogether. Musharraf needn't have gone all the way to Delhi to be told there could be no "re-drawing of borders in Kashmir". That's the Indian line, always has been, much before Manmohan Singh's baptism as Prime Minister.

While India is entitled to take what position it likes, there should have been no compulsion for a Pakistani leader to go along without even a whimper about the UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir, the basis, after all, of our Kashmir policy. Drive a stake through the plebiscite/self-determination principle and Pakistan is left with no leg to stand on as far as the Kashmir dispute is concerned.

But time to "think outside the box", Pakistan's soldier-President advises. Excellent if this was a two-way process, if not only Pakistan but India too was ready for the same walk. What do we see instead? Pakistan under military guidance doing all the visionary thing by itself: not only thinking outside the box but frantically jumping out of it, consigning the carcass of its Kashmir policy to the waters of the Arabian Sea, even as India sticks resolutely to its own box, not prepared to give so much as a centimetre either way.

Why did Musharraf invite himself to Delhi? What gates of Somnath was he hoping to bring back? What he has achieved is a lesson in Indian diplomacy: Manmohan Singh mincing no words in restating the Indian position that Kashmir's geography was set in stone and that the utmost to be hoped for lay in the new *mantra* of "porous borders".

From our point of view, these are high testimonials. So, has Musharraf's heart changed? Is it prudent to rely on a change of heart in one man?

A new Musharraf?

We are told that, after the two attempts to assassinate him nearly succeeded, after the attack on the Corps Commander in Karachi, and later on Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, Musharraf "is a changed man", that he now sees that he cannot patronize terrorism in India and Islamic extremism as a requisite for that, and be immune from the backlash within Pakistan; that, therefore, he wants an accommodation with India.

How can we so swiftly put the deceit that lay behind Kargil out of our minds? That assault was not something that had happened on its own, not something that had been done on the spur of the moment in a fit of passion. It was a cold-blooded operation. It had been planned in meticulous detail. It had been planned over years. And on all counts Musharraf was the architect of that invasion. Nor has Musharraf expressed any second thoughts, to say nothing of regret about the operation. Quite the contrary. In his website¹ he declares India to be "our arch enemy", and he claims that the Kargil operation "proved a lesson to the Indians and a rude awakening to the world of the reality of Kashmir." "A changed man"?

Look at what the International Crisis Group says in the report, *The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan*, that it released on 18 April, 2005 – almost to the day that we were being asked to put faith in the new Musharraf.²

"Religious militias calling themselves Sipahs, Jaishes and Lashkars cannot exist parallel to the Army," it recalls Musharraf telling an inter-faith conference in the sorts of words that many in the West and in India have taken to testify to a changed heart. "Our Army is our only Sipah and Lashkar in Pakistan." The fact?

Sectarian terrorists in Pakistan are thriving in an atmosphere of religious intolerance for which its military government is largely to blame. General Musharraf has repeatedly pledged that he would eradicate religious extremism and sectarianism and transform Pakistan into a moderate

¹<http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk>.

²International Crisis Group, *The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan*, Asia Report, Number 95, 18 April 2005, www.crisisgroup.org. Italics added in the extracts.

Muslim state. *In the interests of retaining power, he has done the opposite...* Instead of empowering liberal, democratic voices, the government has co-opted the religious right and continues to rely on it to counter civilian opposition....

"Even the sporadic efforts to deal with sectarian extremists, such as that [sic.] of [Benazir] Bhutto in 1995 and [Nawaz] Sharif in 1997 and 1998, were more thorough than Musharraf's current policies," the Report concludes after an enumeration of steps that were taken. "President Musharraf's reform agenda includes eradicating religious extremism and sectarianism," the Report recalls. "He has pledged to undo Zia-ul-Haq's legacy by transforming Pakistan into a moderate Muslim state. However, *his performance in the past five years is not dissimilar to that of General Zia*, who empowered the clergy to counter his secular, civilian opposition. *Under Musharraf, Islamic extremists continue to thrive* because of his reliance on the religious right to retain power. In Pakistan's chequered history, *the mullahs have never been as powerful as now*, controlling two of four provincial governments and also influencing national politics through their presence in the National Assembly."

Moreover, "Under Musharraf, *Zia's Islamisation measures*, the primary source of religious extremism and sectarian conflict, also *remain virtually untouched*. And much like the Zia period, *madrasas* are again the recipients of large public funds, albeit with a different justification. Then, a section of *madrasas* was rewarded for producing *jihadis* for Afghanistan. Now they are provided incentives, at least ostensibly, to abandon the *jihad*." The operative word there is "ostensibly". For the Report documents in detail how neither the *madrassas* nor the terrorist organizations have been either inconvenienced or deflected in any way. "Justifying his decision to retain the dual offices of President and Army Chief until 2007," the Report recalls, "Musharraf said, 'Pakistan needs unity in order to deal with the internal sources of extremism and to remove the misperception that we are a militant, intolerant society.' *His reformist rhetoric remains just that, even as the military's preferences undermine the few safeguards that exist.*" Yes, ostensibly, bans were announced by Musharraf. The fact?

The offices of banned organisations have been sealed *but most have reopened or relocated*. In fact, the repossession of these offices has sparked factional fighting among sectarian groups. *The infrastructure of banned terrorist groups and thus their capacity to mount terrorist attacks also remains intact*, as was evident in the surge in sectarian attacks during 2004....

During Benazir's time, the further registration of *madrassas* had been banned. Musharraf has allowed them to once again register – this enables them to get largesse from the State, and their final degrees carry the same weight as those of universities. The way money is pouring into the *madrassas*, warns the Crisis Group, "will encourage proliferation." Musharraf's move serves two other purposes in addition. The Report points out,

The lifting of the ban on the plea of facilitating the "mainstreaming of *madrasas*" has also given the government the opportunity to finance its chosen *madrasas*. This process of co-option will intensify the competition for resources among the clergy of the five sects.

And the competition in turn will propel them to outdo each other in being useful to Musharraf and the Military.

The Report shows how recommendations made by Commissions set up by his own Government have been studiously ignored by Musharraf. Some amendments have been carried out to discriminatory laws – only to hoodwink the international community. For the amendments in regard to women are "*superficial*" on the one hand, and, as an opposition member of the National Assembly points out in the case of a specific Bill, "In its effort to please international donors, the government has thrown words like blasphemy, *Zina* offences and 'honour' killings into the Bill, *whereas it deals with none of the above.*"

"Although President Musharraf speaks often of 'enlightened moderation'," the International Crisis Group points out, "his government has yet to invoke existing laws banning hate speech. On the contrary, *the jihadi media operates with impunity. Hate-inciting audio, videotapes, books and pamphlets are freely available, with banned terrorist groups propagating their views through any number of publications....*" Citing a typical contrast, the Report recalls, "A leading opposition politician and parliamentarian, Javed Hashmi,

remains imprisoned for criticising the armed forces, while the head of the banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Hafiz Saeed, continues to preach *jihad* at public rallies. At one of his regular Friday sermons at Qadisia Mosque in Lahore, he defiantly said, 'We are not afraid of crackdown. No one can check the spread of *jihad* all over the world'."

As becomes clear upon reading the account, all this is to a purpose. Musharraf's purpose is exactly the one that successive military rulers of Pakistan have pursued in patronizing the religious extremists, and allying with them. Musharraf doles out money and a share in power to them; and they in turn help him curb civilian opposition, fetch morsels of legitimacy and provide fodder for *jihads* beyond Pakistan.

The Group's overview is as explicit an indictment as possible, and as clear a warning as possible to those who want to believe in the "naya dil". The Group observes,

Sectarian conflict in Pakistan is the direct consequence of state policies of Islamisation and marginalisation of secular democratic forces. Co-option and patronage of religious parties by successive military governments have brought Pakistan to a point where religious extremism threatens to erode the foundations of the state and society. As President Pervez Musharraf is praised by the international community for his role in the war against terrorism, the frequency and viciousness of sectarian terrorism continues to increase in his country.

Instead of empowering liberal, democratic voices, the government has co-opted the religious right and continues to rely on it to counter civilian opposition. By depriving democratic forces of an even playing field and continuing to ignore the need for state policies that would encourage and indeed reflect the country's religious diversity, *the government has allowed religious extremist organisations and jihadi groups, and the madrasas that provide them an endless stream of recruits, to flourish*. It has failed to protect a vulnerable judiciary and equip its law-enforcement agencies with the tools they need to eliminate sectarian terrorism.

....The political use of Islam by the state promotes an aggressive competition for official patronage between and within the many variations of Sunni and Shia Islam, with the clerical elite of major sects and subjects striving to build up their political parties, raise *jihadi* militias, expand *madrasa* networks and, *as has happened on Musharraf's watch, become part of government. Like all other Pakistani military governments, the Musharraf administration has also weakened secular and democratic political forces.*

Administrative and legal action against militant organisations has failed to

dismantle a well-entrenched and widely spread terror infrastructure. *All banned extremist groups persist with new labels, although old names are also still in use. The jihadi media is flourishing, and the leading figures of extremist Sunni organisations are free to preach their jihadi ideologies. Leaders of banned groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Sipah Sababa and Jaish-e-Mohammed appear to enjoy virtual immunity from the law. They have gained new avenues to propagate their militant ideas since the chief patrons of jihad, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), have acquired prominent and powerful roles in Musharraf's political structure.*

And again,

Except for a few showcase "reformed" *madrasas*, no sign of change is visible. Because of the mullahs' political utility, the military-led government's proposed measures, from curriculum changes to a new registration law, have been dropped in the face of opposition by the MMA (Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal) and its *madrasa* subsidiaries. Instead, financial and political incentives to the mullahs have raised their public profile and influence. The government's approach towards religious extremism is epitomised by its deals with extremists in the tribal areas, concluded through JUI mediation after payment of bribes to militant leaders....

The Report nails the underlying reason,

President Musharraf's lack of domestic legitimacy has forced the military to rely on alliances of convenience with the religious right, based on the politics of patronage. In the absence of international support, moderate, secular and democratic parties will remain in the political cold. The choice that Pakistan faces is not between the military and the mullahs, as is generally believed in the West; it is between genuine democracy and a military-mullah alliance that is responsible for producing and sustaining religious extremism of many hues.

A new Musharraf? A Musharraf with a "*naya dil*"?

In any event, how many times have we to be reminded that the matter is not about this ruler of Pakistan or that? First we blamed everything on Jinnah's diabolic machinations. Then on Liaquat Ali's perverse hostility. Then on Suhrawardy's peculiar pathology. Then on Bhutto's congenital untrustworthiness. Then on Zia's innate perfidy. Then on Benazir's hysterics. Then on Musharraf's need to prove himself more-than-a-*mohajir*.

The nature of the State and society of Pakistan

The first truth to bear in mind is the nature of the State of Pakistan. In Pakistan power resides in the hands of persons and institutions – the Army, the ISI and similar agencies – whose importance, muscle, even crass lucre depend on hostility with India. There is not the slightest indication yet that power has at all shifted out of their hands. And they have not suffered the slightest, I repeat the slightest cost because of the killings they have engineered in India. Quite the contrary: every "successful" assault on India has only increased their power and pelf. And we must bear in mind the related fact that every observer stresses: the intertwining webs of the Army, the intelligence agencies and the Islam-*pasand* groups and parties. The Army and the agencies channel patronage to the latter – to begin with, money: recall the open acknowledgements by successive heads of ISI – Hamid Gul, Asad Durrani – and of Army Chiefs – like Mirza Aslam Beg – that they gave money to religious parties during elections to defeat the non-religious parties; next, freedom to operate even during periods when civilian parties were shackled; then, positions – in governments, in academic institutions, and the like; even more valuable, a share in "foreign aid" – for instance, the vast amounts the Americans poured in for creating the Taliban. It is because of the assistance that Musharraf has given them, and the alliance he has formed with them that the Islamic parties today are in power in two of Pakistan's four provinces, NWFP and Balochistan – where they control each of the lucrative ministries to boot; and at the Federal level are partners of the Government. In return, through the political parties and organizations that they control, even more so through the *madrassa*-mosque network, the *ulema* provide legitimacy to every military ruler; they legitimize every war or campaign that the military rulers launch; they provide the fodder for the *jibads* – in Afghanistan, in Kashmir; they belabour the civilian opponents of the military – they are the ones who organized street demonstrations and violence in 1977 against the Government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto which became the excuse for Zia ul-Haq's coup; they are the ones who organized the campaigns in 1989 that led to the ouster of the Government of Benazir Bhutto; they are the ones who worked overtime to legitimize the coup of Musharraf in 1999. It isn't just that the chief beneficiary of these

campaigns was the military. The campaigns were triggered at the behest of the military, and swelled because of the resources the military and the agencies pumped in. And, of course, the religious leaders and groups have been among the principal instruments for whipping up sentiments against India – and thereby for getting people behind the military and the agencies.¹

Nor is this condition of the State of Pakistan something floating in the air. It is well-grounded in the condition to which Pakistani society has been brought. The general mass have been Talibanized to an extent that persons in free, and free-wheeling societies like India and the US and Europe just cannot imagine – just as we cannot imagine the dread that organizations like the ISI and the Army evoke in Pakistan. The International Crisis Group lists the exponential multiplication of *madrassas* and *maulanas*: “By 1995, Pakistan had 20,000 *maulanas* with the highest *madrassa* certificate, in addition to 40,000 local religious scholars. Since 1989, 30,000 more students have appeared for the final exams conducted by the Deobandi Wafaq alone. *A quarter of a million have passed the Hifz (memorization of the Quran) test since 1989...*” In 1950, the Group reports, Balochistan had only seven *madrassas*. By 2003, it had 1,045. In 1950, Karachi had only four *madrassas*. By now it has 979.... The Minister for Religious Affairs in Musharraf’s Cabinet, Ejazul Haq says that the *madrassas* today give “religious education” to *ten lakh* students.² And we have glimpsed – but only in an academic sort of way – what is poured into wards in these *madrassas* as well as in “non-religious” government schools. The line of Maulana Maududi is what has come to prevail. Nor is the phenomenon confined to Islamization. Pakistan is yet not able to think of an identity except as the “*Not India*,” except as the country whose mission it is to dismember India. What Islamization has added is the conviction that the historical animus against India is sanctified by religious sanction – that as a matter of religion, Pakistan’s mission is to undo the error of the Partition, that its mission is to wrest back the entire sub-continent for Islam. In spite of

¹For a compact recounting, International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, ICG Asia report No. 49, 20 March 2003, Islamabad/Brussels, as well as *The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan* referred to earlier. www.crisisweb.org.

²Samina Ahmed, “Juggling figures, Ignoring facts,” <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3311&l=1>.

1971, Kargil and the rest, those who exercise power over Pakistan remain convinced that they *can* break India; that, if they cannot break India, they can bleed India to death; that, if they cannot bleed India to death, they can bleed India enough to hold India down to Pakistan's level.¹

In fact, from their point of view, Pakistan has over the last quarter century waged a masterly strategic offensive against India: at little cost, it has tied down a large proportion of India's Forces; it has deployed a scale of violence, and that over as long a period as twenty five years, violence which has put the severest strains even on the territorial integrity of India, which has inflicted thousands upon thousands of deaths, and yet not provoked any retaliatory offensive on Pakistan's territory.

Notice too that Pakistan has been able to put difficulties as much as opportunities to work: from American anxieties about the Soviet Union during the Cold War; to the opportunity that opened up because of the role Pakistan played in facilitating American contact with China; to the events that followed upon the collapse of the Taliban – Pakistan has extracted some advantage or the other. To the Islamic world, it has presented itself as the alchemist – the country that has the brains that can transform the wealth of the Muslim countries into actual power. To the Americans, and as much to the Chinese it has presented itself as the country that can facilitate their access to the Islamic world.

Nor can one be certain how the situation in Afghanistan will evolve. The Government in Kabul remains as yet completely dependent on the Americans. How long will the Americans stay the course? The other side of the picture is that India, as much as the USA, has almost completely abandoned the Northern Alliance. And Iran too, perhaps to a lesser extent, and perhaps because of its own preoccupations –

¹Writing in the wake of Kargil about the four wars that had been launched, Altaf Gauhar observed in *The Nation*, "The point is that all these operations were conceived and launched on the basis of one assumption: that the Indians are too cowardly and ill-organised to offer any effective military response which could pose a threat to Pakistan. Ayub Khan genuinely believed that 'as a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place.'..." How consistent with what Pakistani students are taught in their textbooks! Altaf Gauhar, "Four wars, one assumption," <http://www.pakistanlink.com/Opinion/99/Sept/10/01.html>.

what with the declarations of the IAEA, what with ominously ambiguous statements from Washington – has abandoned Ismail Khan and others in Herat. Russia has more or less withdrawn from the scene – except that, having been made to realize what a sore here can spell for its own security, it is now trying to regain some presence: witness the Dushanbe Accord that permits it to establish a permanent base of 5,000 troops, and also its decision to join the CACO, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization. Together these developments could well resurrect the bad old times. To put the matter in a sentence, Russia, Iran, India have all abdicated Afghan affairs completely to the Americans, and the Americans are hugely dependent on Pakistan. Stretched in various directions, will the USA gravitate to out-sourcing, so to say, the strategic management of Afghanistan back to Pakistan? With a “moderate Taliban”, the *Jaish ul Muslim*, say, to partner the official Government of Afghanistan?

Should Pakistan again acquire sway over Afghanistan, will it once again direct the malevolent ferocity of its offspring, the fundamentalists towards India?

Nor should we forget that Pakistan has been able to establish an extensive network of agents and saboteurs within India. We laud the fact, for instance, that in two years, 2002 and 2003, our intelligence agencies smashed 161 ISI modules. That is a large and impressive number, true. But each time we announce, “161 cells smashed,” we also affirm how successful Pakistan has been in establishing these in the first place. Equally ominous is the fact that there is scarcely a part of the country where these modules have not been unearthed. Moreover, on all hands those 161 are but a fraction of the modules that Pakistan has in fact been able to set up across India. What is it that Musharraf has said or done which has diminished in the slightest the potential for ill of this vast network?

The capacity being in place, to use Musharraf’s telling phrase, intention can change at short notice.

Reflect on options. Pakistan came to realize that it could not wrest Kashmir through war. Therefore, it launched a proxy war – through terrorists, through its political agents in the Valley. From Pakistan’s point of view, this has been quite a success: India has come to accept that Kashmir is a dispute; it has come to accept that Pakistan is an equal party in the dispute; it has come to accept that, if it wants the

dispute to be settled, India has to negotiate a settlement with Pakistan. Now, it so happens that in the international situation as it is today, Pakistan cannot deploy this stratagem with full force: it cannot go on sending terrorists across into India. Hence, why not the following four-step strategy *directed to the same goal – of wresting Kashmir for Pakistan?*

- ❑ Get India to agree to "soft" or, better still, "open" borders between the two halves of Kashmir.
- ❑ Once India gets irreversibly committed to these "open" borders, foment an Intifada-type movement demanding "autonomy".
- ❑ And then let Islam take over. It will complete the job: the Valley has already been "cleansed" of Hindus; the Islamic network in the Valley is diabolically well-knit; there is nothing in civil society in Kashmir that can stand in its way.
- ❑ As this process works its way, go on "talking peace", making sure that the onus of going on producing ever-new formulae remains on India. The exact stratagem of Jinnah. He too made sure that the onus of producing ever-fresh formulae remained on the Congress, and, for each new proposal, he had, to use Panditji's expression, "the permanently negative answer." Till he got Pakistan.

Recall the three parameters within which Musharraf has just said the solution must lie: you say borders cannot be changed, he said; we say the problem – that is the LOC – cannot be the solution; third, war is not an option.

Does the four-step stratagem breach the parameters even in the slightest? Not only are they fully within the parameters; at each turn, Pakistan will be able to keep proclaiming that the step is just giving expression to "the will of the people of Kashmir"!

"But will the Americans allow this?"

"But will the Americans allow this?" the hopeful ask.

There has indeed been, as we noticed, a change in America's assessments in regard to India. But will this change translate into a check – here and now – on Pakistan, a country that the US finds more than merely useful? Would the claim during the Intifada-type movement, "Each step is just giving expression to the will of the people," not provide sufficient ground for Pakistan's backers to argue

that what is happening furthers America's project of advancing democracy?! In any event, how many times have Americans to demonstrate that, whatever significance they may attach to India "in the long run", they will, as we shall soon see when we read Kissinger's conversations with Chou En-lai in the build up to the 1971 war, go by

- ❑ *Their* interest, not ours'.
- ❑ Their *immediate* interest, not interest in that "never-never land of unrealized tendency," the long run.
- ❑ By their immediate interest *as perceived by them*, not as pictured by our arguments.
- ❑ By their immediate interest as perceived *by half a dozen of them* – look at their ingress into Iraq today.
- ❑ By their immediate interest as perceived by that half a dozen *at that moment* – even those half a dozen may change their view tomorrow, but the step would have been taken, a step that will make the alternate course less likely.

The immediate problems that confront Americans are to manage Iraq, to manage Afghanistan, and to hunt down some conspicuous Islamic terrorists. For these objectives, they regard Pakistan as indispensable. After all, has Pakistan been able to deflect attention from its proliferation activities only by the proficiency of its PR machinery? Is it not the case that US, etc., have been desperate to believe Pakistani denials? Nor is it just the US Government that shut its eyes to what surfaced about A.Q. Khan & Co. The US media moved over to other issues just as swiftly.

Consider a single, recent example – a matter the consequences of which visit us every other week in some part of India or the other. After 9/11, open, daily, shrill calls for *jihad* became an embarrassment. Musharraf made a speech about the inappropriateness of *jihad*. He declared that he would not allow Pakistani territory or territory under its control to be used for waging terrorist attacks against any country. But as far as organizations waging war against India were concerned, all that the Pakistan Government did was to persuade them to change their nameplates. Here is a representative item from *The Daily Times* of Pakistan:

Jihad takes on new 'Benign' look

The Daily Times, Lahore, 2004-02-25, Amir Rana

Muttahida Jihad Council (MJC), an alliance of Kashmiri *jibadi* organizations has been restructured, with six smaller alliances within it representing various groups that will no longer use the words *jibad*, *lashkar*, *jaish* or *mujahideen* with their names so that they appear more political than militant. These semi-alliances are the Kashmir Resistance Forum (KRF) 1, 2 and 3 and Kashmir Freedom Forum (KFF) 1 and 2, while only *Hizb-ul-Mujahideen* (HM) is allowed to use its original name, sources in the MJC told *Daily Times*. "We have been told that these names are damaging Pakistan's image abroad as well as the Kashmiri freedom movement," a *jibadi* leader said. Asked why HM was allowed to use its original name, he replied "HM also holds the chairmanship of the *jibad* alliance and quarters abroad consider it representative of the Kashmiri freedom movement alone." Sources said this decision was taken in October 2003, implemented in January 2004. KRF 1 represents the *Lashkar-e-Toiba* (LT), Brigade 313 (a *Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami* faction led by Commander Illyas Kashmiri), *Lashkar-e-Islam* (LI) and *Al-Bader Mujahideen*, while KRF 2 is an alliance of *Al-Jibad*, *Al-Fateh*, *Hizb Ullah* and *Muslim Janbaz Force* (MJF). KRF 3 consists of *Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami* (Maulana Muzaffar group), *Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen* (JM) and *Jamiat-ul-Ansar* (JA), while KFF 1 is an alliance of *Jaish-e-Mubammad* (JM) and *Al-Umar Mujahideen*, and KFF 2 includes Islamic Front, *Jamaat-ul-Furqan* (JF), *Tebrik-e-jibad* (TJ), *Al-Barq* and *Tebrik-ul-Mujahideen* (TM). This new "adjustment" is called "*Muwakhaat*" and sources said this would also reduce the *jibadi* groups' internal differences. "These organisations' new identities will improve their image, making them look like the political groups," sources said. The MJC earlier consisted of 15 organizations: HM, TM, JM, *Al-Barq*, *Hizb Ullah*, *Al-Jibad*, *Al-Fateh*, HJI (Muzaffar group), IF, LI, Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, *Al-Umar*, JA, TJ, and all of these were Kashmir based. Five Pakistan-based organizations LT, JM, Brigade 313, *Al-Badr Mujahideen* and JF were not the part of MJC but they have been included in the new structure. "The MJC constitution barred Pakistan-based organizations from the alliance but circumstances have changed. We need unity and no one can deny their role in *jibad*," a *jibadi* leader said. Sources also claimed Syed Salahuddin will remain the Chairman of MJC for five more years, being acceptable to all concerned. Sources said the Pakistan-based groups had asked to join the MJC, and claimed this wasn't the first time that the MJC was being restructured. In January 2002, a formula for a merger was adopted but small and Pakistan-based organizations refused to accept it. They wanted to maintain their independent identity and most *jibadi* leaders were not prepared to be

*The
Daily Times*

subordinate to small Kashmiri organizations, sources claimed, adding, "This structure is an extension of 2002's formula and now leaders of these organizations will not share responsibilities with others." Sources said these smaller alliances would launch operations against Indian forces in Kashmir, but after permission from MJC leaders.

Such information is available in the open, it is available from Pakistani newspapers. Yet the West, beholden to Pakistan for the assistance the latter is providing on matters that interest the West, has shut its eyes.

It would be foolish, therefore, for us to proceed on the assumption that the Americans will attend to *our* problem rather than secure Pakistan's help – and, as a price, let it do what it will *vis-à-vis* India: after all, that is a price that *we* rather than Americans will have to bear. Indeed, there will be many American strategists who will see *mêrit* in the Pakistani argument that it must channel the terrorists into Kashmir, and ensure them some victories *so as to pacify those in Pakistan who oppose assistance to the US* in what these elements, the Pakistani authorities will say, are projecting to the people as the US' "war against Islam".

Even if we disregard all this, and, with tunnel vision, focus only on "the peace process," we should bear in mind the operating principle of US policy when dealing with two hostile, or potentially hostile neighbours. As successive National Security Advisors – Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski – and others have explained, the objective of US policy makers in such situations is to ensure that the US is closer to each of the two countries – separately, naturally – than they can be or are likely to be to each other. This operational maxim alone will preclude them from putting on Pakistan the kind of pressures that our security concerns would require.

And then there is the goad of and material help from Pakistan's "long and trusted friend", China, there is the encouragement from a relationship that has been described by the Chinese as that between lips and teeth.

An opportunity if only we would use it

Instead of relying on a "changed heart", therefore, the sorts of things that we should watch out for are:

- ☐ Is the locus of power shifting in Pakistan out of the hands of persons and organizations whose muscle and lucre depend on hostility towards India?
- ☐ Is Pakistan's society getting less Talibanized?
 - ☐ Has there been any change in the *madrassas*?
 - ☐ Have the textbooks that are being drilled into children in "normal" schools changed?
 - ☐ Have the Zia-laws and Ordinances been diluted or scrapped?
 - ☐ Have the *Islam-pasand* and *jibadi* organizations been actually circumscribed?
 - ☐ Are there signs that Pakistan is acquiring a new sense of identity? Is it, for instance, getting interested in growth?

In the meanwhile, we should

- ☐ Not be too alarmed at the prospect that Pakistan may become even more "Islamic" in the coming years. The prospect that Pakistan will become increasingly Islamic, will force others to sit up – especially those who are concerned about its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. Indeed, there is much to be said for joining Islamic ideologues in taunting Pakistan that it is still dragging its feet in regard to Islamization – of the economy, for instance. For fifty years the *Islam-pasand* have been urging that *riba* be abolished, that in all spheres the divinely ordained *shariah* be enforced. Instead of being anxious about such demands, we should wish them Allah-speed. Nothing we could do would do to Pakistan what such "reforms" will.
- ☐ Simultaneously we should give opportunities to journalists, legislators, judges, academics of Pakistan to come and see India for themselves. That will by itself give the lie to what they have been fed, to what the "Ideology of Pakistan" and even more so what the version of Islam that pervades Pakistan proclaims to be the case.
- ☐ Improve governance in Jammu & Kashmir.

And acquire the capacity "to do a Kashmir to Pakistan". Till the US felt the need to get Pakistan to assist in driving the Taliban out

of Afghanistan and in chasing down the conspicuous terrorists, Pakistan was being written off as "a failed State". Those analyses from "independent" media and think-tanks suddenly disappeared the moment the US needed the help of Pakistani rulers! But the faultlines remain. In POK, in Gilgit-Baltistan there are strong groups that are fed-up with the way the Pakistani establishment has treated the peoples of those regions, and, therefore, advocate breaking away from Pakistan. The Pashtuns see how they have been used. They also see the victory of President Karzai as a Pashtun phenomenon. The Saraiki remain disaffected. Action in Afghanistan has triggered a deep reaction in Waziristan, and the rest of FATA. In Balochistan memories of the brutal suppression in Zulfikar Bhutto's time remain fresh. And they are determined not to repeat the mistake of that encounter – when by concentrating forces on a few towns, Bhutto could crush the movement. This time the insurgency-like movement is widely dispersed throughout that vast area. So unsettled have the Western and Northwestern parts of the country become that, as I write, Pakistan has had to withdraw very substantial numbers of troops from the borders with India and deploy them in that region. In Sindh, to the traditional and deep resentments arising from the neglect of and discrimination against the people has been added the looming ecological disaster: the salination of vast tracts because of excessive exploitation of Indus waters upstream, the ingress of the sea, the acute shortage of water. This is an issue waiting to explode. And not just in Sindh.

How would Pakistan have viewed such developments if they had been in India? Indeed, how does it today *use* the stresses it locates in India?

Islamization in the East

The few who have been troubled by the reversion to fundamentalist notions in Islamic societies in this region have focused mainly on Pakistan. But developments in Bangladesh hold as much danger for the region, in particular for India. Islamization has proceeded relentlessly since the assassination of Mujibur Rahman in 1975. The ban on pro-Pakistan Islamic groups was lifted in 1976. "Secularism" had been incorporated as one of the State Principles in the Constitution: it was formally removed from the Constitution in 1977. Islam was declared as the State Religion in June 1988 by President Ershad. The usual sequence followed: recitations from the Quran at the commencement of every function, Friday replacing Sunday as a holiday.... And the occasion for each new exhibitionist step of this kind was the usual one: the less the ruler was able to do by way of governance, the more zealously he paraded the next "Islamic" step. The same sort of change came about in the conduct of the country's foreign policy: Bangladesh started taking an ever more active and vocal role in the Organization of Islamic Countries. Ershad himself was overthrown in December 1990.

There was an even more ominous change. The Jama'at-e-Islami (JeI-BD) had been virtually written off in Bangladesh in the wake of the 1971 War as it had supported Pakistan in the latter's persecution of Bengalis, so much so that its leaders had to flee to Pakistan. They did not just come back; many of them were invited back. The JeI-BD began to rise again as a political force. And not under some camouflage. On the contrary, several persons who had acquired the greatest notoriety in crushing Bangladeshi nationalists were now deliberately given conspicuous posts in the JeI-BD. Abdul Quader Molla, the man who had come to be hated as "the butcher of Mirpur", became the publicity secretary of the organization. Maulana Motiur Rahman Nizami, a person who had to flee to Pakistan because he had

been the head of the *al-Badr*, a hated group that had butchered innocents, became the head of the JeI-BD.

With such audacity as its new banner, the JeI-BD continued to grow. In the 1991 and 1996 elections the principal parties – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party once, and the Awami League the next time – sought its help. By the 2001 elections, the JeI-BD was a significant enough force to have the BNP enter into a formal alliance with it. The elections yielded a splintered result – this splintering worked to the great advantage of the JeI-BD. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party secured 40.9 per cent of the votes, with its coalition right-wing parties, JeI-BD securing 4.28 per cent, and the Islami Oikyo Jote (an alliance of seven radical Islamist groups) getting 0.68 per cent. At the other end, the opposition Awami League received 40.1 per cent of the vote. This evenly split vote allowed the – electorally inconsequential – radical Islamist parties to tilt the balance in favour of the BNP.

Since then JeI-BD has had formal representation in the Government. The erstwhile “butcher of Mirpur” became a regular at press briefings. The erstwhile head of *al-Badr* became a minister in the Government!

There is another change. The situation in Bangladesh makes it difficult even for the relatively – one has to add, alas!, “privately” – secular politicians and parties to oppose the Islamist discourse, since any criticism of Islamist extremism is easily distorted in the political arena as an attack on Islam itself. The result is that “secular” political parties are also forced to engage in Islamist posturing, and during elections, to seek Islamist support. No party in Bangladesh currently has the capacity to confront Islamist extremism. This has greatly increased the Islamist parties’ political clout, and has helped them to consolidate their position further.

The JeI-BD has deep and extensive links with pan-Islamic fundamentalist organizations across the world, in particular with such organizations in countries such as Saudi Arabia that have been the fount of funds for proselytization and fundamentalism. It is well knit into the *Rabita-al-alam-al-Islamia* – founded by the Saudi monarchy, the organization is reported to have been a major source of funds for fundamentalist groups. Through this and similar bodies, the JeI-BD is closely linked to other organizations of the kind – such as the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. It has been known to have received considerable funding from Islamic “NGOs”, and “relief organizations”

like the International Islamic Relief Organization, Benevolence Foundation and Benevolence International, Islamic Relief Worldwide.

The main front organization of the JeI-BD is the Islamic Chhatra Shibir – the ICS, the Jamaat's student body. Founded in February 1977, the latter in turn maintains close links and liaison with SIMI – the banned Students Islamic Movement of India – and other fundamentalist groups operating in the Northeast. ICS is reported to have by now a following of two and half to three lakhs. Interrogation of fugitives and captured terrorists indicates that SIMI and ICS have arrangements to provide shelter and other facilities to members of each other, in particular to those who are on the run or on assignments.

Another organization that has been in the forefront of anti-India propaganda as well as the spread of fundamentalist ideas in Bangladesh is the Islami Oikya Jote. It was founded in 1990, and by now is reported to have a strength of almost four and a half lakhs. A Taliban-like war must be waged, it proclaims, and anti-Islamic forces – that is, anyone *it* dubs anti-Islamic – must be driven out of Bangladesh. The head of IOJ, Maulana Azizul Haq is a member of the HUJI-BD.¹

¹The IOJ situation and leadership is currently somewhat ambiguous – and paradoxically that increases its representation in extremist groups! It also exemplifies the sort of reason for hope we encountered when we considered the proclivity of extremist groups to splinter. The Islamic Oikyo Jote (IOJ) consisted of seven parties at the time of its establishment: Khelafat Majlis, Nezam-e-Islam, Faraizi Jamaat, Islami Morcha, Ulama Committee, a splinter group of NAP (Bhasani), and Islami Shashantantra Andolon. The IOJ split immediately after the general elections in 2001 over a struggle for power and a bid for ministerial posts. There are now two factions of the IOJ, one headed by Shaikhul Hadith Azizul Haque. Azizul Haque is also a member of the Advisory Council of the HuJI, the Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami. The second splinter group or faction of the IOJ is headed by Mufti Fazlul Haque Amini. Amini is also a member of the Executive Council of HuJI. Amini is the head of his own political party, in addition, the Jamayatul Ansar. Both Azizul Haq and Amini had close links with the Afghan campaigns and the Taliban. The splits, alliances, mutations of organizations committed to violence are as many. By now an estimated 13 Islamist militant organizations are reported to be active in Bangladesh: Shahadat-e-Al-Hikma, Jamaatul Mujahedul Bangladesh, Jaamat-e-Yahia Al Trust, Hizbut Tawhid, Al Hayakat Al-Islamia, Al Markajul Al Islam Al-Islami, Jamaatul Falaiya, Tawhidi Janata, World Islamic Front, Jumaatul Al-Sadat, Shahadat-e-Nabuat, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami Bangladesh and Al Khidmat. Often, of course, the sponsors of these organizations – say, the ISI – may for operational reasons divide the organizations, or bring some together.

There are several other organizations also that are committed to the same sort of agendas. Each of them has wings, and members that are zealous proponents of *jihad*. Among these, the Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI-BD), which was founded in 1988, has by now a cadre of fifteen to twenty thousand. Like the HUJI in Pakistan, HUJI-BD advocates actual and literal *jihad*. This *jihad*, it maintains, must aim at establishing the hegemony of Islam. It operates on the principle that Muslims are one *ummah*, that no boundaries of country, culture or geography divide them, that, accordingly, the singular loyalty that every Muslim owes is to Islam alone, that the one cause for which he must strive is to establish the sway of Islam all over the world. Incidentally, this "universalism" pays dividends as rich as "internationalism" delivered during the Comintern days! In a report released by the Bangladesh Crime Investigation Department (CID) in 1999, Osama bin Laden had sanctioned Taka 20 million (US \$ 0.40 million) for recruitment and training of cadres and organizing terrorist and subversive activities in Bangladesh. The money was transferred through a Pakistani national and coordinator of pro-bin Laden terrorist organizations in South Asia, Mohammad Sajed. The amount was distributed through the local leaders of HuJI-BD to 421 *madrassas* that were helping HuJI-BD in recruitment and training. It was reported that bin Laden's monetary assistance to the HuJI-BD came through the Servants of Suffering Humanity International situated in Dhaka. A number of *madrassas* that directly receive money from a multiplicity of charities and Government sources in Gulf countries also transfer some of these funds to the HuJI-BD. Terrorist organizations like the *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, *Jaish-e-Muhammad* and HuJI-Pakistan are also known to have provided funds on occasion. Financial assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan has been routed through Muslim NGOs including Adarsa Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation, Hataddin, Al Fujiari Welfare Association, Benevolence International Foundation, Global Relief Foundation and Islamic Heritage Society. In June 2004, the Bangladesh Government ordered the closure of Al Haramain's activities in the country after the United States pressurized Saudi Arabia to wind up this organization, which was known to have been directly involved in financing *Al Qaeda* and Islamic *jihad* organizations. Some arrests followed the proscription, but the

persons arrested were soon released without charge and have not been heard of since.

The main catchments of HUJI-BD are the *madrassas*, secondary schools and other Islam-*pasand* organizations. Since the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, its ranks have been nourished by some Taliban cadre, and its rhetoric has taken a sharper anti-American tone. No wonder that in the wake of the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan, a shipload of the Taliban were brought to Bangladesh – where they were allowed to melt away into hideouts. Indian intelligence reports indicate that the HUJI-BD is striving to create pockets of Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami followers in Assam, West Bengal, Manipur and Kashmir in India; among the Arakan in Myanmar; and in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh. Of late the organization has been in a bit of a quandary. Its close links with Pakistani agencies and organizations have put it in the dilemma that organizations within Pakistan too have had to confront: the organization must condemn the US and at the same time spare its own patrons in Pakistan who are acting in aid of the US. HUJI-BD was put on the US list of terrorist organizations in 2003.¹ But, as has been the case of similar organizations within Pakistan, its operations have not suffered in any way on that count.

The JeI-BD has had to draw in its horns a bit since it joined the Government. Its strong-arm and violent activities have been carried out by the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM-BD) – another terrorist organization committed to *jihad* – and what has become its unvarying accompaniment in Bangladesh: namely, the “struggle” against India and all non-Muslims within Bangladesh. Eight of its activists were caught in Dinajpur in May 2003. Their interrogation revealed both the *jibadi* agenda of the organization, and also that the JuM-BD has been able to establish an extensive network in eight of our border districts. The activists also gave details of the 39 *madrassas* that JuM-BD is running, and the uses to which these are being put.

According to its own claims and literature, the Shahadat-e-al-Hikma (SAH) is linked to and follows the ideology of *Lashkar-e-Toiba*. Its posters and pamphlets also claim close links with the Maoists in

¹See also Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001*; and Bertil Lintner, “Bangladesh: Extremist Islamic consolidation”, *Fautilines*, volume 14, July 2003, pp.1-27.

Nepal, and the *Al Qaeda* worldwide. The organization's main aim, its proclaimed aim, is to "reclaim" West Bengal on the ground that the state is a part of Bangladesh.

Through the direct deeds of the cadre of such organizations, as well as through the general atmosphere of hatred and religiosity that has been fomented, writers and social workers whose writings or work exhibited the slightest trace of secular values, to say nothing of those who spoke for the Hindus who were being killed and driven into India, have been hounded. Several of them have been killed. The Hindus have been set upon, their temples destroyed, their properties usurped. As we would expect from our analysis of extremist ideologies above, Muslims who do not conform to the doctrines and practices that these extremist groups maintain are the true version of Islam too have come under attack. As has been the case in Pakistan, among Muslims the Ahmadiyas have been the worst hit.¹

Madrassas have multiplied. By now they are estimated to number

¹An Islamist fundamentalist alliance, *Hifajate Khatme Nabuwat Andolon* (HKNA or "The movement to conserve the right of the last Prophet"), had threatened to launch a *jihad* against Ahmadiyas if the Government did not declare them as "non-Muslims" by January 9, 2004. On January 9, the Home Ministry banned all publications of the Ahmadiya Muslim Jamaat Bangladesh. As the US Embassy and several human rights organizations expressed concern, the Government in March deferred proposed legislation by a BNP parliamentarian that would have created a blasphemy law based on the Pakistani model. The anti-Ahmadiya drive organised by the HKNA, led by leaders of the IOJ, has been at the forefront of a movement to capture Ahmadiya mosques throughout Bangladesh. These protests have also galvanized the Islamists to foment trouble in the streets through rallies and marches. The Government has made little effort to contain the demonstrations, since its own coalition partners are leading the crusade. Mobilization against minorities, intellectuals and other "out groups" is an integral part of the Islamist extremist agenda. The Banglabhai phenomenon furnishes an apt illustration in this context. See, Saji Cherian, "Reinventing the Terror," *South Asia Intelligence Review*, Volume 2, No. 46, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/2_46.htm. Banglabhai's Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) also has significant international linkages. The "Amir" of the group, Maulana Abdur Rahman, began his political career by joining the Islami Chhatra Shibir and later its patron organization, the Jama'at-e-Islami. In the early 1980s, he studied at Madina Islami University in Saudi Arabia and later worked at the Saudi Embassy in Dhaka for five years between 1985 and 1990. Thereafter, Rahman set up a mosque and a *madrassa* with financial help from two Islamic non-governmental organizations, the Rabeta-e-Islam and the Islami Oytijho Sangstha. Connections with these organizations persist to this day.

around 64,000. About 7,000 of them are said to educate students at least in a few regular subjects. An observer describes the curriculum and consequence of the rest:

The much more numerous Deobandi *madrassas* are more "traditional"; Islamic studies dominate, and the students are taught Urdu (the national language of Pakistan), Persian and Arabic. After finishing their education, the students are incapable of taking up any mainstream profession, and the mosques and *madrassas* are their main sources of employment. As Bangladeshi journalist Salahuddin Babar points out: "Passing out from the *madrassas*, poorly equipped to enter mainstream life and professions, the students are easily lured by motivated quarters who capitalize on religious sentiment to create fanatics, rather than modern Muslims."¹

A good indicator of the trend is the ever swelling *Bishwa Ijtema* that is organized by the Bangladesh chapter of the World Tableegh Jamaat. Held every year around Tongi, it has by now grown to be the second largest congregation of Muslims in the world. In 2002 the gathering was held between January 19 and 21. About forty lakh are estimated to have participated – they had come from 64 countries, the organizers declared. The President, Prime Minister and cabinet ministers, the Leader of the Opposition of Bangladesh, all attended the concluding function.

There was just one change this time round. The Bangladesh Government was aware that because of 9/11 many would be scanning the proceedings. It strove to ensure that the formal addresses were confined to religious themes. But exchanges at the sidelines reflected what is in store: that youth from Bangladesh would be sent to Sudan, Pakistan, Arakan and Philippines for training under the garb of Tableegh work; that "tactical war against the USA instead of direct attack" would be the better option; that worldwide attack on the Jewish community should be carried out; that Islamic organizations should strive to acquire influence in and control over media organizations, especially the electronic media so that these no longer portray Muslims as terrorists; that the Taliban and *Al Qaeda* have to be reorganized under new names; that the Tableegh Jamaat is indeed the appropriate and inconspicuous mode for spreading Islam – such were the themes and conclusions of exchanges among

¹Bertil Lintner, *op. cit.*, at p. 16.

delegates. JEI-BD leaders met a number of delegations from foreign countries. They urged clerics to unite against the "anti-Islamic activities of Israel, USA and India." Funds were solicited for "fighting atrocities against Muslims in India"....

Bonds of Pakistan's Army and intelligence agencies with counterparts in the Bangladesh Army and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence had survived the 1971 upheaval. Since then they have been completely restored. And today, Bangladesh is a major staging post for the ISI. With heaps of evidence before it, the Task Force on Internal Security noted,

It is now well established that Bangladesh is being utilized as a nodal point for the trans-shipment of arms and ammunition which are acquired by the insurgent groups of the NE region from Singapore and Thailand. The Jama'at-e-Islami of Bangladesh is providing safe storage in *madrassas* in CHT [Chittagong Hill Tracts] and the trans-shipments are being organized by JEI in connivance with elements of Bangladesh Rifles and DGFI under ISI's guidance. ISI has links with NGOs like Islamic Relief Organisation, Junudul Muqawat Al Islamia and Qaumi *madrassas* in the area. Apart from directing intelligence operations from the Pak mission in Dhaka, ISI agents are organizing training and providing weaponry and funds to North East insurgents who enjoy safe havens in Bangladesh....

Nor do the links terminate in Bangladesh – for the fundamentalist organizations in that country are intertwined with their counterparts in Pakistan, which in turn are intertwined with, which in fact are extensions of ISI and the Pakistan Army.

These organizations, and, through them, ISI and other Pakistani agencies have seen in the spread of Islamic fundamentalist ideas a sure device for widening the distance between Bangladesh and India. A number of activists from these organizations have been apprehended, and subsequently interrogated in India. During interrogations these persons have revealed:

- The arms training they received in Pakistan, and in Kandahar;
- The close operational links that have been knit between the *madrassa*/mosque network on both sides of the border – a Khilafat Majlis leader, Mumtaz Karim put the point precisely: *maktabs* and *madrassas* will be our answer to India's fence, he said;

- ❑ The controlling presence in these networks of Pakistani operatives – in particular the role of personnel in the Pakistani embassy in Dhaka;
- ❑ The shelter they take in *madrassas* and mosques on their way into India and within India;
- ❑ The use of *madrassas* and mosques – both in Bangladesh and in the border districts of India – for storage and trans-shipment of arms and ammunition;
- ❑ The exfiltration through the same network of Indian Muslims for training in the Chittagong Hill Tracts;
- ❑ The links that have been developed with Islamic organizations in the Northeast;
- ❑ The presence and activities of secessionist leaders from India;
- ❑ The use of Bangladesh for transiting into and out of India by Pakistani fomentors. How we forget! Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of JeM, one of the three terrorists who had to be released in exchange for the hijacked passengers, had traveled to Bangladesh in 1993 for planning operations in India. On 29 January, 1994 he again traveled to Dhaka, and from there to Delhi – on a Portuguese passport under the assumed name, Wali Adam Issa.
- ❑ Several operators who were caught and confessed that they had been sent to secure information about security forces and installations – for instance, in the Siliguri region – had come through and were to return to Bangladesh. The Task Force on Internal Security noted with concern,

The ISI has spread its networks in the Siliguri corridor, which has porous borders along Nepal and Bangladesh, for spreading subversive activities. *Madrassas* are being established in growing numbers along the Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Nepal borders; this is a further step to spread subversive activities in India. The Muslim pockets have become a breeding ground for mafia activities – smuggling, gun-running, *bawala* transactions, narco-trafficking and inducting fake Indian currency into the market. The ready availability of a large number of Bangladeshi Muslims in this area provides the support base for such activities. The growth of militant and communal organizations like the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Students Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) and All India Milli Council, led by persons with pan-Islamic loyalties, are the latest danger signals. The ISI has exploited the Islamic credentials of Bangladesh and used Islamic fundamentalist

organizations like the JEI (Bangladesh) and its front organization, the Islamic Chhatra Shibir both of which have Pak links, to establish new subversive networks along the Indo-Bangladesh border.

That development – of the ISI knitting organizations together for greater lethality – has been documented by interrogations of captured terrorists as well as through information gathered directly. According to evidence revealed by these sources, ISI has been making strenuous efforts to coordinate the work of different “Islam-pasand” organizations operating in Bangladesh, our Northeast and northern Myanmar. Among these initiatives are the “Islamic Solidarity Bangladesh” and the “Bangladesh Islamic Manch”. The latter has as its objective the creation of a greater Bangladesh by integrating nine districts of Assam, and the Muslim dominated areas of Myanmar into Bangladesh. Myanmar authorities reveal that over the last three years a number of *ulema* from Bangladesh have established themselves in Arakan province and begun inflaming the innocent tribal Muslims of the area.

Organizations in the Northeast

Interrogations of captured members of Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist organizations in the Northeast speak to a definite, long-term plan. The persons have narrated details of the training they were given in Bangladesh, in Pakistan, as well as in the Arakan region in Myanmar. They have narrated the routes by which they had gone to and come from Bangladesh, the *madrassas* that their handlers used as transit camps on the journeys. They have narrated how they helped smuggle explosives and arms into the Northeast, how they helped recruit youth for training across the border. They have disclosed how they were tasked to collect information about troop dispositions and movements in the Northeast.

The goals that the organizations say they aim to secure should even by themselves awaken us to the danger that is already upon us from this quarter. Here is a sample gathered from their literature, from their propaganda, and from the statements of captured cadre:

- To carve out “a separate Muslim country by liberating Assam from India”;

- ❑ To "protect the interests of Muslims especially of the migrants from Bangladesh";
- ❑ To secure for Muslims their "rightful place" in Assam;
- ❑ To fight "anti-Muslim forces";
- ❑ To set up a separate "homeland" in Assam comprising the districts of Nowgaon, Dhubri, Kamrup and Karimganj, and the Hailakandi portion of Cachar district;
- ❑ To "unite Muslims to work jointly against Hindus of India and the Government of India, and to establish Islamic Rule";
- ❑ To establish an "Islamic country" in the Northeast region by armed struggle against the Government of India.

While such are the goals that these organizations aim to achieve eventually, for tactical reasons they have identified a number of immediate demands and objectives around which agitations are to be launched. These include:

- ❑ To demand that a "university of Islamic studies" be set up in the Northeast;
- ❑ To ensure that 30 per cent jobs in both central and state governments are reserved for Muslims, that 25 per cent of seats in Medical Colleges are similarly reserved for Muslims; to ensure that seats are also reserved in the Assam Assembly for them;
- ❑ To "stop the deletion of Muslim names from the voters' list in Assam";
- ❑ To provide "full protection" for the life and property of Muslims;
- ❑ To establish "Islamic courts" for settling cases among Muslims on the basis of *shariah*;
- ❑ To secure the allotment of adequate funds for the maintenance of *madrassas* and *Idgahs*;
- ❑ To "unite Muslims against the atrocities perpetrated by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland and the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force on Muslims";
- ❑ To unite the Muslims of Manipur for achieving "political recognition" in the state – and to work with Meitei insurgent groups like the Peoples Liberation Army for this purpose.

The consequences are everywhere – from tensions *vis-à-vis* the local

population, to direct acts of violence, to the perversion of electoral outcomes. Successive Election Commissioners have drawn attention to the way names of these infiltrators have been smuggled on to the electoral lists, and the consequences this is certain to have. In his write-ups, T.V. Rajeshwar¹ had recalled that as long ago as 1989 a study had shown that in over 52 seats of the West Bengal Assembly, Bangladeshi infiltrators were the ones who decisively determined who shall win. In another 100 constituencies, they had an appreciable influence. In a word, in over one half of the seats in the state's Assembly, the Bangladeshi infiltrators played a determining role.

Do we require any complicated analysis to identify the roots of the "secularist" rhetoric of West Bengal politicians?

Nepal

The same phenomenon is now being repeated in Nepal. The number of Muslims has been growing three to four times the rate at which the general population is increasing: in 1981 Muslims accounted for about 2 per cent of the population; they are now estimated to be 6 to 8 per cent. Several factors are said to account for this increase: among these is substantial infiltration from Bangladesh. And as in Bangladesh, in Nepal also *madrassas* have become hubs for ISI to foment anti-India activity. One hundred and eighteen new *madrassas* have come up in the last 20 years. The locations of these new *madrassas* foretell their purpose. To give one example, Jhapa district in eastern Nepal borders the strategic and narrow Siliguri corridor. It has thirty-three *madrassas*. Of these, *twenty-five* have come up since 1980!

Tableegh *jamaats* from Pakistan have become regular fixtures in these establishments. Demands and allegations with which we have become familiar in India are now being voiced again and again in Nepal also: that Muslims are being treated as second class citizens in the country; that apart from prescribed subjects, Urdu and Persian should be made part of the syllabus; that the Nepalese Government should accord recognition to certificates issued by *madrassas*; that the Government should give the same sort of financial assistance to *madrassas* as it gives to other schools....

¹Former head of the Intelligence Bureau and Governor of West Bengal, at present Governor of Uttar Pradesh.

Our agencies have identified 73 *madrassas* in Nepal which are being used for recruitment, motivation, training, and sanctuaries. They have set out which *madrassa* is being used for what purpose: *madrassa* 'X' for facilitating meetings of Pakistani backed terrorists operating in Kashmir; *madrassa* 'Y' as a base for the Harkat ul-Ansar; *madrassa* 'Z' as a node for the Pakistani embassy in Kathmandu; the one that is being used for the Islamic Yuva Sangh Nepal – whose members owe allegiance in the large to the Ahle Hadis, Pakistan; the one that is functioning as the fulcrum for training aggressive proselytizers; the one that is being used mainly as a centre of anti-India propaganda; the one that has been functioning as a facilitator for Pakistani and Afghan terrorists to enter India; the one that is being used for campaigns against the Qadiani Muslims.... These "centres of learning" have been soliciting and receiving substantial funds from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and in some cases from other Gulf countries like Kuwait. Many of their personnel have been identified for the close contacts that they have developed with clerics and others in Bihar. These facts and lists have been reported repeatedly to the authorities by our intelligence agencies. But nothing has followed as a result.

Annexation by inundation

"Large scale illegal migration from East Pakistan/Bangladesh over several decades has been altering the demographic complexion of this State. It poses a grave threat both to the identity of the Assamese people and to our national security. Successive governments at the Centre and in the state have not adequately met this challenge.... I feel it is my bounden duty to the Nation and the state I have sworn to serve, to place before you this report on the dangers arising from the continuing silent demographic invasion...." Now, that is not some sundry journalist or AASU activist writing. It is Lt. General S.K. Sinha, the then Governor of Assam – who happens to have been Deputy Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, and is at present the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. And it is no ordinary article in which he begins in this way – it is his official report to the President of the country.

"The unabated influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh....," General Sinha told the President "threatens to reduce the Assamese to a minority in their own state, as happened in Tripura and Sikkim."

"The long-cherished design of Greater East Pakistan/Bangladesh, making inroads into the strategic land-link of Assam with the rest of the country," he warned, "can lead to severing the entire land mass of the North East.... from the rest of the country. This will have disastrous strategic and economic consequences."

After tracing in detail the way the demographic balance has been overturned in district after district adjacent to Bangladesh, General Sinha concluded,

This silent and invidious demographic invasion of Assam may result in the loss of geostrategically vital districts of Lower Assam. The influx of these illegal migrants is turning these districts into a Muslim majority region. It will then only be a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made. The rapid growth of Islamic fundamentalism may provide the driving force for this demand. In this context it is pertinent that Bangladesh has long discarded secularism and has chosen to become an Islamic State. Loss of Lower Assam will sever the entire land mass of the North East from the rest of India....¹

Two years earlier, having failed to awaken anyone in Government, the former Governor of West Bengal, and one who had earlier been the head of the Intelligence Bureau, T.V. Rajeshwar, had felt compelled to go public. In a series of articles in early 1996, he had pointed to the long-standing design to create a Greater, Islamic Bangladesh – by annexing Assam, the bordering districts of West Bengal, and parts of Bihar; and to the fact that through the massive illegal infiltration which was going on the design was well on the way to being realized. Indeed, he stressed, the way this influx had already converted vast, contiguous tracts into Muslim, specifically Bangladeshi Muslim dominated areas, the prospect had already arisen that a third Islamic State may be carved in the sub-continent out of India.

He recalled what the then Muslim League Premier of Bengal, Nazimuddin had told the Governor of the province, R.G. Casey – Casey had set it out for the Viceroy, Lord Wavell:

Nazimuddin tells me that they calculated that the combined area would give them a majority of 58% of Muslims in place of 51% if only all Bengal

¹ Lt. General S. K. Sinha, (Retd.), *Report on Illegal Migration into Assam submitted to the President of India by the Governor of Assam*, 8 November, 1998, pp. i, 1, 18.

and all Assam were to be included. He tells me that the Muslims bred faster than the Hindus and that 58% would reach 60% and more within a relatively few years. He went on to say that they believed that once this North Eastern Pakistan was established, there would be no one more keen about it than the Hindus within its borders and that he believed it possible that the Burdwan Division might come into North Eastern Pakistan in due course.

Incidentally, Rajeshwar could have added many other citations to the same effect. In his *Myth of Independence*, Ajai Sahni reminds me, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had written,

Our controversy with India is not on the problem of Kashmir only. In Assam, there are some Muslim majority districts which should have been given to Pakistan at the time of the Partition, these districts were wrongly included in India....¹

Indeed, Mujibur Rahman, the very one whom we consider the great friend of India, the one who many think would never have got a country but for the help of India, himself had stated,

The population of East Bengal is increasing at alarming speed. The inhabitants face acute shortage of land. The Bengalis need land, which can be given by Assam. Assam abounds in good forests and beautiful scenes of nature. If some inhabitants of Bangladesh migrate to Assam and settle there permanently, they will be very happy. Actually Assam should have been included in East Pakistan.²

But to proceed, Rajeshwar cited Kissinger's dire warning – should that be “wish”?

The inevitable emergence of Bangladesh – which we postulated –

what a choice of words – “which we postulated” – given what, as we shall soon see, he had said to Chou and Huang Hua, that the US would not countenance an independent Bangladesh!

presented India with fierce long-term problems. For Bangladesh was in effect East Bengal, separated only by religion from India's most fractious and most separatist state, West Bengal. They share language, tradition,

¹Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Myth of Independence*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1969.

²Mujibur Rahman, *Eastern Pakistan: Its population and Economics*, Pakistan Renaissance Society, Calcutta.

culture, and, above all, a volatile national character. Whether it turned nationalist or radical, Bangladesh would over time accentuate India's centrifugal tendencies. It might set a precedent for the creation of other Moslem States, carved this time out of India. Once it was independent, its Moslem heritage might eventually lead to a rapprochement with Pakistan.

And Rajeshwar pointed to what had already come to pass:

Muslims in India accounted for 9.9 per cent in 1951, 10.8 per cent in 1971 and 11.3 per cent in 1981, and presumably about 12.1 per cent in 1991. The present population ratio of Muslims is calculated to be 28 per cent in Assam and 25 per cent in West Bengal. In 1991 the Muslim population in the border districts of West Bengal accounted for 56 per cent in South and North Parganas, 48 per cent in Nadia, 52 per cent in Murshidabad, 54 per cent in Malda and about 60 per cent in Islampur sub-division of West Dinajpur. A study of the border belt of West Bengal yields some telling statistics: 20-40 per cent villages in the border districts are said to be predominantly Muslim. There are indications that the concentration of the minority community, including the Bangladesh immigrants, in the villages has resulted in the majority community moving to urban centres. Several towns in the border districts are now predominantly inhabited by the majority community but surrounded by villages mostly dominated by the minority community. Lin Piao's theory of occupying the villages before overwhelming the cities comes to mind, though the context is different. However the basic factor of security threat in both the cases is the same.

.... Figures have been given showing the concentration of Muslim population in the districts of West Bengal bordering Bangladesh starting from 24 Parganas and going up to Islampur of West Dinajpur district and their population being well over 50 per cent of the population. The Kishanganj district which was part of Purnea district earlier, which is contiguous to the West Bengal area, also has a majority of Muslim population. The total population of the districts of South and North 24 Parganas, Murshidabad, Nadia, Malda and West Dinajpur adds up to 27,337,362. If we add the population of Kishanganj district of Bihar 986,672, the total comes to 28,324,034. (All figures are based on the 1991 Census.) This mass of land with a population of nearly 2.8 crores has a Muslim majority. The total population of West Bengal in 1991 was 67.9 million and of these, 28.32 million are concentrated in the border districts, with about 16-17 million population of minority community being concentrated in this area. This crucial tract of land in West Bengal and Bihar, lying along the Ganges/Hughly and west Bangladesh with a population of over 28 million, with Muslims constituting a majority, should give cause for anxiety for any thinking Indian.

From these figures, he gave two warnings. First,

There is a distinct danger of another Muslim country, speaking predominantly Bengali, emerging in the eastern part of India in the future, at a time when India might find itself weakened politically and militarily.

The second part of the warning is relevant even if that contiguous tract does not separate into a full-fledged country:

Let us look at the map of Eastern India – starting from the North 24 Parganas district, proceeding through Nadia, Murshidabad, Malda and West Dinajpur before entering the narrow neck of land lying through Raiganj and Dalkola of Islampur sub-division before passing through the Kishanganj district of East Bihar to enter Siliguri. Proceed further and take a look at the north Bengal districts of Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar before entering Assam, and its districts of Dhubri, Goalpara, Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar and Barpeta. A more sensitive region in Asia is difficult to locate....

In the north Bengal districts unrest has already erupted – the Gorkha National Liberation Front in the Darjeeling Hills, the Kamtapur Liberation Front in the northern districts of the state. And on the other side of that chicken's neck corridor, we have the Bodo groups, and further down ULFA.

As we go over to the border districts of Assam, we find the same phenomenon. General Sinha drew attention to the differential decadal growth of population of Hindus and Muslims in Assam – 33.7% and 38.3% in 1951-61 respectively; 37.2% and 31% respectively in 1961-71; and an estimated 41.9% and 77.4% respectively in 1981-91 – and observed:

Muslim population of Assam has shown a rise of 77.42 per cent in 1991 from what it was in 1971. The Hindu population has risen by nearly 41.89 per cent in this period.

Muslim population [as a percentage of total population] in Assam has risen from 24.68 per cent in 1951 to 28.42 per cent in 1991. As per the 1991 Census, four districts (Dhubri, Goalpara, Barpeta and Hailakandi) have become Muslim majority districts. Two more districts (Nowgaon and Karimganj) should have become so by 1998 and one more district (Morgaon) is fast approaching this position.

The growth of Muslim population has been emphasized in the previous paragraph to indicate the extent of illegal migration from Bangladesh to

Assam because.... the illegal migrants coming into India after 1971 have been almost exclusively Muslims.

Assam and Tripura are the states that have been most heavily infested by infiltrators. But over the last few years, infiltrators have been moving from these two states to other states, in particular the hill areas.

Worse than feared

The figures of the 2001 Census show that the dreaded prospect is right on course. Take first the districts of Assam that border Bangladesh. Table I gives the decadal growth of Muslim and non-Muslim population in the districts that Rajeshwar and General Sinha had listed:

Table I
Percentage growth of population between 1991 and 2001
in Assam districts bordering Bangladesh

	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Non-Muslims</i>	<i>Total</i>
Dhubri	29.5	7.1	22.9
Barpeta	25.8	10.0	18.9
Goalpara	31.7	14.4	23.0
Hailakandi	27.2	13.3	20.9
Karimganj	29.4	14.5	21.9
Cachar	24.6	16.0	18.9

Reports have also pointed out that Bangladeshi infiltrators have been making their way into three other districts – Naogaon, Marigaon and Darrang. The Census bears out the intelligence reports. Table II gives the percentage growth of Muslim and Non-Muslim population in these three districts:

Table II
Percentage growth of population between 1991 and 2001
in three other districts of Assam

	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Non-Muslims</i>	<i>Total</i>
Naogaon	32.1	11.3	22.2
Marigaon	27.2	16.3	21.2
Darrang	28.9	9.6	15.8

In Assam as a whole, the number of Muslims has increased between 1991 and 2001 by 29.3 per cent. The number of Non-Muslims has increased by 14.8 per cent. The result is that the percentage of Muslims to the total population in these areas, and therefore in Assam as a whole has increased exactly the way Rajeshwar had apprehended. Table III indicates the figures:

Table III
Muslims as a percentage of total population
in districts of Assam

	1991	2001
<i>Districts bordering Bangladesh</i>		
Dhubri	70.4	74.3
Barpeta	56.1	59.4
Goalpara	50.2	53.6
Hailakandi	54.8	57.6
Karimganj	49.2	52.3
Cachar	34.5	36.1
<i>Three other districts</i>		
Naogaon	47.2	51.0
Marigaon	46.0	47.6
Darrang	32.0	35.6
TOTAL ASSAM	28.4	30.9

Next, recall the districts in West Bengal to which Rajeshwar had drawn attention – South and North Parganas, Nadia, Murshidabad, Maldah, Dinajpur and the rest. The figures for these are truly alarming. Table IV indicates the way population of Muslims and Non-Muslims has grown in these districts between 1991 and 2001 (see page 196).

As a consequence, Muslims now constitute 64 per cent of the population in Murshidabad, close to 50 per cent in Maldah, close to 40 per cent in South and North Dinajpur.... (see page 196).

And the districts that Rajeshwar had listed in Bihar present the same forbidding picture. In Kishanganj, the place that has sent the "well-known" Minister of State in the central Council of Ministers, Taslimuddin to Parliament, Muslims now constitute close to 68 per cent of the population. In Purnea, Araria and Katihar they are 37 to

Table IV
Percentage growth of population between 1991 and 2001
in districts of West Bengal

	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Non-Muslims</i>	<i>Total</i>
South 24 Parganas	34.2	11.5	20.8
North 24 Parganas	23.8	22.6	22.7
Nadia	21.9	18.8	19.5
Murshidabad	28.4	16.4	23.8
Maldah	30.7	19.4	24.7
Kolkata	19.0	0.7	3.9
South Dinajpur } North Dinajpur }	79.5	41.9	54.3
Jalpaiguri	31.3	20.4	21.5
Cooch Behar	18.5	12.8	14.2
TOTAL: WEST BENGAL	25.9	15.3	17.8

Table V
Muslims as a percentage of total population
in districts of West Bengal

	<i>1991</i>	<i>2001</i>
South 24 Parganas	29.9	33.2
North 24 Parganas	24.2	24.2
Nadia	24.9	25.4
Murshidabad	61.4	63.7
Maldah	47.5	49.7
Kolkata	17.7	20.3
South Dinajpur } North Dinajpur }	33.0	38.4
Jalpaiguri	10.0	10.8
Cooch Behar	23.4	24.2
TOTAL: WEST BENGAL	23.6	25.2

42 per cent. In these districts the population of Muslims is growing a quarter to three-quarters faster than the population of Non-Muslims. And these are precisely the districts in which Bangladeshis are settling down. Table VII shows who determines who shall win elections.

Table VI
Percentage growth of population between 1991 and 2001
in districts of Bihar

	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Non-Muslims</i>	<i>Total</i>
Kishanganj	35.2	25.0	31.7
Araria	36.1	32.4	34.0
Purnea	44.1	30.8	35.4
Katihar	39.7	25.4	31.1

Table VII
Muslims as a percentage of population
of districts in Bihar

	<i>1991</i>	<i>2001</i>
Kishanganj	65.8	67.6
Araria	40.5	41.2
Purnea	34.5	36.7
Katihar	39.9	42.5

What accounts for the differences in the growth of Muslim and Non-Muslim population? That the Muslims of these areas are exceptionally fecund? Or that Muslims from other parts of India are flooding these none-too-prosperous districts? Or that the growth in their numbers is being topped by inundation from Bangladesh?

You may quarrel over the answer, but you can be certain of one thing: secularists will dump the figures themselves! India: the State of Denial.

And anyone who dares to point to the facts

The demographic invasion.

The manifest consequences.

But there is another feature too – and it tells the tale even more vividly.

The facts have been staring everyone in the face. Students of Assam led a movement to induce governments to stem the invasion. They were put down with a heavy hand: almost eight hundred of them were shot dead. To say nothing of sundry writers like me, as we have just seen, high officials of State have often drawn attention to the invasion and the dire consequences it is bound to have for the country. The result has been unvarying:

- ❑ Syed Shahabuddin denounced the articles of the former Governor of West Bengal and Director of the Intelligence Bureau, T.V. Rajeshwar with the usual barrage of epithets: he was “appalled,” Shahabuddin wrote, “by the irresponsible manner in which Shri T.V. Rajeshwar had tried to whip up communal passions in articles on Bangladesh infiltration”;
- ❑ “A communalist, unfit to be Governor, the President must remove him from office” – that is how the report of the Assam Governor, General S.K. Sinha was greeted.

That pattern of response continues to this day. *The Indian Express* carried an article of mine about T.V. Rajeshwar’s forebodings. Two/three days later it carried a letter from a Minister of the Bangladesh High Commission. Do read it in the light of the Census figures:

What is of concern to us is in portraying so, Mr. Shourie has drawn Bangladesh, a friendly neighbouring country of India, into this. We are dismayed and indeed shocked that an eminent person of Mr. Shourie’s stature, who was until very recently a Union Cabinet Minister of the Government of India, could come out with preposterous ideas such as the “creation of a Greater Islamic Bangladesh”.

May we remind Mr. Shourie that Bangladesh is an independent sovereign country, having a democratically-elected government, with all democratic institutions fully in place. It has been our consistent policy to foster and develop good neighbourly relations with India.

The existing goodwill and people-to-people contact between the people of Bangladesh and India are eminently visible in the traditional social,

cultural and historical ties. Moreover, India is Bangladesh's largest trading partner in the region with the former enjoying a huge balance in its favour. These are facts and not based on "ifs". We are therefore amazed as to how Mr. Shourie could implicate a friendly neighbouring country with irresponsible and malicious innuendoes and accusations.

The fact that the piece that Mr. Shourie wrote could find a place in the Op-Ed page of your esteemed daily has done a disservice and dealt an insult to the friendly sentiments that the people of Bangladesh have for the people of India. His type of writing can only generate hatred and instigate bitterness and acrimony among the people.

Bangladesh is a peace-loving country. It certainly does not have any hegemonistic ambitions or designs as he suggests might happen or will take place. However, we take satisfaction that neither the Government of India nor the people of India share Mr. Shourie's nightmares.

Notice the technique. What I had reported was not my assessment, but the warnings that had been given by T.V. Rajeshwar, the present Governor of Uttar Pradesh, appointed by the very Government in which this fellow reposes so much faith. But the "preposterous ideas" are all mine, not Rajeshwar's! Notice too that there was not a word about the differential rates of growth of population to which Rajeshwar had drawn attention, it was all about Bangladesh being "an independent sovereign country, having a democratically elected government"; it was all about how by publishing such writing "your esteemed daily has done a disservice and dealt an insult to the friendly sentiments...."; how such writing "can only generate hatred and instigate bitterness."

Beyond districts bordering Bangladesh

Nor is this demographic change, this *planned* demographic subversion limited to West Bengal, Assam, etc. Region after region of the country is afflicted by it: Hindus have been driven out of the Kashmir Valley; Buddhists have been systematically outnumbered in the Kargil area; the same systematic move to settle Muslims has begun to change the balance in Leh itself; the tribals in Tripura have been reduced to a minority; the tensions caused by Nepali settlers in Darjeeling, in Sikkim are there for all to feel; villages along the border in Rajasthan have seen influx of Muslims from Pakistan; in the parliamentary constituency of New Delhi itself, the Bangladeshi infiltrator is a significant determinant.

As we have seen, Intelligence agencies and others have documented the influx times without number. On occasion, some local government has even tried to do something about the infiltrators in its own parish: once the local administration of Delhi put 150 Bangladeshis in a train to Bangladesh; on another occasion the government of Maharashtra, having identified a few Bangladeshis, put them on a train to Bengal. No sooner had such an effort so much as commenced that such a howl went up – in the press, in legislatures – that the effort was abandoned. The reports of intelligence and enforcement agencies have therefore amounted to little: the general atmosphere is so vitiated – by supposed secularism, by what passes for liberalism in India – that their reports just end up in closets. Indeed, as governments are not able or inclined to do anything about the reports, they ensure that not only are the reports consigned to closets, the closets themselves are kept securely locked.

The conscientious can only raise their wail again. Recall the report that General Sinha, the Governor of Assam, sent to the President in November, 1998. Four years later – in January, 2003 – during his Address at the Conference of Governors, the Assam Governor was constrained to remark:

The influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh into Assam continues unabated. The IM(DT) Act virtually makes the Police helpless in detecting and deporting them. This Act has become a highly controversial issue and has defied political solution. The matter has been taken up through Public Interest Litigation in Supreme Court but for the last couple of years, it has not yet come up for hearing.

I had submitted a special report to the President on this issue in 1998 making various recommendations like repeal of IM(DT) Act, early completion of border fencing, issue of identity cards to our citizens and so on. Border fencing commenced in Assam in 1992 and has not yet been completed. It is likely to be completed in 2004. Border fencing has also now commenced on other portions of Indo-Bangladesh Border and is likely to be completed by 2007. At long last, work on identity cards is now to commence from April this year.

We need to take suitable measures to combat the influx of illegal migrants. It is estimated that approximately 4 million illegal migrants have infiltrated into Assam. This influx may be due primarily to economic reason but it poses a grave threat to the demography of Assam. It is also a serious threat

to our national security in the light of the longstanding demand for more "living space" in Bangladesh and report of Al Qaeda and other fundamentalist activities in that country.¹

That was the end of that.

In the meantime that piece of invidious legislation continues to defeat every effort to deport illegal infiltrators. The IM(DT) Act operates only in Assam, while the Foreigners Act, 1946, applies to the rest of the country. Under the IM(DT) Act, the onus of proving the citizenship of an accused "illegal alien" lies on the accuser, whereas in the Foreigners Act, the onus lies with the accused. Given the infirmities of the Act and the absence of political will, progress has been extremely slow. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs admits that the functioning of the IM(DT) Act has been "unsatisfactory", and in a presentation in mid-1999, in connection with a court case, disclosed that action under the Act had proceeded as follows:

Total enquiries (against suspected illegal migrants) initiated: 3,02,554;
Enquiries referred to the Screening Committee: 2,96,564;
Enquiry reports referred to the IM(DT) Tribunals: 31,264;
Persons declared as illegal migrants by the IM(DT) Tribunals: 9,625;
Number of illegal migrants expelled: 1,461.²

A summary statement

The various facts and trends that have been enumerated above have been put before successive governments time and again. The Intelligence Bureau listed them yet again in a note for a conference of Directors General of Police in 2003.

The note repays reading: for both reasons – it shows once again the twin facts: everyone knows what is going on, and yet nothing gets done. Here is the text of the note:

¹Lt. General S.K. Sinha, *Address at the Conference of Governors*, 11-12 January, 2003, New Delhi, pp. 8-9.

²Wasbir Hussain, "Assam: Demographic Jitters," *South Asia Intelligence Review*, Volume 3, No. 10, September 20, 2004, South Asia Terrorism Portal, www.satp.org.

* * *

There has been an accretion to India's security threats from Bangladesh, particularly after the formation of the BNP led government there in October 2001. The points of concern include:

- i. Shelter and training to Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) and use of BD soil for carrying out actions in our border States;
- ii. Acquisition of arms by IIGs in Bangladesh and their transportation for use in India;
- iii. Growth of radical Islamic groups as also private *madrassas* spewing hatred against India;
- iv. Enlargement of ISI activities with increasing use of Bangladesh soil for espionage in India as also terrorist actions by radical Islamic groups;
- v. Efforts to subvert sections in India's border States with indoctrination and training being provided to such elements;
- vi. Continuing inflow of illegal migrants resulting in demographic distortions and growing political clout of such illegal migrants in some border States.

The 4096 Kms long and porous Indo-Bangladesh border makes for easy crossing. The problem of continued unabated influx of large-scale (over 15 millions) illegal Bangladesh migrants into India has assumed serious security implications. Illegal BD migrants, driven by economic forces, have settled in various States including West Bengal (79 lakhs), Assam (50 lakhs), Bihar (4.75 lakhs in the north-eastern districts including Katihar, Sahebganj, Kishanganj and Purnia), Tripura (3.75 lakhs) and Delhi (3.7 lakhs). In Nagaland, the population of Muslims, mostly illegal migrants from Bangladesh, has more than trebled in the last decade – the figures rising from 20,000 in 1991 to over 75,000. Similarly, in Mizoram also, there has been a growth in the numbers of illegal Bangladeshi migrants though firm estimates are not yet available.

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The illegal BD migrants have significantly altered the demographic complexion particularly of the border districts of West Bengal and Assam. Their ability to obtain ration cards as also enroll themselves as voters not only gives them a back-door entry to Indian citizenship but also provides them with a political clout that facilitates settlement of more Bangladeshi illegals in our country. In Assam, the illegal migrants are able to affect State politics in a major way with their having acquired a critical say in around 50 of the 126 Assembly constituencies in the State. Their presence has already led to a major movement against them in Assam and in Nagaland. Also their presence is being increasingly resented by the locals. The North East Students Organization (NESO) has also taken up the issue of illegal migration and repeal of IMDT Act with increased fervour.

Besides the demographic threat, the support to the NE based IIGs in

Bangladesh, by its Army and security agencies, has become stronger. The IIGs use BD soil for shelter, training and storage and transport of arms as well as carrying out actions in India. All the major outfits in Tripura (NLFT, ATTF), Assam (ULFA, NDFB), Meghalaya (HNLC, ANVC), Nagaland (NSCN/IM, NSCN/K) and Manipur (PLA, UNLF)) have such camps primarily in the districts of Bandarban, Rangamati, Chittagong, Khagrachari, Maulvi Bazaar, Habibganj, Sleet, Mymensingh, Kurigram, Comilla and Dhaka. Cox's Bazar is the main reception point for foreign arms whereafter these are transported to India through land routes in Bangladesh.

Several top IIG leaders stay in Bangladesh, some with their families. These include Paresch Barua (C-in-C, ULFA), Ranjan Daimary (President, NDFB), Julius Dorphang (Chairman, HNLC), Dilash Marak (Chairman, ANVC), Bishwamohan Debbarma (President, NLFT) and Ranjit Debbarma (President, ATTF). These leaders are known to be in contact with Bangladesh security agencies as also the ISI. Most of the IIG leaders use Bangladesh passports, as these are easily available.

Bangladesh, particularly Dhaka, has been used as a staging point for sending members of both IIGs and *jibadi* groups to Pakistan and Afghanistan as also for their infiltration into India for action. Three ATTF UGs [underground operators], who surrendered before Security Forces on October 2, 2002 revealed that ISI had arranged a 6-months' training camp for 8 ATTF UGs at Kandahar (Afghanistan) and they were flown to Kandahar from Dhaka. Two senior leaders of NDFB (Dhiren Boro, Vice President, arrested on January 1, 2003 and Gobinda Basumatary, General Secretary, arrested on December 5, 2002) disclosed the instrumentality of ISI in training of NDFB cadres in Pakistan with the cadres being sent from and returning to Dhaka. The interrogation/debriefing reports of several ULFA leaders including Pradip Gogoi (Vice Chairman, presently in jail) and Lohit Deori revealed that several batches of ULFA cadres were flown to Pakistan from Dhaka for imparting training, which was arranged by ISI.

Asghar Ali (R/o Nalgonda, Andhra Pradesh), the person responsible for the killing of Haren Pandya, former Gujarat Home Minister, revealed during interrogation that at least 8 Muslim youths were sent to Bangladesh through Kolkata for onward journey to Pakistan for training around December 2002. Qari Salim, an ISI operative and a HuM cadre who was arrested in Guwahati in 1999, had revealed that he had come via Bangladesh and was tasked to carry out sabotage activities on the Leh-Manali Highway. The persons involved in conspiracy of the hijacking of IC-814 from Kathmandu in December 1999 had used Bangladesh for their movement to India from Pakistan.

Pak Intelligence Offices (PIOs) in Dhaka are becoming increasingly active in espionage against India. In 2002, 3 modules being run by PIOs from

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Dhaka, and using some BD operatives, were busted. A large number of secret documents and photographs of sensitive defence locations were recovered. Another module run by a PIO from Dhaka, also using a BD operative, was exposed in August 2003 in Sikkim while collecting defence related information pertaining to deployment/movement of Indian Army in sensitive North Bengal and Sikkim area.

Meanwhile, within Bangladesh there has been a steady growth of the Wahhabi brand of Islam, which encourages '*jibadi*' terrorism. The '*Qaumi*' *madrassas* of Bangladesh (estimated to be 90% of total one lakh *madrassas* which are outside the ambit of government control) are the main purveyors of its doctrines with India-baiting remaining a lynchpin of their teachings. The financial aid to these *madrassas* comes through charities mainly from

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Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The *madrassas* are used for indoctrination of youths from both sides of the border, as also shelter/transit point by military/suspected Pak ISI operatives, as also as training centers by fundamentalist outfits like HUIAI, JEI, ICS, IOJ, and for infiltration into India.

Islamic organizations in Bangladesh have been distributing anti-India and fundamentalist propaganda material in North East. During October-November 2001 calendars depicting Osama bin Laden were found in circulation in Karimganj district of Assam. Police also seized CDs and audio-cassettes at Tezpur (Nov. 2001) and at Karimganj (Nov. 2002) containing anti-India inflammatory speeches of Maulana Dilawar Hussain Syeedi, a JEI-BD MP.

The radical ambience in Bangladesh has encouraged the growth of a number of '*jibadi*' groups including the Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (HUII-BD), Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM), Shahadat-e-Al-Hikma and Jaish-e-Mustafa. The presence of JEI-BD in the Government and Islami Oikya Jote ((IOJ) in the ruling alliance provides protection and encouragement to their activities as also to the indoctrination, training and shelter to radical Islamic groups from India including the SIMI, MULTA and Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI).

The growth of the clout of radical Islamic forces in Bangladesh, the increasing activities of the ISI there and the susceptibilities of the BD Government to such forces predicates greater attention to this front. A section of Bangladeshi opinion makers have already been talking of a Bangladeshi *lebensraum* in our North East. Besides a response at the political level, there is need for greater focus on the Indo-BD border and closer coordination between the Security Agencies, Border guarding forces and State Police forces for an effective response to the growing threat from Bangladesh.

Soon the Government changed. The Home Ministry undertook yet another study! The new document – *Pakistan's Alternative Proxy War Base* – was finalized in February 2005. It set out how Pakistan had launched a new operation to redouble its destabilizing work in India through Bangladesh. It stated that Pakistan was developing Bangladesh as the new base for its anti-India operations, and that it had already shifted almost 200 terrorist training camps from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to Bangladesh. The document listed several reasons for the shift to Bangladesh. Among these were the following:

1. The India-Bangladesh border is geographically porous and difficult to keep under close surveillance due to its riverine configurations in the West and hilly terrain in the Northeast and East.
2. The fencing remains incomplete – out of the total length of 3,287 kilometers sanctioned for fencing, only 1,502 kilometers have been fenced thus far. And the fence is of the most elementary kind.
3. Bangladesh's border configuration rests along vulnerable Indian states such as West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
4. Bangladesh territory provides ISI with multiple ingress routes to these sensitive states.
5. Bangladesh territory sits astride India's strategic "Siliguri Corridor", India's slender communication link with its seven Northeastern states. It is easy to play havoc in the Corridor through Bangladesh.
6. The borders of Nepal and Bhutan, states that enjoy close links with India as non-Islamic states of South Asia, are within close reach of Bangladesh territory. Pakistan already has established extensive links in these countries.
7. In the belt running parallel to the borders with Bangladesh and significantly deep into Indian territory, reside large sections of illegal migrants from Bangladesh – who can be handy recruits for ISI.

Yet another truthful analysis.

- ☐ Prepared.
- ☐ Marked "Secret".
- ☐ Circulated to a handful.
- ☐ And buried.

A palsied Executive

The country has continued in a state of denial. The political establishment has done worse: large chunks of it, led by the Congress

but not limited to it, have continued to patronize these illegal entrants for captive votes. And in the meanwhile, the administrative and police machinery has been allowed to rust and decay – so that now, even when a party comes to office that genuinely wants to do something to stanch the influx, all it can do is hold meetings of officials and make announcements of intentions.

The violence that has exploded in the Northeast at the moment is the compound result of all these factors. Foremost among these is a political class that benefits from the very ones who are undermining the State. And among the latter now are not just the illegal migrants. Remember who propped up Bhindranwale to out-do the Akalis? The same stratagem is being repeated with many miniature Bhindranwales across the country. Help is being sought for elections and being taken from groups that exercise sway by the gun. Victories won, it is payback time. That is what we see today in Assam, in Andhra, in Bihar, in Jammu and Kashmir.

And then there is the atmosphere of permissiveness that our “liberals” foment. The absolutely baseless assault on POTA, to which we shall revert, is a recent example. But only the most recent one. Exactly the same sequence had been enacted during Mr. Narasimha Rao’s tenure in regard to TADA. And he too, knowing full well the consequences, had to scrap the law.

Yet we persist. Confident that in the end, when the conflagration gets completely out of hand, we have the armed forces to hurl at it, and they will by their blood and bodies douse the fire....

But the matter is not confined to the Executive. After all, those who win by the votes of such “voters” and such groups enter legislatures. The result is that even the most elementary step to remedy the situation cannot be taken as many a law comes in the way, and legislatures so peopled will not change it.

With the Executive unable to do much, and on occasion proudly proclaiming that it shall *not* do anything; with legislators dependent on vote banks and, therefore, shouting down any proposal that might help stanch the annexation, conscientious citizens have turned to the courts. The ruinous Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act provides a classic illustration of the sequence – a sequence that I have

set out in *Governance, and the sclerosis that has set in*.¹ The result has been precisely zero. Indeed, it has been negative – for the infiltrators and their patrons have had vivid demonstration that nothing but nothing will happen to them – legislatures will block any step that may be proposed; the Executive will not be able to carry through the step on the ground; the courts will keep adjourning the matter....

¹ASA-Rupa, New Delhi, 2004.

The threat in the middle distance

The borrowed knife

Pakistan is the immediate threat. Bangladesh is on the way to becoming a major cause of problems in the immediate future. But it is China that looms in the farther distance as the more ominous cloud. Indeed, as the years proceed, Pakistan's potential to harm India will be even more a reflection of, Pakistan will be even more an instrument of China's "force projection" into South Asia than it is today.

On occasion Chinese authorities mention India's potential and successes in passing: the nuclear and missile capabilities the country has acquired; its "multi-dimensional diplomacy" and the steps it has been able to take to improve relations with the USA, Central Asian Republics, Vietnam, its openings to ASEAN countries; it's establishing a tri-Services base in the Andamans.... But in the main China does not look upon India as a rival or a threat: "a marginalized big power in geopolitics and geoeconomics," that is how a Chinese writer on military strategy refers to India. A potential nuisance that is to be kept busy in South Asia. Chinese analysts often assert that India considers itself to be heir to the British imperialist status, and is therefore always out to establish its hegemony over this region. They note its handicaps too in executing this design: its caste and religious divisions, its slow-moving political and bureaucratic systems. Accordingly, in such assessments, India's potential of being troublesome arises not so much from its own strengths as from the alliances it may succeed in forming – the Chinese are particularly concerned at India becoming an instrument of US designs to "encircle" or "contain" China as in their reckoning India had become of the Soviet Union; at the possibility that it may ally with Japan, and that both may by then have become inflamed by nationalism.

India as an instrument of the US

While in fact Indo-US relations have been buffeting along from indifference to opposition to cooperation to exasperation and back to cooperation; while in fact the US and China itself have on occasion cooperated to check India – as they did in the wake of Indian nuclear tests in 1998;¹ the Chinese see India as a pawn of the US in this region.

The Chinese believe that the US is proceeding according to a master strategy. The singular objective of this strategy is for the US to “acquire an absolute freedom of action in international affairs and to firmly establish its overlordship in the world.” That it has used every conflict – South-North Korea; China-Taiwan; Terrorism – to establish and enlarge its military presence in this region. That one of the devices by which it aims to do so is to contain and encircle China. That for this purpose, the instruments in this region are India, Australia, Philippines, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea.²

Pillsbury’s anthology contains several allusions to this effect. In a representative assessment, a Chinese defence analyst declares:

In the next century, to split China’s western part, or more specifically, to split China’s Tibetan region.... is probably the target of the Western world’s geopolitical strategy. Having pushed Russia northward, creating a political barrier like Tibet or Xinjiang between China and the oil-producing countries in Central Asia conforms to the strategic interests of the West to control permanently the world’s geographic and energy center. This dovetails with India’s political plot to create a Tibetan buffer zone between China and India. Currently, India is pulling out all the stops to convince the West that it is willing to play the vanguard for the West’s effort to achieve this goal, under the prerequisite that the West will adopt an appeasement policy towards its nuclear option.³

¹For instances, see John W. Garver, “The Chinese-India-US triangle: strategic relations in the post-Cold War era,” *NBR Analysis*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington, Volume 13, No. 5, October 2002.

²For a summary of such writings see, for instance, Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the offensive: Chinese perspectives on US global strategy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 3, 2001, pp. 343-65.

³Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 111.

A typical account is that of Xin Benjian from the Faculty of Luoyang PLA Foreign Language College.¹ "If the US wants to play the role of 'stopper' like the British Empire did in the 19th Century, it will need to entrap other regional powers, i.e. Japan, India and Russia into confrontational or strategic, competing relations with China," Xin Benjian explains. "The American scholar Huntington said, 'Theoretically speaking, the US could contain China by playing a balancing role if other powers would like to balance China as well.' Since Russia is friendly to China owing to the antagonism with the US over NATO expansion, ABM revision, and Chechnya, the US could only place the hope of balancing China on Japan and India."

"While using Japan to balance China," he continues, "the US has also exploited Sino-India relations. Troubled by border disputes, the issue of Tibet, the 'intimate' Sino-Pakistan relations, and India's nuclear weapon program, the Sino-India relationship today is 'just like an unsunken, unrotten, but static boat'. The stagnant Sino-India relations opened a door for the US to attempt to rope in India to contain China. The unhappy experience with China in the past and the current suspicion of Beijing has made New Delhi an ideal partner in Asia for the US when implementing a containment strategy against China. In order to contain China, the US even acquiesced in the Indian nuclear tests because it felt Russia from the North, Japan and South Korea from the East, and India from the West and the South could check a rising China. 'One day Americans will be grateful to the Indian nuclear tests.' When visiting India, Mr. Huntington advocated in an undisguised way that '...in the future India has three options. First, to remain an isolated country, then it will be marginalized; second, to stand only with other Asian countries, then it will be under the shadow of China forever; and third, to coordinate with the US, then it will not only enjoy economic prosperity but also safeguard its security.' Some believed that the US was building a security line encircling China by allying Japan, South Korea, India, the Philippines and Thailand. India was viewed as the fortress in the West wing...."

¹Xin Benjian, "Security Dilemma, Balance of Power *vs.* US policy towards China in the Post-Cold War Era," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, (Contemporary International Relations), September 2001. This journal is of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, an institution linked to the country's Ministry of State Security.

But it isn't just the US that is making an instrument of India. India itself, the scholar says, is eager to prove its usefulness to the US. "India always regarded China as 'the biggest challenge in the region and threat to its security in the 21st Century'," he says. "American scholars also perceived the Indian intention of containing China through the hands of the US. 'India's strategy is to exploit the conflicts between China and the US and to act as a part-time agent for the latter so as to resist the danger from China.' This means that there are quite a number of common interests between India and the US in containing China, and there could be more common ground between them in this regard in the future."

Such assessments reached a hysterical pitch after the 1998 atomic tests by India. India had been aware of how far Pakistan had already gone towards developing the bomb. India was aware of the help it had received from China and North Korea in this regard. Indeed, the US itself had imposed sanctions on both Pakistan and China on this count. And while Pakistan's bomb might have been in the near-future, China's arsenal of atomic and hydrogen bombs was an ever-present threat to India. Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton alluded to this circumstance.

The mere mention of China in the letter ignited a fusillade from Beijing. Yet another of "anti-China statements" of Indian leaders.... "Preposterous" for anyone to think that China's nuclear weapons could be used against India or that Sino-Pak cooperation would constitute a threat to India.... India, as usual, is playing the "China-threat card".... It is India that is the "hegemonist".... When Vajpayee visited the US, and India and US were seen to be inching closer, the Chinese were certain, "The China factor is the most important content of the contemporary US-Indian dialogue".... The aim of the US is to "establish strategic relations" with India to "contain China in the post-Cold War system by using India as a core element for balancing China".... The US aims to do so by "mak[ing] use of India's psychology of 'suspicions' regarding China to form a sort of strategic 'balance' of China in Asia".... US aims to bolster India to "balance a daily-more-powerful China".... Recalling Vajpayee's visit in 2000 to the US, a Chinese analyst reported that a US Defence Department publication has "without giving any name.... strongly hinted that in the next century China will be perceived as America's No. 1 enemy,"

and observed, "The US strategy is to use Japan and India to constrain China. So it is not difficult to understand why the United States entertained the Indian leader so lavishly".... The US is allying with India for "establishing a bastion for containing China; checking and containing the Islamic fundamentalists in Central Asia; and promoting democratic politics in South Asia," noted another scholar.... Because of India's "special strategic position on the US global chessboard," noted another Chinese analyst, "it has always been regarded by the United States as a chip for containing China and Russia. The experience of many years shows that preventing any power from coming to the fore to pose a threat to the United States has always been the essence of US foreign policy".... Washington "regards India as a pillar to stand against China"....¹ The US Defence Secretary's report on the military power of the People's Republic for FY-2004 quotes a PLA academic to the effect that "the (US) intention to use India to contain China goes without saying."²

These concerns have been heightened after the Gulf, Afghan and Iraq wars – the engagements have given the US an opportunity to establish itself in this region. To lessen the possibility, China has pursued a threefold policy:

- ☐ Without making any substantive concessions on the border or in regard to India's strategic concerns – *vis-à-vis* assistance to Pakistan, for instance – make gestures from time to time that would keep India from going too far in its relationship with the Americans;
- ☐ Encircle India in turn;
- ☐ Keep India tied down in the South Asia region.

¹For numerous citations from Chinese scholars see John W. Garver, "The Chinese-India-US triangle: strategic relations in the post-Cold War era," *NBR Analysis*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington, Volume 13, No. 5, October 2002, from which these representative observations are taken.

²US Secretary of Defence, *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, Washington, DC, 2004. Of course, India is not the only country that China views in this manner or for which it uses such vivid expressions. Michael Wesley recalls an August 1996 *People's Daily* editorial that sees the US using Japan and Australia as "the claws of a crab" for containing China: Michael Wesley, "The challenges of China: Australian perceptions and reactions," in *Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China*, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 2001, at p. 57.

For keeping India bogged down in this region, China has an ideal and enthusiastic instrument in Pakistan. The prescription in the late Ming/early Qing *The Wiles of War* is an almost perfect description of the line China has been pursuing for this region. You will recall the fourth stratagem:

When the enemy's intention is obvious and the ally's attitude hesitant, induce the ally to fight the enemy while preserving one's own strength.

The commentator explains the counsel:

To avoid getting incriminated for his act of murder, a person can sometimes conduct the act with a "borrowed knife," which generally refers to someone else who holds a grudge against the victim. By inducting a third party to commit the murder, one will be able to achieve one's goal without being held responsible for it. In military contexts, the idiom advises the commander to exploit the conflicts among various powers. To fight a strong enemy, he should find out the power groups that are at odds with this enemy and thereby induce them to fight it in his stead. In this way, he will get twice the result with half the effort.¹

Of course, in the instant case the "ally's attitude" is anything but "hesitant"! For China, helping Pakistan acquire atomic weapons and missiles is as masterly and costless a way of nailing India in this region as cross-border terrorism is for Pakistan.

Moreover, both China and Pakistan have seen that while a country like the USA will make some noise about this sort of cooperation, while it may also, as it has, take some steps – for instance, the sanctions it has imposed more than once on both countries for the help China has rendered Pakistan in developing atomic weapons and missiles – the measures are of marginal, if not negligible consequence.

In India we realize that China and Pakistan are close to one another, and also that the focus of their proximity is what to do about, and to India. But it is only in a vague way that we know this – the sort of thing that lies at the back of one's awareness. Few would know, for instance, that the two countries collaborated as long ago as the late 1960s and early 1970s to build the Karakoram Highway, an all-

¹ *The Wiles of War: 36 military strategies from Ancient China*, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1996, pp. 24-25.

weather highway that enables China to move goods across land into Pakistan, one that gives China over-land access to the Indian Ocean. Few of us would know that Pakistan has been one of the principal sources for China to acquire Western equipment which it could then reverse-engineer. While enumerating several such instances that testify to an intimate, and not just a close relationship – a relationship that China and Pakistan describe as “a model relationship”, as “all-weather time tested friendship,” as “higher than mountain, deeper than sea friendship” – U.D. Bhatkoti narrates a tell-tale instance: “In December 1998, Pakistan arranged a meeting between a Chinese delegation and the Taliban leadership in Kandahar after a US cruise missile attack against the camps of Osama bin Laden in August 1998 in Afghanistan and obtained permission to extract an unexploded missile. The Chinese team subsequently visited Afghanistan in April 1999 to extract the missile.”¹

And assistance to, and collaboration with Pakistan in developing atomic weapons and missiles is not the only “borrowed knife” that a country like China may deploy. It could go on talking against “hegemony” – a proxy for US domination these days as it used to be for attempts at domination by the USSR earlier – and yet countenance US laying down the law on, say, Kashmir.

Myanmar

Since the late 1980s, China has also put to good use the “principled stand” of the US, Japan, etc. as well as India in regard to Myanmar – exactly as it had done in regard to Pakistan in 1965. At that time, Pakistan had been totally dependent on the US for arms and a protective umbrella. When India and Pakistan went to war in 1965 over the Rann of Kutch, US aid was stopped to both countries. China immediately stepped in and befriended Pakistan. The same sequence was repeated in the 1980s in Myanmar. In many ways, Myanmar is by now a dependency of China. About 60-70 per cent of Myanmar’s trade is now with China. As Myanmar has a substantial deficit in this, it is doubly dependent on Chinese subventions. The Yangon-Mandalay Highway, the Thanlwin Bridge, the International Airports at Yangon

¹U.D. Bhatkoti, “Sino-Pakistan Relations: A Chinese Perspective,” IDSA Weekly Fellows Seminar, 21 December, 2002, New Delhi, mimeographed, p. 13.

and Mandalay, the Lancang-Mekong Riverway, the digital automatic exchanges in Meitkila and 11 other townships of Mandalay Division, the switchboards project, the Bang Kang and Shweli power projects in northern Shan state, the Thaparseik hydro power project in the Sagaing Division, the Mone hydro project in southern Shan state, the Paung Laung hydel project in the Mandalay Division, the Yenwe and Zawgyi hydro project power projects, the Kyauk-se cement manufacturing project, the electrical and switch apparatus manufacturing project, the scheme for gold extraction, geological exploration in the Kachin state, that in the Pyay Oilfields, LPG extraction from the offshore gas project from Yangon.... for one and all, Myanmar is dependent on China – for finances, for expertise, for personnel. A tell-tale consequence is the presence of huge numbers of Chinese in, for instance, the Mandalay Division – so numerous are the Chinese that many shops now have signboards only in Chinese.

Myanmar's dependence on China for defence equipment and facilities, of course, is much greater. By now it is almost total. Myanmar's arms and equipment profile is overwhelmingly Chinese. "Cooperation" in this sphere – the construction by China of strategic assets and their being leased to China – has naturally meant that it will help China in its "force projection" as much as the assets might help Myanmar in its defence. Roads, bridges, airfields, ports (for instance, Thilawa), development of river basins (for instance, the proposed Irrawaddy Corridor Project), the silent development of naval bases (at Sittwae, Kyaukphyu, Hainggyi and on the Tanintharyi coast), the establishment of radar and communication facilities – especially in Coco Islands, training of Myanmar defence personnel in China as well as in Myanmar, and cooperation in intelligence – in each of these, Myanmar is now dependent on, and intertwined with China.

And those who keep track of Chinese thinking on strategic matters see that India is much in China's calculations as it moves to "assist" Myanmar. In a typical passage RAND specialists record,

China has several interests in Myanmar. First, China's arms sales to Myanmar – like its sales to Pakistan – complicate the security planning of China's strategic rival, India. [Interview at Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, May, 1998.] The effort appears to be successful – Indian leaders and analysts have complained about Chinese encirclement. [A militarized, China-supported Burma to the east is the last

thing India needs at the moment' according to an Indian security official. Bertil Lintner, '...But Stay on Guard,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 16, 1998, p. 21] In addition, China has apparently received access to Myanmar's [Bay of Bengal] naval bases, including a radar installation on the Coco Islands that is close to India's naval base in the adjoining Andaman Islands, in return for arms shipments and technical assistance to Myanmar's navy. [Karl W. Eikenberry, 'Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers,' p.22; Bertil Lintner, 'Arms for Eyes,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 17, 1993, p. 26; Bertil Lintner, 'Burma Road,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 6, 1997, pp. 16-17; Lintner, '...But Stay on Guard,' p. 21.] India and the Indian Ocean are said to be China's third greatest strategic concern after Taiwan and the South China Sea, [Tai Ming Cheung, Hong Kong-based military analyst, quoted in Lintner, "...But Stay on Guard," p. 21] so China would appear to have a strong interest in continuing access to Myanmar's naval facilities....¹

We cannot blame Myanmar for turning to China – after all, other countries, including India, spurned it in the name of principle. We cannot blame China – it has only picked up what was pushed to it on a platter. The consequences for India, however, are not any the less for that reason. The stage has been set for China to gain direct and continuous access through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal, and to establish its presence – its military, naval presence – in the Bay through the naval bases it has helped construct and modernize – the Kyauphyu monitoring facility, the Hainggyi Radar Station, the Thilawa port – as well as from the islands that notionally belong to Myanmar – recall the modernization of the Naval-cum-Air base on the Coco Islands. The last, to mention just one tidbit, is just *thirty* nautical miles from the Andaman Islands.

Only three further facts need be noted in this regard. Evidence indicates that China has played a significant role in bringing the two sets of Army rulers – those of Pakistan and Myanmar – close to each other. Second, not just evidence in general but actual seizures indicate that shipment of arms to terrorist groups *via* Myanmar has resumed. Third, that Myanmar has become a dependency of China is, of course, a matter of concern to Southeast Asian countries too: after all, Myanmar is the western flank of those countries just as much as it is the eastern flank of India – a China well-entrenched in Myanmar can

¹Daniel L. Byman and Roger Cliff, *China's Arms Sales, Motivations and Implications*, RAND, 1999, p. 19.

have as much access to them as it can to our Northeast. But, and this is the point we have to bear in mind, for reasons that we shall soon encounter, these countries in Southeast Asia are not likely to risk being seen to be even contemplating any step that may give reason to China to charge that they are becoming part of a "contain China" conspiracy.

Bangladesh

Chinese relations with Bangladesh are much more intimate – the Bangladesh Army's tanks are from China, several of the frigates and other craft of its Navy are from China, squadrons of its Air Force fly Chinese jets. During the December 2002 visit of Khaleda Zia to Beijing, the two countries signed a mutual defence pact. Much secrecy preceded the announcement. The Bangladesh Foreign Minister met Indian officials in Sri Lanka literally a day before emplaning for Beijing. He ensured that not a hint of what had already been finalized would escape his lips or those of his officials. Once the pact was made public, it was said in India that the text was general, that it did not contain anything at which we need be alarmed. Even if this is the case as far as the formal text is concerned – though even these authorities who claim to have knowledge of the precise provisions of the pact acknowledge that it speaks of both: joint production of weapons as well as cooperating against common adversaries – the announcement effect itself would fan adventurism in Bangladesh *vis-à-vis* its relations with India. "What can India do? We have China backing us...."

Tibet

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, from the Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal to the Gwadar port that China is developing for Pakistan to the west of Karachi – at a reported cost of over two billion dollars – these add up to a very strong ring by themselves. And yet they are an *addition*. After all, an even more ominous buildup has been within China on India's northern and northeastern rim. Tibet is by now a substantial military base equipped for force projection into South Asia – the network of roads, the military bases, the airfields are all in place. Indeed, an officer who had held some of the most sensitive assignments in the Indian Army says that he was startled to travel on

the road network in Tibet and to see how swiftly equipment and personnel could be moved over it. This transformation has been brought about by three prongs: Sinification, Militarization and "Modernization".

The civilian population of Tibet has been browbeaten – where it has not been eliminated that is, and replaced by Hans. Over half of Tibet has already been reapportioned to other provinces of China – the "Tibetan Autonomous Region" so called consists only of the western and central parts of Tibet. In the larger original region that we know as Tibet, Hans are now said to outnumber Tibetans – 7.5 million to 6 million; in Lhasa itself they now constitute half the population – the Tibetans huddled into a small "Tibetan quarter". This has been achieved by deaths on the one hand and settlement on the other. Tibetan sources put the deaths that can be traced to the occupation to over a million. Even if we discount, even if we disregard this figure, the other arm of the operation is all too visible to visitors. Reproducing the comments and acknowledgement of Jin Shixun, Deputy Director General of Tibet's Development and Planning Commission, the *South China Morning Post* reports,

Tibetans will become a minority in their own capital in the next few years as Han Chinese migrants pour into the city to take part in a new drive to develop Tibet's economy, a senior local official said yesterday....

"With the introduction of the policy of reform and opening up, there are more and more people from other provinces of China who come to Tibet to open up their business or make investment here," Mr. Jin said.

"At the moment the population here in Lhasa stands at around 200,000 – about half of them are the migrant population," he said.

"According to the needs of economic development and construction and the improvement of the investment environment and strengthening of tourist infrastructure, there will certainly be a large increase in these numbers." Mr. Jin's remarks confirmed what seems obvious to a visitor returning to Lhasa after several years. The city now resembles most provincial Chinese towns, except for the imposing Potala Palace and tiny Tibetan quarter.

Residents say Han Chinese businesses have started encroaching on that cluster of whitewashed stone and wood houses in the past few years, taking over stalls and shops on the Barkor pilgrim circuit around the main Jokhang temple. The rest of the city is dotted with neon-lit shops, karaoke bars and Chinese restaurants....¹

¹*South China Morning Post*, 8 August, 2002.

In the Amdo province (now referred to as Qinghai) of Tibet, Tibetans now constitute only a fifth of the population. In Kham province, all major towns now consist 90 per cent or more of Han Chinese. Incidentally, in every other area also where local minority populations were clustered, the Chinese rulers have moved with the same ruthlessness to overturn the demographic balance. Hefner recalls that at the time China became independent, Muslims were 90-95 per cent of the population of Xinjiang. By the time of the 2000 Census, Hans had become 40 per cent of the population, Uighurs had fallen to 46 per cent – and this in spite of the fact that the birthrate among the Uighurs remains higher than among other segments of the population.¹ And in Inner Mongolia, the 2.5 million Mongolians are dwarfed by the 18.5 million Han Chinese who have been settled in the province.² The result is that in the provinces in which the Manchus, Turkish Muslims and Mongolians were in majority, now for every Manchu, there are 35 Han Chinese; for every person of Turkish descent, there are three Han Chinese; for every Mongol, there are five Han Chinese. And even as the Chinese rulers have pushed Hans into these areas, they have extended the family limitation policies and directives to the minorities of these very areas – on the ground that as “population growth is putting increasing pressure on the environment and resources in the (western) region,” the ethnic minorities too must limit their numbers.³ Contrast this purposiveness with the “state subject” regulations in Jammu and Kashmir which prohibit people from the rest of the country from buying any property in the state!

Next, the entire region has been transformed into a military base. Between 300,000 to 500,000 soldiers are reported to be stationed in Tibet – that comes to 1 Chinese soldier for every 10 to 20 Tibetans. The area has been covered with a network of thousands of miles of roadways. There are 14 military airfields. Accounts also speak of up to 10 missile bases.

To top it all, China is now about to complete a 1,500 miles rail network from Lanzhou to Golmud to Lhasa. Commenting on the security implications of this undertaking, an observer notes:

¹Robert W. Hefner, “Islam and Asian Security,” in *Strategic Asia*, 2002-03, pp. 18-19.

²*International Herald Tribune*, 27-28 November, 2004, p. 2.

³See, for instance, “China curbs births in the West, but wants more people to move there,” *Agence France-Presse*, 18 August, 2000.

The railroad will open previously unrealized strategic, tactical and conventional possibilities for the PLA to direct military firepower toward South Asia and beyond. With this railroad in place the PLA will have excellent hiding places for its new rail-mobile ICBM, the DF-31A. If the PLA follows the Russian lead and rail-bases its ICBMs, each missile train could carry up to thirty nuclear warheads capable of destroying any strategic target in Japan and many in the western United States. In eastern China, it is the PLA's practice to move its theater ballistic missiles, the DF-11 and the DF-15, by rail to staging areas prior to dispersal to pre-surveyed launch sites. The Tibet Plateau Railroad will give the PLA the opportunity to threaten India with theater ballistic missiles in the same way it now threatens Taiwan. From a military logistics standpoint, rail has an enormous advantage over roads in moving heavy equipment, supplies and manpower. In effect, this means the permanent militarization of the entire plateau into a staging ground for aggression into South Asia. With even a single line, the PLA could move about 12 infantry divisions to Central Tibet in 30 days to meet up with their pre-positioned equipment.¹

The settlement of Han Chinese, as well as the rapid build up of roads and railways in the region, is, of course, sought to be explained away in the name of "development". The more China presses ahead with this programme – and it *is* accelerating in that same direction: witness the projects for diverting waters from this region to northern China; witness the projects to pipe gas and oil from this region to eastern cities like Shanghai – the more swiftly it will reduce Tibetans to a tiny, marginalized, ineffectual fraction in their own land – the area we used to look upon as the buffer of safety. Though that is a subject that will take us too far from the immediate concerns of this book, this pattern of development will have other, and possibly more devastating and irreversible effects for the security and survival of vast regions of India and other countries on the rim of the Tibetan plateau – the devastation that is being inflicted on the ecology of Tibet by this pattern of development. The consequences that have already erupted from the wholesale deforestation of eastern Tibet, to take just one particular example, are pre-views of what regions adjacent to Tibet will experience in the coming decades. China itself experienced devastating floods in the Yangtze in 1998. In India we have had these

¹William C. Triplett, "The dragon in the Indian Ocean," *China Brief*, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. III, Issue 4, 25 February 2002, pp. 4-6.

pre-views more than once. Recall the 20-foot high, unseasonal wall of water that came hurtling down in June 2000 and devastated Arunachal Pradesh after the dam burst in Yiong River. Recall the threat to Himachal to which we were suddenly awakened when our satellites showed the level to which water had risen in the "lake" that had formed in the Pareechu river. And in late 2004 the Central government had to alert the governments of Arunachal and Assam to a new danger – a crack had developed in the Tsangpo river at Doxong, and had the dam given way, the states would have been in for massive devastation.

Whenever attention is drawn to the ecological consequences of what China is doing in Tibet, China explains away what is happening – for instance, the melting glaciers – to be the result of global developments, such as global warming! And as in other parts, western multi-nationals have jumped over each other to partner in "development" of this region also. This characteristic salivating for immediate profits confers all the familiar advantages on China: China puts the strengths and resources of others to work for itself; the fact that these companies have sunk their resources into these projects, ensures that the governments of their countries will keep mum about what such development is doing to the Tibetans, and what it is liable to spell for adjacent countries.

One aspect of this pattern of development is that of unintended consequences: China develops Tibet the way it is developing other regions, and India, etc., have to live with the consequences as much as China itself has to. But there is another aspect: that which *can* be intended in the future. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the flood in Arunachal in 2000, that the threatened floods in Himachal and Arunachal in 2004 were purely natural occurrences. But they are exactly the kind of events that are envisaged in Chinese strategic writings also. Today China attributes the Arunachal and Himachal floods to the bursting of lakes that got formed as a result of "natural" factors like landslides – omitting, of course, the connection of those landslides with the massive deforestation of Tibet that it has engineered. But the lakes – even when they have been formed "naturally" – become handy "lake bombs" which can be breached to cause massive devastation in eastern and northern India – causing disaffection against the

governments here as well as tying Forces down in relief work. The very fact which we have looked upon as a guarantor of security – the height of the Himalayas *vis-à-vis* the north Indian plains – would then become the ideal asset for waging environmental warfare against our country.

But that is something we shall have occasion to consider as we turn to the change in Chinese strategic thinking.

An equally ominous development

"One of the most remarkable and potentially dangerous developments in the post-Cold War era is the rise of '*haiyang guotu guan*' (concept of sea as national territory)," Samuel Kim notes, citing Chinese writings and pronouncements. "The Chinese people have been prodded to cultivate and cherish *haiyang guotu guan* so as to direct their attention to the unpleasant fact that it is China's maritime interests that have been encroached upon most alarmingly in recent history: 'Territorial claims laid by foreign countries over China's maritime territory amount up to one million square kilometers, ten times the size of China's disputed land border. By now, over thirty Chinese islands with surrounding waters are still in the hands of foreigners. Losses in maritime interests are really to be grieved and they call for our serious consideration.' As well, Chinese strategists now speak of the need for 'survival space' (*shengcun kongjian*)—and for strategic frontiers that extend horizontally into the Indian Ocean, the South China and East China Seas, and vertically into space. A recent internal Chinese document states that the disputed island groups in the South China Sea, some of them situated nearly 1,000 kilometers south of China's Hainan island province and most of them subject to conflicting jurisdictional claims, could provide *lebensraum* for the Chinese people...."¹

China clothed itself in "legality" in a typical way: it passed a law of its own declaring what it claimed to be its own by law! As Kim recounts, first at the 1991 session of the National People's Congress, 31 deputies, acting no doubt on their own!, signed a motion demanding that a "law of the seas" be enacted. Acting no doubt in response to this pressing demand from the grassroots,

¹Samuel S. Kim, "China's Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 1996.

....the NPC adopted on February 25, 1992, "The Law of the People's Republic of China on Its Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas" to empower the PRC to exercise "its sovereignty over its territorial waters and its rights to exercise control over their adjacent areas, and to safeguard state security as well as its maritime rights and interests" (Article 1). Article 2 stipulates China's territorial sovereignty as including "the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha [Paracell] Islands, Nansha [Spratly] Islands, and other islands that belong to the PRC" (Article 2). The law vests the Chinese military with the right to remove by force any incursion on the stipulated islands and areas. President Jiang Zemin issued a clarion call that the military "should enhance combat strength in an all-around way; should more successfully shoulder the lofty mission of defending the country's territorial sovereignty over the land and in the air, as well as its rights and interests on the sea; and should safeguard the unification and security of the motherland."

China, in accordance with this law no doubt!, extended its naval exercises into farther and farther reaches. The law was enacted in February 1992. In May, Kim notes, China landed troops on a reef claimed by Vietnam and set up a "sovereignty post". Even at this stage, others in line of fire assumed that they would somehow escape untouched. Kim records,

The conventional wisdom that Beijing would leave ASEAN countries alone in its southward expansionism in the South China Sea, concentrating all of its shots at the weakest link – Vietnam, was shattered on February 8, 1995, when Filipinos woke up to find a Chinese flag fluttering on Mischief Reef just 200 or so kilometers from Palawan Island. Although the reef is well within Manila's 200-mile exclusive economic zone – recognized by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that entered into force in 1994 – the best President Fidel Ramos could do was to come up with the "right is might" normative response as well as to depict the Chinese "might is right" occupation as a multilateral, not bilateral, challenge for the ASEAN to deal with. The Chinese raid on Mischief Reef has been made all the more shocking by China's separate claim to some of Indonesia's gas fields. In 1994 Indonesia discovered that, according to China's cartography, its Natuna gas field, well within its 200-mile exclusive economic zone, now lies within Chinese waters. Apparently, quiet behind-the-scenes bilateral probing met only Chinese stonewalling....

The official stand of China is that China will never occupy an inch of foreign territory, and it will never give up an inch of China's territory.

What could be more reasonable, and reassuring? But, as Kim notes, "The problem obviously lies in the expansive definition of Chinese territory."

As is the practice in China, the assertions to areas, and the new law were accompanied by vigorous campaigns in official media and, by indoctrination of troops in particular. Kim recalls the admonition of the *People's Liberation Daily*: "Greater indoctrination in an ocean concept to increase awareness of oceans as national territory, and of cherishing every inch of China's ocean territory is a matter of major importance having a bearing on survival and development of China's posterity." By contrast, far from indoctrinating anyone, we wouldn't have acquainted our citizens with even the grounds for Chinese assertions in regard to the oceans or our areas *vis-à-vis* the facts.

Having established their presence, having devised the "legal basis" for their assertion, the Chinese are, of course, always ready to reach out for peace – *provided* the other side agrees to their perception of what is theirs! In a typical account, the President from 1993 to 1996 of the Academy of Military Science in Beijing, General Zhao Nanqi, explained how Deng Xiaoping had refashioned Chinese assessments, how he had emphasized that China must find new ways to solve problems, and how these new ways would promote peace. "[To solve] New problems [we] need to find new ways," the General explained. "He [Deng] pointed out that we should use peaceful means and not war to solve problems. It would be most proper to solve international disputes through peaceful means. For example, on the question of Nansha islands [the Spratlys], we have proposed that *on the condition of their recognizing Chinese sovereignty*, we could have joint development with relevant countries...."¹

As I close the manuscript, *The Standard* reports a statement of the Japanese Foreign Ministry that "China had illegally conducted undersea surveys inside Japan's special economic zone 22 times last year...." "The number of claimed incursions is nearly a threefold increase from eight in 2003," the paper continues. And in another account in the same issue it reports that "PetroChina, the country's largest oil producer, has obtained approval from the Ministry of Land

¹General Zhao Nanqi, "Deng Xiaoping's theory of defence modernization," *China Military Science*, Spring 1994, in Michael Pillsbury, *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, 1997, Lancer, Delhi, 1998, pp. 11-18, at p. 18.

and Resources to explore for oil and gas in an area near the disputed Spratly Islands.... The decision to explore near the Spratlys comes at a time when several Asian countries are renewing territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea...."¹

Having forged the ring

Having ringed India, having equipped Pakistan and Bangladesh, having converted Tibet into a well-provisioned staging base, China can be sweet reasonableness personified – exactly as Pakistan, having equipped, fired up and smuggled terrorists into India, can go on advocating dialogue!

Nor should one assume that Pakistan is a "borrowed knife" for Beijing alone. The US too pursues several objectives in the region. It may find India useful today in one context, it may find India useful for one objective, but it also has the aim of preventing the growth of any regional powers that may in some distant future pose an inconvenience to it. So it also looks the other way, and will continue to do so as Pakistan keeps India tied down to this region.

And, of course, Pakistan is not the only agent through which either the US or Beijing wields "the borrowed knife". In East Asia, North Korea performs the function that Pakistan executes in South Asia. Beijing instigates Pyongyang, or, because it knows that in the end Beijing will stand by it, Pyongyang rattles its missiles, it flaunts its nuclear weapons programme. Everyone has to turn to China to mediate, to somehow make Pyongyang see reason. Incidentally, another advantage too falls to China: the US as much as everyone else sees that when they can't bring even a bankrupt, starving country like North Korea to book, they better not even dream of imposing their will on China!²

¹*The Standard*, 26 March, 2005, <http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/China/GC26Ad01.html> and[stdn/std/Business/GC26Ae06.html](http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Business/GC26Ae06.html).

²Samuel Kim reports a Security Council representative as saying, "And they (PRC representatives) used the North Korean debate as a case to illustrate a deeper point – If you can't force the North Koreans to do what you want, how do you imagine you could ever force the Chinese to do anything? Nothing can be done against the Chinese.... We lobbied them as part of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) countries on the Bosnia and the Haiti missions. Again, they believe in bilateral dealing, they come, they smile, they leave."

An illustrative lesson: "principle" versus pragmatism

All this has several ominous implications for India. For the time being, let us infer just one lesson. Reflect on the sharp contrast between Chinese pragmatism and our penchant for "standing by principles", and the contrasting consequences. To take one example, even while swearing peace, China has been one of the main proliferators – of atomic weaponry, of missiles and missile production technology: it has supplied these to countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Pakistan. It supplied armaments simultaneously to *both* Iran and Iraq when the two were engaged in war. To take another example: China is estimated to have today around 400 ballistic missiles pointed at Taiwan. These are likely to increase to 600 in the next five years. It is just a few years ago that China test fired several of these perilously close to Taiwan. On the other side, to arm itself against China, Taiwan is the second largest purchaser of arms from the US. In a word, on the face of things, the two countries are in a state of hostilities. Yet the two-way trade between the two is in excess of \$ 30 billion. Officially Taiwanese investment in China is around \$ 17 billion. In fact, because of restrictions imposed by Taiwan, much more has been invested by Taiwanese businessmen *via* Hong Kong, Cayman Islands and other tax-havens. The total Taiwanese investment that China has been able to secure is estimated to be not \$ 17 billion but close to \$ 70 billion. This investment has generated an estimated three million jobs in China. Kunshan, a city near Shanghai, is little more than an enclave of Taiwanese firms. Anywhere between 400,000 and 700,000 Taiwanese live and work in China now – they constitute 7 to 10 per cent of Taiwan's total labour force. The largest companies of the two – including companies owned in each case by the respective governments – have formed joint ventures. Taiwanese are estimated to make three million trips to China every year – *three million trips* when direct air-links have *not* been established. Now that they are being re-established, this figure is expected to go up to five million.... This migration adds directly to China's military strength too: for instance, the hardware producers from Taiwan have enabled China to develop High Performance Computers at a much faster rate than would have been the case otherwise – computers that are vital for testing and deployment of missiles and nuclear weapons,

computers whose export to China, the US, as we shall see in a moment, has been trying to restrict.¹

Exactly the same sort of pragmatism has guided China in its handling of border disputes with its neighbours. Swaine and Tellis make an important, tell-tale distinction in regard to the approach that China has been following in border disputes with its neighbours. They observe,

Beijing's "calculative" strategy has resulted in a two-pronged approach aimed at securing Chinese interests with respect to these territorial disputes. First, if the dispute in question is both intrinsically trivial and marginal to China's larger interests, Beijing has sought to resolve it amicably to pursue its larger goals. The border disputes with Russia, for example, are evidence of this approach where China's overarching interest in improving its political relationship with Moscow and securing access to Russian military technology has resulted in quick, it is hoped permanent, solutions to the Ussuri River dispute. Another similar example pertains to the speedy resolution of the border disputes with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: given Chinese interests both in preventing external support to the separatist movements in Chinese Central Asia and in ensuring access to the energy reserves of the Trans-Caucasus, Beijing moved quickly to amicably delimit its border with both these newly independent states.

Second, if the dispute in question is significant but cannot be resolved rapidly to China's advantage by peaceful means, Beijing has advocated an indefinite postponement of the basic issue. This tactic has been adopted, for example, in the case of the territorial disputes with India, Japan, and several of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. The basic logic underlying this approach has been to steadfastly avoid conceding any Chinese claims with respect to the dispute, while simultaneously seeking to prevent the dispute from vitiating the pacific environment that China needs to complete its internal transformation successfully. Such an approach has at least several advantages: it positions China as a conciliatory state seeking to resolve all outstanding disputes peacefully. It does not increase the demands on China's military forces at a time when the PLA is relatively weak and when the Chinese economy needs all the breathing room it can get. It prevents balancing coalitions from arising against China in the event Beijing pursued more coercive

¹For these facts and related information, see Report to the US Congress of the US-China Security Review Commission, *The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China*, July 2002, pp. 58-63, 106-07.

strategies. And, it delays the resolution of these disputes at least until the balance of power changes substantially in favor of China. At that time, both simple usurpation and coercive bargaining might become more attractive, although it is unclear today whether the Chinese leadership would actually conclude that the benefits of such actions easily exceed the costs.¹

In a word, a clear aim: keep India bogged down in South Asia. A clear device: "murder with a borrowed knife". And pragmatism – unhampered by "principles" and the like.

Multi-pronged, multi-layered, all instruments to one purpose

Even though China views the US as its main future adversary, even though it is convinced that the US is at present engaged in stratagems to contain and encircle China, China is not just preparing itself militarily to meet that challenge. It has forged the closest possible diplomatic relations with the US. It cooperates and coordinates actions with the US on a host of issues – from North Korea; to restructuring of the UN; to ensuring that moves by Taiwanese leaders do not cross a line; to exerting pressure on India so that it rolls back its nuclear weaponization programme.

We have seen earlier how China is convinced that the US aims to use India as a claw to contain China, and equally convinced that India is only too eager to fill this role. But its response is not simple denunciation or opposition. It is multi-faceted, each facet having many layers. It works to persuade the US that containment won't work. It lets access to its own markets and factories do its work. It puts American firms and funds to lobby for it. It begins processes for improving relations with India. It vaguely endorses proposals for Russia-China-India "strategic partnership". It sabotages any proposal, even mere conferences at which such a proposal may be discussed, for collective security arrangements for this region. It inflames nationalism at home, and denounces the merest signs of nationalism in every other country. All the while, it strengthens itself militarily....

There is another feature that we must learn from China. Among the factors that have helped China most in achieving its security and

¹Michael D. Swaine, Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future*, RAND, 2000, pp. 131-32.

foreign affairs related goals has been the fact that it deploys all instruments to each purpose. The point was brought home to me by the head of one of our major software firms. He explained how every limb of the Chinese governmental structure dealt with his managers as if in a perfectly coordinated pincer manoeuvre. Some departments and the provincial authorities would clear every obstacle so that the operations of this firm could commence at the earliest. Others would make suggestions, still others would exercise "moral suasion", yet another set would go a bit beyond suggestions leaving the managers and negotiators in no doubt that the firm would be well-advised to do 'X', 'Y', 'Z' if it wanted its operations to proceed smoothly and be profitable – that it must locate high-end R&D in its China plant; that it must train up Chinese software engineers; that it must locate Chinese software engineers in its labs in India; that it must instruct them in English; that it must put in additional funds.... As we shall soon see, these "suggestions" soon come to extend beyond the operations of the company: that it must persuade Senator 'X' to exercise his influence for opening the home country's market; that he must argue against sanctions.... By contrast, in India, there is absolutely no strategic thinking about what we can get out of firms that are investing here to make money, nor is there the slightest coordination between different ministries – even of the single, Central Government, to say nothing of their coordinating their overtures and admonitions with the government of the state in which the company has set up its operations. The result is predictable: the Myanmar Government agrees to give India a series of telecom and IT projects, they languish – the files moving from one ministry to another; scores of military personnel from other countries attend courses at our military academies; no one keeps up with them once they return to their countries....

That kind of purposive coordination in China naturally extends beyond firms. China is a major exporter of arms. Earning foreign exchange is a minor objective in doing so. China uses these sales to acquire influence over the attitude of those countries on issues that are of concern to China – say, the status of Taiwan. Samuel Kim gives the telling instance of successor States of the USSR: when they were seeking admission to the United Nations, the Chinese made it clear to

them that unless they endorsed the Chinese line on Taiwan, they could scarcely hope to enter the UN.¹

Operating on many facets, operating on many layers of each facet, marshalling many instruments for each layer.... And then working each instrument assiduously, relentlessly. China employs agents *per se*. It goads companies doing business in China to work on policy-makers at home. It yokes investment bankers to create a virtuous-victorious impression of the country, its policies, and its rulers as individuals. But it also works indirectly – by affecting the general climate of opinion. For this purpose, it particularly targets *those who do not know much*. And for good reason. Whether senators or mediamen or just ordinary citizens, the less they know, and the less time and effort they are liable to put into examining a proposition, the more susceptible they will be to lines that are insinuated into discourse.

¹Samuel S. Kim, "China's Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 1996, monograph.

The single-minded pursuit

Swami Vivekananda said of us that we are “an essentially religious people.” For the Chinese by contrast, religion means little. But they have a strong sense of history, and great pride in their culture. Their history is a living presence for many Chinese. The lessons from the stratagems that different rulers adopted, the results of diverse manoeuvres, tricks and counters to them, rules for when one is strong *vis-à-vis* one’s adversary, rules for when one is weak – these are in the marrow of the Chinese. You will find them at every level – from proverbs for daily life to contrivances of rulers like Mao.

The leitmotif of this history has been the braid of power and the State – the two intertwined, each the prerequisite and the guarantor as well as the object of the other. Their history has led the Chinese to attach the greatest importance to a strong Centre – they have come to look upon it as the sole guarantee of stability, and through that of peace at home and the prosperity that flows from peace. The strong Centre is also, in their experience, the precondition for exercising the kind of influence that in their view their culture enjoins upon and entitles them to exercise. In their experience threats to the Centre have sprung from states and groups at the periphery of China. These have been occasioned by, and when they have succeeded they have done so because of divisions and disarray among rulers.

From this have followed two strains. The Chinese have come to condone almost everything in a ruler so long as he maintains a strong Centre – as they do today in their continuing reverence for Mao. Second, subduing the periphery has been a continuous objective of Chinese statecraft. The two are intertwined, indeed almost indistinguishable – the more successfully a ruler subdues groups and states that might threaten China, for instance, the

higher his legitimacy, the more spectacularly he can fail in other dimensions.¹

For establishing and maintaining a strong Centre, and for subduing states and groups along the periphery, the Chinese have internalized utmost pragmatism. Any and every instrument may be, and has been deployed – according to capacity and circumstance. One day the ruler may opt for the mighty military blow that will crush the other – when one is strong relative to the other; and just as readily feign fealty the next day – when one is weak and force offers little chance of success. In neither instance is one to be trammelled by “principle” and the like. The object is to prevail over the opponent. The sole test is success. The singular question to be considered is whether, in circumstances as they are, what the ruler is about to do shall prevail, not whether it accords with some text or teaching or precedent or pledge. In particular, force is certainly not to be shunned out of any scruple. Indeed, in instance after instance, force has been the instrument of choice. And Chinese rulers have felt secure only when they have rendered the potential or actual adversary completely harmless or subservient.

And what is the “periphery” that is to be subdued? That surely is a function of the distance from which China can be threatened. When soldiers could only trudge on their feet, the “periphery” would have consisted of States and peoples within a few score miles. Mongolian horses extended the “periphery” to several hundred miles. In this age of missiles and surveillance and targeting from space, the “periphery” includes countries on the other side of the globe.

“But what would China gain by such a pursuit? What would be China’s object in trying to control so elongated and distant a ‘periphery’?” The object of Chinese policy is to ensure that *no country takes a step without paying heed to the effect that step is liable to have, indeed the effect that the Chinese leadership is liable to think it shall have on China’s interest.*

¹For an instructive summary of the enormous amount of literature on the subject, see for instance, Michael D. Swaine, Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future*, RAND, 2000, which we have already encountered, and the array of works cited in it.

"And what is China's 'interest'? By what touchstone is a step taken by another country to be assessed in this calculus?" The touchstone is: Will the step help or hinder China's acquisition of power and prosperity? And "power" certainly, some would say even prosperity is always *relative to what others have or are liable to acquire* through the step.

China has not hesitated to use force – ask the Vietnamese, or the Indians who remember 1962. And the basic reason that China does not use force more freely today is that *at present* it does not have the capability to overwhelm. There is the US presence in the region to contend with. Moreover, at the moment, on their own ground, neighbours like Russia, Japan, Taiwan, India have the capacity to hold their own. And there is always the prospect that too forbidding an image will spur these neighbours to get together.

But what will China do *once it acquires such strength relative to a country like India* as to be able to force a decision on its terms? Nor do we have to believe that the Chinese are in any way exceptionally sinister – just that they are no different from others. Look at the US today, that is after the disintegration of the USSR: would it have gone into Iraq, would it have threatened Iran the way it did in the latter half of 2004, had the Soviet Union still been around as a countervailing power? But once US has acquired overwhelming power relative to others, it has no compunction riding a lie into Iraq.

Economic development as an end in itself?

It is this potential that we must bear in mind as we read the reams that are put out about the decision of the Chinese leadership to focus exclusively on economic development, about China being a responsible member of the international order. It is prudence born out of current incapacity, not some principle or ideal that dictates its current strategy.

One way to inoculate ourselves against the "exclusive focus on economic development" thesis, and its lemma, "and therefore not a threat," is to ask: Is there any evidence at all that China has come to believe that power does not determine international relations? If there isn't, how come China will look upon economic strength as an end in itself, and not as the foundation for military power? How come it will

fail to notice that the reason the US is able to force the hand of others today, and the UK counts for little is that the US has military power that the others cannot withstand, and the UK does not?

Of course, like other countries, China too wants prosperity for its people. Deng turned the rhetoric and rationalizations of the Mao-phase on their head. Where those speaking in the name of Mao seemed to make Socialism the goal that had to be pursued in contradistinction to economic development, Deng made faster economic development the test of Socialism.¹ That is common sense too: and would have been made brutally evident to every Chinese Maoist too by the fall of the Soviet Union: it was the second most powerful country, but it was as if the storeys of the lofty edifice had been built in the air – the great power crumbled and broke up without a shot being fired.

But economic development does not just bring prosperity to the people. It provides the wherewithal for, it lays the foundations for military might. Indeed, much of "economic development" *consists of* activities and products that spell military might. China has made great advances in producing a wide range of missiles, including independently targeted re-entry vehicles – MIRVs – and liquid and solid fuels for them; aircraft – fighters as well as bombers; naval vessels of a wide range including submarines; it has put several series and types of satellites, and now a man in space; it has made major

¹"We have been making Revolution for several decades and have been building socialism for more than three. Nevertheless, by 1978 the average monthly salary of our workers was still only 45 yuan, and most of our rural areas were still mired in poverty," he told Kim Il Sung, and asked, "Can this be called the superiority of socialism?" "How is socialism superior when our people have so many difficulties in their lives?" he asked. "The 'Gang of Four' clamoured for 'poor Socialism' and 'poor Communism' declaring that Communism was mainly a spiritual thing. That is sheer nonsense...." "If we are to build Socialism, our fundamental task must be to develop the productive forces, shake off poverty, build a strong, prosperous country and improve the living conditions of the people," he told Milo Jake, Secretary General, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. "There is no such thing as poor Socialism. Socialism is characterized not by poverty but by prosperity – the common prosperity of all." For instance, Deng Xiaoping, "We shall concentrate on economic development, 18 September, 1982, talk with Kim Il Sung; 25 May 1988, talk with Milo Jake. See Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volumes I to III, edited by Peoples Daily Online, <http://english.people.com.cn/dengxp/>

strides in crafting, placing and manoeuvring low earth orbit mini satellites; it has acquired substantial anti-satellite capabilities.... All this is "economic development" too.

China's reasoning

The sequence of Chinese reasoning is easy to discern:

- ❑ For China the world is a harsh, treacherous place – of fierce, relentless contention.
- ❑ In its own eyes as much as in the eyes of others, China is a rising power. Indeed, observers when talking of the pace and dimensions of its growth, talk in terms of "a once in a century" shift in relative power.
- ❑ One of the instruments that the US uses, one that, given the difficulties it has run into in Iraq after its decision to proceed without the Security Council, it is liable to rely on increasingly is the international order – in particular, the array of international institutions: from the Security Council to the WTO. To counter this domination, to acquire a say in the decisions of these organizations China must equal and eventually overtake the US.
- ❑ For this reason, China benchmarks itself against the US, not any lesser neighbour. The prospect is certainly not lost on it, nor the implications that outcome will have: that if only it is able to sustain an 8 to 10 per cent growth per year for another 15-20 years, its economy will be larger than that of the US.
- ❑ With the USSR gone, and its successor Russia feeble, China sees that the principal threat to it originates from the US.
- ❑ It sees that the US too envisages that China is the one that will be the main threat to itself fifteen-twenty years from now.
- ❑ Accordingly, the US, China believes, is spearheading a major effort to "contain" China.
- ❑ China in turn must arm itself to counter this certainty.
- ❑ To be able to do so, it must have the necessary economic strength as well as advanced technologies. These are also needed to deal with the problems at home – from unemployment to rising expectations to regional resentments.
- ❑ The *clever* way of doing this is to get others to contribute to China acquiring the wherewithal and the new technologies – by their

resources, by bearing even the risk of deploying those resources and technologies. And the *really clever* way of doing it is to yoke those to make it strong who have most to fear from a strong China – the US, to give the prime example.

- These countries must not only help make China strong eventually, they must also be inveigled into spreading the notion today that China is nothing but a responsible participant in the new international order.

China has succeeded to a spectacular degree in this stratagem – of putting the strength of its adversaries to subserve its own objectives. As Swaine and Tellis note,

All told, therefore, the calculative strategy has paid off handsomely for China: It has put it along a path that, if sustained, could make China the largest economy in the world sometime in the first half of the 21st century. Even more significantly, it has allowed such growth to occur as a result of an export-led strategy that increasingly employs significant proportions of imported technology and inputs – an amazing fact signifying that China has been able to rely upon both the markets and, increasingly, the resources of its partners to create the kind of growth that might eventually pose major concerns to its economic partners, *all without greatly unnerving those partners in the interim*. This does not imply that China's partners in Asia and elsewhere are unconcerned about the implications of China's growth in power. It implies only that such concerns have not resulted, thus far, in efforts to constrain China's growth because the desire for absolute gains on the part of all (including China) has outweighed the corrosive concerns brought about by the problem of relative gains. This represents the true success of the calculative strategy. By being explicitly premised on a refusal to provoke fear and uncertainty as a result of provocative Chinese actions, Beijing has succeeded, whether intentionally or not, not only in desensitizing its trading partners to the problems of relative gains but it has also, by rhetoric and action aimed at exploiting all sides' desire for absolute gains, created the bases for the kind of continued collaboration that inevitably results in further increases in Chinese power and capabilities. Carried to its natural conclusion, the Chinese transition to true great-power status could occur in large part because of its partners' desire for trade and commercial intercourse so long as Beijing is careful enough not to let any security competition short-circuit the process in the interim.¹

¹Swaine and Tellis, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.

And on whom will the immediate effects of China's pursuit of power fall? On whom will fall the burden even in the short run of the shortsightedness of Japan, the US, even Taiwan as they help it acquire that power without regard to the consequences that will befall them eventually? Surely, on countries like India that lie on the rim of China.

At the moment and for the next few years, the object of China is to ensure that, should China get into a scrap with a neighbour like India or Taiwan, the US will not intervene on behalf of that neighbour. This it aims to ensure by acquiring the capacity to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage to the super-power through *any one* system or instrument – the prospect of the loss of China's market, the loss of China as an investment destination; the potential that China has acquired of destabilizing the US financial system by heavy purchases of US government securities; by acquiring the capacity to disrupt integrated systems – stock exchanges, power grids, air and rail traffic control systems – by using Information Technology; by igniting “lines” in public discourse that unsteady the hand of US rulers – as was done so successfully during the Vietnam War. For China to ensure its immediate objective, it is not necessary that it acquire strength that rivals the strength of the US across the board. Enough ability in any one of these means to cause an unacceptable level of dislocation in that particular sphere will be sufficient to deter the US from intervening on behalf of a neighbour of China in the event of fracas.

In the case of Taiwan, of South Korea and Japan, the defence pacts that the US has with the country can perhaps be counted upon to get it to intervene – for if it does not, few will choose to remain in the sort of special relationship that the US would want them to enter with it. But, surely, the degree of involvement of the US in its economy that China has already ensured is by itself enough to ensure that the US will not intervene on behalf of a country like India.

Scholars and diplomats spend much energy debating whether closer integration into the international economic order and more institutionalized governance at home coupled as it is with the “normal pursuits” of rulers – corruption and industrial empires of the scions of high ups, for instance – will “socialize” China sufficiently, so that the threat it may constitute to neighbours will diminish.

What will happen eventually is at the least an open question:

- ❑ Scions of the high ups may get addicted to fortunes, and thereby lose the stomach for dominance, true; on the other hand, they may be acquiring their fortunes through pursuits that ensure dominance – the production of electronic and military hardware, for instance. In a word, they may become the Zaibatsus of China.
- ❑ As its prosperity comes to depend more on the international economic order, China may become more rule-abiding, true; but, equally possible, China's determination to have a major say in setting the rules of that new order may redouble.
- ❑ That policies of Europe and of the US have substantial consequences for its economy may only lead it to redouble its efforts to influence policy-makers in these countries.
- ❑ Yes, China is getting to depend a great deal on imported oil and steel and iron ore. Will this mean that it will work to ensure that peace prevails? Or will the dependence redouble its determination to have such naval power that as will enable it to control the sea routes vital to its economic interests? Will it work for an open international economic system? Or will it seek to tie countries that have the oil and other essentials that it needs in pacts which guarantee supplies at preferential rates?
- ❑ And what happens if the next surge of Chinese growth comes to cater to the very thing that has been attracting others – that is, the vast market of China itself?

Some draw solace from the presumption that governance in China is liable to become more institutionalized in the coming decades; that it has already begun to pass into the hands of leaders who are less charismatic and who, being professionals, are liable to be more risk-averse and therefore less liable to go in for military adventures; some even argue that, as China becomes richer, it is liable to become democratic, and therefore less liable to embark on aggressive wars.

Most presumptions of this kind can be turned around.

Greater institutionalization? But that may just mean even greater power to an institution like the PLA.

Less charismatic leaders? But that may compel them even more to seek legitimization through measures that show that China, under

their leadership, is recognized by one and all as the paramount force in the region. A charismatic leader can often ride out setbacks that lesser men feel compelled to fight back.

A larger proportion of them are from the professions? But the most zealous body-counters in the Vietnam War were professionals of the first water.

The regime will be more democratic? There is little evidence that democracy is about to break out in China. In any case, look at the record. Vietnam, Grenada, Falklands, Iraq – the most institutionalized democracies are the ones that mounted wars against these hapless countries, and they did so to resounding acclaim of people within their countries. Indeed, the lesson seems to be the opposite – democracies are just as tempted to swoop down *when the victim is weak, when he seems to be an easy pick*.

Growing professionalization of ruling structures? But an aspect of this has been the growing influence of the PLA in military matters. As an analyst notes,

This combination of the PLA's size, growing strategic and conventional capabilities, organizational restructuring and adoption of a new strategy of preparing for "high-tech limited warfare" are factors that its Asian neighbors have to take seriously. Its already acquired major power status, and the political will to achieve even greater influence and techno-military power implies that China's expanding role will be a major feature in the world order in the 21st century. In many ways this is already evident. Moreover, over the past two decades of reform, while the PLA's role in elite and societal politics has seemingly declined, it has become increasingly influential in the security policy making process. Michael Swaine in an important recent study underlines this point:

"Ultimate national strategic and security decision making authority does not rest with the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) as a body. Instead, a collective leadership composed of a small subset of senior party and military leaders determines policy in these areas. The PLA's role in shaping national strategic objectives and in providing strategic analysis and intelligence to civilian leaders is particularly significant and apparently increasing."

Since China's relations with its neighbours – including those in South Asia – have a substantial national security dimension, and involve disputes over sovereignty, the military is likely to set much of the tenor of the relationship and the policy line, leaving less room for flexibility in dealing with issues such as arms transfers, proliferation, and defence ties. The

dominant role of the military in shaping China's national security and important sectors of the foreign policy agenda is highly destabilizing, since the absence of democratic or other constraints means the use of force and application of coercive strategies would not be politically impeded. Indeed, "by taking tough positions Chinese leaders demonstrate their nationalist credentials and win vitally important domestic political support." Asian states therefore have reasons to worry and take precautions.¹

The lessons for a country like India are clear, and they hold whichever way these open questions come to be settled over the coming decades:

- ❑ Once China acquires capacity, its intention can change. Once it is safe enough for it to reveal its intention, its behaviour will change. Its history, the self-image of its people, the convictions of its rulers leave little doubt that its goal will be dominance.
- ❑ Countries that are liable to be impacted by that change of behaviour must determine what they should be doing *according to the time it would take to safeguard their interests if and when China's behaviour changes.*

To these long-term considerations we must add the immediate context. On the one side is the sheer size of Chinese forces – that size may be little use in the initial stages of a high-technology engagement *vis-à-vis* the United States, but in a tussle with India, a central Asian country or even Russia, it would be as important a determinant of the outcome as any other – especially as it will be coupled with the willingness of Chinese leaders, and their political system to bear very heavy casualties. And as China extends its presence into Southeast Asia – through closer economic relations as much as through a stronger navy – one must reckon with a very potent advantage it has – the presence in these countries of a very large, well-entrenched, cohesive Chinese population. On the other side are five factors that by themselves constitute temptations:

¹Sujit Dutta, "China's emerging power and military role: implications for South Asia," in Jonathan D. Pollock and Richard H. Yang, *In China's Shadow, Regional perspectives on Chinese foreign policy and military development*, RAND, 1998, at pp. 94-95.

- The continuing gap between the rates at which our respective economic – and therefore military – strengths are growing;
- The evaporation of governance in large tracts of India;
- The fact that, because of its sheer size, because of what it considers the likelihood of India making itself available as an instrument to the US, India is seen by China as a potential nuisance;
- The Chinese see five major disputes facing them: Taiwan, Spratly Islands, Tibet, Aksai Chin and Arunachal. Three of these five involve India.
- China remains deeply apprehensive about the *status quo* – about US presence in Southeast and East Asia, about what it regards as barely suppressed militarism of Japan, about the enhanced presence of the US in its southern and western rims after the Gulf and Afghan wars.

A volume can be – and should be – written about Chinese strategic assessments of India and the region. I shall enumerate just a few of the determinants that strike me as ones that will have a particularly important bearing on our future.

The propelling impulse

First: nationalism is what propels China. Nationalism was as important in the appeal that the Communist Party held out to the Chinese people in the 1930s and 1940s as the promise of emancipation from the thralldom of warlords and landlords. Since then egalitarianism has been much diluted – it cannot quite sit with Deng's "Getting rich is good" exhortation. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party today is "Communist" only in name. It is not building on the prescriptions of Lenin and Mao. As Edward Friedman, points out, it is a "Right, Populist, Authoritarian" machine. It already relies on nationalism, indeed on chauvinism for legitimation. Tomorrow, especially if the country falters in maintaining its high rates of growth, or if some of the side-effects of the pattern of growth it has adopted – the numbers who have been thrown out of work, for instance – continue to swell, or if disillusionment with corruption spreads, it will deploy nationalism even more to perpetuate its rule. Projection of Chinese military power beyond its territorial limits could well be the instrument of choice.

It is only in India that we shut our eyes to this prospect. Others have no difficulty in seeing it. To confine ourselves to Friedman's analysis, he observes,

....Dr. Michel Oksenberg, a former National Security Council specialist on China who has long promoted the warmest possible Beijing-Washington relations, concludes that "The Chinese people are exhibiting a nationalism which the leadership cannot necessarily control. The leaders have nurtured a nationalism and, to a certain extent, they are now captive of it."

Citing incidents, Friedman himself echoes this perception, "...China's chauvinism is almost out of control, increasingly evolving a life of its own." He recalls how Zbigniew Brzezinski, "often described as a warm friend of the PRC," finds

important parallels between China's current situation and imperial Germany circa 1890. At that time, German policy was in flux, while Germany itself was a rising power. Like today's China, Germany's ambitions were driven by a resentment of a perceived lack of recognition and respect (in the case of Germany, especially on the part of a haughty British empire, and in the case of today's China, on the part of an arrogant America), by fears of encirclement.... by rising nationalistic ambitions.... and by the resulting desire to precipitate a significant rearrangement in the global pecking order.

Friedman draws attention to the kernel on account of which the Chinese today revere Mao – not his "Communism", but his Sinocentrism. Alluding to analyses that discern "a deeply structured, preconscious Chinese political culture," a tradition that sees China as engaged in an unremitting struggle for racial dignity and recognition in the world, Friedman remarks, "Mao is conceived of as a Sinocentric thinker who experienced China as dwelling in an inhospitable world." "While Mao's Sinocentrism was challenged by cosmopolitan modernizers, it was Mao who won," Friedman notes. "Deng's cosmopolitan modernization also is being beaten back. In this deep-culture perspective, the Chinese government increasingly is 'unable or unwilling.... to stand off the forces of nationalism and xenophobia that have always slept just beneath the surface in China and have once again overtly erupted.'" "While I personally am suspicious of explanations premised on deep cultural causes of foreign policy," Friedman says, "China's left conservatives (right

populists) embrace this constructed culturalism as good for China, that is, they identify with this Chinese primordialism...." "There are disturbing political continuities in the legitimating nativistic identities of the Mao and Jiang eras," Friedman continues, "continuities in the hateful passions which infuse Chinese nationalism. In the Mao era, people acted as if any Chinese with a foreign connection was a traitorous spy. They learned to hate the Russians as an evil threat to China until Deng came to power and halted Mao's war of ideological vituperation against Soviet Russia. They believed in the Mao era, that an actually economically rising Taiwan was somehow an American-occupied war camp in which the women were turned into prostitutes for US GIs, while the men were reduced to begging. 'We actually came to believe the lie peddled to us by the Communist Party that the people on Taiwan were so poor they had to eat banana skins.'"

"Similar passions infuse the most dangerous political forces in China's post-Mao right populist authoritarianism," Friedman records. "They reflect a racialized nationalism, going back at least to the mobilization of Han to overthrow the Manchu, seeking to destroy some imagined group held responsible for not allowing China to resume the power, dignity and greatness of earlier centuries. For almost a century, it has been virtually impossible for any other political force in China to stand against the tidal passion of a surging xenophobic nativism. The regime's legitimation of economic reform is not that it is part of a policy of international mutual benefit guaranteeing a long-term future of peace and prosperity in the region, but that it is a strategy in a struggle unto death, a Darwinian survival of the fittest, a zero-sum game of 'I win, you lose,' which will return China, just China, to its deserved place in the sun."¹

¹Edward Friedman, "Post-Deng China's right populist authoritarian foreign policy," in *China Review 2000*, Lau Chung-ming and Jianfa Chen, eds., The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 2000, pp. 1-25, at pp. 17-18. See also, Edward Friedman, "Chinese nationalism: challenge to U.S. interests," in *The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition*, Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, 2003; see also the two useful review articles of Sui-seheng Zhao, "Chinese intellectuals' quest for national greatness and nationalistic writing in the 1990s," *The China Quarterly*, 152, December 1997, pp. 725-45, and "Chinese nationalism and its international orientations," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 115, No. 1, Spring 2000.

No one is in any doubt on this score. No one, that is, except the Indian intellectual and political classes. And that for predictable reasons:

- ☐ We devote next to no effort to keep abreast of developments there;
- ☐ We do not *want* to see the danger as we would then have to mend our ways;
- ☐ A dominant element in our public discourse, the Left intellectuals and the Communists, have a vested interest in portraying that China still remains Communist – and, therefore, by definition, “internationalist”, and, therefore, once again by definition, benign....

The first thing to do thus is to put aside these blinkers. Nationalism is what drives China. Being the dominant power in Asia, being one of the major determinants of the course of world affairs are necessary co-products of this fuel. And with these goals go two other instruments: military strength as a necessary instrument for achieving these nationalist goals; and, second, hobbling potential rivals like India.

The second portent which should awaken us in India is best illustrated by a relentless pursuit of China.

A relentless pursuit over twenty years

Over a fortnight, I asked four groups of friends – highly placed civil servants, journalists, politicians, and three officials from our intelligence agencies – what they made of the following names of companies and institutions:

China Great Wall Industry Corporation
China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation
China National Space Administration
China Aerospace Corporation
Aviation Industries of China
China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation
Chinese Academy of Space Technology
Beijing Wan Jun Industry Corporation
China Haiying Company
Shanghai Astronautics Industry Bureau
China Chang Feng Group

Apart from the fact that these obviously are Chinese institutions and companies, and that the spheres in which some of them ostensibly operated were apparent from their names, the friends said, they do not know anything in particular about any of them. Nor, it turned out, did they know off-hand – if the need arose in the course of their work – where they could swiftly obtain facts about them. Yet the Cox Committee Report of the US Congress¹ lists the first two as being Chinese companies that were involved in transferring missile technology to Pakistan – they were among the companies that were singled out for sanctions that the US imposed on China in 1991. The remaining companies and institutions were the ones that were also found to have been passing on missile technology to Pakistan – and missile proliferation sanctions were imposed against them in August 1993.

Take another example. Assume that the China Ocean and Shipping Company filed an Expression of Interest for leasing port space or for modernizing one of our ports. Most of us would know next to nothing about it. Were the Government to find out something ominous about it, and were it to debar the company from the bids, were it to direct that all cargo emanating from this company or any affiliate of this company shall be thoroughly screened, the Government would be roundly condemned – for mindless paranoia, for remaining stuck in 1962, for succumbing to lobbies that do not want Sino-Indian relations to improve, for acting at the behest of and in the interest of some competitor. Yet here is what the Cox Report records about COSCO:

China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), the PRC's state-owned shipping company which operates under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and answers to the PRC State Council, attempted to lease port space that was being vacated by the U.S. Navy in Long Beach, California. The lease proposal led to a heated debate between Congress, which wanted to prevent the lease based on national security concerns, and President Clinton, who supported the lease. Legislation passed by both Houses of Congress in 1997 barred the lease

¹US House of Representatives, Select Committee on National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, *U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China*, May 1999.

and voided the President's authority to grant a waiver. Other information indicates COSCO is far from benign. In 1996, U.S. Customs agents confiscated over 2,000 assault rifles that were being smuggled into the United States aboard COSCO ships. "Although presented as a commercial entity," according to the House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, "COSCO is actually an arm of the Chinese military establishment." The Clinton administration has determined that additional information concerning COSCO that appears in the Select Committee's classified Final Report cannot be made public.

My point is not so much about our agencies or officials and politicians not having vital information, but about our not being alert to possibilities. And about our system not being in the habit of doing even the elementary things that could help reduce the chances of danger slipping through: when an intelligence agency has such information, for instance, the information is neither routinely sought from it by another part of government that is taking a decision for which the data would be vital input, nor does the intelligence agency feel confident enough to proffer it. Indeed, all concerned feel terribly inhibited in talking openly about what they might know regarding the security implications of what is being decided.

Sixteen million Chinese tourists travel to other countries every year. I have heard many urge that we specially target this lot, and steer them to Indian tourist destinations. Similarly, we can well imagine how we would react if a Chinese scientific delegation visited our university or research laboratory – the ancient links.... Fahien, Huein Tsang...., the ancient scientific traditions of the two peoples, the need to work together so as to break the hegemony of multinationals and Western powers.... To their great discomfiture, US authorities, as the Cox Committee records, have found:

As the PRC Government has increasingly participated in the world commercial and capital markets, the number of PRC representatives entering the United States has increased dramatically. One estimate is that in 1996 alone, more than 80,000 PRC nationals visited the United States as part of 23,000 delegations. Almost every PRC citizen allowed to go to the United States as part of these delegations likely receives some type of collection requirement, according to official sources.

Scientific delegations from the PRC are a typical method used by the PRC to begin the process of finding U.S. joint venture partners. These delegations have been known to go through the motions of establishing a joint venture

to garner as much information as possible from the U.S. partner, only to pull out at the last minute. It is estimated that at any given time there are over 100,000 PRC nationals who are either attending U.S. universities or have remained in the United States after graduating from a U.S. university. These PRC nationals provide a ready target for PRC intelligence officers and PRC Government controlled organizations, both while they are in the United States and when they return to the PRC.

As it garnered information about the extent of Chinese penetration of the most secret of US weapons' laboratories and research establishments, the Congressional Committee was properly alarmed: about how unrelenting the Chinese pursuit had been, about the success that had attended it, and about the great advantages that China had obtained as a result for developing its own weapons – nuclear and thermonuclear warheads, road mobile and submarine based missiles, advanced aircraft. These weapons, the Committee notes, have already altered the balance of power in the region, and, developed further, they will constitute a threat to the US itself. They constitute even greater deterrents in the hands of the Chinese than they do in the hands of looser societies because its command structure is completely opaque, and because of the reputation and record that China has built up where its interests are affected. Writing about America's most advanced thermonuclear warheads, the Committee in its "Overview" summary observes:

The PRC stole design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons as a result of a sustained espionage effort targeted at the United States' nuclear weapons facilities, including our national weapons laboratories. The successful penetration by the PRC of our nuclear weapons laboratories has taken place over the last several decades, and almost certainly continues to the present. More specifically, the Select Committee has concluded that the successful penetration of our National Laboratories by the PRC began as early as the late 1970s; the PRC had penetrated the laboratories throughout the 1980s and 1990s; and our laboratories almost certainly remain penetrated by the PRC today. Our national weapons laboratories are responsible for, among other things, the design of thermonuclear warheads for our ballistic missiles. The information at our national weapons laboratories about our thermonuclear warheads is supposed to be among our nation's most closely guarded secrets.

And again, a little later,

The PRC has vigorously pursued over the last two decades the acquisition of foreign military technologies. These efforts represent the official policy of the PRC and its Chinese Communist Party leadership. The PRC seeks foreign military technology as part of its efforts to place the PRC at the forefront of nations and to enable the PRC to fulfill its international agenda. The PRC's long-run geopolitical goals include incorporating Taiwan into the PRC and becoming the primary power in Asia. The PRC has not ruled out using force against Taiwan, and its thefts of U.S. technology have enhanced its military capabilities for any such use of force. The PRC has also asserted territorial claims against other Southeast Asian nations and Japan, and has used its military forces as leverage in asserting these claims.

Each of these elements is elaborated in extensive detail over hundreds of pages. Spelling out details in a typical instance, the Committee observes,

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen classified information on all of the United States' most advanced thermonuclear warheads, and several of the associated reentry vehicles. These thefts are the result of an intelligence collection program spanning two decades, and continuing to the present. The PRC intelligence collection program included espionage, review of unclassified publications, and extensive interactions with scientists from the Department of Energy's national weapons laboratories. The stolen U.S. secrets have helped the PRC fabricate and successfully test modern strategic thermonuclear weapons. The stolen information includes classified information on seven U.S. thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal. Together, these include the W-88 Trident D-5 thermonuclear warhead, and the W-56 Minuteman II, the W-62 Minuteman III, the W-70 Lance, the W-76 Trident C-4, the W-78 Minuteman III Mark 12A, and the W-87 Peacekeeper thermonuclear warheads. The stolen information also includes classified design information for an enhanced radiation weapon (commonly known as the "neutron bomb"), which neither the United States, nor any other nation, has ever deployed.

In addition, in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national weapons laboratory classified U.S. thermonuclear weapons information that cannot be identified in this unclassified Report. Because this recent espionage case is currently under investigation and involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods, the Clinton administration has determined that further information cannot be made public.

The W-88 is a miniaturized, tapered thermonuclear warhead. It is the United States' most sophisticated strategic thermonuclear weapon. In the U.S. arsenal, the W-88 warhead is mated to the D-5 submarine-launched

ballistic missile carried aboard the Trident nuclear submarine. The United States learned about the theft of the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead information, as well as about the theft of information regarding several other thermonuclear weapons, in 1995.

On two occasions, the PRC has stolen classified U.S. information about neutron bomb warheads from a U.S. national weapons laboratory. The United States learned of these thefts of classified information on the neutron bomb in 1996 and in the late 1970s, when the first theft – including design information on the W-70 warhead – occurred. The W-70 warhead contains elements that may be used either as a strategic thermonuclear weapon, or as an enhanced radiation weapon (“neutron bomb”). The PRC subsequently tested the neutron bomb. The U.S. has never deployed a neutron weapon.

In addition, the Select Committee is aware of other PRC thefts of U.S. thermonuclear weapons-related secrets. The Clinton administration has determined that further information about these thefts cannot be publicly disclosed.

Later,

The PRC thefts from our national weapons laboratories began at least as early as the late 1970s, and significant secrets are known to have been stolen as recently as the mid-1990s. Such thefts almost certainly continue to the present. The Clinton administration has determined that additional information about PRC thefts included in this section of the Select Committee’s Report cannot be publicly disclosed.

When the Committee turns to secrets about missile technology, it discovers the situation to be identical. The Committee notes,

The PRC has stolen U.S. missile guidance technology that has direct applicability to the PLA’s ballistic missiles and rockets. The stolen guidance technology is used on a variety of U.S. missiles and military aircraft:

- The 90-mile range U.S. Army Tactical Missile System
- The U.S. Navy’s Stand-off Land Attack Missile-Extended Range (SLAM-ER)
- The U.S. Navy F-14 fighter jet
- The U.S. Air Force F-15 fighter jet
- The U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter jet
- The U.S. Air Force F-117 fighter jet

On the ways in which this technology will multiply China’s power, the Committee states in its “Overview”,

The stolen guidance technology has direct applicability to the PRC's intercontinental, medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, and its spacelift rockets. The theft of U.S. ballistic missile-related technology is of great value to the PRC. In addition to ICBMs and military spacelift rockets, such technology is directly applicable to the medium- and short-range PLA missiles, such as the CSS-6 (also known as the M-9), the CSS-X-7 (also known as the M-11), and the CSS-8 that have been developed for, among other purposes, striking Taiwan.

CSS-6 missiles were, for example, fired in the Taiwan Strait and over Taiwan's main ports in the 1996 crisis and confrontation with the United States. The Select Committee has uncovered instances of the PRC's use of this specific stolen U.S. technology that:

- Enhance the PRC's military capabilities
- Jeopardize U.S. national security interests
- Pose a direct threat to the United States, our friends and allies, or our forces.

The Clinton administration has determined that particular uses by the PRC of this stolen U.S. technology cannot be disclosed publicly without affecting national security.

There is another consequence that we in India have certainly to beware: China has not kept the technology to itself. As the Committee notes:

The PRC has proliferated weapons systems and components to other countries including Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and North Korea.

Next come the "magic weapons", which, as we shall see, many surmise are a key pursuit of Chinese strategists and technologists. Summarizing its findings on some of these, the Committee concludes:

In the late 1990s, the PRC stole or illegally obtained U.S. developmental and research technology that, if taken to successful conclusion, could be used to attack U.S. satellites and submarines. During the late 1990s, U.S. research and development work on electromagnetic weapons technology has been illegally obtained by the PRC as a result of successful espionage directed against the United States. Such technology, once developed, can be used for space-based weapons to attack satellites and missiles. In 1997, the PRC stole classified U.S. developmental research concerning very sensitive detection techniques that, if successfully concluded, could be used to threaten U.S. submarines....

The consequences of these acquisitions are not difficult to imagine. China has been able to leap-frog, saving years upon years and millions in cost of research, trial, development – it has been able to replace its 1950s vintage, Soviet design missiles with more recent and more lethal ones; it has been able to reduce the bulk and multiply the explosive force of its thermonuclear weapons; it has saved years and years in its efforts to develop the new “magic weapons”. For China has not only been obtaining these secrets, the infrastructure it has developed for military production has enabled it to actually build the weapons.

The consequences are far-reaching – from the immediate effects on the regional balance of power, to the way the acquisitions will affect even distant and powerful countries like the United States. As the Cox Committee observes,

In the near term, a PRC deployment of mobile thermonuclear weapons, or neutron bombs, based on stolen U.S. design information, could have a significant effect on the regional balance of power, particularly with respect to Taiwan. PRC deployments of advanced nuclear weapons based on stolen U.S. design information would pose greater risks to U.S. troops and interests in Asia and the Pacific. In addition, the PRC's theft of information on our most modern nuclear weapons designs enables the PRC to deploy modern forces much sooner than would otherwise be possible.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the PRC had only one or two silo-based ICBMs capable of attacking the United States. Since then, the PRC has deployed up to two dozen additional silo-based ICBMs capable of attacking the United States; has upgraded its silo-based missiles; and has continued development of three mobile ICBM systems and associated modern thermonuclear warheads. If the PRC is successful in developing modern nuclear forces, as seems likely, and chooses to deploy them in sufficient numbers, then the long-term balance of nuclear forces with the United States could be adversely affected.

This direct accrual of might to China is just one element of the threat that the clandestine acquisition of advanced weapons technology constitutes for a country like India. Equally menacing, and in a sense even more immediate is the threat that arises from the fact that, as the Cox Committee writes, China has been one of the worst proliferators of such technology. In the sort of ominous passages that occur in more than one context, the Committee states,

The PRC is one of the world's leading proliferators of complete ballistic missile systems, as well as missile components. Despite the fact that, in 1991, the PRC agreed to adhere to the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines that call for restraint on the sale of missiles capable of delivering a 225-pound payload to 185 miles, the PRC has sold complete ballistic missile systems or missile components to a number of countries, including but not limited to Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

In 1993, the MTCR States issued new expanded guidelines that called for a "strong presumption to deny" both sales of complete missile systems and sales of components that could be used in ballistic missile systems. Furthermore, the new guidelines call for restrictions on transfers of missiles that can deliver weapons of mass destruction payload to 185 miles. However, the PRC has accepted neither these revised guidelines, nor the annex on the transfer of components and other commodities such as propellants and test equipment. Notwithstanding the PRC's purported adherence to the MTCR Category I restrictions, the PRC has provided, or is providing, assistance to the missile and space programs of Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. The PRC also continues to offer Category II missile components for sale to international customers. In addition, the PRC has provided assistance to the nuclear programs of Iran and Pakistan.

In a typical passage about China passing these lethal technologies to Pakistan, the Committee states,

The PRC has provided Pakistan with a wide range of weapons assistance. The PRC has reportedly supplied Pakistan with CSS-X-7 (or M-11) ballistic missiles, mobile missile launchers, and the facilities necessary to produce M-11 missiles. The PRC has also provided Pakistan with assistance on uranium enrichment, ring magnets, and other technologies useful for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

China's pursuit, its single-minded determination to acquire the technologies, and its success in doing so thus spell double-jeopardy for a country such as India.

The lack of vigilance in free societies

The details and sequence of espionage and thefts that the Cox Committee sets out hold many other lessons also for us.

They illustrate first of all the perils and self-deception to which free societies are particularly prone. Like us, the United States has a shelf-full of laws and regulations to check transfer of such technologies. It

has a dozen agencies to thwart theft. But the freewheeling ways of individuals, the fact that in such societies penalties are seldom severe enough to deter negligence and worse, entail that the laws and regulations come to little. Even by themselves such features are enough to enable a determined enemy to slip through.

How can a society believe that the highly specialized machine tools it has agreed to sell to a country like China will be used only in the production of civilian aircraft, and that they will not be used for production of military aircraft just because it has got some firm – or even the Government – to sign a piece of paper to that effect? How can a society believe that when it allows its satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets – because China is offering to launch them at costs that are 20 to 50 per cent less than doing so would cost in the US or Europe – the Chinese would not one way or another get access to the satellites? There was even the delusion that the Americans would be able to prevent the Chinese from photographing the satellites! How could a society be so short-sighted as to conclude that just because two of its enemies – China and the Soviet Union – had fallen out, it was in its interest – that is, in the interest of the United States itself! – to transfer lethal technologies to China?¹

¹The vicissitudes are described by the Cox Committee:

From 1949 to 1971, exports from the United States to the PRC were subject to restrictive export controls. The export control policy was liberalized in 1972, when the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) agreed to change the licensing status of the PRC to allow it to be treated the same as the Soviet Union. Subsequently, beginning in 1981, the PRC was given access to higher levels of technology than the Soviet Union. In December 1985, COCOM adopted what was called a "green line" policy toward the People's Republic of China. That policy gave preferential licensing treatment for the export to the PRC of 27 categories of controlled items as compared with other COCOM-proscribed countries. Further liberalizations in the "green line" licensing policy toward the PRC by COCOM continued until early 1989.

In response to the repressive actions taken by the PRC in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, COCOM decided in October 1989 to cancel plans for additional liberalization of export controls toward the PRC. However, COCOM did not make any changes to the PRC "green line" policy that was in effect at the time. Following Tiananmen Square, the Bush Administration imposed a policy of denial regarding applications for exports to military and police entities in the PRC. In addition, the Bush Administration decided not to support further liberalization of the "green line" policy toward the PRC by COCOM. A COCOM meeting in June 1990 eliminated or significantly reduced the differences between items that could be exported to the PRC under the "green line" ...

Accounts of specific cases covering hundreds of pages of the Report show how crass commercial considerations led American firms to cut corners, to jeopardize security, to bend regulations, to lie.

The accounts show how careless are firms that are accustomed to operate in the environment of loose, free societies – an environment in which being concerned about security is condemned as being paranoid. Is our society, are our firms and government departments more security conscious? The security lapses that the personnel of American firms committed – and these were firms whose bread and butter is military hardware – fill pages of the Cox Committee's report – just the item-wise listing takes pages. The personnel get trapped and way-laid by the oldest, most elementary sleights – the satellite is to be shielded from cameras; Chinese "villagers" and personnel bring their families for getting themselves photographed in front of the satellite! The American security personnel get taken in by the most basic of temptations – the prostitute put in their way. The instances leave one laughing at American personnel. But for us the other side of the coin is what is of significance – the unremitting effort of the Chinese to explore each chink, to deploy each device.

What the Committee found about the methods that the Chinese used to acquire secret weapons technology holds lessons of even greater importance for us in India. One of the principal difficulties in blocking the Chinese from garnering secrets, the Committee found, was a vital difference between the methods it uses and those that, say, the Soviet Union used to deploy. The Soviet Union relied in the main on its secret service, on professional agents. The Chinese by contrast proceed by a "mosaic" method. Its intelligence services gather tiny bits of isolated information from thousands of sources – and later put the pieces together. Students, tourists, members of scientific delegations, "princelings" – sons and daughters of leading members of the Chinese hierarchy to whom foreign governments are liable to give access they would normally deny to ordinary visitors – are all tasked. In a typical "Overview" passage, the Committee records,

... policy and the items that could be exported to other proscribed destinations. The PRC benefited from the decontrols adopted by COCOM for all proscribed destinations subsequent to that meeting. COCOM did not, however, adopt any additional favorable treatment specifically for the export of items to the PRC.... But an array of items and technologies had already reached China!

The PRC seeks military-related technology through a broad range of activities that complicate U.S. counterintelligence efforts. Many of these efforts are less centralized than was the case with those of the Soviet Union. The number of PRC nationals who seek access to U.S. technology is much greater than the number of persons who sought similar kinds of information for the Soviet Union....

Efforts to deny the PRC access to U.S. military technology are complicated by the broad range of items in which the PRC is interested, and by transfers to the PRC of Russian military and dual-use technologies, which may make the consequences of the PRC's thefts of U.S. technology more severe....

The PRC uses commercial and political contacts to advance its efforts to obtain U.S. military, as well as commercial technology. The PRC has adopted policies in recent years aimed at increasing its influence within the United States in order to increase access to U.S. military, as well as commercial, technology. To this end, the PRC has used access to its markets to induce U.S. business interests to provide military-related technology. The PRC also uses access to its markets to induce U.S. businesses to lobby in behalf of common goals, such as liberalized export standards and practices. Agents tied to the PRC's military industries who have illegally provided political contributions may have used these contributions to gain access to U.S. military and commercial technology....

Given their single-minded determination to wrest whatever objective they have set for themselves, the Chinese have no compunction in signing such documents as they have to, and then violating them. They signed the agreement not to transfer missile technology or missiles, but, as has been well established, they have continued to furnish both to Pakistan.... The Cox Committee found many instances of this kind. In a typical case, the Chinese obtain tools and machines ostensibly for fabricating components for civilian aircraft. Soon, on the ground that the civilian aircraft production programme has been drastically curtailed, they transfer the items to an "academic institution", which is later found not to exist at all. The items end up in a factory producing military aircraft and missiles. They inveigle a US company – which in any case is propelled by crass commercial interests – into supplying a specialized, five-axis high-precision machine tool used in the fabrication of aircraft and missiles. They sign a document that binds them to use the tool in a factory that produces civilian aircraft. Soon the Americans learn that instead the tool – a hydraulic stretch press – has been installed in a new building that has

been constructed specially to house it. The American official reports back, "...The facts of the case are that CATIC [the China National Aero-Technology Import/Export Corporation] has intentionally misused the export licenses to put controlled technology at a facility not authorized to receive [it]. This facility as confirmed by the Chinese is involved in the manufacture of both missiles and attack aircraft...." The Cox Committee sets out to investigate the matter. The US Justice Department requests it not to disclose details that have surfaced – doing so, the Department says will adversely affect their efforts to prosecute CATIC. The Chinese acquire two advanced jet engines ostensibly to assess their potential for a civilian aircraft upgrade programme. They take them apart, to reverse engineer them for military use. After extensive enquiries, the Committee finds,

Under the terms of the licensing agreement:

No technical data was to be transferred with the engines; the Chinese were not to disassemble the engines; and finally, if the Trident [civil aircraft] retrofit program had not begun within 1 year of the engines' arrival, the engines were to be repurchased by the manufacturer. In addition, the Chinese offered to retrofit engines at a Shanghai commercial aircraft facility where GE personnel would be able to monitor Chinese progress. Defense Department officials were concerned because the CFM-56 hot sections are identical to those used in the engines that power the U.S. F-16 and B-1B military aircraft....

The PRC later claimed that the CFM-56 engines were destroyed in a fire. More likely, however, is that the PRC violated the U.S. end-use conditions by reverse engineering part of the CFM-56 to develop a variant for use in combat aircraft....

The Chinese proceed to aggressively acquire components and technology that will enable them to build on what they have learnt from the engines. They buy other engines. They propose a Joint Venture to General Electric for manufacturing the components. They target an array of engines to propel their planes, their short- and long range-missiles, their cruise missiles. They hasten to take advantage of the sudden relaxation of export controls in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.... The components are used in planes that are sold to Pakistan....

The Chinese acquire highly sophisticated machine tools from McDonnell Douglas asserting that they are going to use these for

civilian aircraft – when in fact the same tools can be used for building quieter submarines. Soon, the US Government learns that half the tools have been diverted to make components for military aircraft and missiles – with stealth capabilities.

When they are blocked because the real links – for instance, to the PLA – and identity of the company they are using have been nailed, the Chinese switch to some other front.

A typical case concerned a High Performance Computer – the exports of which were highly restricted because it is required for developing missiles and nuclear weapons. The Committee describes the chase China led US authorities:

During the 1990s, there have been several cases of export control violations involving computer technology shipments to the PRC. One ongoing case concerns the diversion of a Sun Microsystems HPC from Hong Kong to the PRC.

On December 26, 1996, a Hong Kong reseller for Sun Microsystems, Automated Systems Ltd., sold an HPC to the PRC Scientific Institute, a technical institute under the Chinese Academy of Sciences – a State laboratory specializing in parallel and distributed processing. At some point after the sale but before delivery, the computer was sold to Changsha Science and Technology Institute in Changsha, Hunan Province. The machine was delivered directly to that Institute in March 1997. Automated Systems of Hong Kong claimed to Sun officials in June 1997 that it had understood that the Changsha Institute was “an educational institute in Wuhan Province providing technological studies under the Ministry of Education.” The end use there, according to Automated Systems, was to be for “education and research studies in the college and sometimes for application development for outside projects.”

Sun was recommended to contact the end user, the Changsha Institute, for more specific end-use information. The HPC sale came to the attention of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, Frank Deliberti. He queried the U.S. Embassy in Beijing about the Changsha Institute. Deliberti gave the information he obtained to Sun Microsystems, which then initiated efforts to have its computer returned. The Foreign Commercial Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing consulted his contacts at the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. The Ministry denied that the Changsha Institute was affiliated with the PRC military.

Subsequently, the Ministry called the FCO to inform him that the actual buyer of the computer was an entity called the Yuanwang Corporation, and that Sun Microsystems had been aware of this Corporation's PRC military ties. Reportedly, Yuanwang is an entity of the Commission on

Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). So far as the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation reportedly could determine, the end-use statements that had been provided to Sun through Automated Systems of Hong Kong were totally fictitious. The Changsha Science and Technology Institute, according to the Ministry, did not exist.

The official position of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation was that the PRC Government would not help to obtain the return of the computer. The role of the PRC Government, the Ministry asserted, had been merely to help two private parties rectify a misunderstanding. In any event, the computer was returned to the United States on November 6, 1997. The Commerce Department investigation reportedly is continuing....

Of course, why anyone should feel that he has secured his secrets better because he has transferred them to a firm registered in or operating from Hong Kong rather than the Mainland passes comprehension! But for years and years, the Americans have deluded themselves even on this count! Indeed, as the Cox Committee records, the US Administration accorded a special status for these purposes to Hong Kong in 1992 as it was deemed to be a "cooperating country". Accordingly, firms registered in Hong Kong were allowed access to sensitive technologies. In July 1997, Hong Kong reverted to China! But the fact that it would revert to China in July 1997 was known all along – the formal agreement between the UK and China on this matter was signed in 1984! Should anyone then be surprised at the consequence that ensued?

The more relaxed controls on the export of militarily-sensitive technology to Hong Kong have been allowed to remain in place even though Hong Kong was absorbed by the PRC and PLA garrisons took control of the region on July 1, 1997. U.S. trade officials report that no inspections by the Hong Kong regional government nor by any other government, including the United States, are permitted when PLA vehicles cross the Hong Kong border.

Various U.S. Government analyses have raised concerns about the risk of the diversion of sensitive U.S. technologies not only to the PRC, but to third countries as well through Hong Kong because of the PRC's known use of Hong Kong to obtain sensitive technology. Some controlled dual-use technologies can be exported from the United States to Hong Kong license-free, even though they have military applications that the PRC would find attractive for its military modernization efforts.

The Select Committee has seen indications that a sizeable number of Hong Kong enterprises serve as cover for PRC intelligence services, including the MSS. Therefore, it is likely that over time, these could provide the PRC with a much greater capability to target U.S. interests in Hong Kong. U.S. Customs officials also concur that transshipment through Hong Kong is a common PRC tactic for the illegal transfer of technology.

Ever alert, the Chinese have targeted sales of surplus US equipment to pick up equipment that might be a few years out-of-date by US standards but which is still ultra-modern for our region. Better still, the Chinese have gathered bits of vital technology that was embedded in such equipment – and could be used by itself to further the design and manufacture of some other equipment. The Cox Committee notes in this regard,

The PRC is also taking advantage of the ongoing U.S. military downsizing. In particular, PRC representatives and companies in the United States pursue the purchase of high-technology U.S. military surplus goods. In a single 1996-1997 operation, the Los Angeles office of the U.S. Customs Service seized over \$ 36 million in excess military property that was being shipped overseas illegally. Among the seized U.S. military surplus equipment on its way to the PRC and Hong Kong were:

- 37 inertial navigation systems for the U.S. F-117 and FB-111 aircraft
- Thousands of computers and computer disks containing classified Top Secret and higher information
- Patriot missile parts
- 500 electron tubes used in the U.S. F-14 fighter
- Tank and howitzer parts
- 26,000 encryption devices

Often this equipment was purchased as "scrap," for which the buyers paid pennies on the dollar. According to the U.S. Customs Service, many PRC companies that bid on military surplus technology intentionally used "American-sounding" names to mask their PRC affiliation.

The PRC also has been able to exploit U.S. military downsizing by purchasing advanced technology, in the form of machine tools and production equipment from decommissioned U.S. defense factories, through industrial auctions. For example, a multi-axis machine tool profiler, designed to build wing spans for the U.S. F-14 fighter, originally cost over \$3 million but was purchased by the PRC for under \$25,000.

According to one industrial auctioneer, the PRC frequents industrial auctions because they offer accurate, well-maintained equipment at bargain prices and with quick delivery. Moreover, once the PRC obtains

this equipment, there are ample resources available in the United States to upgrade the equipment to modern standards....

And then there are Joint Ventures:

A more recent method used by the PRC to obtain advanced technology from the United States is through the purchase of an interest in U.S. high-technology companies or U.S. export facilities. While this method does not yet appear to be prevalent, it has been identified in at least three instances....

The PRC's approach to U.S. technology firms proceeds from the premise that foreign firms should be allowed access to the PRC market only because such access will enable the PRC to assimilate technology, and eventually to compete with or even overtake U.S. technology. The PRC thus views foreign firms as a short-term means to acquire technology....

Increasingly, the PRC is using U.S. capital markets both as a source of central government funding for military and commercial development and as a means of cloaking U.S. technology acquisition efforts by its front companies with a patina of regularity and respectability....

"U.S. businesses are often subjected to technology transfer requirements that are not in writing," the Committee noticed, "or are not maintained in the field, or are contained in 'secret' rules that only insiders know about." Another danger struck the Committee – a danger that is especially pertinent at a time when several of our firms are beginning to look to China as the new destination for their investments:

U.S. companies involved in joint ventures may be willing to transfer technology because they believe that the only risk is a business one – that is, that the transfers may eventually hurt them in terms of market share or competition. These businesses may be unaware that technologies transferred to a PRC partner will likely be shared within the PRC's industrial networks and with the PLA, or that joint ventures may be used in some instances as cover to acquire critical technology for the military.

In a typical case, the Cox Committee found:

In 1990, CATIC acquired an interest in MAMCO Manufacturing, a Seattle, Washington aircraft parts manufacturer. In a highly-publicized decision that year, President George Bush exercised his authority under section 721

of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (also known as the Exon-Florio provision) to order CATIC to divest itself of the MAMCO interest based on the recommendations of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency committee chaired by the Secretary of Treasury and tasked to conduct reviews of foreign acquisitions that might threaten national security.

CFIUS concluded that:

- Some technology used by MAMCO, although not state-of-the-art, was export-controlled
- CATIC had close ties to the PLA through the PRC Ministry of Aviation (now known as Aviation Industries Corporation, or AVIC)
- The acquisition would give CATIC unique access to U.S. aerospace companies.

It is likely that the PRC's strategy in acquiring MAMCO was to give CATIC a venue from which to solicit business with U.S. aerospace firms, both to yield revenue and to gain access to aerospace technologies, inasmuch as CATIC has conspired to illegally acquire U.S. sensitive technology in the past....

China is not sitting back frightening itself about these foreign companies – as some of us are apt to do. On the contrary, once it has created an economic interest, it uses these companies, and their well-connected personnel to have its way in other governments. A typical case that the Cox Committee sets out in detail is one that involved US satellite manufacturers:

The PRC is determined to reduce restrictions on the export of U.S. communications satellites for launch in the PRC. From the perspective of the PRC, provision of such launch services creates a unique opportunity to consult with U.S. satellite manufacturers, access information regarding U.S. satellite technology, and obtain resources to modernize their rockets. U.S. satellite manufacturers are, in turn, anxious to access the potentially lucrative PRC market, and realize that launching in the PRC is a potential condition to market access. By agreeing to procure numerous satellites from Hughes Electronics Co. (Hughes) and Space Systems/Loral (Loral) in the early 1990s, the PRC created a mutuality of interest with two companies well-positioned to advocate the liberalization of export controls on these platforms. For example, Bernard L. Schwartz, Chairman and CEO of Loral Space & Communications Ltd., the parent company of Loral, met directly on at least four occasions with Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown after 1993, and accompanied him on a 1994 trade mission to the PRC. C. Michael Armstrong, the former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of GM

Hughes Electronics, the parent company of Hughes, has served as Chairman of President Clinton's Export Council since 1993, working with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and others to "provide insight and counsel" to the President on a variety of trade matters. Armstrong also serves or has served as a member of the Defense Preparedness Advisory Council, the Telecommunications Advisory Council, and the Secretary of State's Advisory Council. Both Armstrong and Schwartz, as well as other executives from high-technology firms, advocated the transfer of export licensing authority from the "more stringent control" of the State Department to the Commerce Department. Armstrong met with the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of State on the matter, and both Schwartz and Armstrong co-signed a letter with Daniel Tellep of Lockheed-Martin Corporation to the President urging this change. The changes they advocated were ultimately adopted. Between 1993 and January 3, 1999, Loral and Hughes succeeded in obtaining waivers or export licenses for an aggregate of five satellite projects....

Furnishing details of the communications later in the Report, the Committee records,

During 1995, the Clinton administration was lobbied by companies interested in transferring the responsibility for commercial satellite export licensing from the State Department to the Commerce Department. For example, Armstrong sent a letter to Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in September 1995, following a meeting with him on September 20, that stated:

Efforts by the State Department to keep commercial communications satellites on the State Department Munitions List should not be allowed to succeed.

Also, Armstrong, along with Bernard L. Schwartz, Chairman of Loral, and Daniel M. Tellep, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Lockheed Martin Corporation, sent a letter to the President on October 6, 1995, that stated:

Continuing to license export of these technologies under the more stringent and cumbersome Munitions List places American companies at a distinct disadvantage in global markets....

Where Chinese companies or American companies having direct and extensive commercial interests in China could be suspect, the Chinese, the Committee records, put third-country companies to work. A typical instance recorded by the Committee relates to one of Thailand's largest industrial houses:

Another example of the incentive to advocate the relaxation of export controls involves the Charoen Pokphand Group (CP Group), Thailand's largest multinational company and one of the largest investors in the PRC. CP Group executives have served as economic advisors to the PRC Government and were chosen to sit on the committees dealing with the absorption of Hong Kong.

The CP Group was a founding member of Asia Pacific Telecommunications Satellite Holdings, Ltd. (APT), a consortium run by PRC-controlled investment companies, including China Aerospace Corporation. APT imports satellites manufactured by Hughes and Loral as part of the Apstar program for launch in the PRC by China Great Wall Industry Corporation.

On June 18, 1996, several CP Group executives attended a coffee with President Clinton at the White House. These executives included Dhanin Chearavanont (CP Chairman and Chief Executive Officer), Sumet Chearavanont (Vice Chairman and President), and Sarasin Virapol (employee and translator). The CP executives were invited to the coffee by their Washington, D.C., lobbyist, Pauline Kanchanalak. According to one participant, Karl Jackson of the U.S.-Thailand Business Council, the CP executives "dominated the conversation at the coffee." The discussion included U.S.-PRC relations, Most-Favored-Nation trade status for the PRC, and U.S. technology. Jackson's characterization of the role that CP executives played at the event is corroborated by other participants....

Ever alert, China, the Cox Committee found, has put even failures to extract vital, classified information from foreign scientists and technologists. China today has about 10 per cent of the commercial satellite launch market. It has been assiduously courting foreign satellite manufacturers offering to launch their satellites at costs that are 25 to 50 per cent less than these firms can obtain in the US and Europe. The first opportunity this service brings is direct: "Access to US communications satellites has undoubtedly permitted the PRC to gain invaluable information about their configuration and design," the Cox Committee observes. "In as little as two hours, PRC technical personnel can penetrate the interior of a satellite without leaving any trace...."

Elaborating this, and contrasting it with the evidence that had surfaced – about how the satellites had been left unattended for long intervals – the Committee remarks,

If the PRC had unrestricted access to a U.S. communications satellite for at least two hours, the PRC military could gain valuable information that is not

otherwise available in the public domain. The PRC could accomplish even exploitation that penetrated the interior of the satellite, given two hours of time, without leaving any traces. With this kind of exploitation, the PRC could gain new information about major satellite subsystems, as well as the design and manufacture of each subsystem. While unmonitored PRC access to a U.S. satellite for more than five or six hours would produce diminishing returns, there is almost nothing about a U.S. satellite that the PRC could not learn from unrestricted access for 24 hours.

Among the reasons the PRC would be interested in exploiting the technology in U.S. communications satellites is to determine the satellite manufacturer's techniques for passive thermal control. Thermal control is critical to satellite life. The PRC would also likely be interested in:

- Encryption
- The materials used in satellites
- Engine and propellant data
- Electrical design and protection

Additionally, the PRC could seek to acquire information about the dimensions and part numbers for satellite components or assemblies, as well as dimensional tolerances. Obtaining part numbers could allow the PRC to try to acquire U.S. technology directly from the manufacturer that would improve the performance and provide for longer on-orbit life for PRC satellites.

How an alert adversary can put even "failure" to work, how vital information can unwittingly get transferred is well brought out by the failure of a satellite launch. The Chinese rocket carrying an American satellite exploded. The failure had been caused by a defect that was inherent in the design and manufacture of the rocket. Locating that defect, and putting together an alternative could have taken a lot of time and effort, perhaps some more failures too. The US firm that owned the satellite needed to nail the problem – for commercial reasons. The companies that had insured the satellite were just as eager. On their pressure, a team of international experts was put together. It did not just get at the defect soon enough and thus save China years, in the course of casual exchanges about how that particular component was designed and handled in American and European rockets, the experts provided China the vital clues it needed for improving its rocket – and missile – design.... The Cox Committee reconstructs these events in detail.

The lessons for us in India are as patent as they are urgent.

Vital lessons

The use of every device – conventional espionage; joint ventures; the hankering of others for profits; the fear of others of rivals – USSR's fear of the Americans, and later the American's fear of the USSR; fictitious companies; legitimate companies doing legitimate business in Hong Kong; agreements that one does not intend to honour; acquiring sensitive items through third countries and reverse engineering them....

The use of every person – tourists; scientists; "princelings"; personnel of firms that are profiting from or hoping to profit from operations in China; a Presidential candidate in search of campaign funds; lobbyists....

The use of every occasion – a visit by scientists; providing a service at a low cost as well as the failure in doing so; sales of surplus stock by an Army....

This determined pursuit as well as the method – espionage and theft using multiple sources – continues to this day. As I close this book, *Time* reports the case of a Chinese couple who have been arrested in Wisconsin state for sending computer parts to China, parts "that could enhance missile systems." "As these naturalized citizens await trial," *Time* reports, "similar episodes in Mount Pleasant, N.J., and Palo Alto, Calif., point only to the tip of the iceberg, according to FBI officials keeping tabs on more than 3,000 companies in the U.S. suspected of collecting information for China.... The number of Chinese snoops is staggering, if only because average civilians are enlisted in the effort. FBI officials say state security agents in China debrief many visitors to the U.S. before and after their trips, asking what they saw and sometimes telling them what to get.... The FBI's three most recent counterintelligence arrests were of suspects who had held student visas at some point...."¹

And none of this for charity! One and all geared to one aim – to multiply China's military might. And here we are lulling ourselves asleep – "China's singular aim is economic development. How does it constitute a threat to us?"

¹Brian Bennett, "China's big export," *Time*, 21 February 2005, p. 9.

We must be alert to the pursuits of others, and of their myriad methods. Are we?

A single tell-tale incident will probably bring home the point. "Now India" is an Internet Service Provider. It operates in many cities across India. In 2001, it launched an aggressive marketing campaign offering Internet connectivity for just Rs. 5 an hour. This low rate attracted attention. A strange fact came to light as the software was being installed. It transpired that the CD had a Remote Control Trouble Shooting tool called "Unicenter". This got installed automatically once the CD was used. The Remote Control tool was not listed in the end user's license agreement. Normal users would not see the tool at all. In turn, "Unicenter" gave the Service Provider, "Now India", direct access to the personal computer of the customer. When this fact was brought to the attention of "Now India", the firm stoutly denied that any such device existed in the programme. When they were shown that such a device did in fact get installed automatically the moment the CD was used, they denied that it enabled "Now India" to access the personal computer of the customer. Ultimately they had to be confronted with proof they could not deny.

The story doesn't end there. "Now India" turned out to be a subsidiary of a Hong Kong based group. This group is headed by an entrepreneur who had been in the news for his close links to the Chinese establishment. "Now India" had listed a foreign participant also – "Pacific Convergence (Mauritius) Ltd." But inquiries revealed that this too was a subsidiary of the same Hong Kong company of the same Chinese entrepreneur. Moreover, the Internet traffic from India was being routed through two servers of yet another "Internet service provider," and it reached the gateway of another Chinese Company in Hong Kong. A perfect detour to enable agencies based there to monitor, and manipulate Indian Internet traffic from Hong Kong.... The company would not waste resources on monitoring all traffic. They would zero-in on the client who was in a sensitive organization or post.

Are we alert to such possibilities? Are we even alert to what, as this instance shows, is already happening?

In fact, if some one expresses concern on these counts, is our instant reaction not, "Surely, you are being paranoid"?

Not only should our agencies be ever on the look-out for such stratagems; when facts are unearthed about such operations and attempts, the knowledge must be widely disseminated within the limbs of Government.

It must be disseminated widely among others in society too – firms, for instance, that are trading with “firms” in such countries; firms that, suddenly enamoured of the prospects offered by the Chinese market, are thinking of setting up production establishments or Joint Ventures in China.

Most important, we must see that in countries like China “firms” – Chinese firms, firms registered in and operating out of Hong Kong, firms that set up operations in India – are limbs of the Chinese governmental structure, often of the military establishment. We must always remember that for ferreting out military secrets, for instance, such societies are a seamless web.

None of this is an argument for walling ourselves in – for shunning foreign investment, for keeping tourists out. The point is that as a country like China uses such avenues also for, to take one instance, gathering information, we have to do something more than merely invite firms and welcome tourists.

“We must conceal our abilities,
quietly nurse our vengeance”

China has a long, continuous tradition of strategic thought. There are said to be almost 2,300 extant manuals like Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, and *The Wiles of War* that encapsulate this tradition. And they are on the lips of the Chinese. In our case, during the thousand years of foreign domination, all records of this tradition – even of the tradition of chivalry – were erased – much as the temples were erased in North India, much as idols and pictorial representations of gods and goddesses were smashed and disfigured. Even the modest *tulsi* plant had to be hidden during Portuguese rule in Goa. In addition, there are several further features that should be borne in mind as they too make for differences.

In the case of the Chinese, apprehension of internal disarray, of domestic weakness has been driven deep. That such disarray will invite invasions by foreign marauders is a belief that has been deeply drilled into them. Thus, at all times, Chinese are apt to opt for a strong, even dictatorial government rather than reconcile themselves to disorder. Indeed, just as the Chinese associate internal disarray with foreign invasions, they associate a monolithic political order, controlled and directed by a strong individual, with internal strength, and, therefore, with security. In our case, as it has been made an anathema to think of the invasions by marauders from the Middle East and Afghanistan and the rule that ensued as invasions by and rule by foreigners, indeed as British rule too is imagined mainly to have brought boons to our society, our people do not make that vital connection – they do not instinctively feel the temptation that internal disarray constitutes for foreign powers.

Moreover, Chinese strategic tradition is not confined to stratagems that should be followed when one's side is the more powerful one. The tradition consists as much of what a State must do when it is

weaker than its adversaries, of how it should play off "barbarians against barbarians", of how it should be conciliatory towards those whom it cannot fight at the moment and be stern in dealing with those it can tame into heeding its interests. When we devise conjectures about likely Chinese policies in the coming decades, we should, therefore, not think only in "either/or" terms, "Will China be domineering and actually project its power, *or* will it conduct itself as a responsible, conciliatory member of the international community?" It is much more likely to pursue a more nuanced option – be conciliatory towards those who are much stronger than it – the US – but do things from time to time that will put down those who might aspire to parity within the region; be conciliatory in regard to disputes with countries that are not liable to pose a threat to or aspire for parity in the region – boundary disputes with Myanmar, for instance – but postpone indefinitely disputes with others; reach out to rulers and countries in distant Africa – doing so will win a few friends directly, of course; it will also yield the inestimable advantage of engendering the image of a China that is ever so reasonable and accommodating. China could choose to be cooperative with a hegemon like the US, and simultaneously be assertive, if not aggressive towards, say, India: the US would not come to India's aid; by being cooperative towards the US, China would further dilute the chances of US action; on the other hand, by "teaching India a lesson", to recall Deng's phrase, China would establish its status in the eyes of countries within Asia that may have delusions of disregarding China's interests....

Third, as we saw in an earlier chapter from the account of Swaine and Tellis, one of the central themes of Chinese strategic thinking, and military strategy in practice has been to dominate and control the periphery. In Chinese lore, when control over this periphery has weakened, especially as this loosening has been but an aspect of disarray at the centre, hordes from the periphery have descended upon and disrupted the centre. The "periphery" has traditionally been the immediate geographical vicinity, the physical rim of central and southeast China. But today geographical distance means little. China, and the control of rulers over China can be undermined from a

"rim" that lies at the other end of the world. Today all of cyber-space constitutes as much of a realm from which an assault may be mounted as the neighbouring stretches across the Ussuri River. Hence, the age-old preoccupation with securing the rim can goad Chinese rulers to conclude that they must acquire power to an extent that they would eventually be able to dominate far more than just the immediate geographical periphery. India is in that immediate periphery, in any case.

Deng's revolution

Our image of the PLA is a collage of its victories during the Chinese Revolution, of the way it stalled American forces in Korea, of the slap it administered us in 1962, and Mao's stratagems for People's War that have been so romanticized in India.

But by the mid-70s the PLA as well as its doctrine were showing all the symptoms of ossifying. What Deng Xiaoping was later to call "the period of Left errors that began from 1957" and the "sabotage by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four since 1959," and specially during "the ten year disaster," the Cultural Revolution – each phase so idolized and romanticized in India – had severely disrupted the PLA, and cost China twenty years.

From the very first addresses he gave upon being designated Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Deng began listing in vivid terms the ailments that had come to afflict the PLA. The PLA had imbibed excellent traditions during the Liberation Struggle, he said; but many of these have been discarded.

The PLA has become "seriously bloated", he warned.

Factionalism has become widespread, he warned, with officers and cliques having acquired a "mountain stronghold" mentality. "... Now there are always a few people in the Army who like to build strongholds or set up small tight circles of one sort or another; they are partial to persons who flatter them and obey them, and they practice favouritism when making appointments to posts. In fact, flatterers are persons of dubious character. Nevertheless, some of our comrades delight in being lavishly praised and flattered....," he told the controllers of the PLA.

This had already had serious consequences, he warned. Organizational as well as political discipline has become weak, he warned. "Sometimes not just individuals but even whole units act in defiance of orders," he observed. He traced this weakening to the factionalism which had spread through and through: "The lack of a sense of organizational discipline is related to factionalism. Those who disobey orders have the interests of their own factions in mind instead of the overall interests of the Revolution. They place personal and factional interests above everything else. They seek fame, gain and position, and when they fail to secure them, they take offense and even refuse to obey orders of transfer. Just shifting someone to a new post is rather difficult these days, because many people prefer to remain in the big cities, especially in Beijing. If you want to transfer them to other places, it is very hard – what with talk of poor health and heart trouble which is certain to recur if they are given jobs elsewhere but will disappear if they remain in Beijing. In a word, excuses are endless...." "Now we have some cadres who don't carry out directives or obey orders from above," Deng told the Military Commission. "This is a violation of discipline. In some units there are a few people who have arrogantly practiced factionalism for a long time. They are like tigers whose backsides no one dares to touch. But why shouldn't we dare? When told they are being transferred to another post, some cadres simply don't obey the order if it doesn't conform to their personal wishes. In 1975 one unit planned to transfer a number of people elsewhere. But they just refused to leave, on the ground that there had been no 'satisfactory explanation' of what they called the rights and wrongs of their transfer. They acted with perfect assurance, thinking that they were quite justified in disobeying orders...." An Army must act like an Army, he said, and the reform in this regard must start from the General Headquarters itself.

Because of the turmoil and uncertainties that had been fomented by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, the senior cadre of the PLA had become over-cautious, Deng pointed out. As in defence enterprises, so in the PLA in general, a tendency had developed to "put fear first." That was understandable in years gone by, he acknowledged; but Lin Biao and the Gang of Four had been dealt with, and now officers must "place daring first."

"A certain amount of conceit," had crept into the force, Deng pointed out repeatedly. From basking in the glory of what the PLA had accomplished in the past to soldiers and officers beginning to think of themselves above the people, and not extending even common courtesies to them.

So had "a certain degree of extravagance," he told the PLA. "As I have said, some people pursue a bourgeois way of life. Some seek ease and comfort, higher salaries, more housing space and indeed top conditions in every respect. Some even treat public property as their own, making hardly any distinction between public and private. Some army units entertain guests with lavish dinners and give them generous gifts, or erect buildings, halls and guesthouses that are not needed. These phenomena are widespread; they are increasing and have so far gone unchecked. In pursuit of their luxuries, the army units concerned contravene policy in many ways. Some people take things from the civilian units at will, or buy them at reduced prices. Some just take things without even going through any formalities.... Measures must be taken to change this situation. Army units have taken over too many buildings and too much of the land belonging to civilian units, and the civilian units have a lot of complaints about this...."

Next, "there is a certain degree of inertia," Deng said. "It is found not only among individuals but also to a varying extent in some organs. Some high-ranking cadres, their revolutionary will failing in their later years, seek their own self-interest instead of maintaining their revolutionary integrity. Some people with only minor illnesses ask for long recuperation leaves as if they were seriously ill, or they moan and groan without being ill at all. And they are bureaucratic; they don't put any effort or conscientiousness into their work. They don't go down to the grass-root units. They don't lift a finger themselves, nor do they use their minds. They rely on their secretaries to do everything and even ask others to write five-minute speeches for them – and then they sometimes read it wrong. This is mental indolence...."

Because of the disruptions and sabotage that had been engineered by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, training had declined, he told the senior command.

In a word, the PLA was not the fighting force it ought, and used to be.¹

Accordingly, Deng set in motion far-reaching reforms in the PLA – from downsizing; to structural reorganization; to retiring older cadre; to promoting young, meritorious officers; to training; to modernization of equipment.

But the real revolution he sparked was in the military doctrine of Chinese defence forces. It is that revolution which has serious consequences for us today, and which we should heed.

In a sense, the People's War doctrine of Mao posed no *direct* danger to countries that did not intend to invade China. Mao maintained that the super powers – from the Korean War to the late-fifties, the USA; from then to the eighties, the USSR – would inevitably foray into China; he maintained often that war resulting from such a foray was imminent. People's War strategies were designed to tempt the enemy deep into Chinese territory, and then finish him with a thousand cuts. The principal danger that the People's War doctrine thus posed to neighbours was *indirect*: it had sparked the imagination of several "revolutionary" groups and insurgents; it provided a ready "user's manual" for Naxalites, for rebels in the Northeast. Moreover, during that period, the Chinese were also set on "exporting Mao Zedong Thought" and the wherewithal to convert that Thought into an actual "Revolution" in the targeted country. These were substantial dangers. But apart from these, there was no direct threat. For a country like India that did not have any intention of encroaching on Chinese territory, People's War strategy constituted no direct danger.

¹Deng Xiaoping was designated Vice Chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in January 1975, and its Chairman in June 1981. For representative speeches in which he pointed out these shortcomings, see Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volumes I to III, edited by People's Daily Online, <http://english.people.com.cn/dengxp/>: "The Army needs to be consolidated," 25 June 1975, address to senior staff at the General Staff Headquarters of the PLA; "The task of consolidating the Army," 14 July 1975, speech at the enlarged meeting of the Military Commission; "On consolidating national defence enterprises," 5 August 1975, address to executives of the national defence industries; "The Army should attach strategic importance to education and training," 23 August 1977; "Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," 28 December 1977; "Streamline the Army and raise its combat effectiveness," speech to the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Military Commission, 12 March 1980.

There were five other features that left others a trifle safer.

First, as long as Mao was active, China was pre-occupied with dislocations and experiments at home. We have Deng's own testimony about how these convulsions affected the fighting capabilities of the PLA too.

Second, the regime's bellicose rhetoric, what it did to "export the Revolution" made others sufficiently wary of China.

Third, the regime was first at loggerheads with one super-power – the USA from the Korean War till the late fifties – and then at loggerheads with the other super-power – the Soviet Union. This too reduced the resources and attention it could spare to hobble neighbours like India.

Fourth, while much of this was caused by the peculiarities of Mao and his circle, as much of it sprang from doctrine – from "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought". In this sense it was independent of, and more durable than individuals like Mao and his circle. War is inevitable, this doctrine maintained: Capitalism inevitably results in Imperialism; Imperialism inevitably leads to war. War is in fact imminent, the doctrine insisted. The two super-powers are rushing towards unleashing World War III. The Americans are preparing to invade China any moment. Later, the Soviet Union is preparing to invade China any moment. This thesis, "War is inevitable, War is imminent," kept PLA in a feverish state at all times. It propelled it to focus on the moment, to go in for whatever improvements and increments it could grab at that moment.

Finally, the doctrine too helped – it became a straitjacket as all dogmas do. Whatever was in accord with something Mao had said was by definition valid. Whatever was outside what Mao had said was not necessary. Of course, as we saw to our cost in 1962, the PLA remained sufficiently strong to inflict a sharp enough slap to a neighbour like India. Even in that "bloated" condition, the PLA remained ever so inventive at a tactical level. But if, as technology changed the way it has over the past three decades; if, as war got redefined as radically as it has over the past twenty years, the PLA had remained inventive merely at the tactical level, neighbours like India would have been left fairly secure.

Deng Xiaoping jolted the PLA into "emancipating the mind" from dogma. Do not look for quotations from Marx and Lenin, he said;

instead heed the four-word motto that Mao wrote for the Central School at Yan'an: "Seek truth from facts." "As you all know, there is a doctrine known as the 'two whatevers'," he told the commanders. "Hasn't it become famous? According to this doctrine, whatever documents Comrade Mao Zedong read and endorsed and whatever he did and said must always determine our actions, without the slightest deviation." "Can this be called holding high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought?" Deng asked. "Certainly not! If this goes on, it will debase Mao Zedong Thought. The fundamental point of Mao Zedong Thought is seeking truth from facts and integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution. Comrade Mao Zedong wrote a four-word motto for the Central Party School in Yan'an: 'Seek truth from facts'. These four words are the quintessence of Mao Zedong Thought..."

If Mao had not thought for himself, how could he have developed new strategies – such as encircling the cities from the countryside – that led the Communist Party to victories? Deng asked. Neither Marx nor Lenin had mentioned this. "For one thing, if the 'two whatevers' had been followed," Deng remarked half in jest on another occasion, "I would never have come back to work. I came back in July 1977, nine months after the Gang of Four had been smashed. It was then that I was allowed to attend meetings of the Central Committee...."

New problems arise, new opportunities open up – problems and opportunities that were not there when Comrade Mao was grappling with affairs. How could China have opted for greater trade at the time when other countries had imposed sanctions against China? Deng observed. Does that mean that we should not now opt for greater trade when conditions are completely different? "The world is changing every day," he told leaders, "new things are continually emerging and new problems continually arising. We can't afford to lock our doors, refuse to use our brains and remain forever backward...."

In speech after speech, Deng berated this mental enslavement, and tracked it to several factors. "First, it is because during the past dozen years Lin Biao and the Gang of Four set up ideological taboos or 'forbidden zones' and preached blind faith to confine people's minds within the framework of their phoney Marxism. No one was allowed to go beyond the limits they prescribed; anyone who did was

tracked down, stigmatized and attacked politically. In this situation, some people found it safer to stop using their heads and thinking questions over." The over-concentration of power of those years had resulted in bureaucratism, he said; centralism had swamped democracy in "democratic centralism". This bureaucratism "often masquerades as 'Party leadership', 'Party directives', 'Party interests' and 'Party discipline'," he told the Working Conference that led up to the all-important Eleventh Central Committee meeting, "but actually it is designed to control people, hold them in check and oppress them...." Even those who had done good work were attacked: hence, all thought it was safer not to think for oneself. "Veering with the wind" had become the one safe course. Eventually, following directives, "book worship" had become a habit....

We must shed all this, he admonished commanders as he admonished those who were responsible for economic planning. We must think for ourselves, he said. We must rethink issues in the light of present conditions. We must proceed from present realities and make full use of all favourable conditions....¹

¹Deng's counsel for those who were responsible for charting China's economy was the same as indeed it was for visitors who were flocking to China for its Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought! "None of the works of Karl Marx or of Lenin," he told what must have been the surprised pilgrim from Mozambique, "offers a guide for building Socialism in China, and conditions differ from one country to another, each having its own unique experience. So we have to think for ourselves.... There is a problem here: perhaps, given the conditions in your country, you should consider whether a headlong rush to Socialism is advisable. Choosing a Socialist orientation is a good idea, but first of all you have to know what Socialism is. Socialism is certainly not poverty. When you speak of Socialism, it can only be Socialism suited to conditions in Mozambique...." For representative speeches and conversations, see, Deng Xiaoping, "Hold high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought and adhere to the principle of seeking truth from facts," 16 September 1978, Remarks to the Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; "We shall concentrate on economic development," 18 September 1982, record of talks with Kim Il Sung, Secretary General, Korean Workers Party; "Emancipate the mind, seek the truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future," 13 December 1978, speech leading to the third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; "We must continue to emancipate our minds and accelerate the reform," 25 May 1988, talk with Milo Jake, Secretary General, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; "We must emancipate our minds and think independently," 18 May 1988, talk with President Joaquim Alberto Chissano of Mozambique.

Thus, Deng said, the PLA which has had splendid achievements to its credit has acquired infirmities of various kinds. The first step in purging these is to think for oneself. Next, Deng revised the basic assessment of the situation that the PLA had to face. The basic premise of Mao's period had been that war is both inevitable and imminent – both in the sense of a World War sparked by and among the two super powers, and in the sense of an offensive against and into China. Marx had taught that wars as well as struggle within countries were inevitable as long as there were classes. Lenin had maintained that Imperialism is the inevitable culmination of Capitalism, and that too makes wars inevitable. Building on these, Mao had maintained that wars were imminent. This premise required the PLA to be at perpetual readiness, and thereby forced it to patchwork planning. And not just the PLA: as Deng was to explain, it led the regime to disperse projects “in three lines”, to locate many of them in mountains and to hide many of them in caves.

Once he had acquired a grip over the PLA and the regime, Deng began saying that he had been thinking deeply about the international situation, and had come to the conclusion that war was neither imminent nor inevitable. Only the two super powers had the capacity to unleash World War III, he said. But each of them had such a stockpile of atomic weapons that neither of them dared to launch them. Moreover, both super powers had suffered setbacks. Local wars were, of course, possible – because of hegemonism: both in the sense of wanting to dominate the world as well as a region; and China must, of course, remain prepared for thwarting such designs. But all-out war could be postponed, and even averted, he said. There were always forces that wanted war, but at the moment the forces of peace are stronger, Deng told the PLA: there are the people of the Third World, of which China is a part; there are the people of the Second World, Europe and Japan; the people of the First World, the USA and the Soviet Union, too do not want war.

That being the case, Deng told the PLA, we can afford to build our strength systematically as well as comprehensively. We need not proceed in a patchwork manner. We need not build just a storey here and a storey there. We have time to strengthen the foundations, and then build storey by storey. The second inference was that China should systematically work towards gaining more time, for the longer

the interval till the next war, the stronger China would be. In a typical passage he told the Plenary Meeting of the Military Commission,

.... Experience shows that, even if the enemy were to come now, we would be able to fight him with our present weapons and eventually win the war, provided we persevered in people's war. With such a huge population, once our people and our Army unite as one, no enemy can destroy us. Nonetheless, we must strive to gain more time, to improve our military equipment and educate and train our Army well so as reduce unnecessary losses. If we can gain a relatively long time free of war, that will enable us to continue modernizing our Army, raising its combat effectiveness and making our preparations for defence. Here I would like to say that, even if we can gain 10 or 20 years in which to modernize our Army's equipment, it will still be inferior to the enemy's. For the enemy will not be sleeping while we are advancing. Therefore, if and when war breaks out, we will still have to triumph over superior forces with our inferior equipment. This basic situation cannot as yet be completely changed. Our experience has always shown that we can defeat a superior enemy with inferior equipment, for our wars are just, they are people's wars. In this respect we should be fully confident....¹

It is important to bear that perspective in mind, the reasons why China decided to go in for time – a point to which we shall return when we consider the way many hoodwink themselves about China's current focus on economic development. If the country were faced with some imminent danger, then naturally it had to get whatever it could from wherever it could, it had to make whatever it could howsoever it could as swiftly as it could. But when it had time, when by its own actions it could gain more time, it was mere common sense to acquire the wherewithal for military strength through economic development. This was all the more evident after the fall of the Soviet Union: that country had devoted formidable resources to acquiring military strength; but the economy had stagnated; it was forced into an arms race; and what happened? The country could not sustain the weight, and the entire edifice collapsed. So, China should acquire the wherewithal for sustaining continuous enhancements of its military prowess. And it must acquire that wherewithal in such a way as not to alarm others in the meanwhile. The point to ascertain is whether,

¹Deng Xiaoping, 28 December 1977, "Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party."

given the assessment that caused China to focus on longer term acquisition of strength, we should infer that it has turned pacifist, whether the current focus on economic development proves that its rulers have abandoned the goal of having a dominant say in the affairs of the Asia-Pacific region in particular? Samuel Kim points out that the very fact that the security situation of China has been better in recent years than it has ever been since the Republic was founded is seen as "the unprecedented opportunity for accelerating the military modernization drive – and thus narrowing the military gap with Russia and the United States – without diverting too many resources from economic development. As two military analysts put it: 'The relatively peaceful international climate and our friendly relations with our neighbors are providing fine external conditions for PLA weapons development'"¹

The basic premise of inevitable and imminent war set to one side, as the years went by the strategic vision for China got reformulated under Deng's aegis:

- ❑ The aim is to make China a strong and prosperous country.
- ❑ Safeguarding sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China and ensuring its security must always be the first and over-riding objectives.
- ❑ At a minimum, the country must be secure from aggressors and from internal disturbance. But the aim has to be higher: no country should be able to take a step without factoring in the likely effects of that step on the interests of China, and, therefore, the likely reaction of China to the step.
- ❑ To instill this awareness and caution in others, China must acquire Comprehensive National Power – military prowess is a major ingredient of this, it is in a sense the point of the spear, but it cannot stand on its own: the fate of the Soviet Union is a clear reminder of the fact that a country's power must be comprehensive.
- ❑ To acquire such capacity, the country must develop economically and technologically.

¹Samuel S. Kim, "China's Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 1996, monograph.

- ❑ Better still, we should get others to help China acquire that Comprehensive National Strength.
- ❑ For it to be able to do so, it needs time – in particular, it needs peace in this region and the world, and stability at home.
- ❑ For that, China should keep a low profile; it should not do things that would alarm or intimidate others, or propel others to gang up against it. To take one instance, this would rule out "exporting Revolution".
- ❑ China should eschew isolationism. It should use relationships with other countries, it should use alliances to advance China's interests. But it must rely on its own strength.
- ❑ As situations will keep changing, China should make no policy, no position, no alliance a dogma.
- ❑ Instead of the huge Army it has traditionally had, China should have a well-equipped, highly trained compact Army. This should be supplemented by a large reserve force so that, should China ever be attacked, it can give a fitting riposte as in the traditional doctrine of People's War.
- ❑ Just as Mao had emphasized battle-field dominance, China must aim to seize mastery in the very first hours and engagements. This is all the more imperative in high-tech warfare.
- ❑ Thus, "*active* defense" must remain the beacon.
- ❑ That, of course, translates into *attack* in several circumstances.¹

¹The FY2004 Report of the US Secretary of Defense on China's military might correctly observes: "China's military strategy, 'Active Defense,' reflects the ambiguity with which its leaders seek to cloak military and security affairs. It declares a defensive military strategy and asserts that China does not initiate wars or fight wars of aggression, but engages in war only to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity and 'attacks only after being attacked.' However, Beijing's definition of an 'attack' on national territory or sovereignty, or what constitutes an initial attack, remains vague. Consequently, the term active defense indicates little about when or how China would choose to initiate hostilities. Moreover, once Beijing determines that hostilities have begun, evidence suggests the characteristics of active defense are distinctly offensive. PLA writings on the campaign level of war imply this offensive nature of active defense. The PLA text *The Study of Campaigns* (*Zhanyi Xue*), published in 2000, explains:

While the guideline is active defense, in military campaigns, though, the emphasis is placed on taking the initiative in 'active offense.' Only in this way, the strategic objective of 'active defense' can be realized.

Accordingly, active defense calls for forces to be postured to defend against ...

- ❑ As China's forces will continue to be inferior to those of some of its major potential adversaries, special attention must be paid to devising ways by which to defeat a superior force with an inferior one.
- ❑ In a word, the traditional People's War paradigm, which was first modified to "local, limited wars," must now be further modified to encompass "People's War under modern conditions". In particular, as the wars that China is liable to have to face in the near future are "local wars under high technology conditions", it must acquire the technologies that will enable it to acquire control over air space, command of the seas; it must acquire capabilities for C4I; it must be able to counter and survive strikes from afar; it must build a series of Rapid Reaction Units.... Hence, the emphasis of the last two decades on modernizing the Chinese Air Force; on acquiring space-capabilities; on equipping the Chinese Navy to safeguard and advance Chinese interests far from its shores; on building the hardware as well as the software for Information and Electronic Warfare....

The 24-character directive that Deng sent out as the Soviet regimes collapsed became the leitmotif of Chinese defence forces and diplomacy:

Observe with calm; make our position firm; meet challenges with equanimity; hide our capacities and bide our time; maintain a low profile; never take the lead; be able to accomplish.

... perceived security threats. At the same time, however, China's leaders seek not only to react but also to positively shape their security environment and prevent adversaries from engaging in actions contrary to China's national interests. This desire suggests a general deterrent role for China's military and provides for coercive uses of force. For example, the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict was a punitive measure Beijing conducted in response to the threat from Vietnam's incursions into Cambodia, which at that time was China's closest regional partner. The 1979 case underscores the contention that China's military strategy is not purely defensive but rather calls for attacks and offensive actions in support of foreign policy aims. In this context, peacetime applications of active defense provide for using force short of war for coercion. China's launch of missiles into closure areas off Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, in an attempt to pressure Taipei and intimidate the Taiwan people, is an example of this form of military coercion." See, Report for FY04 of the US Secretary of Defense to the US Congress, *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, Washington, DC, 2004.

The new wars

Five features of the Chinese view of the world fuse to fortify this security perspective – of yoking every instrument to acquire “comprehensive national strength.” The world is an arena for a Darwinian struggle for survival, they believe. Second, the present order is iniquitous, and has to be changed: under it “The magistrates are free to burn down houses, while the common people are forbidden even to light candles.” Third, the principal controller of the present order, the one whose power has to be countered is the USA. It exercises its control through many instruments, including the international institutions it has got in its grip: this is its strategy to “Hijack the Emperor to order the dukes about in his name.” Fourth, the order is especially iniquitous to China – it does not address China’s requirements, it does not recognize China’s inherent weight – and, therefore, China has a special duty to alter it. Fifth, it is within China’s capacity to acquire the wherewithal to do so – the power that is required for changing the order is to be comprehensive: from a reputation – “national awesomeness” – to “soft power”, influence over others, to economic strength culminating in hard, military power.²

¹c.f.: Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the offensive: Chinese perspectives on U.S. global strategy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 3, 2001, pp. 343-65, at p. 351.

²Citing a string of Chinese sources, Samuel Kim observes, “Despite the situation-specific changes and shifts in Chinese definitions of the regional and global orders, there remains at the core a fundamentally realpolitik view of the outside world as essentially conflictual where antagonistic contradictions and rivalries are the norm. At the same time, global debate on the new world order is said to be symptomatic of the emerging neo-Darwinian contest for an all-out struggle for power in which every major State actor jockey for a favorable position during the process of tumultuous change.... The revised definition of the world situation, according to a classified Communist Party document, rejects the core assumptions of the world peace/development line, warning instead that world politics has entered a new phase of ‘the struggle between the two systems.’ Although varying ‘in its form, intensity and tactics employed,’ we are told, the two-system struggle ‘will be sharper, more complex and more intense than before.’ The major challenge that China will have to face and respond to in the next 15 years (1995-2010) is not of managing global interdependence but a concerted western plot to split and weaken China by giving support to separatists in minority localities, by exaggerating and taking advantage of the center/periphery contradictions, intraparty policy differences, state/society chasm, and by exerting pressure on such issues as ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’....

The Gulf War was a jolt to the Chinese, as it was to defence forces across the globe. It awakened them to the new technologies any adversary the US chose to target would have to contend against. Analysis followed analysis in Chinese military journals and elsewhere. The new weapons systems, the simultaneous deployment of forces and weapons, the launching of weapons from hundreds of miles away, the primacy of air power, the blinding of Iraqi radar – a host of lessons were inferred. In a representative analysis,¹ two senior colonels of the PLA noted how the war had lasted barely 42 days. Even more telling of what future wars would hold for every country was the fact that thirty eight of these forty two days were devoted to air strikes. The ground war lasted only a hundred hours. It was the first war, they noted, in which air power was used to defeat ground forces. The US lost only 184 persons. More than 500 kinds of new, advanced technologies were deployed, in their reckoning. In individual instances the triggering of a weapon was but the final result of commands and actions that spanned half the globe: "After a DSP satellite identified a target, an alarm was sent to a ground station in Australia," they record, "which was then sent to the central command post in Riyadh through the US Cheyenne Mountain command post, after which the 'Patriot' operators were ordered to take their battle stations, all of which took place in the mere 90-second alarm stage,

... Some international relations scholars have even resurrected the Maoist line espoused in the United Nations in the early 1970s that interdependence in the contemporary world economic system amounted to no more than an asymmetrical interdependence 'between a horseman and his mount'.... Consider and contrast, for instance, Zhao Ziyang's 'world peace and development line' replete with global interdependence theme in the mid-1980s with Jiang Zemin's CNS line in 1992 challenging that the military 'should enhance combat strength in an all-round way, should more successfully shoulder the lofty mission of defending the country's territorial sovereignty over the land and in the air, as well as its rights and interests on the sea; and should safeguard the unification and security of the motherland.'...." For the passages and the Chinese sources on which the observations are based, see, Samuel S. Kim, "China's Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 1996, monograph.

¹Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, February 1999, from which the following illustrations are taken to give a glimpse of what struck the Chinese about the war.

relying on numerous relays and coordination of space-based systems and the C3I systems, truly 'a shot heard round the world'...."

Not only do these new technologies multiply force in ways and to degrees that most of us can scarcely fathom, the Colonels pointed out, they make obsolete much of the arsenal that we have grown accustomed to regard as the guarantors of our security. "Today, the life-span of a tank as an individual target on the battlefield," the Chinese analysts reviewing the results of the Gulf War, and citing Russian and American sources remarked, "does not exceed two or three minutes, and its life-span in the open as part of battalion/company formation is 30-50 minutes...."

As had happened in the Gulf War, the Kosovo war reminded the Chinese of what war in the new era is going to mean, and how the doctrines as much as the weapons systems they had were not up to the new warfare. Citing Chinese reviews of the conflict, Shambaugh lists some of the elements that struck Chinese strategists: "initial attacks against Yugoslavia's command and control infrastructure; extensive electronic jamming of both military and public communications; remote targeting by long-range cruise missiles, launched from sea and air; achievement of 'information dominance,' making extensive use of space-based sensors and satellites; and air-strikes launched from as far away as North America, utilizing in-flight refueling." These had been used in the Gulf War also, Shambaugh recalls. The PLA analysts were "surprised", Shambaugh writes, by several new features of this conflict – "For example, the use of several new weapons systems such as improved laser-guided precision munitions that employ a variety of new active homing and direction-finding devices.... Also on display were an array of satellite-guided bombs, delivering 1,000-2,500 pound warheads with accuracy of a few meters. PLA analysts also noted the use, for the first time, of microwave bombs that could sabotage electronic equipment, missile target seekers, computer networks, and data transmission lines...." "This was a stark realization for PLA commanders whose whole orientation and doctrine to date had been of fighting adversaries in land battles on China's soil or in contiguous territory," Shambaugh records. "PLA analysts were profoundly disturbed by the very idea that, in modern warfare, an enemy could penetrate defenses and

devastate one's forces without the defender's ability to see or hear, much less counterattack, the adversary."¹

In a word, part of the reason for alarm was the glimpse that the conflict gave of the new weapons systems and technologies that any country crossing the US would have to contend with. In addition, the conflict showed that the US was acquiring a greater and greater appetite for intervening in what had hitherto been regarded as the "internal affairs" of other countries. The Chinese noted in particular that the reasons which had been given to justify the attack – violation of human rights, suppression of minorities, cruelty of the regime – "could be used to justify intervention practically anywhere on earth, since a great many countries have ethnic conflicts in progress," to recall James Perry's summary, "and intervening on behalf of separatists in Kosovo will only encourage separatists elsewhere." The Chinese went farther and believed that one of the objectives for targeting the Milosevic regime was to remove an obstacle to the expansion of NATO, and thus intrude into what had hitherto been Russia's sphere of influence. Having succeeded in this "strategic conspiracy", "the US would intensify its efforts to contain China. Containment would entail support for India's missile programs, encouragement of separatists in Xinjiang and of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and strengthening the defenses of Taiwan and Japan." By clearing the way for the eastward expansion of NATO, the Kosovo conflict was "an important pre-emptive chess move for a possible conflict with China in the 21st century."²

Perry notes that even after the Gulf War, Chinese analysts expected that "future warfare would be primarily characterized by a clash of ground forces." The Kosovo conflict changed this assessment drastically. "No-contact war" – that would be the leitmotif of future conflicts, they concluded. Both the pattern of American assault as well as the successes of the Yugoslavs in postponing a complete collapse

¹David Shambaugh, "China's military views the world," *International Security*, Volume 24, No. 3, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 52-79, at pp. 57-58.

²Yong Deng, "Hegemon on the offensive: Chinese perspectives on U.S. global strategy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 3, 2001, pp. 343-65; James Perry, "Operation Allied Force: the view from Beijing," *Air and Space Power Chronicles, Chronicles Online Journal*, 22 October 2000.

led the Chinese to infer a number of lessons for their forces. Citing numerous Chinese analyses, Perry enumerates a series of conclusions that the Chinese drew for their own equipment, orientation and organization. Among these are ones that are of particular significance to a neighbour like India:

- ❑ The country must prepare to counter "war of all dimensions" in which long range cruise missiles, short range weapons, high altitude bombers, precision guided munitions, advanced imaging technology, Information and Electronic Warfare, etc., are all deployed simultaneously, continuously "from all directions, in all weather, and at all times of the day," and in "intrinsic coordination".
- ❑ "Large scale annihilation of the enemy's effective strength will no longer be regarded as the target of war"; instead networks will be disrupted by smashing the nodes – of command, communications, transport.... The highest priority must therefore be given to securing the country's fighting assets against air strikes: hence it must build under-ground shelters, use to the full "cliffs, valleys, caves, ravines, jungles, and other natural shelters and structures": Chinese analysts were full of praise for Yugoslavs who held on by using deception; concealment – for instance, keeping radars off except for the fleeting moments, moving units and equipment only when American satellites were not overhead, etc. "In future war, we should also skillfully set up false targets and false positions to confuse and deceive the enemy; we should use imitative materials, civilian vehicles, and scrapped weapons and equipment to set up fake command posts, fake airports, fake radar stations, and fake positions to attract the enemy's firepower...." Hide forces among civilian population....
- ❑ As the adversary will aim at C4 nodes in the first wave itself, China must replace "individual fighting platforms" by "networked fighting centres", and "tree-shaped military organizations" by "networked military organizations".
- ❑ China must close the technology-gap with likely adversaries like the US. In particular, it must develop high-precision weapons, the requisite IT capabilities for these weapons, and for Information

and Electronic Warfare. For this it must upgrade the technical knowledge and expertise of its defense personnel and develop its own software industry.

- China must redouble its work on satellites, and also on crippling and confusing the satellites of others: the analysts marveled at the way satellites were used for directing munitions, but they also noted the extreme dependence of US forces on these. They noted what could be accomplished by jamming or distorting GPS coordinates, by electronic deception....
- The US mastered the war of spreading its version and blocking the version of the Serbs – by destroying Serb broadcasting facilities, by beaming accounts of devastating air strikes on the one hand and on the other by painting the Serb regime as cruel to an inhuman degree. Hence the importance of using modern technologies to accomplish the ancient objectives of confusing, demoralizing and blackening the enemy.
- The US still can not stand casualties, “modern Americans have a fragile psychology and very poor endurance for war” – hence, its adversary must inflict as many casualties as he possibly can. And he should deploy other means: “The side with the marked technical inferiority can still use certain special means to conduct nuclear, biological and chemical strikes, either destroying the enemy’s advanced information network, or striking with modern guerilla warfare tactics such as unconventional warfare and terrorism....”¹

Visualize a China that has learnt these lessons, developed the requisite technologies and capabilities, and then swoops down to “teach India a lesson”.

A vital change

There has been another vital change in Chinese strategic doctrine that will have far-reaching consequences for countries like India that lie on its rim.

¹For these lessons and several others, along with references to Chinese writings from which they are culled, James Perry, “Operation Allied Force: the view from Beijing,” *Air and Space Power Chronicles, Chronicles Online Journal*, 22 October 2000.

All preparations and planning of Indian forces are to fight wars on Indian soil. Thirty years ago, Chinese planning too had one premise: that the adversary – the USA or the USSR – would launch a major offensive into China, and its plans centered on ways China would use – the "protracted war" and "people's war" stratagems – to thwart such an offensive. Since then, as observers emphasize, Chinese military thinking has travelled a great distance. The modernization of the PLA aims at "force *projection*" – *beyond* the borders of China. And that for two distinct purposes:

- ❑ To ensure that, in whatever they do, others – in particular, countries neighbouring China – always bear in mind the interests and likely reactions of China;
- ❑ To ensure that, should things come to such a pass that a war has to be fought for defending China, the war must not be fought on Chinese soil.

As Pillsbury's survey of Chinese military writings shows, Chinese strategic analysts repeatedly affirm these premises. Summarizing them, Pillsbury remarks, "After the Cold War, a consensus has basically been reached on these questions among Chinese military circles, i.e., in order to ensure the safety of the country's economic achievements against war damages, the Chinese army must commit itself to the task of engaging the enemy *outside the territory of China*. Additionally, because wars China might be involved in during the post-Cold War period will most probably be high-tech local wars, the Chinese army must acquire the ability of winning a high-tech local war so as to keep the enemy *outside the country's territory*." And again, "Consequently, a strategy of active defense that lays stress on enhancing the army's rapid response capability and readiness for any high-tech local war has become China's current military strategy for national defense. The objective of this strategy is to prevent wars breaking out, or failing that, *to keep them outside of China's territory*."¹

Since Deng's well known reformulation of the strategic challenges that China is likely to face – that these will not be in the form of an

¹Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 191.

assault by a major, nuclear power, but in the form of limited, local wars – PLA's modernization has aimed at preparing the country for "local wars under high technology conditions." The way the USA has conducted the Gulf, Afghan and Iraq wars has sharpened this focus manifold: in part because the technology that has been deployed reminded the Chinese how ill-equipped even they were to counter such weapons.

Chinese strategists list the capabilities that China must acquire for such wars. China must be the one that delivers the blow, and the blow it delivers must inflict

- ☐ At the very outset
- ☐ Such terrific losses – for instance, by crippling vital nodes of the victim
- ☐ At such lightning speed
- ☐ That it achieves the objective, breaks the morale of the victim, and scares away allies from standing by the victim.

The victim having been "taught a lesson," one that he will remember for decades, the forces are to withdraw – unilaterally and as swiftly as they had descended on the victim. The object is not the protracted engagement so characteristic of the Maoist doctrine on "people's wars". The object is "to assert one's own standpoint and will through limited military action, or to teach the opponent a lesson, to deliver a shock, politically or psychologically, and then immediately withdraw to home bases."¹

The blow must be sufficient to "teach a lesson" – a phrase that Chinese leaders routinely use in regard to both the 1962 attack against India as well as the 1979 invasion of Vietnam. But it must be below the threshold that will catapult allies into action. And it must be so swift that it is over before they have got through their internal debates on whether they should go to the aid of the victim. Indeed, as Burles and Shulsky point out, were even the victim to react to his full capacity, or over an area that is beyond the immediate theatre that, say, the Chinese have breached, or if he were to think of retaliating over an extended period, the onus of prolonging the conflict would be on

¹Cited in Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from history and doctrinal writings*, RAND, 2000, p. 31.

him! An onus that the aggressor will plan to drill in through fellow-travellers, the media, leaders and opinion-makers of other countries.

We do not need any elaborate reconstruction to remind ourselves how the 1962 attack on India fits these propositions to the dot – except that in that instance the Chinese did not deploy the high-technology weapons that they are devising for the future. There is a telling, and chilling account in the memoir of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Adviser to President Carter that we would do well to read, and commit to memory.

The year is 1979. Deng Xiaoping has come to Washington. Deng has requested a private meeting with Carter. Brzezinski has described the conversation at length: as you read the account, notice how eager Brzezinski is to believe the Chinese, notice the calm with which the fate of millions is decided, notice the twin themes of Deng – of "teaching Vietnam a lesson" the way India had been taught in 1962, and of deploying a level of force that would be sufficient to administer that "educational experience" but would not invite Soviet retaliation. Here is Brzezinski's narrative:

* * *

When we sat down together in the Oval Office, I had a general sense of what was coming, and so did the other members of the American side. Nonetheless, there is a difference between anticipating a situation and actually experiencing it. There was something grave and very special in the calm, determined, and firm way in which Deng Xiaoping presented the Chinese case. China, he said, had concluded that it must disrupt Soviet strategic calculations and that "we consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to *give them an appropriate limited lesson.*"

Without detailing at this stage what the lesson specifically would entail, he added that *the lesson would be limited in scope and duration.* He then calmly diagnosed for us various possible Soviet responses, indicating how China would counter them. He included among the options "the worst possibility," adding that even in such a case China would hold out. All he asked for was "moral support" in the international field from the United States.

Though we had had some preliminary discussions earlier, I wondered how the President would react. Prior to Deng's arrival, I had mentioned to the President the growing Chinese concern over Cambodia and *how important it was for us not to convey to the Chinese any excessive U.S. alarm over possible Chinese actions.* I was worried that the President might be

persuaded by Vance to put maximum pressure on the Chinese not to use force, since this would simply convince the Chinese that the United States was a "paper tiger." Accordingly, I was quite relieved when the President responded in a matter-of-fact fashion, simply pointing out that this was a serious issue which he would like to discuss with his advisers before giving his reaction. He did register the view that the Chinese action could be highly destabilizing and that restraint was desirable in such a difficult situation.

Deng responded by saying that if the Vietnamese were not restrained, they would expand their activities. China would undertake a limited action and then withdraw its troops quickly. *Citing the Chinese-Indian clash of 1962 as an example, Deng insisted that the Vietnamese must be similarly punished.* He concluded by saying that he did not expect United States endorsement, and indeed appreciated that sometimes one had to do things one would prefer not to do. It was obvious that the Chinese had weighed all the alternatives and decided to undertake the action, even if it involved a confrontation with the Soviet Union. I must admit that I was impressed with the deliberate and resolute tone of Deng's presentation.

Zbigniew
Brzezinski's
account

The next day the President met with us to discuss how best to respond. We agreed that he should meet with Deng alone and urge him in restrained terms to reconsider. In addition to international repercussions, we were concerned that military action by China could undermine U.S. domestic support for normalization. The President himself drafted by hand a letter to Deng, moderate in tone and sober in content, stressing the importance of restraint and summarizing the likely adverse international consequences. I felt that this was the right approach, for we could not collude formally with the Chinese in sponsoring what was tantamount to overt military aggression. At the same time, the letter did not lock the United States into a position which could generate later pressures to condemn China in the UN. When the President met alone with Deng, the Chinese leader expressed his appreciation for the President's comments, but reiterated his view that "*China must still teach Vietnam a lesson.*" Otherwise, he argued, the Soviets might use Vietnam the way they had used Cuba, adding prophetically that later on Afghanistan would suffer the same fate. Deng reasserted his confidence that China had the necessary strength to carry the operation through and again assured us that *it would be short, lasting only ten to twenty days.* He expected divided international reactions but felt that in the longer run world opinion would gravitate in China's favor. Deng concluded by saying, not disingenuously, that it was good to have a friend with whom these things could be discussed so frankly. The President said that he wanted Deng to understand that our position was not based on fear

of the Soviet Union; rather, we felt that it was better to isolate the Soviet Union and Vietnam internationally than to engage in actions which could gain them greater worldwide support.

I held separate meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang, an engaging though extremely assertive and somewhat polemical diplomat, and I shared with him my concern that the Chinese might be forced to withdraw by a Soviet nuclear threat or that their operation might become more protracted than they had planned. Although Huang was silent and apparently not very much alarmed, *I hoped that my warning would encourage the Chinese to concentrate on a swift and decisive move and not undertake a prolonged engagement.*

As a particular gesture of friendship, I went out to the helipad near the Washington Monument to bid goodbye to Deng personally. *I wanted to underline Presidential support,* and Deng gave me the impression of being quite pleased. We had the traditional two-handed handshake, and Deng urged me to visit China again.

Zbigniew
Brzezinski's
account

The Chinese did not give us a precise date for the forthcoming "educational experience" that they were planning for Vietnam. Within days of Deng's departure, I outlined my views on how the United States should react. *I wanted to avoid a situation in which we would be pressured, both by world opinion and by the State Department, to condemn the Chinese as aggressors.* Accordingly, I developed a proposal that the United States should criticize the Chinese for their military action but should couple that criticism with a parallel condemnation of the Vietnamese for their occupation of Cambodia, and demand that both China and Vietnam pull out their forces. I knew that such a proposal would be totally unacceptable to the Vietnamese and to the Soviets, and hence *would provide a partial diplomatic umbrella for the Chinese action without associating the United States with it,* thereby permitting the United States to adopt publicly a somewhat critical position.¹

. . . .

To teach another country "lessons". To administer it an "educational experience". Advance information to a super-power. The super-power's sole concern – the kind of statement that it is to issue once the assault begins! The other super-power, as expected, stays out for the only duration that matters....

¹Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *Power and Principle, Memoirs of the National Security Adviser: 1977-1981*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1983, pp. 409-11. Italics added.

Nor were the forays against India in 1962 and against Vietnam in 1979 the only ones in which China deployed this calibrated use of force: Paracel Islands in 1974, Spratly Islands in 1988, Mischief Reef in 1995. The strategy is well-honed: do as much as will perceptibly change the *status quo*, but not so much as will provoke a reaction – neither military reaction of any significance, nor a ganging up of others. And then let time pass – so that all concerned come to internalize what has been done, and get accustomed to it.

And in each instance, this “grab, hold, let time pass” strategy has worked – China acquired what it sought, and the acquisition did not ignite retaliation or even a reaction worth the name.

Derek da Cunha furnishes a telling instance. China occupied the Mischief Reef in late 1994. Philippines protested with some verve – that was to be expected as it regards the Reef as its own. But a significant thing happened – other ASEAN countries joined to project a unified ASEAN response. Derek da Cunha describes what followed:

This unified ASEAN stand on the Spratly Islands issue seemed to draw a more conciliatory tone from China at the August 1995 ARF meeting in Brunei. At this meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen gave the clear impression that Beijing was now willing to discuss the Spratly issue multilaterally with ASEAN, and to accept the Law of the Sea Convention as a basis for negotiations to resolve the dispute. The Foreign Minister's remarks were widely applauded by other ARF governments. His remarks, however, seemed to ring hollow when Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofang, reasserted the old position affirming China's sovereignty over the islands, contending that the ARF was not an appropriate place to discuss what he characterized as a “bilateral” issue. There were no regional expressions of dismay over Shen's statement, however.

Thus, Beijing seems adept at turning regional atmospherics to its own advantage. Some observers in Southeast Asia have called this the “three steps forward, two steps back” approach, whereby China would advance into the South China Sea and when confronted by expressions of regional disquiet would give the impression of being conciliatory, then when the dust had settled it would make a further advance into the area.

The logical end result of an apparent Chinese minuet – “three steps forwards, and two steps back” – is one of steady and inexorable advance.¹

¹Derek da Cunha, “Southeast Asian perceptions of China's future security role in its ‘backyard’,” and sources listed by him, in Jonathan D. Pollock and Richard H. Yang, *In China's Shadow, Regional perspectives on Chinese foreign policy and military development*, RAND, 1998, p. 123.

In any case, we in India hardly need to look for examples concerning other countries. Has not China by the very same strategy annexed the Aksai Chin Region as well as parts of Kashmir under Pakistani occupation? And has everyone – including India – not reconciled to that annexation?

Since 1991, as we have seen, China has equipped itself with a "legal basis" for what it might do – at least across the oceans. And it has done so by the most convenient method – by itself passing a law! By virtue of this new maritime law, it has extended its maritime boundaries to include all of the South China Sea, and most of the East China Sea. The law makes "Chinese", not just Taiwan, but also a host of islands – including those at present in the control of Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and other countries. By this law, China has conferred on itself the right to use military force to protect what it has declared to be its rights in these territorial waters, and to forcibly evict military vessels of other countries!

Incidentally, much else that China has done – apart from "teaching lessons" to India and Vietnam, apart from seizing islands in the South China Sea – must lead it to the same conclusion. It has by now not just colonized Tibet. It has completely changed Tibet's demographic composition. The world has just shut its eyes. Similarly, for long China has been one of the principal providers of arms, of missiles and missile technology, of nuclear weapons and the technology for producing them. And that too to countries which the US itself has been pro-claiming to be irresponsible, rogue states – not just Pakistan, but Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan, North Korea. Indeed, as US Government and Congressional documents themselves state, China has continued to do so in spite of the agreements it has signed *not* to do so. Has China had to pay on that count?

The report of the US-China Security Review Commission to the US Congress provides the answer. It records,

* * *

U.S. sanctions imposed on the PRC following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown are still in effect. One result of the sanctions was the suspension of satellite export licenses for Chinese launches. Sanctions also exist under the 1990 Missile Technology Control Act that relate to M-11 missile technology and equipment transfers to Pakistan; under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which pertains to Chinese assistance to Iran's

chemical and biological weapons programs; and under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Act of 1991.

Several Chinese companies now are under sanction for violations of U.S. law. In 2001 the U.S. imposed sanctions on a Chinese company for aiding Iran's chemical weapons program. In the same year the China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation (CMEC) was sanctioned for providing missile technology to Pakistan. In January 2002, two Chinese companies and one individual were sanctioned for the transfer to Iran of equipment and technology for production of chemical and biological weapons. In May 2002, sanctions were imposed on seven companies (two of which were already under the January 2002 sanction) for aiding Iran's WMD program. Also sanctioned for the third time is an individual, Q.C. Chen, long involved in these transfers.

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These sanctions provide that for two years, *U.S. Government agencies* are prohibited from producing or entering into contracts for the procurement of goods, technology, or services from a Chinese enterprise associated with proliferation activities. *No department or agency of the U.S. Government* may provide any assistance to the sanctioned entities, and they shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the U.S. Government. Prohibited are items on the U.S. Munitions List and sales of any defense articles, defense services or design and construction services controlled under the Arms Export Control Act. New licenses are denied, and existing licenses suspended for the transfer to these entities of items controlled under the Export Administration Act.

As the sanctioned companies are not engaged in activities with the U.S. Government, sanctions can have little or no deterrent effect on them. Furthermore the President can waive any sanctions if he deems it to be in the national interest. Throughout the 1990's *this waiver authority was often exercised* to permit China to launch U.S. satellites. Presidential waivers continued to be issued, even as the PRC transferred M-11 missile technology to Pakistan.

Although the President has a variety of sanctions available to respond to China's proliferation activities, *these sanctions are case-specific and relate to designated activities with a narrow set of options available on a case-by-case basis.*

For example, the Iran Nonproliferation Act (PL 106-178) prohibits U.S. Government procurement of goods and services from the sanctioned entity and denies export licenses for the transfer of controlled items to the sanctioned entity. *None of these laws provides for economic sanctions (trade, investment, and capital flows) against the offending country or government.* Missile technology sanctions (PL 101-510) provide for the denial of U.S. Government contracts relating to missile equipment or

technology and denial of export licenses for missile equipment or technology. The President can also deny licenses for the transfer of Munitions List items and prohibit the importation into the United States of products produced by the foreign entity or entities. *Once again, the law does not provide for economic sanctions against the offending country or government.* Similarly, chemical and biological weapons sanctions (PL 102-182) provide the President the authority to deny U.S. Government contracts and to deny importation into the United States of products produced by the sanctioned entity, *but the law does not provide for economic sanctions against the offending country or government.*

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The President has sufficient authority to select from the full range of economic and security related sanctions under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA). But its implementation is an unlikely remedy, *since the IEEPA is to be invoked only in the event of a national economic emergency.*

Finally, *so many waivers have been granted during the last decade that U.S. sanctions and threats of sanctions appear to be more of an irritant to China than a credible obstacle.* Moreover, their utility must be weighed against their impact on our own economic interests, including American jobs, and often pose a dilemma for U.S. trade officials.

In most cases, U.S. business interests have successfully argued that sanctions harm U.S. industry and the U.S. economy, particularly when the same or similar goods are available from other countries.¹

• • •

Hence the pincer that confronts us: a China equipping itself for teaching others "lessons"; and countries like the USA concerned about the statements they will issue, countries satisfied at imposing *pro-forma* "sanctions". And there is the other lesson too – of how to equip ourselves for that sort of a bind. The only reason that China failed to teach to the full the "lesson" it had planned was Vietnam's will and strength to fight back, its ferocious nationalism.

"We must conceal our abilities, quietly nurse our vengeance"

A necessary accompaniment of this focus on "local wars under conditions of high technology" is the emphasis China is placing on

¹US-China Commission, Report to Congress of the US-China Security Review Commission, *The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China*, July 2002, Chapter 7, "Proliferation and Chinese Relations with Terrorist-Sponsored States." Italics added.

"magic weapons", on "the assassin's mace" with which the country may, at a decisive moment, deliver the sudden, crippling blow against a weak point in the enemy's anatomy. Even open-source Chinese writings discuss these weapons often and extensively – from "stealth ships"; to electro-magnetic pulse devices that will wipe out electronic circuitry; to nanotechnology implants that can be embedded in computer systems to be activated years later; to ant-sized robots that, when commanded, disable information highways, power transmission systems, civil aviation control systems, telecommunication and broadcasting networks; to chemical or gaseous agents that can disorient entire populations in an area, induce nausea, diarrhoea; to directed energy weapons; to anti-satellite weapons; to robots that lay mines over land and under water; to IT viruses; to gases and chemicals that will guide bombs and missiles; to sensors sprayed on the wings of bees that send back data; to micro sensors sprayed over an entire area that transmit signals to satellites or other "listening" stations.... Pillsbury recalls the observations of General Pan Jungfeng. While remarking on the vulnerabilities of the USA, the General observed, "We can make the enemy's command centres not work by changing their data system. We can cause the enemy's headquarters to make incorrect judgments by sending disinformation. We can dominate the enemy's banking system and even its entire social order...."¹

Pillsbury summarizes what is in the case of China a centuries-old doctrine on this point: "Victory in warfare.... through possession of secret weapons that strike the enemy's most vulnerable point (called the acupuncture point) at precisely the decisive moment." "Information-intensified combat methods," explains a Chinese strategic thinker, "are like a Chinese boxer with knowledge of vital body points who can bring an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement."² True, the weapons are talked of most often in terms of the weaker party – China – defeating the stronger opponent – the USA. But surely, they would be as useful from the Chinese point of view, and, therefore, as sought after in dispatching a weaker opponent – like any of its immediate neighbours. Indeed, they would

¹Cited in *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, op. cit., p. 70.

²*ibid*, pp. xviii, 187.

be even more effective. Such an opponent is liable to have some of the same points of vulnerability – for instance, the nodes through which an integrated power grid can be tripped, the air-traffic and railway signaling systems – and is less liable to have developed the security devices that would forestall such an assault.

The extent to which China has, or can in the foreseeable future have such weapons continues to be a matter of intense debate: many scholars argue that, given what is known about the work going on in China's R&D facilities, given what is apparent about its manufacturing capabilities, given the fact that for conventional aircraft, ships and submarines that its armed forces require it has had to depend on imports, China is far from developing such weapons – on a scale and of a nature that can be a counter to the US arsenal. Many analysts remain skeptical of Chinese capabilities in this regard, several shrug off Chinese writings on these 21st century weapons as a "wish list". Others note, for instance, that its research and manufacturing base is just not sophisticated enough to enable it to fabricate advanced weaponry of this kind. They note that it has had to continue to purchase systems of even twenty years ago from countries such as Russia and Israel. Furthermore, that

.... China has rarely been successful in moving from simple reverse-engineering of foreign weapons to significantly advancing the indigenous capacity to produce new generation systems. This problem spans the past century and a half of Chinese weapons development, and has been exacerbated by myriad social, political and military upheavals over this period. Moreover, the nature of military technology – with its emphasis on software over hardware, and digital over analog technologies – complicates the already questionable over-reliance the Chinese have placed on reverse-engineering.¹

Of course, there is a handy aphorism for China to feign that it has the weapons when it does not! "Tie silk blossoms to the dead tree," counsel the compilers of *Thirty Six Strategies*. The commentator explains: "Tying silk blossoms on a dead tree gives the illusion that the tree is healthy. Through the use of artifice and disguise

¹Bates Gill, "Chinese military modernization and arms proliferation in the Asia-Pacific," in Jonathan D. Pollock and Richard H. Yang, *In China's Shadow, Regional perspectives on Chinese foreign policy and military development*, RAND, 1998, at p. 22.

make something of no value appear valuable; of no threat appear dangerous; of no use, useful."¹

On the other hand, in his informative study, *China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States*, Mark A. Stokes draws attention to an important distinction. "Ground force analysts, who tend to dominate the PLA studies field," he observes,

naturally view the PLA mostly in terms of field equipment such as tanks, artillery, basic soldier skills, maneuver, and firepower. Air force analysts usually focus on aircraft, aircraft production, and pilot skills. Navy analysts think of the PLA in terms of destroyers, frigates, and other sea-based platforms. From these perspectives, the PLA is viewed as hopelessly backward, with little prospect, at least within the next 15-20 years, of becoming a challenge to any power in the region. These analysts are not necessarily wrong in their conclusions. Conventional PLA ground, air and naval forces are woefully inadequate, and it is difficult to believe that they will be able to overcome shortcomings in the short to mid-term.

However, these analysts do not pay sufficient attention, he points out, to efforts that China is making for "the development of doctrine and systems designed to enable targeting of adversarial strategic and operational centers of gravity, and defend its own, in order to pursue limited political objectives with an asymmetrical economy of force...." In this view of what is required, he correctly emphasizes, it is not necessary for China to acquire across-the-board superiority in weapons systems:

There is a widespread perception that the technological level of the Chinese defense industrial complex, to include quality control, is just too far behind to ever produce weaponry which could challenge US supremacy. However, most within the PLA believe that matching the technological level of the United States is not necessary to complicate US power projection in the Asia-Pacific region. The predominant view within China, and that which was advocated by Deng Xiaoping, is that selective emphasis into a few "pockets of excellence" is enough.

"China's strategic modernization, if successful," he remarks, "will enable the PLA to conduct operations intended to directly achieve strategic effects by striking the enemy's centers of gravity. These

¹Stratagem 29, Stefan Verstappen, *The Thirty Six Strategies of Ancient China*, China Books and Periodicals, San Francisco, 1999.

operations are meant to achieve their objectives without having to necessarily engage the adversary's fielded military forces in extended operations...."¹ China's efforts in this regard are focused. They aim at ensuring information dominance. They aim at acquiring capabilities for precision targeting. They aim at developing an array of weapons which lie at the heart of this strategy, namely of attaining military objectives without having to engage in military hostilities.²

The point is not that these weapons and this kind of strategic thinking are meant to be a substitute for other forms of warfare. Quite the contrary. The object is to let loose warfare *across the board*. Such weapons, and targeting of economic and communication nodes, of control and command infrastructure, targeting the eyes and ears of the enemy – these are but devices through which China will ensure that it seizes and retains the initiative at every stage of an engagement. Accordingly, China is striving to develop devices through which it can cut off leaders of the enemy country from the people, leaders from each other, headquarters from field commanders, field commanders from soldiers in the field.... and thereby create such confusion and paralysis and demoralization that the enemy would conclude that it is better for him to come to an accommodation with China than to fight it. The point is to hit "the brain, heart and nervous system" of the enemy – simultaneously and massively; to inflict on him a blow so sudden and so devastating that it induces what military strategists call "strategic paralysis" – the enemy is just not able to respond to what happens thereafter.

The object is not necessarily to capture and hold territory of the enemy. It is not to annihilate large numbers. In a given situation, strategists may conclude that hitting military assets and units is an inefficient route to achieving the strategic objective – in a given circumstance there may well be other ways which will cause the enemy to heed the interests and preferences of China and yet be less likely to ignite a response.

And the more modern a society gets, the more it comes to have integrated systems, the more it comes to depend on technology.

¹Mark A. Stokes, *China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States*, RAND, 1999, pp.1-2, 135-36.

²See, for instance, Appendix III, "Space Support for Strategic Modernization," and Appendix IV, "China's Directed Energy Weapons," in Stokes, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-214.

Chinese scholars and strategists see great opportunity in this. As Stokes points out "AMS [Academy of Military Sciences] writings note that the United States relies on satellite platforms for 70 percent of its communication (90 percent for Navy communications) and 90 percent of its intelligence. Chinese strategists and engineers perceive US reliance on communications, reconnaissance, and navigation satellites as a potential 'Achilles' heel'...."¹ Reviewing Chinese writings on the subject, Stokes notes, "Engineers have conducted feasibility studies on introducing viruses (*bingdu*) into adversary's computer systems from long distances *via* wireless means. Besides serving as a means to attack computer networks, these studies have been useful in developing countermeasures to enemy attempts to inject viruses into Chinese computers."² China is reported to have made substantial advance in micro-electronics, for instance, and also in developing and acquiring some of the weapons systems that have so dazzled the world in the last decade. The infrastructure China has put in place for modern communications, the capabilities it has acquired in space technologies point in the same direction.³

¹*ibid*, p. 117. As one can imagine, attacking the "acupuncture points" of an integrated economy is also in the sights of terrorist groups. The founder of an Islamic website explains, "As information technology comes to rule every part of our life, it is no longer necessary to have rockets to destroy an electrical facility. Instead, penetrating the enemy's networks and planting your code will get a better result." Faris Muhammad Al-Masri, cited by Giles Norman <http://www.it-director.com/article.php?id+2744> ; *Examining the Cyber Capabilities of Islamic Terrorist Groups*, Technical Advisory Group, Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College, November 2003/March 2004, at www.ists.dartmouth.edu.

²Stokes, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

³In the testimony that he gave to the US Congress' Committee in February 2004, another expert from RAND had this to report,

"The Chinese military is in the midst of a C4I revolution, characterized by the wholesale shift over the last twenty years from relatively insecure analog communications to digital, secure communications via fiber optic cable, satellite, microwave, and enhanced high-frequency radio. Specifically, the PLA has:

- Laid thousands of kilometers of buried fiber optic cable connected by modern switches and routers, extending high speed, secure, communication to nearly every unit in the force;
- Deployed large computer network intranets on this fiber backbone, dedicated to operational command and control, training, logistics, finances, and education among other subjects.

In future, the PLA will continue to build an infrastructure that is increasingly ...

But there is another point of relevance to us in India. We cannot wrest much comfort even from the "skeptics", those who believe that China is far from acquiring the weapons systems that are associated with electronic and other forms of modern warfare. The threshold for such analysts is, "Will China have in the next 10-15 years 'magic weapons' of such capabilities and on such a scale as to be able to offset the weapons and technologies liable to be available *to the United States?*" Clearly, China may not have weapons of that kind or on the scale that would neutralize the enormous lead the US has in this field, and yet have enough to disrupt life and systems to an unacceptable degree in India, and in other countries on its rim.

Even if we assume that India is not in China's sights at all; even if China is preparing itself only against possible moves by the USA against it, *that* preparation is bound to have consequences for India: it will alter relative power in the world; in particular, it will alter relative power in the region that directly impinges on India; it will alter the working of international institutions – from the Security Council to the WTO – each of which can impact India's interests.

We should observe the same caution in reading American assessments of China's military modernization. They often conclude that China still has a long way to go before it acquires capabilities associated with modern forces. We cannot afford to be lulled into complacency by such assessments. These are *from the point of view, and by the standards of the USA*. They aim to gauge, "To what extent will China represent a threat *to the USA?*", "By when is China likely to acquire weapons systems by which it will constitute a threat *to the USA?*", "What are the likely scenarios over Taiwan?" In fact, China itself is acutely aware of its relative weaknesses *vis-à-vis* the Americans, and we may safely conclude that it will go to the farthest

... digital, automated, encrypted, faster, secure, and wider in terms of bandwidth." See, Evan S. Medeiros, RAND, "Analyzing China's Defense Industries and the Implications for Chinese Military Modernization," Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Chinese Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Politico-Military Relations, 6 February, 2004. For a summary of the debate among "skeptics" – those who think that China does not have and will not in the next 10-15 years have such weapons – and "optimists" – those who think that China will have them – see, Paul H.B. Godwin, *China's Defense Modernization: Aspirations and Capabilities*, Project Asia, Center for Strategic Studies, CNA Corporation, 2001.

extent not to provoke a crisis that will trigger direct US intervention or retaliation. But how can that lead to the inference that it does not have the capacity, or will not have the gumption to slap India *a la* 1962?

To take a specific case, while it is true that Chinese preparations are dominated by what its strategists expect over Taiwan, the question we must keep in mind is different. Will the technologies, weapons systems, force-projection capabilities that it acquires for the Taiwan straits not have consequences for India? The typical American assessment concludes that the weapons systems and capabilities that China is likely to develop for the Taiwan theatre will not be enough to stand up to the weapons systems that the US will deploy for the defence of Taiwan:

....the vast majority of existing weapons in the PLA inventory, even when their capabilities are maximized by equipment modification or employment techniques, simply do not have the range to be used in an offensive manner against many modern high technology weapons systems with long-range target acquisition, stand-off, and precision strike capabilities.¹

But will those weapons systems, even more so the capabilities that would have enabled China to build those weapons systems not be enough for harming north Indian cities from Tibet? For projecting force into Arunachal?

There is an even more elementary consideration. We benchmark ourselves against what we used to be – and ever so often feel comfortable in the knowledge that our ways are better than they used to be. China benchmarks itself against the United States; it aims at eventually overtaking the latter. And for the period that it is still the weaker of the two, it devises capacities for “asymmetric warfare” through “magic weapons”, etc. We will not be able to hold our own even in our region if we reconcile ourselves to the current, and growing gap between China and India. In any case, we should at least follow China’s example *vis-à-vis* the USA. Today much of China’s strategic planning *vis-à-vis* the USA is directed at devising ways by

¹Dennis J. Blasko, “A new PLA force structure,” in *The PLA in the Information Age*, James C. Mulvenon and Andrew Yang (eds.), RAND, 1999; see also, James C. Mulvenon, “The PLA Army’s struggle for identity,” in *The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition*, Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti (eds.), Center for Study of Chinese Military Affairs, 2003.

which a weaker State may overcome a stronger State. If we are going to be a State weaker than China for some years, should we not be planning *vis-à-vis* China the way it is planning *vis-à-vis* the US?

The fact that such weapons are being talked of even in open-source writings can be adduced to argue either way: that they are just ideas – the military equivalent of science fiction – and have not been developed, that by talking of them the Chinese are trying to mislead potential adversaries into believing that they actually have them and are, therefore, more formidable than they in fact are; in the alternate that because such weapons are being talked of openly, the capabilities the Chinese must be having are even more fearsome. Prudence counsels that, while not being frightened, in this regard we take the Chinese at their word. In August 1999, President Jiang Zemin formally asked scientists and strategists to develop such weapons on a priority basis. Since then, to take one example, the Chinese have been openly recruiting "an army of hackers".¹

We should take these claims seriously all the more because, for one thing, *the lead-time for developing such weapons, and weapons to neutralize or counter such weapons is very long indeed.* To brush aside these open discussions, and lose a decade could spell the difference between security and a crippling blow.

Second, by the very nature of such weapons, conclusive proof will not be available till they are actually deployed – and then it will be too late to conjure up counters to them. Evidence about them will be carefully concealed till that sudden moment when China would have demonstrated such overwhelming superiority that others would have no option but to reconcile themselves to the new balance of forces. One must identify the possible threat by imagination rather than wait for confirmed intelligence, and prepare shields as well as counter-weapons. And there is a perilous difficulty here. The country that is committed to peace, the "*status quo* power" as the term goes, is at a perpetual disadvantage. Whether it is the terrorist or it is a country like China or Pakistan that is out to alter the existing configuration, it can set a target date, and leapfrog to that moment. It can skip the intermediate stages – in developing or acquiring weapons, for

¹US-China Security Review Commission, *The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China*, op. cit., pp. 20, 124.

instance. A country like India or the US, on the other hand, has to be *prepared at every turn*, it cannot let the hostile power – be it a terrorist organization, an insurrectionary movement or a China – acquire such a lead, however momentary, that *at that moment* it will be able to shatter through the defences.

Of course, weapons are not everything. The three wars – the war over Kuwait, that in Afghanistan, the war to acquire Iraq – showed vividly both facets – what can be accomplished by the new weapons and methods of warfare as well as their limitations. The new weapons and stratagems can vanquish organized, concentrated forces swiftly. They can, as the phrase went, shock and awe. But after the initial victory, the country has to be held. It has to be governed. Goods and services, rights and institutions – deprivation of which, denial of which were the rationale for intervention in the first place – have to be made available. That process just cannot be compressed the way the military campaign could be. In this aftermath – as has been made so clear once again in Iraq recently – men *will* die, body bags will arrive home. And disenchantment *will* set in – especially among those who had been most enthused about the war, expecting it to be a swift, clean victory. Weapons and technologies notwithstanding, in the end the country has to be prepared to sacrifice lives. Americans showed in Iraq that they are not prepared to do this. India showed in Kargil that *we are*. For America, the prescription has to be: acquire that singular capacity. For us, the prescription is: acquire those weapons.

Thus, we should pursue the course which will maximize options for the future. Nor must one assume that long lead times are required just for “magic weapons”. Look at what has happened in Nepal. The Nepalese Government thought of the country as a peaceful kingdom. “We never imagined that we could have such a problem,” the then Foreign Minister of the country told me when we met at a BIMSTEC conference in Colombo. “We did not, therefore, modernize our Army, we did not pay attention to training it for such contingencies.” As governments succeeded governments, as politicians were consumed tripping other politicians, as instability and intrigue disabled the Palace, Maoist insurgents swelled – in arms, in audacity, in the sway they acquired through fear over villages upon villages. Eventually they started attacks in Kathmandu itself. Nepal could not field the requisite force overnight.

Coasting along, neglecting to engage in the kind of research, neglecting to build the kind of fabrication facilities that will produce these esoteric weapons systems that China is set at acquiring, hoping that China will flounder, or that in the end it will turn benign is the surest way to put future options beyond our reach. Often a country has to walk alternative paths simultaneously. Talking with the Chinese, trading with them, exploring formulae with them to see if they will whittle down their claims to territory we regard as our own – doing so does not exempt us from simultaneously ensuring military preparedness. Indeed, acquiring military muscle may be the one thing that will convince the other side that it is best to settle disputes through discussions. Most important, we must always bear in mind that disputes about the alignment of borders are minor ones compared to the singular objective of China – that it shall be the dominant power in this region in the immediate future and the dominant power far beyond in the decades to come. The lead-time in developing and assimilating these technologies is very long. Therefore, even if one's view is that either reading is possible – that the recent conduct of China indicates that it *has* changed; that its progressive integration in the international economic order, that sustained engagement with it *has* "socialized" it; that it is conducting itself as a responsible member of the international community; or that China is behaving in this way only to gain time in which it acquires that overwhelming degree of strength which will compel everyone to heed its preferences – either way, prudence dictates that we equip ourselves militarily. Prudence dictates that even as we pursue diplomatic, peaceful options, Cromwell-like we "keep our powder dry."

A capability that has already been developed

Whether some of the more science-fiction like weapons are round the corner or not, the Chinese have already made substantial progress in acquiring capacities for Information Warfare. By the pragmatic policies they have pursued, as we have seen, they have been able to get a number of Taiwanese hardware firms to shift their production facilities to the Mainland. Similarly, few of us realize that China has a very extensive and highly developed software capability: it is not as much in the news because, unlike its Indian counterpart, it is oriented

towards the domestic market. Both their modernization programmes as well as the Gulf, Afghan, Kosovo and Iraq wars have led the Chinese to redouble their work on Information Warfare.

Chinese theorists see another potential in this form of "no contact warfare". Everyone who has access to a computer can be mobilized for overwhelming the enemy: these new technologies make possible the wide participation of hundreds of thousands that Mao envisaged in his People's War doctrine, they point out. Chinese authorities are full of the enormous damage that even a single teenage hacker can inflict on both the economy and the control and command systems of a country such as the US – given how highly integrated its systems are, and how totally dependent they are on the proper functioning of modern information and communication technologies. Chinese writers stress again and again that the quantum of damage that the single hacker may inflict in seconds and at next to no cost could well exceed what divisions using weapons may be able to inflict even with full scale assault. For this among other reasons, the Chinese have been preparing themselves for such warfare very systematically and very energetically.

Timothy Thomas lists a host of groups that China has organized for – to take one instance – overwhelming servers in the US. Indeed, as he narrates, China has set up regular contingents in different centres for waging such warfare. It has been paying close attention to methods of linking thousands of computers and of mobilizing them at short notice to target some specific system or site or server. Second, he sets out how China has been conducting exercises regularly in this sphere. Third, he and Yoshihara both record the attacks it has actually carried out on US systems, sites, servers, etc. in recent years. And, fourth, it turns out that the attacks in fact succeeded in penetrating those systems – including systems of US defence forces, and inflicted substantial damage.¹

The official position of the Chinese Government, of course, is white as fresh snow. An official of the Chinese Embassy told the *Los Angeles Times* in April, 2002, "It is not the Chinese Government's policy to

¹For specific examples of each of the elements mentioned above, see, Timothy Thomas, "Like Adding Wings to a Tiger: Chinese information war theory and practice," Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, November, 2000.

disrupt the computer system of any other country." "We do research on the security of computers," he said, for "self-defence to understand how a hacker can get into our computer systems so we could find it.... But China has never assumed an offensive stance with regards to computer technology."

Known facts belie the claim. In China, severe punishments are inflicted on those who are caught hacking into Chinese sites. Chinese newspapers carry reports of the extreme punishments that have been meted out to hackers. How come, therefore, analysts ask, that *some* hackers' groups operating from within China – the China Eagle group, the Hackers Union of China, the Green Army Corps – flaunt their activities openly? For news of their exploits, of their meetings, in the case of the China Eagle Union even the photographs and bio-data of their members have been put out by them on the net. On occasion, senior officials have shared platforms with the leading members of such groups. Moreover, on several occasions – the attacks on Indonesian sites in 1998 after anti-Chinese riots there, the attacks on American sites in 1999 after the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the attacks in January 2000 on Japanese sites, the disfiguring of almost a thousand American sites in the wake of the spy plane incident – the hackers have acted in unison, as packs.¹

It is true that, as has been said, thus far these "invasions" have by and large been the equivalent of "bar-room brawls" – the most common foray has been in the form of mere defacement of a site. But the very fact that such groups are being allowed to acquire expertise, that even in open source writings China is talking of concepts and possibilities in this regard show that we must equip ourselves for both – to use such technologies, and to insulate ourselves against an adversary who is acquiring capacities to launch them at others.

There is another point we must bear in mind. Popular conceptions of Information Warfare are confined mostly to hacking, and in that also mainly to defacing sites. In fact, that is the simplest instance of what may be done. "Trojan horses" can be embedded in hardware or software that collect and transmit data from the memory of the computer when it is connected to the Internet or to any other

¹For informative accounts on these groups, see the websites of Internet security groups such as *iDEFENSE*, <http://www.idefense.com>.

network. Viruses can be let loose that destroy or, what would be even better in matters such as targeting, corrupt data. The counterpart of "sleepers" in espionage can be embedded in chips and in other components which destroy or corrupt information after designated periods, or when triggered by some external impulse. Entire networks, all devices located in vast expanses can be disrupted by sudden surges engineered through electro-magnetic weapons. Deterrence, the power to launch massive retaliation, the power to pulverize anyone who attacks you, does not work against such an adversary: he has so arranged affairs that you cannot detect who he is, nor where he is.

In a word, Information Warfare can be unleashed through scores of routes. Moreover, the lightning speed at which the attacks can be engineered – in milliseconds – the surreptitiousness with which the virus can be introduced, the vast variety of *modus operandi* that can be used, all leave no opportunity for "analysis", for thinking through and planning a response once the attack has been unleashed. Resources must be devoted to insulating devices and networks at the very outset – from ensuring that the devices measure up to safety standards, to building redundancies and firewalls, to building capacities to swiftly locate and neutralize the source of the assault, and to repair and replace the affected infrastructure. And all these mechanisms must be continually updated through unremitting research, through probes by hackers.

There are three other points to bear in mind in this context. First, electro-magnetic weapons have been under development *since the 1960s*. Second, it isn't just that China alone is developing them, and shall have them. They could as well come into the hands of terrorist groups – considerable capabilities in regard to them can be acquired by using off-the-shelf, commercially available components. Consider, for instance, the following: "Many of the technologies required to build RFWs [Radio Frequency Weapons] have been described in open sources and have been sold to many countries. For example, Sweden announced, in 1997, that they had bought RFW technology from Russia, had reengineered it, and then used it to test effects on elements of their infrastructure. Dr. David Schriener, a former Navy engineer, testified before the Joint Economic Committee, 15 February 1998 that '.... such a weapon could be made by anyone with an

engineering degree or even a bright technician with good hardware experience. The technical information required can be found in open sources, if not just from good common engineering sense. The required materials are not special and if the effort is made, advanced concepts can be made using everyday hardware such as automotive ignition system.¹ Third, it is just as vital to see the very long term over which such weapons may be deployed: a server, a stack of computers, software acquired today may contain the bug that will be activated years from now. At the least, therefore, to take one example, the software that sensitive users will incorporate in their systems must be indigenously designed.

In a sense, there is an even more pressing chasm. In the controversy about Chinese capabilities in regard to weapons of the Gulf-Afghanistan-Iraq wars variety the operating consideration has to be the length of time it will take us to develop counter-capabilities once we get conclusive proof that China indeed has acquired or developed such systems. There can be no comparable dispute about conventional capacities. Has China already not got the capacity to execute an "educational campaign" in, say, Arunachal? Are the capacities it already has in regard to atomic weapons and missiles – by now, "conventional" weapons – not far greater than our capacities? India's gravest strategic failure, an expert in the field instructs me, has been a military posture of passive defence – and that too only against Pakistan. In regard to the growing capabilities of China, we have just looked the other way and hoped that it will choose to do nothing. This has been compounded in the last two-three years by the delusion that the growing trade between India and China will make China aware of the advantages of friendly relations with India!

All of one voice!

We should also remember that China has an unbroken tradition in regard to such potential weapons and sources of military strength. Thinking about them, devising them, integrating them into tactics and strategy, better still crafting tactics and strategies around them is in the

¹Howard J. Seguire, "Impact of Radio Frequency Weapons on National Security and National Infrastructure," in William R. Schilling, *Nontraditional Warfare, Twenty First Century, Threats and Responses*, Brassey's Inc., Washington, D.C., 2002, pp. 273-82, at p. 280.

very genes of Chinese strategists. As is the counsel that such capacity as one acquires in regard to them must be kept secret. Recall Sun Tzu:

All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when we are far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to the enemy, and crush him.... Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle....¹

Remember the 300 year old *The Wiles of War* that we have encountered above: Hide your capacities, the strategist counsels, conceal your intentions:

Reassure the enemy to make it slack, work in secret to subdue it; prepare fully before taking action to prevent the enemy from changing his mind: this is the method of hiding a strong will under a compliant appearance....

Be the "smiling tiger", the manual counsels. Indeed, go further: if the enemy happens to be strong, puff it up:

When the enemy is strong and cannot be easily overcome, we should puff it up with humble words and ample gifts and wait till it reveals its weak point to subdue it once and for all. The principle goes, 'When the enemy is humble, make it proud.'²

And Mao's dictum: "To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds."³ Again, recall Deng's counsel, and that of others over the last two decades: "China must '*tao guang yang hui*,' which," Pillsbury explains, "literally translated means 'Hide brightness, nourish obscurity,' or, as the official Beijing interpretation translates the four-character idiom, 'Bide our time and build up our capabilities'."⁴ And

¹Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981, 1.18-20.

²*The Wiles of War*, *op. cit.* pp. 88-89.

³Recalled by the Director of the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in his foreword to Yoshihara's study of Chinese capabilities in Information Warfare, Toshi Yoshihara, "Chinese Information Warfare: a phantom menace or emerging threat?," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, November, 2001.

⁴Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, *op. cit.*, p. xxxix.

read what the Vice Commandant of the Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing, General Mi Zhenyu says now:

For a relatively long time, it will be absolutely necessary that we quietly nurse our sense of vengeance. We must conceal our abilities and bide our time.¹

Hide your capabilities – such as the “magic weapons” you may have acquired – till these have reached the point of such superiority that, unleashed suddenly, they will overwhelm the enemy.

As a result, the opponent would not have taken preventive – to say nothing of preemptive – steps when he could have done so; and, when you at last announce your capabilities, or, better still, when you give him an actual taste of them, it would be too late for him to do anything about them – he would have no option but to reconcile himself to, and acquiesce in your superiority.

A lemma

There is an obvious lemma: denounce anyone who tries to alert the potential victim about what he is liable to suddenly face five-ten years hence. As China is no threat at all, the denunciations are certain to run, the self-appointed Cassandra has some ulterior motive in crying, “Wolf”. Clearly, he is out to rupture the painstaking work that has been done over the last decade to improve Sino-Indian relations....

The Americans certainly are taking seriously the Chinese focus on developing such weapons, and on carrying through the transformations that are required in the structures of the PLA, in their very culture – the “Revolution in Military Affairs.” While introducing *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, Pillsbury notes that China has recorded many successes in stealth technology already.² A recent RAND study notes, “China is one of the world’s leaders in ‘obscurant’ technology – technology designed to degrade an adversary’s reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition and weapon guidance capabilities....”³ It would be odd that a country that does

¹Cited in Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China*, Alfred Knopf, 1997, p. 1.

²Michael Pillsbury, *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, National Defense University, 1997; Indian Edition, Lancer, 1998, p. xlv.

³Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, *Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from history and doctrinal writings*, RAND, 2000, p. 66.

not face any "clear and present" danger from China – the USA – should be taking its abilities and plans in this vital sphere seriously, and that we should not prepare for them.

Remember Sun Tzu again:

At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards simulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.¹

Develop such capabilities, hide them, and then strike at the enemy's weak point – suddenly, with overwhelming impact: "That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg....;" let it be "like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along its course;" let it be like "...the swoop of a falcon...." "Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy," Sun Tzu admonishes. "Therefore," he says, "the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision."²

In India, there is quite a lot of talk of China these days. Almost all of it is about the success that China has had in modernizing its economy, in the rapid rates of growth that it has attained. This talk is useful – it goads us into improving the ways we take our economic decisions. But the talk has an unintended consequence: the focus on China's economic achievements shuts our eyes to the other modernization that is proceeding simultaneously – that of the country's armed forces.

Technology plus

"Magic weapons", Information Warfare capabilities are just instances of one of the principal determinants of warfare today: technology. Many years ago, in his book, *Profiles of Tomorrow*, Arthur Clarke had formulated two propositions about technological development: whatever is possible, comes to pass; and it comes to pass sooner than anyone had thought possible! To these we can add two more that are of immediate relevance:

- The new technology shall have consequences that reach farther than anyone had thought would be the case;

¹ *The Art of War*, op. cit., XI.60-61, 67-68.

² *ibid*, IV.14, V.4, 12-14.

- ❑ Governmental structures are the least well attuned to anticipating either such changes or their effects – individuals, mavericks, think tanks, “market forces” outside governmental structures are much better at doing so. So, at the least the governmental structures must be open to hearing what is being said in circles outside their own.

The propositions are even truer in regard to weapons than they are in other spheres. Nor is it much comfort that our immediate enemy is not yet capable of developing the technologies and weapons with which to hurt us. He may not have developed the technology but a more distant adversary may loan him its use: Pakistan did not have the capacity to develop either atomic weapons or missiles on its own, but China and North Korea enabled it to acquire both; similarly, China has placed several imaging and reconnaissance satellites in orbit; Pakistan will have ready access to the information they gather and transmit. The US is reported to be mapping every object on earth to within 5 to 10 meters in absolute coordinates and within 1 meter in relative coordinates. Chinese analysts have been emphasizing that the Gulf War itself marked a watershed in the types of technologies that were deployed and the scale at which so many different technologies could be deployed simultaneously. True, Pakistan does not have that technology today. But not only may a US Administration give the information to Pakistan; a few years from now, not only may some private firm be selling the images in real time to whoever is prepared to pay the price; what India is doing at that time may not fit into what the US or China perceive as being in its interest. Assume Indian forces are advancing in or towards Pakistan. The US or China decides that the advance will upset *its* plans for the area at that moment – say, it needs Pakistan at that time for some purpose as it needs it today to locate Osama bin Laden. It declares, “Stop your advance – else we transfer these images to Pakistan right away.”

These developments naturally are changing the character of warfare every few years. While many were crowing over the fact that Americans could not stand the sight of body-bags being brought home, their technologists and armed forces had redefined warfare – in part to minimize American casualties: in the entire Gulf War, the US suffered only 340 dead; in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2004, the figure was just 153 fatalities

– just 12 in 2001, 43 in 2002, 46 in 2003, 52 in 2004. But just as many were crowing over the wonders that new technology had wrought, a handful of old-fashioned guerilla fighters inflicted substantial casualties on US forces in Iraq.

Generals are often warned not to prepare for the last war. There is an important lemma to that: never underestimate the extent to which the adversary may devise an entirely new type of war.¹

As they are not able to suffer casualties, American strategists and technologists so designed their assault in the Gulf War that their casualties were in the second order of smalls. But then many drew some other, equally comforting lessons from the Gulf War. Chinese analysts attributed American success in good part to the fact that “the terrain in Kuwait and Southern Iraq is a flat desert where it is

¹Or apply hoary dicta in novel ways! Timothy Thomas shows how deftly the ancient Chinese maxims we have encountered can be, and are translated into our times – of Information Warfare and the rest:

Strategy one is “fool the emperor to cross the sea.” This means that in order to lower the enemy’s guard you must act in the open hiding your true intentions under the guise of common every day activities. The IW application would be to use regular email services or business links over the Internet to mask the insertion of malicious code or viruses. Strategy two is ‘besiege Wei to rescue Zhao.’ This means that when the enemy is too strong to attack directly, then attack something he holds dear. The IW application is that if you can’t hit someone with nuclear weapons due to the catastrophic effects on your own country, then attack the servers and nets responsible for Western financial, power, political and other systems’ stability with electrons. Strategy three is ‘kill with a borrowed sword.’ This means that when you do not have the means to attack your enemy directly, then attack using the strength of another. The IW application is simple – send your viruses or malicious code through a cut out or another country. Strategy four is ‘await the exhausted enemy at your ease.’ This means that it is an advantage to choose the time and place for battle. Encourage your enemy to expend his energy in futile quests while you conserve your strength. When he is exhausted and confused, you attack with energy and purpose. The IW application here is to send out multiple attacks while saving the significant attack for the time when the West’s computer emergency response teams (CERT) are engaged. Finally, strategy five is ‘loot a burning house.’ This means that when a country is beset by internal conflicts, then it will be unable to deal with an outside threat. The IW application is to put hackers inside the West (under the guise of a student or business) and attack from the inside. While chaos reigns, steal from information resource bases.” Timothy Thomas, “Like Adding Wings to a Tiger: Chinese information war theory and practice,” Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, November, 2000.

difficult to build long-term solid fortifications" because the sand layer is so thin. Even though the Iraqi forces were handicapped by this basic feature, the analysts noted, "The United States took a long time to tackle them ... in 38 days they flew 10,000 sorties, and eliminated only 40 percent of the Iraqi forces." Hence, the Chinese analysts inferred, "If the Iraqi forces could have relied on mountainous areas and built tunnels with layers more than 10 meters or even dozens of meters thick, then even if the U.S. forces could have cut several meters away from the peak, they could not have hurt the Iraqi forces one little bit."¹

Afghanistan not being flat, would the Taliban strategist have been justified in reposing confidence in the Chinese analyst? The Afghan mountains had many hard-to-detect caves, true. For centuries these had provided almost invincible cover, true. But when the Americans hurled down bombs that sucked oxygen out of miles upon square miles, how secure were those who had taken shelter in the caves?

In a word, we have to be prepared for ever-newer forms of warfare. Today, for instance, the international situation will not allow us to move massive forces across borders for any length of time. Pakistan has deployed one possible alternative – that of sending terrorists across. We have not acquired that capacity.

That fact of contemporary life – large forces cannot be sent across international borders – is yet another reason for developing an array of non-conventional capabilities – Special Forces, capabilities like precision bombing that the world witnessed during the Gulf and Iraq wars: such capabilities, even more important *an array* of capabilities of that sort, alone will equip us with options. More often than not, if all one can do is "All or nothing," one has to opt for further analysis!

Moreover, in regard to each newer type of warfare, a country that is not planning to be the aggressor has to prepare for the entire spectrum of violence in those ever-changing forms of warfare: for it is the adversary who will determine what he will unleash. We have to have the capability to locate the movement of a Pakistani armoured corps via our satellites, but we must also have the intelligence network to locate the terrorist hiding in a rented house in the old city.

¹See, for instance, Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, *op. cit.*, Chap. II.

We have to have the capability to take out an in-coming missile. But we have also to have the capability to take out a military command centre or terrorist school located under a hospital inside a dense residential colony in Muridke with least collateral damage.

In his USI National Security Lecture, President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam made an important point: acquiring non-strategic technologies is not going to be sufficient to defend our country; as for strategic technologies, no one is going to sell them to us.¹ That simple truth entails a host of tasks. For one thing, we have to “walk on two legs” – that is, to ensure first of all that no significant technological gap develops between us and our adversaries and their patrons: for this reason we have to acquire the latest weapons and technologies to the maximum extent that we can; and we must simultaneously develop our own capacities to build the requisite weapons systems. The latter in turn entails that we

- Ensure much greater accountability and swifter delivery by organizations such as the DRDO – how is it that we have been able to construct missiles on our own, fabricate satellites and put them in space on our own, do much in nuclear technology in the face of technology denial, but have suffered so many setbacks in manufacturing an efficient battle tank, and in the training jet we have sought to build at HAL? Are our ordnance factories up to mark? What is the failure rate of weapons and ammunition produced in these?
- Stanch the haemorrhage of so many scientists and technologists to the West.
- Reverse the decline in enrolment of students in basic sciences, and now even in engineering and technology courses.
- Reverse the precipitate collapse of standards in higher education.
- Move much more swiftly than we have to rope in the private sector’s creativity for defence production.

Nor is it just a question of acquiring a “magic weapon” or a new technology. The organization of forces, the capabilities of the last man to master and use that technology have to be honed. That requires continuous transformation. For ever.

¹*Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. CXXVI, No. 526, October-December, 1996; cited in A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, *India 2020, A vision for the new millennium*, Viking, New Delhi, 1998, p. 5.

To lull oneself into complacency because we have made some incremental improvements in our battle tank when others are developing long-range precision missiles that make tanks obsolete, when they are redefining warfare itself is to court suicide. Grafting a new weapon or device on to an organizational structure, and even more so on to a pattern of thinking that remains unchanged, will not suffice: it is to believe, as an analyst observes, that "had Patton's tanks been equipped with the GPS, his divisions would have embodied the RMA." "Rather, the true RMA represents an entirely new manner of warfare, using information, long-range precision strike, and other tools to destroy an enemy's ability and will to fight without closing on the battlefield and exchanging tank fire; without sending vulnerable aircraft deep into hostile airspace; and without deploying aircraft carriers close to an enemy coast."¹ And while acquiring such capacities, as the world has been reminded by the guerrillas in Iraq, the country must retain the "pre-RMA" capacity to hold its own against old-fashioned fighters.

Organizations ossify. Governmental organizations do so all the sooner. Moreover, almost every governmental organization is large. As a result, its members' days are filled just talking to, and fending off each other. And each governmental organization is hierarchical – so that the position of the man who is advancing the idea rather than the intrinsic merit of the idea determines the distance it travels. Few new ideas creep in. Those that do, are swiftly digested, and reduced to ineffectual homilies. What will "magic weapons" do if the military organization, indeed the larger set up that takes decisions on military affairs, is of this type? Therefore, the Revolution in Military Affairs is not a matter merely of weapons. Higher ups must be open to frequent, incessant interaction with a heterogeneous lot. They must ensure follow through on the ideas that are thrown up. A good instance of how things should *not* be is provided by the Prime Minister's Economic and Trade Advisory Councils. They do have persons who could give lateral inputs. But the bodies seldom meet. When the meetings take place, they are rituals. The PM reads a

¹Michael J. Mazarr, "Chaos theory and US military strategy: A 'leapfrog' strategy for US Defence Policy," in *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*, conference convened by National Defense University and RAND Corporation, 1996, pp. 155-56.

prepared statement. The members deliver their set interventions. Some pious "decisions" are taken. And everyone disperses for lunch. Is the meeting of the Prime Minister with Army commanders less of a ritual?

The weapons systems, the defence forces, the structures that plan and execute defence strategies, the country's diplomacy, the systems of governance as a whole, have to have "instantaneous flexibility". They have to have the agility to respond to perpetual surprise.

We cannot expect flexible responses from inflexible organizations, nor creative, out-of-the-box thinking from "know it alls", from set philosophies. That is the lesson: the Revolution in Military Affairs is not just about technologies, it isn't even about a few new ideas. New, adaptable, modular organizations; entirely new ways of thinking; open, modest, "listening" philosophies – that rest on the opposite premise from the traditional dogmas, persons who believe that they are *not* the repositories of all knowledge, that they have a lot to learn, that every new event, every new configuration requires a fresh answer. Our Five Year Plans are a classic example of what has to be shunned: "No, no this is not the sixth Five Year Plan," the late Raj Krishna used to say. "It is the sixth edition of the First Plan!" Contrast that sort of thinking with the way a terrorist organization thinks: each operation is an out-of-the-box brain wave. And one of the root causes for successive Five Year Plans being just heavier and heavier editions of the same set themes is that the organization producing them has remained moribund *as an organization*. Silos, committees, working groups, the lowest common denominator, in a word "group think".

Every technological change has far-reaching implications – and not just on the battlefield. To take a simple example, the real-time, almost instant reporting of war events means that an element that decision makers have always had to contend with – public reaction to the zigzags of war – presses even more forcefully upon them. It also entails that they have even less time to take decisions. Contemplate the rout of a part of the country's armour; TV screens all over the country show vast areas strewn with wrecks of its tanks, they show in every home pictures of corpses – of brave soldiers as they scrambled to get out of the burning tanks. And within next to no time, the TV channels bring images of distraught widows of the

soldiers, of their children. Which leader of a democratic society will be able to disregard the ensuing clamour?

There is another lemma of technological change. A large proportion of the technologies are in fact being developed *outside* the governmental systems. That has an immediate consequence. While "magic weapons" will naturally be kept hidden, and will not be shared even with the closest ally, much of the latest and relevant technology will be available off-the-shelf, commercially. In the very near future, for instance, as Alvin Toffler noted, news networks will be able to provide live, real-time coverage of the course of battles: every adversary will have access to this information. Similarly, an adversary like Pakistan is far behind us in rocketry and satellite technology, as well as in image-gathering and resolution. But it will be able to buy much of what it will need commercially: "Imagery of half-metre resolution," Air Vice-Marshals Kak had noted five years ago in his valuable survey, "is envisaged to be commercially available by the latter half of 2001."¹ Of course, when hostilities break out the targeted country will be able to blind the satellites supplying such information, and thereby inflict an important disability on the adversary. But doing so will not be enough to neutralize the advantage that would have accrued in the period *up to* the outbreak of hostilities: the images of structures required for programming missiles, to take one instance, would already be in the possession of the enemy.

Even the lone terrorist abolishes the distinction between the "front" and "rear". The new technologies do so in a comprehensive way. All hostilities in future will be war-in-depth. That will require preparations of an entirely different order from the ones to which we are accustomed. For instance, we must train and equip the people at large how to get back on their feet "the morning after" – when water supply systems, power supply, and much else have been knocked out.

To take an even more elementary example: we have to bring our notions of security up to date with these developments in technology.

¹Air Vice Marshal (Retd.) Kapil Kak, "India's Defence Modernization," in *India's National Security, Annual Review 2001*, Satish Kumar, ed., Vikas, New Delhi, 2002, p. 317.

What protection did the "No photography allowed" signs at our airports and bridges ensure in this age of satellite imagery, of micro-cameras? Or recall the recent contretemps over "oil security". Spending *Rs. eighty thousand crore* on importing oil every year as we do, for us, true security would consist in developing alternate energy technology and sources. And how much did we set apart for research on solar energy last year? *Rs. four crore and twenty lakh!* How much did we spend on developing more efficient apparatus for wind power? *Rs. one crore and ninety lakh!* The technology for producing an inexhaustible additive to petrol – ethanol – has been known for more than half a century: ethanol was used here in India during the Second World War; Brazil has been using it for decades. Countless committees having urged it, we had just about commenced usage. The Government changed. And that beginning has come to a crawl. Technology for extracting substitutes for diesel from oilseeds has been developed at our own institutes; the requisite oilseeds that will grow even in wastelands have been identified. The scientists who have developed the technology are knocking from door to door. We were among the first to install biogas plants: I don't have to request you to imagine what we have done to overcome the small problem – of low fermentation rate in winter – that caused so many to give up on this perpetual, renewable source. Energy from municipal waste, energy from stalks of paddy – technology for all these is available. Individual plants too have been set up using it. But each plant is by now mired in the familiar bog – neglect by the State apparatus, huge debts that have piled up because the state electricity boards have not paid their dues....

At the same level of incomprehension, we have opened up oil exploration, we have opened up terminals, we have opened up pipelines to private participation. Indeed, we hold road-shows across the world inviting foreigners to invest in these activities. And then balk at their operating petrol pumps: war, oil security, the importance of petrol pumps in time of war, we shout! That mapping the seabed near our shore can provide information vital in naval operations; that setting up terminals gives the foreigner not just access to but presence in our ports; that handing over the construction, ownership and maintenance of pipelines across vast expanses of our country enables a foreign firm that is so minded to do a hundred things to

injure our security – none of this seems to matter. But petrol pumps – why, he may put them in his pocket and run away the moment a war is declared....

We post policemen upon policemen at our airports to check passengers. But a while ago, ground-handling in four major airports was assigned to a company without the least check on its antecedents. A colleague telephoned me. I brought the matter to the attention of the Home Minister. Because of his intervention, some little data about the firm was gathered. It transpired that this firm was in turn owned by a company in which vital posts were manned by personnel – serving and retired – from the Pakistani Air Force, that this very company had the contract for ground-handling at airports in Pakistan. Imagine: our policemen frisking passengers at the entrance, and someone loading baggage at an airport in Pakistan and his colleagues "handling" it in Mumbai!

The Ministry of Civil Aviation writes letter after letter after letter – seven times during the course of a single year – asking the Home Ministry for the mandatory security check of the board of directors of a private airline. The letters are scotched upon receipt. Eventually, the Intelligence Bureau is asked to report on the airline. The papers publish its communication: registered in a tax haven, precise ownership not known, "confirmed evidence" of the nominal owner having been in touch with Dawood Ibrahim and Chhota Shakeel for help "to settle financial matters"; the agency says there are reports that anti-Indian elements who owned East West Airlines have since shifted their investments to this airline, etc.... Report and the evidence buried....

Both the Research and Analysis Wing and the Intelligence Bureau write official letters about a cellular operator, and the security threat that its operations constitute for the country. Both communications sent on the bureaucratic go-around.... Long enough for everyone to conclude that it is by now too late to do anything in the matter, long enough for everyone to have got encoiled in the next crisis....

How will this attitude towards national security save us from the multi-pronged, single-minded operations that the Cox Committee, for instance, uncovered?

“Acupuncture points”

The blow that is talked of is to be delivered at the decisive moment, and against the weak point in the enemy's anatomy. For this reason, Chinese analysts expend a good deal of effort in identifying the “acupuncture points” at which they may strike an enemy in the future. Much of the open-source writing is about the weak points of the US anatomy: the inability of Americans to withstand major casualties; the total dependence of US forces on satellite communications; the guidance systems of missiles and other weaponry; the integrated control and regulation systems for power transmission; the susceptibility of American financial markets to rumour and misinformation; the dependence of the entire financial system on computer networks.... It will pay us to follow one representative analysis. While reading it, at each passage we should pause, and inquire, “How would these strategists of China be applying such notions *to India?*” and we will see what omens such thinking and planning hold for India.

The emphasis on technology – to the point of dependence – is often listed by the Chinese as one of the “acupuncture points” of the Americans. Americans are slaves to technology, two senior Chinese Colonels state at several places in their work, *Unrestricted Warfare*.¹ This enslavement to technology is something a country like China should aim to exploit – that is their thesis. Americans are still bogged down in thinking of “weapons of new concepts,” they say, when the outcome will be determined by “new concepts of weapons.” The Americans have “not been able to get their act together” in envisaging how things other than weapons can be used as instruments of war, they assert. “This is because proposing a new concept of weapons

¹Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, February, 1999.

does not require relying on the springboard of new technology," they explain, "it just demands lucid and incisive thinking. However, this is not a strong point of the Americans, who are slaves to technology in their thinking. The Americans invariably halt their thinking at the boundary where technology has not yet reached." "It cannot be denied that man-made earthquakes, tsunamis, weather disasters, or subsonic waves and new biological and chemical weapons all constitute new concept weapons, and that they have tremendous differences with what we normally speak of as weapons," they allow, "but they are still all weapons whose immediate goal is to kill and destroy, and which are still related to military affairs, soldiers and munitions.... However, a new concept of weapons is different.... As we see it, a single man-made stock market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumour or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country's exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons. A new concept of weapons provides direction for new-concept weapons, while new-concept weapons give fixed forms to the new concept of weapons." It is this distinction that brings them to pinpoint the Americans' point of vulnerability, for, as they write, "With regard to the flood of new-concept weapons, technology is no longer the main factor, and the true underlying factor is a new concept regarding weapons" – but that is precisely what the Americans, in the Colonels' assessment, are slow to grasp, fixated as they are on what can be achieved through better technology.

There is a related consequence, of course – the obsession with technology leads Americans to neglect other ingredients of victory, the Colonels insist: "They [the Americans] would rather treat war as the opponent in the marathon race of military technology and are not willing to look at it more as a test of morale and courage, wisdom and strategy. They believe that as long as the Edisons of today do not sink into sleep, the gate to victory will always be open to Americans. Self-confidence such as this has made them forget one simple fact – it is not so much that war follows the fixed course rivalry of technology and weaponry as it is a game field with continually changing direction and many irregular factors. Whether you wear Adidas or Nike cannot guarantee you will become the winner."

In a word, because of their fixation on technology, Americans are stuck in the groove of new-concept weapons. Hence, out-do them with new concepts of weapons. American thinking spans only a "narrow band width", they assert. Hence, "Whether it be the intrusions of hackers, a major explosion at the World Trade Center, or a bombing attack by bin Laden, all of these greatly exceed the frequency band widths understood by the American military.... [Remember that the book was put in circulation in 1999]. This is because they have never taken into consideration and have even refused to consider means that are contrary to tradition and to select measures of operation other than military means.... We can here appreciate the deep significance of the old saying, 'A stone from other hills may serve to polish the jade of this one.'"

The Colonels urge Chinese planners to "completely mix up the cards in our hand, combine them again, and see what the result would be." They set out what the sequence would be in a war between powers using new-concept weapons: "Supposing a war broke out between two developed nations already possessing full information technology, and relying upon traditional methods of operation. The attacking side would generally employ the modes of great depth, wide front, high strength, and three-dimensionality to launch a campaign of assault against the enemy. Their method does not go beyond satellite reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, large-scale air attacks, ground outflanking, amphibious landings, air-drops behind enemy lines.... The result is not that the enemy nation proclaims defeat, but rather one returns with one's own spears and feathers."

By contrast, they point to what a country such as China should aim at doing: "... If the attacking side secretly musters large amounts of capital without the enemy nation being aware of this at all [At least the first half of that prescription is already being followed – China today is among the largest purchasers of US Government securities!] and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets, then after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hacker detachment in the enemy's computer system in advance, while at the same time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial

transaction network, telephone communications network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis. There is finally the forceful bearing down by the army, and military means are utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonourable peace treaty...."¹

One does not need any classified information to realize that a country that is expending effort at identifying the weak points of distant America would have done at least as much work on pinpointing similar points of vulnerability in a country next door, India. Are we doing enough to insulate ourselves against such stratagems?

Doing the work for the enemy

Consider just one example – one that follows from sources completely in the open – in that they are more than 2,500 years and 300 years old respectively!

Recall Sun Tzu:

To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

Therefore, the skilful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

Neither is the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.²

The same counsel reiterated 2200 years later:

One who is good at fighting battles concludes them before the army is dispatched; one who is good at eliminating perils deals with them before they burgeon; one who is good at defeating the enemy gains victory unnoticeably. The best war strategy is to win without war. Therefore, one who vies for victory by naked swords is not a good general, and one who makes preparations after defeat is not a person of wisdom.³

¹Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, February, 1999, pp. 145-46.

²Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, *op. cit.*, III.2, 6, IV.9, 12.

³*Six Strategies*, reproduced in *The Wiles of War*, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

The counsel is soon made more specific – move to crush an enemy when he has already lost:

In ancient times, one who was good at warcraft attained victories that were easily attainable. Therefore, the victory brought him neither fame for wisdom nor merit for courage. Each victory was certain, for it was gained by *defeating an enemy who had already lost*. Thus a victorious army *gains victory before seeking engagement* whereas a doomed army seeks victory during the engagement.

And what is the best way of defeating the enemy without fighting? Which is the enemy who has “already lost”?

When the enemy suffers from a major crisis, seize the chance to gain advantage. Resolution prevails over pliancy.

The commentator elaborates:

A burning house falls into commotion and tumult. Thus a thief can seize the chance to loot the property in the house when the doorkeeper and house guards are busily engaged in putting out the fire. The idiom therefore means to take advantage of someone's misfortune to do him harm.

In war, a burning house symbolizes a nation that is suffering a major crisis or is on the decline. By attacking such a nation, one can get twice the result with half the effort. Thus the strategy advocates the universal principle of striking at the enemy's weak points and in this sense relates to several other strategies. For instance, when one chooses to set fire to the house before looting it unopposed instead of squaring with the house guards, one may also be said to have applied Strategy Nineteen: Remove firewood from under the cauldron....

Thus, wait and watch as the enemy destroys himself by his own hand:

When the discord of the enemy becomes apparent, take no action but instead wait for the oncoming upheaval. Cruel internecine struggles can only cause the enemy to die at its own hand. Movement at an opportune moment brings happiness.

Do not attack outright, do not attack till the enemy has completed the job – lest you awaken him into initiating correctives:

Close in upon the [defeated] enemy and it will strike back; let it go and its position will weaken. Follow it closely but do not press too hard. Fritter

away its strength and sap its will. After it has scattered, subdue it without staining the swords with blood. Waiting. Sincerity brings glory....

In specific, the strategy advises delaying when one has the upper hand. Under violent attack, an encircled enemy will be forced to fight to death. Encircled but not assaulted vigorously and left with an escape route, the enemy will soon lose its spirit. Therefore, in order to destroy the enemy forces that have been cornered into an adverse position, one should perpetrate this situation to wear out the enemy rather than press hard onto the enemy for fear of rousing it to desperate resistance.¹

Not that someone set on harming India would require classics to locate the opportunity, but if he did, he would find more than enough in Chinese writings to direct him to Bihar, indeed to large parts of North and Northeast India! "When you attack a country, you must take advantage of its changes," Master Wei Liao counsels. "Observe its economy to see its deficits; observe its corruption to see its problems. When those above are perverse and those below are alienated, this is the basis for attacking it." And again, "When officials cluster in cliques, each promoting their friends, nominating crooks for appointments, suppressing and thwarting the good and the intelligent, turning their backs on the public for the sake of their own private interests, slandering their colleagues...." And yet again, "When powerful clans [in the present context, 'When political parties'] gather crafty villains, they become distinguished without having any official rank, making everyone tremble at their power. Like entangling vines, they get others indebted to them by selective favours; usurping the authority of those in office, they violate and abuse the common people. The country is in an uproar, but the government ministers conceal it and do not report it...." And yet again, "When the good are recognized as good but are not promoted, the evil recognized as evil but are not dismissed, the wise are obscured while the corrupt are in office...."² Who would miss the regions in India that were ripe?

Could there be a more precise description of the way we have prepared Bihar and J&K and the Northeast for the enemy? And are

¹*The Wiles of War*, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44, 45, 77, 141-43.

²Thomas Cleary, *Ways of Warriors, Codes of Kings*, Shambhala, Boston, 2000, pp. 38, 50-51.

now striving to prepare other states for him? In the light of the counsel, what should we infer from the following account of the Northeast by one of our experienced police officials, one who till recently was the Governor of Manipur and then Jharkhand?

The pursuit of narrow political agenda can be exploited by the subversive groups. Many political leaders in this region indulge in double-speak. They mouth nationalist slogans in Delhi but have no hesitation in making strong anti-national statements and collaborating with the insurgent groups in the state. Nor do they have any reservation in changing parties. They frequently hop from one political party to another. In Manipur some politicians have changed sides as many as six times in a year. A chief minister changed his party three times in one month, and his coalition partners three times in 48 hours. A party label has very little meaning. Money and muscle power with active support of the insurgent groups play a key role in the elections.

Most of these states are not financially viable. They hardly collect any revenue and depend almost entirely on the Union government for financial support. This has caused lack of responsibility in incurring public expenditure. For example, Manipur has created a huge bureaucratic structure with a workforce of almost 100,000 on its pay roll. Over 80% of its total revenue (both Plan and non-Plan) is spent on payment of salaries and pensions. Extortion by the insurgent groups, the leakages of huge funds through corrupt practices leave very little for development. And they conveniently put the blame on the Centre for not giving them adequate funds. Through years of neglect this potentially rich region is today the most backward, almost primitive, part of our country. In these appalling conditions an alienated population becomes an easy target for the secessionist propaganda....¹

The numbers may be a bit different, but is the political culture which Marwah describes limited to "distant" Manipur? Has it not come to UP and Haryana – each on either side of Delhi? Was what we witnessed in Jharkhand in March 2005 any more reassuring? Which adversary will miss the opportunity to turn such conditions to his advantage? Is it any surprise that today ULFA is an instrument in the hands of the ISI? Is it any surprise that, as Marwah remarks in the same lecture,

The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was born out of the demand to throw out the migrants from Bangladesh, and yet its top leaders are today finding sanctuary in that country.

¹Ved Marwah, *India's Internal Security Challenges*, IDSA Foundation Day Lecture, November, 2003, pp. 8-9.

Has someone taken a contract to save us whatever we do?

Is someone duty-bound to haul us out of quick sand even as we do nothing?

Putting the maxims together

Consider one further maxim – "Kill a chicken to scare the monkey" – and we have enough to infer the sorts of inflictions that others may hurl at us in the coming years. Introducing the 26th stratagem, the commentator explains:

In the old Chinese family, a concubine dissatisfied with the domineering principal wife usually dared not confront her face to face. She might instead find fault with the wife's maid. This is the household application of Strategy Twenty-Six. In military contexts, the phrase conveys an idea similar to another common expression, "Kill the chicken to scare the monkey." Compared with the chicken, the monkey is much more difficult to kill, but it can be scared into submission by the killing of the chicken. More frequently, the killing of a chicken is used to scare a whole group of chickens, monkeys and others.¹

We thus have the following propositions:

- ☐ Local war;
- ☐ Under high technology conditions;
- ☐ Using magic weapons;
- ☐ To win without fighting;
- ☐ The best way for doing so – watch as the enemy, through internecine quarrels and mis- or non-governance weakens himself; if necessary, give him a helping hand – by exacerbating these internal ruptures;
- ☐ And once in a while, "Kill a chicken" – not so much to acquire territory, but to break his morale, and thus ensure that he stays out of your way.

It is correctly observed that the era when large armies could march across international borders is over – as we noticed when we talked of Pakistan, this is the premise on which we must plan. But the proposition is true only where the armies are evenly matched. The Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan, that in Iraq – to say nothing

¹*The Wiles of War, op. cit.*, pp. 230-31.

of Granada and Falklands – are recent reminders that if one side is manifestly the weaker one, forces *will* be hurled across borders also. Hence, there is a *sine qua non*: to ensure that forces do not march across our borders, we must be adequately prepared to crush them if they do.

But in addition, we must be prepared for the sorts of forays that follow from the preceding propositions. It does not take much imagination to string these together and infer the types of assaults against India that an enemy would find the least costly, the most effective, and, therefore, the most tempting:

- ❑ Organize mass disruptions of the intertwined, integrated systems of a modernizing military and economy that depend on ultra-modern modes of communication and command – power grids, stock markets, airport control towers, weapons guidance systems;
- ❑ Funnel arms and funds to warring groups in areas like Bihar;
- ❑ Funnel arms and funds, and give sanctuary to “freedom fighters” operating in vulnerable stretches – for instance, to the Kamtapur insurrectionists operating in the Siliguri corridor, to the Bodo Liberation Front and ULFA on the other side, to the various extortionist groups available in Manipur for blocking National Highways 39 and 53, and so on;
- ❑ Orchestrate protracted, near-war to bleed the country – of the kind Pakistan has waged in Punjab, Kashmir and elsewhere;
- ❑ Suborn mafias, and through them execute Bombay-blasts type operations;
- ❑ Administer an occasional slap in an outlying, loosely or poorly administered area – say, some limb of the Northeast.

But to what end?

“But what would China gain from such a foray? It orders its forces to plunge into our Northeast. They inflict some damage, and, suddenly, retreat. What would be the net gain from China’s point of view?” The apprehensions of an American Army analyst in regard to the South China Seas provide an answer. Indeed, by transposing just a few words, his foreboding, as we will see, applies to our Northeast.

Roy C. Howle Jr., then executive officer and military assistant for operations to the US Under-secretary of the Army, contemplates

"a defining moment" – "a climactic event, actively driven by an emerging power, that virtually overnight reconfigures the strategic landscape so that things are never the same again." He lists such "moments": "Sadowa in 1866, Santiago and Manila Bay in 1898, and Tsushima in 1904." "These engagements decisively shifted the balance of power in favour of Prussia, the United States, and Japan, respectively," he writes. He enumerates the strategic consequences of the Spanish-American War: "In Europe, it obliterated the last claim of Spain as a world power and demonstrated the global reach of US naval power; in Asia, it introduced a whole new array of ideological and strategic forces that challenged the old colonial order; in the Americas, it consolidated the position of the United States as the premier regional power. In one hundred days, the United States strode onto the world stage as a full-grown global power. The Spanish American War, one of the most bloodless of all US wars, had a profound strategic impact...."

Howle turns to the South China Sea, and to what China would establish by a foray into it. "The inevitable question," he writes, "is whether a defining moment exists for China. If, in a *coup de main*, China were to seize the Spratlys and retain effective control over them, it could instantly accomplish several objectives. Apart from gaining rich fisheries and potential oil reserves, it would: Signal an increase in both capability and national will for Chinese unilateral action; Reaffirm its primacy as champion of territorial integrity of 'one China' (perhaps even with Taiwanese support, since Taipei also has a claim on the Spratlys); Demonstrate its capability for force projection; Reconfigure the strategic landscape of the entire East Asian seaboard, Indonesia and the Philippines; Control a major strategic choke-point of westbound Japanese and Taiwanese trade; Obtain valuable footing for forward projection of Chinese power."

"In short," Howle continues, "if it did not immediately redress the balance of power in East Asia, it would show that the time for such redressal was near. The potential gain or loss to China, of course, would depend on the dynamics of the global and regional strategic environment. However, if China succeeded in such an effort it would likely be as a consequence of the United States and its allies being unwilling to pay the cost of a military or economic response to Chinese aggression sufficient to maintain the *status quo* in Asia."

"What would the United States do about the Spratlys?" Howle asks. "What *could* the United States do, in the face of such a *fait accompli*? We recognize the South China Sea as a danger zone, and vaguely acknowledge its importance to our national interest. Although contingency plans for this scenario undoubtedly exist, would any of these plans ever be used? To return to the original point of this article, America's weakness lies not with her capabilities, but with her national will...."¹

Now contemplate a foray into Arunachal – an area over which China has asserted claims, an area, exactly like Spratlys, over which the rulers in Taiwan too have never abandoned their claims – or other parts of the Northeast. One has to change no more than a few words, and Howle's list would apply to the dot:

If, in a *coup de main*, China were to seize a strip of Arunachal and some adjacent parts of the Northeast and retain effective control over them, it could instantly accomplish several objectives. Apart from gaining rich fisheries, vast forest and mineral wealth and enormous potential for hydro and other power, it would: Signal an increase in both capability and national will for Chinese unilateral action; Reaffirm its primacy as champion of territorial integrity of 'one China' (perhaps even with Taiwanese support, since Taipei also has a claim on the same parts of the Northeast); Demonstrate its capability for force projection; Reconfigure the strategic landscape of the entire South – Southeast Asian landmass, including Myanmar, Thailand and beyond; Control a major strategic bridge for the entire region; Obtain valuable footing for forward projection of Chinese power – further into India, Bangladesh and Myanmar....

Of course, everything would depend on India's response. But that response is not something that can be manufactured once the lunge occurs. The outcome will not turn on "will", but on what the country can deploy to ensure that the will prevails in the area itself.

And bear in mind that China is steadily acquiring the physical presence for force projection – right into our immediate vicinity: the bases in Tibet, the 1500 kilometer railway running across it, leasing of Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal, the collaboration to develop Gwadar in the Arabian Sea....

¹Roy C. Howle Jr., "An evitable war: engaged containment and the US-China Balance," *Parameters*, US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 2001, pp. 92-104.

Overt aggression apart, we will be faced with a tightening grip. To take one instance, as its dependence on imported oil increases, China will move aggressively to extend its presence and influence in the South China Sea, in the Malacca Straits, the Bay of Bengal, and over the sea lanes to and from the Indian Ocean.

True, much of this will be adventurous in the extreme. True, it will inflict great suffering. But appeals to law, to justice, to humanity will avail as little as they have in Punjab and Kashmir. Remember what the Athenians told the frail islanders of Milos when the latter spoke of justice, when they reasoned how they, rather than the Athenians, were in the right. Right, the Athenians told them, comes in question only among those who are equals in power. For the rest, "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must." That is the way of the world.

Hence, we must be right, of course. But we must in addition have the means and skills to prevail – the capacities that will help deal with the specific situation at hand: foreknowledge, the capacity and nerve for violence, for deception, for seizing every fleeting opportunity, for putting difficulties to work.

Those means, those skills cannot be acquired overnight. It is not enough to have in some sense reckoned such possibilities – in newspaper articles, say. A country has to be *prepared for them*. And preparation to thwart any one of the kinds of dangers that we are certain to face takes years, indeed decades: one can't go around acquiring capacities once the avalanche has commenced. Similarly, the rot that prepares the ground for the enemy too corrodes bit by tiny bit for decades: stemming it requires the same unremitting diligence over decades.

Nor is it any comfort to be able to adduce "proof" or "evidence" to show that the adversary will not actually launch invasions. It need not launch invasions – in the common meaning of the term. It need only deploy such means as are necessary – and ensure that its interests – interests as *it* perceives them – prevail, that others always bear them in mind, and also always have at the back of their minds what it might do in case those interests are not borne in mind, that the countries it has in mind heed it and not some other power in the region. The test thus is not whether, for instance, China will take Taiwan by force. Will the purpose not be achieved if it swallows the island economically?

The test is not whether, as a result of the "force projection" modernization it is implementing, China will actually move to establish itself in Southeast Asia. It may achieve the same objective by enmeshing countries of that region in economic ties to such an extent that they do not decide anything which impinges on its interests without consulting it, that in future they heed China rather than, say, the USA, that they keep a safe distance from India. Why invade when "credible intimidation" will do? Why "fight to take" when you can "talk and take"? In a word, it would be foolish to lull ourselves because China is not deploying physical force in the region.

"Omnidimensional" capabilities for "omnidimensional warfare"

Henceforth, war must be "omnidimensional", it must be "total dimensional", write those two senior Colonels of the Chinese Army.¹ The object must not be some single narrowly conceived emblem of victory – say, the enemy's territory; but the entire "interest penumbra" of the enemy – his economic strength, relations among communities in his country if that is what peace and order in his society depend upon, the esteem in which that society holds its leaders, the esteem in which it is held by the rest of the world, the country's perception of itself.... The enemy's territory, even his military personnel and equipment are just two among the "omnidimensions" in which he can be routed.

For such a war "there is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon," the Colonels write. In waging such a war no "rules" of law or morality must restrain the country, the Colonels counsel. Only that is forbidden which may cause defeat. For instance, seizing the territory of another country by marching armies across international borders as Saddam did by seizing Kuwait was "foolish", they reason – not because it violated some canons of international law, but because it enabled the US to craft an "international alliance" to crush Iraq. Strong countries make rules, rising powers break them, they work to exploit loopholes – that is the Colonels' message.

As the enemy can be defeated in any of n-dimensions, military prowess is just one of the sets of means that a country should aim

¹For the following, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing, February 1999.

to wield. It must equip itself to unleash "non-military combat operations", the Colonels say, by, for instance,

- ☐ Undermining the currency of its opponent through speculation – as "financial terrorists" did, the Colonels say, to trigger the Southeast Asian collapse;
- ☐ Printing fake currency;
- ☐ Hacking into his computer networks;
- ☐ Overwhelming the servers through which his networks operate;
- ☐ Transferring capital out of the accounts of the enemy country – even better out of the secret accounts that the leaders of the enemy country maintain clandestinely in safe havens: you could hit them, they will be driven to despair, but they won't be able to even complain about what you have done;
- ☐ Using NGOs, and other voluble groups to create a prejudicial image of the enemy;
- ☐ Using rating agencies to create doubts about its prospects;
- ☐ Using international aid agencies to put pressure on it;
- ☐ Acquiring determinative positions in international agencies that will set rules for trade, etc., and using these to set such rules as will hobble it;
- ☐ Tying other countries to your own through webs of bilateral and multilateral agreements, and thereby denying the enemy potential allies, and *fora*.

The Colonels give many examples of the use of such weapons by others – for instance, by the US. This is what they write about tying others in intermeshing arrangements:

For example, regarding the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization, the initial idea of its conceptualizer, Australian Prime Minister Hawke, was that it would only include Asian countries, Australia and New Zealand. However, this idea immediately encountered strong opposition from President Bush, and it was then expanded to include the United States and Canada. At the same time, so as to check the momentum of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, the United States spared no effort in instigating some Asian countries to sign independent agreements with the North American Free Trade Area. Not only did the United States make its way in, it also dragged others out. It might well be said that the United States used a double-combination tactic.

Does the way China is moving to intertwine ASEAN countries with its own economy through the new proposal for a Free Trade Area, suggest that it is far behind in using the same *modus operandi*?

In any event, such "non-military combat weapons" can often injure the opponent in the flicker of an eyelid to a degree which far exceeds what divisions upon divisions will take long to inflict: "One hacker + one modem causes an enemy damage and losses almost equal to those of a war," the Colonels note, adding, "Because it has the breadth and secrecy of trans-level combat, this method of individual combat very easily achieves results on the strategic and even war policy levels." "Even a quasi-world power like China," they write, "already has the power to jolt the world economy just by changing its own economic policies. If China were a selfish country, and had gone back on its word in 1998 and let the Renminbi lose value, no doubt this would have added to the misfortunes of the economies of Asia. It would also have induced a cataclysm in the world's capital markets, with the result that even the world's number one debtor nation, a country which relies on the inflow of foreign capital to support its economic prosperity, the United States, would definitely have suffered heavy economic losses." "Such an outcome," they conclude in words that are more than a prescription, "would certainly be better than a military strike."

And, in a sense these are the kindlier weapons – they do not involve blood and gore, the Colonels remind us: ".... Technological progress has given us the means to strike at the enemy's nerve center directly without harming other things, giving us numerous new options for achieving victory, and all these make people believe that the best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill...."

There are three further points about wielding and countering such weapons that should awaken us to what we have to do. First, the country's strategists must learn to think laterally about the ways in which they shall react to aggression. "During a war between two countries," the Colonels ask, "during the fighting and killing by two armies, is it necessary to use special means to wage psychological war aimed at soldiers' families far back in the rear? When protecting a country's financial security, can assassination be used to deal with financial speculators? Can 'surgical' strikes be made without a declaration of war against areas which are sources of drugs or other

smuggled goods? Can special funds be set up to exert influence on another country's government and legislature through lobbying? And could buying or gaining control of stocks be used to turn another country's newspapers and television stations into the tools of media warfare?"

Do we in India think in such terms? We do not even dare think in such terms – mortified that someone will accuse us of being paranoid, of being war-mongers. How would the typical person in Government react if you told him that, far from being afraid of opening up trade with Tibet, we should look forward to the day when *we* will be able to use traders who would be moving to and fro? Or that we should be using Buddhist clergy – from Ladakh, say – for forging relations with Taiwan, with Mongolia, with Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka? Or that we should field our film stars in Central Asia rather than ministers?

Second, while at some juncture even one of these omnidimensional weapons deployed well can inflict fatal injury, their real potential, the Colonels emphasize, lies in being used in combination – "a myriad methods converged into one."

Third, the reason we do not see how potent such "weapons" can be is that we think of their being deployed in normal times – "OK, some currency speculator tries to destabilize the Rupee. So what? How much harm can he inflict? We have foreign exchange reserves of \$ 130 *billion*." But such weapons will be hurled at "the tipping point" – at *that* moment they will spell the difference between stability and a tail-spin. If you push me as I sit typing this manuscript, the maximum that can occur is that I may fall off the chair; but if you stalk me, and push me as I stand on the edge of an abyss....

There is the other lesson too – in recounting what such Chinese authors are counseling their countrymen, we have looked at what *that* country is to acquire. The implication for the country that is not preparing to be the aggressor is just as stark: it must have the capability to ward off attacks in all these dimensions. Military strength cannot be more than one, just one element in the arsenal. The Chinese Colonels put the point themselves:

For example, how can the military means of 'blood-letting politics' spoken of by Clausewitz be used to resolve the financial crisis in Southeast Asia? Or how else can hackers who come and go like shadows on the Internet be dealt with using the same type of method? The conclusion is quite evident

that only possessing a sword to deal with national security on a large visible level of security is no longer sufficient. One log cannot prop up a tottering building. The security vault of a modern national building is far from being able to be supported by the singular power of one pillar. The key to its standing erect and not collapsing lies in whether it can to a large extent form composite force in all respects related to national interest....

Everyone for himself

Every country works for its own interest: it is only when the USA itself was hit on 9/11, and hit so blatantly that the notion of its mainland being invulnerable, of its being the only super-power around was dented, it was only then that it reacted to terrorism. Till that fateful day, each time we drew attention to the suffering that terrorists from Pakistan were inflicting on our people, teams from the US – teams from the State Department, from its numerous intelligence agencies, all of whom had more than ample knowledge from their own sources – would ask for proof.

It is particularly important to remember this basic fact these days – what with talk of the Americans having recognized our worth, what with so much talk, and several steps to institute strategic cooperation between them and us, what with the self-satisfaction with which the news that the latest US strategic review has talked of India as potentially a “great power”. Today the talk is about “strategic convergence,” about a “permanent alliance based on ideological and strategic convergence.” But in fact the only permanent foreign policy maxim is: everyone for himself. We will come to grave harm if we rely on “friends of the day.” That warning is particularly necessary for us as we are prone to swing from one extreme to another – recall the euphoria of “*Hindi-Chini bhai bhai*”; look at the newspapers today in regard to the cricket matches with Pakistan; look at the 8-column banner headline on page 1 of *The Hindustan Times* about the guidelines for border talks agreed to between China and India: “At the gate of heavenly peace? Nearly.” “USSR” has simply been replaced by “US” in establishment thinking. The US sees us as a “natural ally” in the war against Islamic terrorism, we tell ourselves. Have we assessed what the impact on India will be of the rise of the Christian Right in American politics? It targets Islam, true; but it is just

as determined to harvest souls in India. If we allow the evangelists free play, simmering social tensions are bound to explode. If we don't, US perception and policy are bound to revert to regarding India as a foot-dragging, hostile nuisance.

We are swept up by simple-minded *mantras*, and are thereby repeatedly seduced into relationships of dependence, and thence to disappointments as our "close friend and ally" decides that his interest lies elsewhere. Only when we have built our own power will we have friends think twice before ditching us. And in that regard, in spite of some conspicuous achievements, we have a long way to go.

But I am on the current talk of "strategic convergence," of our worth – as a knowledge generator, as a potential counterweight to China, as an ally in the war against terrorism – having at last been recognized. It is precisely at such a moment that every Indian policy-maker should burn into his consciousness the record of Henry Kissinger's meetings with the Chinese in 1971. The transcripts of his meetings with Chou En-lai in Beijing on July 9 to 11 and 22 October 1971, and in New York on 10 December with the Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN are now in the public domain. We should not just study them, we should commit them to memory.

In Beijing

Thirty three years ago. Under the sterling command of General Tikka Khan, the Pakistani Army has been butchering people in East Pakistan from early 1971. As a result, India is inundated by about 10 million refugees from East Pakistan.

Kissinger has come to Peking *via* Pakistan. He calls on Chou En-lai. Kissinger flags developments in South Asia as one of the topics for the two sides to discuss. The meeting is, of course, a historic one, one of the pivots that both know will transform international relations. South Asia is understandably only a marginal matter. But the topic turns out to be one of the subjects on which the two are in complete agreement. Both Chou En-lai and Kissinger see in what is happening in East Pakistan, Indian conspiracy and design. They have similar views about not just the Indian "tradition" in such matters, they have the same reading of Indian character – a character that, in their view, is given to deceit, to blaming others. They inveigle each other into moving jointly to forestall steps that India may take.

Chou remarks on the military equipment India is being able to obtain, and warns that with such large amounts of equipment, India "will take expansionist turns."

Kissinger says that the US is not giving any military equipment to India.

But you are giving it to Pakistan, Chou remarks.

"Yes, but so are you," Kissinger retorts.

"We do so because India is committing aggression against Pakistan," Chou says – remember they are talking in *July 1971*, even the Bangladesh war is months in the future. "They have also committed aggression against us, too, as you said yesterday....," Chou adds.

"No, you mentioned that," Kissinger interjects.

Chou ignores that interjection and continues his sentence, "in accordance with Nehru's traditional thinking as expressed in the book, *'The Discovery of India'*. So with respect to the issue of the South Asian sub-continent, this region continues to be in turmoil and is not settling down. The turmoil in East Pakistan in a very great way is due to India. The so-called Government of Bangladesh set up its headquarters in India. Isn't that subversion of the Pakistani Government?"

The conversation wanders off to other topics. Chou reverts to developments in South Asia. "In our opinion," he tells Kissinger, "if India continues on its present course in disregard of world opinion, it will go on recklessly. We, however, support the stand of Pakistan. This is known to the world. If they (the Indians) are bent on provoking such a situation, then we cannot sit idly by...." He accuses the Indians of "just spreading rumours" about restoring relations between the two countries.

"Of course when we speak of the South Asian subcontinent," Chou observes, "this means mainly India and Pakistan," and immediately adds, "However, China also has a part there." "You said you were pressing India not to provoke a disturbance, and we also believe that you probably did say to India what you told us," Chou grants – implying that, to convince the Chinese, more will have to be done *vis-à-vis* the Indians. "We also support your opinion, that is advise India not to provoke such a disturbance, because President Yahya Khan is most concerned about the situation." He expresses full faith in Pakistan: "For its part, Pakistan would never provoke a disturbance

against India because in all military fields Pakistan is in a weaker position than India."

But "There is still one special characteristic in this situation," Chou observes. "The morale and fighting capacity of Pakistan is greater than India." "We can bear witness to that," Chou says, "because we have had contacts [!] in such a sense with India, and if India is going to go ahead and provoke disturbances in the sub-continent, then India itself will be the victim...."

Kissinger's response in this meeting is markedly pale compared to what it is soon to become – we will soon see him playing up to the Chinese in this regard also. When he takes up this subject, Kissinger tells Chou, "Mr. Prime Minister, with respect to South Asia, I think our analysis is not too different from yours." The US has friendly relations with India, he says – it has given economic assistance, but it does not give any military assistance to India. As for Pakistan, "You know from President Yahya Khan the strong friendship we feel for him and his country. We strongly oppose any military action to solve the problems of East Pakistan. And if India takes military action in East Pakistan, we would strongly and publicly disapprove of it. Furthermore, we would under no circumstances encourage Indian military adventures against the People's Republic of China. Nor would we permit the indirect use of our aid for such purposes. We want the people of India to develop their own future. but we also want them to leave their neighbours alone."¹

They talk again later that night. Chou states that Indians had been responsible for "the Ladakh incident". He recounts how China had built the road from Western Sinkiang to the Ali district of Tibet, and how suddenly Pandit Nehru raised the issue of this road. Chou tells Kissinger, "I said, 'you didn't even know we were building a road the last three years, and now you suddenly say that it is your territory.' I remarked upon how strange this was...."²

¹For the record of the conversation, *Memorandum, The White House, Top Secret/Sensitive/Exclusive Eyes Only, Memorandum of Conversation*, Great Hall of the People, Peking; July 10 1971, 12.10 p.m. – 6.00 p.m.; www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/#11.

²For the record of the conversation, *Memorandum, The White House, Top Secret/Sensitive/Exclusive Eyes Only, Memorandum of Conversation*, Chinese Government Guest House, Peking, July 10, 1971, 11.20 p.m.-11.50 p.m., www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/#11.

As they conclude their discussions the next day, Chou tells Kissinger, "Please tell President Yahya Khan that if India commits aggression, we will support Pakistan. You are also against that."

Kissinger replies, "We will oppose that, but we cannot take military measures."

"You are too far away," Chou allows. "But you have strength to persuade India. You can speak to both sides."

"We will do our best," Kissinger promises.¹

It is now October. The situation in East Pakistan has become awful. Kissinger is back in Peking. He and Chou are now engaged in settling particulars for Nixon's visit to China. This time, having sensed that what they would term as Indian perfidy is a subject on which Chinese and Americans agree, Kissinger is the one who is more emphatic.

"I have read the book by [Neville] Maxwell that the Prime Minister [Chou En-lai] recommended to me last time," he tells Chou, "and it is our view, certainly at the White House, that the Indians are applying essentially the same tactics to that situation [in East Pakistan] as they did to you [in 1962]."

"That is their tradition," Chou responds.

The Indians see this as "an opportunity to settle the whole problem of Pakistan which they have never accepted," Kissinger insinuates. Nudging the distrust and anxieties of the Chinese *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, he adds that in this India is being encouraged by "some outside countries".

Kissinger is now in full flight. He continues spraying insinuations:

As far as the policy of the United States is concerned, we are the only major western country that has not condemned Pakistan. It is only because of us, and I may say over the opposition of the pro-Indian element of our government, that the Consortium hasn't cut off aid to Pakistan. And we will bring about now a \$90 million debt relief for Pakistan. And we have in the form of relief made available \$250 million of other funds.

We are totally opposed to Indian military action against Pakistan. I do not normally see ambassadors, but I have warned the Indian ambassador on behalf of the President that if there was an attack by India we will cut off all economic aid to India. We have told the Russians of our view, and they

¹For the record of the conversation, *Memorandum, The White House, Top Secret/Sensitive/Exclusive Eyes Only, Memorandum of Conversation, Chinese Government Guest House, Peking, July 11, 1971, 10.35 a.m.-11.55 a.m.; www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/#11.*

have told us they are trying to restrain the situation, but I am not sure that I believe them. We believe that there is a good chance that India will either attack or provoke the Pakistanis to attack by driving the Pakistanis into a desperate action in the next month or two. We told President Yahya that I would discuss this with you when I was here, and I simply want you to know we are totally opposed to it, and we are ready to listen to any proposal you will like to make.

He elaborates,

Mrs. Gandhi is supposed to come to the United States November 4 and 5, and if she comes and if there is no war by then, the President will speak to her in the strongest possible terms. We would be very grateful for your views.

Chou of course regards aggressiveness and deceit as an Indian tradition! He says,

We from the East and you from the West have the most to do with East Pakistan, and we understand best the traditions of India. After having read the book by Maxwell you also believe it is the traditional policy of India – she doesn't agree the Kashmir problem is solved and doesn't believe in the existence of Pakistan.

Kissinger elaborates on the Indian penchant for conspiracy. Chou responds,

And to add to that the desire of the Soviet Union to exploit the situation and contradictions in Asia, so as to give it a free hand in Europe. This is a very stupid way of thinking.

Kissinger displays his contempt:

Gratitude is not the outstanding quality of India, as Moscow will learn.

The transcript records: "Laughter."¹

Two days later, Chou and Kissinger are wrapping up their discussions. Kissinger says,

¹For the record of the conversation, *Memorandum, The White House, Top Secret/Sensitive/Exclusive Eyes Only, Memorandum of Conversation*, Great Hall of the People, Peking; October 22, 1971, 4.15-8.28 p. m.; General Subjects: Korea, Japan, South Asia, Soviet Union, Arms control; www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/ #11.

In the Indian Ocean, Mr. Prime Minister, we suffer the illusion that we are supporting one of your friends [Pakistan] against one of your neighbours that is attempting to achieve hegemony.

"It [Pakistan] is also your friend," Chou remarks.

"True," Kissinger says, adding, "But we have many offers from India to contend with you and your neighbour [the Soviet Union] and that is recommended by most of the bureaucracy. If we wanted domination in the Indian sub-continent, we would not support Pakistan because Pakistan cannot dominate the Indian sub-continent, as you well know."

"Indeed, it is impossible for Pakistan to do so but it is also impossible for India to do that," Chou says. What India wants to do as I have said last time during your visit is to get two big powers to contend for it in the Indian Ocean so that it can make use of both. That's a most stupid policy."¹

In New York

It is now December. Indian forces have reached the vicinity of Dacca. From their sources the Americans have learnt that the Pakistani Army in the East would surrender soon, perhaps within a day. Kissinger seeks an urgent, secret meeting with Ambassador Huang Hua. He has sought the meeting because they want certain things to be communicated to Prime Minister Chou En-lai immediately, Kissinger explains.

He had held a press backgrounder the previous day, Kissinger tells Huang Hua, and had told the media that "India is at fault". That is what the US has stated in formal statements also, he tells Huang Hua. "In order to underline what we have said, we worked with a number of countries to provide aid to Pakistan," he discloses. And the US has done so in spite of the fact that under law it is barred from assisting Pakistan in a situation of the kind that prevails in the sub-continent. "This is terribly complex," Kissinger explains. "We are barred by law from giving equipment to Pakistan in this situation. And we are

¹For the record of the conversation, *Memorandum, The White House, Top Secret/Sensitive/Exclusive Eyes Only, Memorandum of Conversation, Government Guest House, Peking; October 24, 1971, 10.28 a.m. – 1.55 p.m.; General Subjects: General Philosophy and Principles, Communiqué; www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/#11.*

also barred by law from permitting friendly countries which have American equipment to give their equipment to Pakistan."

In that case, what is the US doing?

"So we have worked out the following arrangements with a number of countries," Kissinger spells out. "We have told Jordan and Iran and Saudi Arabia, and we will tell Turkey.... We said that if they decide that their national security requires shipment of American arms to Pakistan, we are obliged to protest, but we will understand. We will not protest with great intensity. And we will make up for them in next year's budget whatever difficulties they have. On this basis four planes are leaving

*William
Burr's
record*

Jordan today and 22 over the weekend. Ammunition and other equipment is going from Iran.... And six planes from Turkey in the near future. This is very confidential, and we are not eager for it to be known. At least not until Congress gets out of town tomorrow. In addition, we are moving a number of naval ships in the West Pacific toward the Indian Ocean...."

Kissinger then proceeds to egg the Chinese on to do something substantial *vis-à-vis* India, and assures the Chinese Ambassador that the Americans will warn the Soviets to stay away. We will give you, at your request, whatever information we have about the disposition of Soviet forces, Kissinger promises. And then delivers a chilling message:

Secondly, the President [Richard Nixon] wants you to know that it is, of course, up to the People's Republic to decide its own course of action in this situation, but if the People's Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian sub-continent a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others [read, the Soviet Union] to interfere with the People's Republic.

For form's sake, and lest the proud Chinese feel, "Who is he to tell us what we should be doing?" Kissinger adds, "We are not recommending any particular steps; we are simply informing you about the actions of others." That is worth an exclamation mark.

And all this is only in the interest of China: "We think that the immediate objective must be to prevent an attack on the West Pakistan army by India," Kissinger continues. "We are afraid that if nothing is done to stop it, East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan will become a Nepal. And India with Soviet help would

be free to turn its energies elsewhere. So it seems to us that through a combination of pressures and political moves it is important to keep India from attacking in the West, to gain time to get more arms into Pakistan and to restore the situation...."

To forestall this attack, Kissinger says, two things are necessary: "Maximum intimidation of the Indians and, to some extent, the Soviets. Secondly, maximum pressure for the ceasefire."

He then slips in a cock and bull story: that they have an intelligence report that suggests that Mrs. Gandhi aims to destroy the Pakistani Army and Air Force, annex "Azad Kashmir" and declare a cease fire only after that. He also tells the Chinese that the previous night the US had summoned the Indian Ambassador "and demanded assurance that India has no designs, will not annex any territory." Adding,

*William
Burr's
record*

We do this to have a legal basis for other actions.

The Chinese Permanent Representative is no less definite. For him, the proceedings at the UN have shown "what the majority of the people of the world support and what they oppose," and that they are opposed to what India has done. And for good reason: "Because if India, with the aid of the Soviet Union, would be able to have its own way in the subcontinent then there would be no more security to speak of for a lot of other countries, and no peace to speak of. Because that would mean the dismemberment and the splitting up of a sovereign country and the creation of a new edition of Manchuko, the Bangladesh. It would also mean aggression by military force and the annexation of sovereign territory."

"The Soviet Union and India now are progressing along on an extremely dangerous track in the sub-continent," Huang Hua continues. "And as we have already pointed out this is a step to encircle China."

"There is no question about that," Kissinger joins in.

The suggestion by the Soviet Union for negotiations between the two wings of Pakistan "is in fact direct and obvious intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country," Huang Hua observes, "and something we feel is completely unacceptable, is inadmissible."

China does not have information about the immediate military situation, Huang Hua says, "But from our experience of a longer

period we feel that the struggle waged by the people in Pakistan is a just struggle and therefore it is bound to have the support of the Chinese people and the people of the world."

Kissinger rushes to rub the apprehension in deeper: "Mr. Ambassador, we agree with your analysis of the situation. What is happening in the Indian sub-continent is a threat to all the people. It is a more immediate threat to China, but it is a threat to all people. We have no agreement with the British to do anything. In fact we are talking with you to come to a common position. We know that Pakistan is being punished because it is a friend of China and because it is a friend of the United States." What insight!

*William
Burr's
record*

"We want to preserve the army in West Pakistan so that it is better able to fight if the situation arises again. We are also prepared to attempt to assemble a maximum amount of pressure in order to deter India.... We want to keep the pressure on India, both militarily and politically.... We have taken a stand against India and we will maintain this stand...."

As they reach the end of their exchanges, Kissinger is even more explicit about the reason the US has sought this meeting:

When I asked for this meeting, I did so to suggest Chinese military help, to be quite honest. That's what I had in mind, not to discuss with you how to defeat Pakistan.... But this is for you to decide....

As for the United States, Kissinger strains to make sure that the Chinese get the proposition he is advancing for them. "I don't want the Prime Minister [Chou En-lai] to misunderstand. We are not looking for a way to get out of the situation. We are looking for a way to protect what is left of Pakistan. We will not recognize Bangladesh. We will not negotiate with Bangladesh. We will not encourage talks between Pakistan and Bangladesh." "We have an immediate practical problem," he emphasizes. "Is it better to have a cease-fire or is it better to let the military events continue? In either event both of us must continue to bring pressure on India and the Soviet Union."

As the meeting draws to a close, Kissinger rubs in the Chinese angle again. "We have particular affection for Pakistan because we feel they helped to reestablish contact between the People's Republic and the United States."

And he repeats the suggestion for some, unilateral action by China. "So we are prepared to listen to any practical proposals for parallel action," he tells Huang Hua. "We will do our best to prevent pressure against any country that takes unilateral action."¹

Notice how India is just a deviant to be put in its place.

Notice the breezy "detachment" of such personages as they bargain over moves that will affect the lives of millions: we have just to recall what Robert McNamara has revealed in his *In Retrospect*² to shiver – the clinical aloofness with which carpet bombing is decreed, how lakhs of lives turn on internecine turf battles in the American bureaucracy. We have just to recall the savage extension of the war into Cambodia by the same Kissinger, and the innumerable deaths that followed to realize that it isn't just that each country pursues its own interest, the "mistakes" of half a dozen individuals in one country can rain untold suffering on lakhs of innocents thousands of miles away.

William
Burr's
record

"As flies to wanton boys...."

Notice how easy it is for such worthies to conjure high principles for what they plan to do in regard to another country.

Notice their felicity in invoking cock and bull stories to urge each other on – Kissinger on Mrs. Gandhi's plans.

Notice Chinese preconceptions – Huang Hua sees even the Bangladesh fight against Pakistan as being part of a conspiracy to encircle China.

Notice the vital trait: Kissinger genuinely believes in double-standards – contrast the way the same National Security Advisor of the very country that has just killed a few million in Southeast Asia pronounces India to be at fault over Bangladesh.

Notice "the art of the master diplomat" as Kissinger flatters the Chinese, as he fans its anxieties of the Soviet Union.

True, the world has changed. True, the same Kissinger in his latest book, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*³ argues for strategic

¹*The Kissinger Transcripts, The top-secret talks with Beijing and Moscow*, William Burr, ed., The New Press, New York, 1998, pp. 48-57.

²Robert McNamara, *In Retrospect, The tragedy and lessons of Vietnam*, Times Books, Random House, 1995.

³Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a diplomacy for the 21st century*, Touchstone, New York, 2002.

cooperation between the US and India. But remember that he argues for even closer cooperation between the US and China. And in any case, whether setting China up to take "unilateral action" against India is appropriate or cooperating with India is appropriate, the touchstone remains unchanged: the interests of the United States.

And Kissinger is just one "realist". Were records of conversations of others at that level to come to light, the exchanges would be as sharply focused on the interests of their own countries.

In fact, we do not have to wait that long! We have to go just by the public record.

Some of our "natural allies"

The Soviet Union was for long our mainstay for weapons. We continue to think of its successor, Russia as an especially close friend. It continues to be the major source of armaments – from tanks to fighter aircraft – for us. So much so that we have in a sense got locked into supplies from Russia – a fact that Russia has been using to extract extravagant amounts for spares and the like. But the same Russia has also been one of the major suppliers of armaments to China. Ever watchful of the relationship between the two and of the implications for its own security, the US Government's account states,

China and Russia have typically maintained a robust defense and security relationship, including bilateral policy consultations and professional military-to-military intelligence exchanges. Selling arms and military technology to China is a major component of Russia's foreign and security policy. Russian conventional weapons transfers will help advance the speed of development and improve the lethality of every major category of weapon system under development in China. The pace of this technology transfer continues unabated as China strives for self-sufficiency. Military-technical cooperation with Beijing acts as a source of revenue to fill state coffers, support defense industries, and enrich influential Russian individuals and groups. It also provides Moscow with a vehicle to bolster relations with an emerging power and provides a primary source of funding for continued Russian military R&D efforts.

Beijing reportedly purchased, on average, some \$ 1.2 billion worth of Russian weapons each year during the 1990s, accounting for about 30 per cent of total Russian arms sales. However, beginning in 1999, China's purchases from Russia rose and have averaged approximately twice that amount annually. Russian leaders are not likely to reduce their sales effort

in China, even under pressure from a third party. Similarly, improved US-Russian relations after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks are unlikely to cause Moscow to scale down arms transfers to Beijing.

In 2003/04 alone, the US Secretary of Defense stated in his report, China entered into two significant contracts with the Russians: \$ one billion for 24 Su-30 fighter aircraft, and \$ 500 million for SA-20 surface to air missile systems.

In the 1990s China was the largest purchaser of arms from Russia. Many in Russia actively rationalize the large arms sales to China: from the narrow economic justification – that China is one of the largest customers for armaments, that it is better disposed to accepting Russian equipment than others who could buy at that scale – say, European countries or Japan; that if Russia were not to sell missiles and aircraft, someone else surely would; to the strategic ones – that selling arms and military technology is a useful way of putting pressure on the US – as they show the problems that a restive Russia can create: recall what Boris Yeltsin said when he was President:

China is the most important State for us. It is a neighbour, with which we share the longest border in the world and with which we are destined to live and work side by side forever. On the success of our cooperation with China depends Russia's future. Relations with China are extremely important to us in global politics as well. *If we can rely on the Chinese shoulder in our relations with the West, the West will be more considerate to Russia.*¹

Russian analysts argue that supplying arms ties the PLA – in orientation as much as physically – to Russian industry and defence establishments; that eventually the main threat to Russia is once again going to be from the US, and so China is the country with which Russia must ally in the long run.

And Russia is not the only country that merits caution. Awed by Islamic hostility, we feel that India and Israel are natural allies. And there is no doubt that military and intelligence cooperation between the two countries has grown considerably over the last two decades. Some of us would, therefore, be surprised to learn that

¹c. f.: Evgeniy Bazhanov, "Russian perspectives on China's foreign policy and military development," in Jonathan D. Pollock and Richard H. Yang, *In China's Shadow, Regional perspectives on Chinese foreign policy and military development*, RAND, 1998, at p. 80. Italics added.

One of the most significant foreign sources of electronic warfare technology [for China] is Israel. In the late 1980s/early 1990s, Israel export firms and China's Ministry of Electronics Industry signed a Memorandum of Understanding on technological transfer of electronic warfare hardware and software. Israeli companies such as Elbit, Elisra, Tadiran, Elop, and Elta entered into cooperative development ventures with Chinese entities such as SWIEE, the Hebei-based Communications, Telemetry, and Telecontrol Research Institute (MEI 54th Research Institute), and the Anhui-based East China Research Institute of Electronic Engineering (ECRIEE, or the MEI 36th Research Institute). Projects include airborne radar warning receivers, ELINT systems, and radar jammers.¹

As perceived at the moment

Nor does each country pursue its interests in the abstract.

It strives for its interests *of the moment*.

It strives to secure its interests of the moment *as it perceives them at that moment*.

Saudi Arabia and the US gave arms and ammunition of around \$10 billion to the *mujabideen* to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. China joined them in arming the Taliban. Soon enough, the US, and to a lesser extent China were pressing Pakistan to scotch the Taliban as the latter had come to constitute a threat to their countries.

The huge arsenal for the Taliban was funneled through the ISI which, doubtless, kept much of it for its own use – against India. That fact was brought home to the US time and again from piles of evidence in Kashmir. Yet, in the next round, the US decided to give another three billion dollars worth of equipment to Pakistan – ostensibly to help it fight the terrorists. But would F-16s that the US agreed to release for Pakistan be used against Osama bin Laden? Without a doubt, these would be deployed against India. The US knows this as well as any one else. Yet, it gives the arms and the aircraft – because it has concluded that *at this moment* it cannot do without Pakistan.

The Gulf War itself announced a new environment – a fact that Chinese analysts took pains to emphasize. "A hundred and ten countries took part in the embargo against Iraq," the two senior

¹Mark A. Stokes, *China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States*, RAND, 1999, pp. 53-54.

Colonels of the Chinese Army we have encountered point out in *Unrestricted Warfare*, "and more than thirty countries took part in the use of force, including numerous Arab countries." "More profoundly," they continued, "the appearance of the 'over-night' alliance brought an era to a close. That is, the age of fixed-form alliances which had begun with the signing of the military alliance between Germany and Austro-Hungary in 1879.... Without a doubt, the alliance phenomenon will continue to exist, but in more cases they will be loose and short-term interest coalitions. Which is also to say that there will no longer be any alliances where only morality, not interests, are involved...."

Moreover, the device the country adopts for advancing what it perceives at that moment to be its interests may not accord with what we think will be in *its own* interest. It may even conflict with, it may undermine some other objectives the country is trying to attain. Consider again the large arms sales of Russia to China. The Russians are, of course, concerned about the effects these transfers are liable to have on their own security. But because of other competing and immediate factors, such concerns for what may happen in the long run are not sufficient to make them hold back to an extent that could be any comfort to India:

Because of persistent concerns over the direction of China's foreign and security policies, Russia's leadership has placed some limits on the types and sophistication of weapons sold to China. However, arms and technology sales also strengthen Russia's relationship with China. Access to Russian weapons gives Beijing a strong stake in cooperating with Moscow. Russian leaders probably view China's commitment to good relations as particularly important because of the length of their common border, demographic trends in Russia's eastern regions, Beijing's growing power, and mutual concern over US policies, in particular the growing US military presence in Central Asia....¹

"The traditional friendship with India" is but a small factor in the balance. Even the consequences for Russia a decade hence – even *just a decade hence* – are not a decisive determinant. The here and now

¹On all this, see, Report for FY04 of the US Secretary of Defense to the US Congress, *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, Washington, DC, 2004.

prevails. Russia has been in severe economic difficulties over the last decade. To meet these, it has been selling to China high-technology weapons and technology for manufacturing them. Sure, that has consequences for our security. But Russia's concern is not the consequences for us, its concern is its interests. Indeed, an armed, strong China will in the not too-distant future be a challenge to Russia itself – but even that problem of the near-future is not the determining factor in Russia's decision today, its immediate economic compulsions are. As is its competing concern, a concern it in a sense shares with China: Russia is as apprehensive of American intervention in its environs – Chechnya, Kosovo – as China is of American intentions and capacities in East and Southeast Asia. President Putin, whom we look upon as being especially well-disposed towards India, is an ardent advocate – one on record – of a Russia-China axis. We assume that, because he is our friend, he will stand by us. Cocooned in this belief, we never think of using the leverage that our purchases could give us *vis-à-vis* the Russians – after all, numerous factories manufacturing defence supplies are helped, entire cities are helped by the orders they receive from India. Using such orders as leverage, why that would be “taking advantage” of Russia's current plight! And so we are stupefied when, on a much trumpeted visit to Delhi, the Russian President announces to an incredulous establishment that, while Russia supports India's membership of the UN Security Council, India shall have to be content with what is in effect a second-class membership – that is, one without the veto power that gives the five “permanent members” their clout over the organization. “How *could* he?” exclaims a high-up when I call on him the day after, “I want to know, how *could* he – after all we do for Russia....” And when the candid remark hits the headlines to the embarrassment of the Indian Government, the familiar “explanation”: misunderstanding caused by faulty translation!

Russia, Israel, and then France. Our interactions have shown that the French are much clearer than others about the threats from Islamic fundamentalism. India places considerable store with the security dialogue that has been instituted with France. In this background, read the testimony of a RAND staff-member to a US Congressional Committee:

Growing access of Chinese firms to foreign weapons technologies (i.e. know-how and production technologies) is an additional variable. It has facilitated improvement in Chinese defense production capabilities. Aviation co-production with the Russians has helped Chinese aviation enterprises expand their knowledge of manufacturing fourth generation aircraft. The Israelis have provided assistance with avionics and air-to-air missiles; and the French have assisted with the development of air-to-air and surface missiles.¹

The investments of US and South Korean firms in China, the shifting of Japanese manufacturing units to China, all add muscle to a competitor; they multiply the economic, and, therefore, the military might of the very power they themselves aver is liable to become a threat to their interests in the region. Senior leaders and officials of these countries agree that these steps "are feeding a python". But the investments rush ahead, the firms continue to shift. The huge investments of Taiwanese firms in China, the fact that a substantial part of the Taiwan's computer hardware industry has already shifted to China, the shift now of Taiwanese semi-conductor industry to China have immediate security implications for Taiwan itself. The relocation of these firms to China is of immediate assistance in developing the sorts of weapons that future warfare requires. As analyses by Chinese strategists show, the principal lesson that China has drawn since the Gulf War is that it must develop precision guidance systems for missiles and explosives, and that it must aim at information dominance. The technologies that Taiwanese firms bring to China are capable of military applications as much as they are of producing faster word-processors. The former Vice-Minister of the Chinese Commission on Science, Technology and Industry is quoted as stating candidly,

Because national defense technology is by its nature having multiple technologies, the differences between defense and civilian technology are becoming smaller and smaller. The trend of interchangeability of the

¹Evan S. Mederios, RAND, "Analyzing China's Defense Industries and the Implications for Chinese Military Modernization," Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Chinese Military Modernization and Cross-Strait Politico-Military Relations, 6 February, 2004.

military and civilian is on the rise, allowing the technical foundation for an accelerated modernization of national defense and to realize the steady improvement of weapons.¹

Evident as can be. But the shift of Taiwanese firms to Mainland China proceeds apace.

China itself is not immune from such dilemmas. For maintaining its impressive rates of growth, it strives to ensure that everyone sees it as a responsible participant of the international order. At the same time it builds its military strength, a strength that unnerves many around it. On the one hand, it sees relations with the US as being vital for its continued economic growth. On the other hand, the running refrain in the writings of its security experts is that the US is the hegemon that is trying to dictate to the rest of the world, that it is bent on encircling China. It deals with the US so as to untangle the final issues that bedevil its entry into the WTO, and in those very months it hauls it over the coals in regard to the US plane that has strayed into Chinese airspace....

Thus, each country is pursuing its own interests, and these translate into a web of complex objectives. Even when it is pursuing some clear cut objective, one that we share with it, the device it chooses to do so may not be one that will promote our interest: after 9/11 in a sense both the US and India want to end terrorism in this region; the US thinks that this is best done by sweet-talking Pakistan to take on the terrorists, we think the opposite.

Just an individual and his immediate circle

Indeed, it isn't just that every country acts in its own interest. It isn't even that every country acts in its interest as it perceives that interest to be at that moment. It acts often as *an individual and his immediate circle perceive that interest at that moment*. Accordingly, an adversary aiming to deflect its decisions often has to suborn just that individual and his tiny circle. The Cox Report which we have encountered elsewhere documents example after example of the manner in which

¹c. f.: Bates Gill, "Chinese military modernization and arms proliferation in the Asia-Pacific," in Jonathan D. Pollock and Richard H. Yang, *In China's Shadow, Regional perspectives on Chinese foreign policy and military development*, RAND, 1998, pp. 10-36, at pp. 23-24.

successive US Presidents, in particular the President we consider to have a special regard for India, Bill Clinton, and his immediate circle set aside evidence, how they glided over facts to enable China to continue to have access to weapons and technologies that, under US laws and regulations, would have been barred.

In spite of many misgivings, US firms were eventually allowed to have their satellites launched on Chinese rockets. When evidence of Chinese supplying missile and nuclear technologies to other countries – Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, North Korea – became too blatant to be ignored, and again after the killings in Tiananmen Square, sanctions were imposed, and restrictions were decreed on commercial dealings of this sort. The President, however, was given the authority to waive the restrictions on the grounds of “national interest” or because China was making progress on human rights’ issues. A typical passage in the Cox Committee’s Report records what happened in practice:

The first “national interest” determination under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act was made by President Bush on April 30, 1991. This “national interest” determination, or “waiver,” covered the Freja satellite that was to be built for Sweden. It also included a reissuance of the waiver for the Hughes-built Aussat satellites that had been identified in the December 19, 1989 “national interest” determination. Between 1989, when Congress imposed the requirement for a Presidential “national interest” determination, and the beginning of 1998, 12 “national interest” waivers were granted for launches of commercial communications satellites on PRC rockets. President Bush made three of these “national interest” determinations, on December 19, 1989, April 30, 1991, and September 11, 1992. President Clinton made nine of these “national interest” determinations: July 2, 1993, July 13, 1994, February 6, 1996 (three determinations), June 23, 1996, July 9, 1996, November 19, 1996, and November 23, 1996.

Cox
Committee

The most recent “national interest” determination regarding the launch of a U.S.-manufactured commercial communications satellite on a PRC rocket was made by President Clinton on February 18, 1998. This waiver applied to the Chinasat-8 satellite manufactured by Space Systems/Loral.

The Chinasat-8 satellite waiver became controversial after the *New York Times* reported on April 13, 1998, that President Clinton had approved the “national interest” determination, or waiver, *despite an ongoing Department of Justice criminal investigation of Loral’s alleged earlier*

unauthorized transfer of missile guidance technology to the PRC. The *Times* also reported that the Chairman of Loral Space & Communications Ltd., Bernard L. Schwartz, *was the largest individual donor to the Democratic Party in 1997.*

On May 22, 1998, the White House publicly released a number of documents regarding the Chinasat-8 waiver. One of the released documents, a decision memorandum for the President, discussed the pending criminal investigation and concluded:

We believe that the advantages of this project outweigh the risk, and that we can effectively rebut criticism of the waiver.... The project is in the national interest because the development of China's civil communications infrastructure will promote access by Chinese citizens in remote areas to people and ideas in democratic societies....

Cox
Committee

The current project also will help the competitiveness of U.S. satellite exporters in a most important satellite market.

This decision memorandum for the President was accompanied by a transmittal memorandum, dated February 18, 1998, from Phil Caplan (Executive Clerk, Office of the White House) which stated:

Chuck Ruff, the counsel to the President, notes that there have been *extensive* discussions with Justice on this matter. The Department [of Justice] realizes the potential adverse impact on a potential criminal prosecution but has chosen not to oppose the waiver.

Therefore, in balancing national security and criminal justice interests, Chuck agrees that the balance, under these special circumstances, is properly struck by granting the waiver. [Emphasis added]

Robert S. Litt, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General in the Department of Justice, recalls he had two conversations with Charles F. C. Ruff, the Counsel to the President, on this matter. Litt also indicates that there were one or more conversations between Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division, and James E. Baker, the Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council. Litt does not characterize these conversations as "extensive." Regarding whether the Justice Department had chosen not to oppose the waiver, Litt says:

Certainly the Department was put on notice that there was a waiver application, and in that sense, we had an opportunity to weigh in. On the other hand, as I said, I didn't believe that we were being asked for our views on whether or not the waiver should be granted as a matter of policy.

The transmittal memorandum from Caplan to the President also stated:
Commerce must issue a second license within 90 days of this waiver; if the Justice Department's evidence warrants, Commerce could withhold this license and block the project.

Litt does not recall whether Justice was contacted by the Commerce Department prior to the approval of the Chinasat-8 license application by Commerce on March 23, 1998.

A January 1998 draft of a National Security Council memorandum for the President regarding the request for a "national interest" waiver for the Loral Chinasat-8 communications satellite project included a reference to the ongoing review of the PRC's transfers to Iran of C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles. These transfers by the PRC were included in the list of "Essential Factors for the President to Consider in Deciding Whether to Waive Restrictions on U.S.-Origin Exports to China for the Chinasat-8 Satellite Program" that was attached as Tab A to the State Department's memorandum to the NSC regarding the Chinasat-8 waiver. The reference to the transfers was deleted from the memorandum that ultimately was sent to the President....

Cox
Committee

The lessons are manifest. First, we must bear in mind that this is the way the world is. To keep complaining that countries are not adhering to ideals, that they are not living up to their professions is worse than futile: it convinces others that we are out of touch with reality! Second, we must be as single-minded in pursuing our interests. Third, it is only on occasion that our interests will coincide with the way another power perceives its interests: we must seize that moment. Fourth, as every country that we may want to deal with will be pursuing a complex set of objectives – some of which may well run counter to others – we have to further our interests through the interstices of the interests and maneuvers of others.

Pursuing policies which on the surface contradict each other becomes all the more difficult in a noisy democracy, in particular in an environment in which the persons who dominate public discourse – in legislatures, in the media – do not delve beneath sound-bytes and slogans.

Thus we have to shun our high-school "*either/or*" habit, and instead to yoke contraries to our purposes: not "*either* development or defence" but "development *and also* defence"; not "*either*

diplomacy *or* armed might" but "diplomacy *and also* armed might"; not "*either* engagement *or* containment" but "engagement *and also* measures to contain if engagement does not *work*"; not "*either* ally with the US *or* ally against the US" but "ally with US in situations where doing so serves our interest *and also* build our own strength so that we are not dependent even on the most reliable of friends."

A single event

Even a single, "unequivocal" event has complex consequences for our security. Consider 9/11. On the one side,

- ❑ It awakened the US to the terrorism which we had been facing, and about which it was always asking us for proof.
- ❑ It accelerated cooperation between the intelligence and defence communities of the two countries.
- ❑ It compelled the world to look at Pakistan's role in fomenting the ideology of and nurturing the personnel for terrorist organizations.
- ❑ It triggered the invasion into Afghanistan, and thus deprived Pakistan of what it had come to consider as one of its great successes – acquiring "strategic depth" *via* the Taliban.
- ❑ It deprived terrorists and Pakistan of a convenient venue for training terrorists.
- ❑ It made Central Asian Republics more receptive to closer cooperation with India.
- ❑ The chain of events triggered tensions between the Generals in Pakistan and the *jihadis* they had spawned.

On the other side,

- ❑ It made the military rulers of Pakistan indispensable for the US.
- ❑ That by itself would be of much comfort to China: its ally in the region – Pakistan – would not be allowed to sink.
- ❑ It distracted the US from China and East Asia.
- ❑ It brought US forces into the larger South Asian region.
- ❑ The chain of events over-extended the US.
- ❑ It created a pervasive enemy for the US in particular, but also for other non-Muslim States.

- ❑ It deepened the sense of identity and, therefore, of solidarity among the *ummah*.
- ❑ While few supported the US in its lunge into Iraq, all came realize that a defeat of the US after the invasion will give a huge boost to Islamic fundamentalism.

The lesson thus is that even a single event has in its womb a complex of potentials. What it will yield for us will depend on *what we do in its wake*. We have to be the proverbial *hans* that drinks up the milk and leaves the water aside.

Swiftiness, nimbleness

The next feature of the world around us puts in sharp contrast what needs to be done and the ways to which we have become accustomed. Perhaps it is only technology that is changing faster than the international configuration! Re-establishment of relations between China and the US; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European communist regimes – and the collapse of the Soviet Union did not just mean that our main ally had disappeared, it gave Afghanistan to Pakistan, it meant that the Soviet navy would be withdrawn from East and Southeast Asia, thus leaving the waters that much clearer for the Chinese, it meant the end of subvention to Vietnam – and hence the weakening of an important potential ally for us in the region....; the Southeast Asian economic crisis; the collapse in Indonesia; 9/11 and the dangers and possibilities that have opened up in our region; the expansion of NATO to the East right up to the borders of China; the war on Iraq; the discord between much of Europe and the US; the progressive emasculation of the UN.... The mutations and transformations are as complete as they are swift. The international situation changes so fast that to make a fetish of the formulations of some leader, of any position, of any alliance, of any approach – “non-alignment” – is suicidal to the point of idiocy. Instead, we need a sturdy and sensitive compass – honed, among other things, by prior intellectual work – to swiftly make out where in this vortex our interest lies. And our apparatus responsible for national security and forging relations abroad has to be nimble enough to catch the opportunities that spring up in these upheavals.

One lesson is that our policies must be “omni-directional” – we

must deal with, we must establish day-to-day, working relationships with a host of countries. Our leaders must have personal, intimate, continuous interactions with the leaders of a host of countries. And we must engage with each country on a host of issues: that it does not agree with us on one issue does not mean that the country is our sworn enemy; we must work with it on issues other than that one.

Similarly, force-projection capacities having become what they have, the "strategic frontier" of a country, it has been well put, lies far beyond its "geographical frontier". The virtual annexation of Afghanistan by Pakistan during the Taliban period affected our options in the west. For the same reason, today relations with Central Asian Republics, with Israel, Japan, South Korea, Australia are as vital for our security as relations with any other country.

And the opportunities come and go at lightning speed. Countries like Singapore urged us for years to join up with ASEAN. We went into thinking! The result was that when in November 2002 the ASEAN countries met in Cambodia, China and India were both there: India to participate in its first "summit level dialogue" with ASEAN – with a proposal to initiate discussions for a trade and investment area of which India could be a part; China to sign an agreement by which ASEAN and China will become a common trading zone – the ASEAN heads having already approved at their summit in November 2001 the proposal to create a free trade area with China over the coming decade. Imagine the implications for India. The ASEAN leaders are well aware that the move can compound problems of "hollowing out", with industries from their region migrating to China – they see what has happened to Japan. Yet they endorsed the move – to hitch on to the engine of Chinese high growth. That will tie these economies so much more with China. It will thus deepen Chinese influence in the region. Just as important, while we are part of no trading bloc, together ASEAN-China will become one of the most vibrant trading blocs in the world.

Little Cyprus – the Greek Cypriot portion – is a semi-arid country. But in just ten years it has gone from nothing to a country with a per capita income of \$ 15,000. The moment Hong Kong's reversion into China was settled, Cyprus saw an opportunity – of becoming a hub for off-shore banking services – and quickly grabbed it. We kept on thinking, and debating – this time the morality of allowing off-

shore banking facilities. Similarly, while we keep holding seminars on how to promote tourism, this country of just seven lakh people – a population one-twentieth that of just the city of Delhi – gets *three million* tourists.

And it can't be that general administration and policy making will be lackadaisical and winding, but in matters relating to defence and foreign affairs, the same system will deliver expeditiously. When an ailment seizes the body every follicle exhibits the same symptoms....

Hence, a sturdy compass, the nimbleness to catch lightning, the shrewdness to put not just opportunities but difficulties to work.

A porcupine, or a peacock?

Hence,

- ❑ The singular pursuit by each country of its own interests.
- ❑ Of its interests as it perceives them at that moment.
- ❑ Of its interests as a few individuals in that country perceive those interests to be at that moment.
- ❑ Through stratagems that just as often conflict with each other.
- ❑ And all this in a context that is somersaulting at hurricane speed.

Furthermore, the configuration which surrounds us at the moment has four features that set the contours within which we have to operate.

The first, of course, is the distance between the economic and military might of the US and others – it is a unipolar world, everyone tells everyone. The US proceeds on this premise even more than the others. This means, for instance, that it is willing to be much more open – to be blatant, if you please – than used to be the case even a decade ago in using the United Nations and its agencies, in yoking the IMF, the World Bank, etc., to its perceived interests, and, as the 2003 invasion of Iraq shows, it is more open about proceeding without these agencies when they demur at toeing its line. Moreover, as the Gulf and Afghan and the Iraq wars have shown, the force projection capability that the US has acquired makes it a neighbour, an immediate presence in our region.

This single fact by itself has a host of implications for our security. Either we must be strong and determined enough, and confident enough – like China, like we were in the immediate aftermath of the 1974 and 1998 atomic tests – that we can ignore likely US reaction to what we plan to do in our interest. Or, we have to have advocates and lobbies that are consequential enough within the US to scatter its resolve to act against us in the wake of something we do – as Israel

has through much of US society, as the Chinese have in the American firms that have business dealings with it.

The second feature is the shadow of Chinese military and economic strength: by now it looms over the entire region – it has been there over the land mass for some time, and is now beginning to be felt over the waters. This might is already sufficient to have ensured an important result: no country in the region wants to be seen as part of an alliance or even of a loose grouping that China may perceive to be aimed at China. Each country feels that its security interests are better safeguarded by securing its relations with China directly than by teaming up with any other country in the region for the purpose.

Consider an example. In India, even as we curse the US, many exclaim, "But why does the US not see that India alone can be an effective counter to China in this region?" A part of the answer is that the other person is liable to reckon us as a possible counter-weight to a looming threat only when he sees that we are in fact serious about countering that particular menace: seeing how we used to hem and haw on, say, Islamic terrorism, few would have thought it prudent to rely on us in dealing with that particular threat. Similarly, the US, or Japan, or Russia – each equally concerned about an unbridled China – will reckon us as a possible counter to China only when it sees that we ourselves are in fact serious about out-competing China. But there is another aspect also, and it is one we must bear in mind – specially these days when there is so much talk of cooperation between the US and India.

There is a prescription for the Americans that both Brzezinski and Kissinger advance, indeed both list it as a description of what they say has long been American policy. Countries in a region such as Asia have a host of problems with each other; many of them are at loggerheads with their neighbours. The US has aimed, these counselors say, the US *should* aim in the future also, to stay out of these disputes, and develop close relations separately with each disputant. Recall how Kissinger describes what the US was striving to do when the USSR and China fell out:

The challenge for the United States was *to make sure that it always had more options than either of the two parties within the triangle*. This obliged the United States *to stay closer to both Moscow and Beijing than they were to each other*, with a tilt towards Beijing since it was the Soviet Union

which represented the more immediate and by far the more powerful threat.¹

The same operating principle would apply to US relations with India and China, with India and Pakistan – that is, the US would strive to “stay closer to both Beijing and Delhi, to both Islamabad and Delhi than they are to each other.” Second, we can substitute in that passage “Russia”, “Australia”, “Japan” or the ASEAN countries for the words “United States”: the observation would be just as true – both as a description of their current approach, and as a prescription that they would embrace for their future policies. Each of them would aim to be closer to us as well as to any of our adversaries than we and that adversary could possibly be to each other.

Indeed, the same prescription would be urged by many to China also. Much of Chinese strategic writing portrays the US as the main future enemy of China, as the country that is even today aiming to break China, to encircle and contain it. But we can be certain that China also looks upon America as an opportunity – and not just as an economic opportunity. Many in China would be urging what Kissinger urges China to bear in mind:

Conflict [of China] with the United States would free all countries around the vast Chinese periphery to pursue their various ambitions and claims. A far more prudent course for China would be to implement the basic maxim of its statecraft – of pitting the far-off barbarians against those close by. In such a context, the United States is cast in the role of a geopolitical option for China – even as a potential safety net – rather than an innate adversary. On the whole – and despite some ups and downs, largely over Taiwan – this has, in fact, been the thrust of Chinese policy.²

Thus, just as the US would strive to maintain close relations with countries that may be actively hostile to India even as it deepens cooperation for a period with India, a country like China would exert to ensure that India and the US, or India and the ASEAN countries do not come too close together. This has been evident in the last three years. As the US-China relationship got redefined during the Vajpayee Government's tenure, China, concerned lest India get too close to the

¹Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a diplomacy for the 21st century*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2002, p. 141. Italics added.

²*ibid.*, p. 147.

US, began to be more responsive. It became even more so after the US and Japan issued their joint statement in February 2005. The statement mentioned Taiwan as a possible flash-point and stated that the US and Japan had a common strategic concern in the matter. China also concluded that the US had begun to encourage Japan to be more active internationally, and to equip itself better militarily. China took these to be moves to contain and counter it. Denunciations of Japan reached the customary pitch. Simultaneously, China moved to keep India getting closer to the US. The result was the announcement by the two countries during the Chinese Prime Minister's visit to India in April 2005 of an intention to establish a "strategic partnership". Even as the Chinese said all this in Delhi, they continued to put pebbles in the way of India's efforts to cement ties with ASEAN.

Who will be better disposed to believe us?

Contrary to so much "progressive" rhetoric today, insularity does not mean independence. Put to use, close economic relations fortify security. This was brought home to me during a discussion with Japanese intellectuals during the Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit. We were discussing ways to increase Japanese investment in India. A leading academic and thinker of Japan pointed out that there were at any time about 60,000 Chinese students in Japan. By contrast, there were just 250 Indian students in the country. Two and a half *million* Japanese tourists visit China every year. By contrast, only sixty *thousand* visit India. Every week there are *two hundred and eighty two* direct flights from Japan to China. By contrast, there are only *seven* to India. The trade between China and Japan is a colossal *ninety billion* dollars. By contrast, the trade between Japan and India is just *three and a half billion* dollars. So, he said, if you want Japanese to invest in India, first make them familiar with India – by multiplying the number of direct flights, then by sending more students from one country to the other....

The point holds just as well for foreign and security relations. In the wake of the Tiananmen killings, few lobbied harder to keep the US from taking steps that would hurt Beijing than the American firms that had invested in China: after all, for American firms China is today important not just as a market but as a manufacturing platform for exporting to third countries; after all, American firms earn about

7 to 10 billion dollars a year from China, a figure that is a fifth higher than the next source – Mexico; after all, with a trade surplus of approximately *eighty billion dollars* every year *vis-à-vis* the US, China has accounted for a tenth of the total purchases of US securities.¹ Today few work as assiduously to promote China as an investment destination as the merchant bankers and consulting firms that have been used by China for its IPOs in the New York Stock Exchange and elsewhere; few work as resolutely to keep up China's image in the investing public as the Fund Managers whose principals have invested billions in Chinese issues.

Is it any surprise, then, that an American analyst should observe as follows?

In other words, if the United States should opt to curtail commercial links with the mainland, it may be effectively cutting off a key source of foreign capital – something the world's largest debtor nation can hardly afford.²

Could there be a better text-book illustration of the maxim that one must get the enemy to work for one's objective as if it were his own – in this case, for strengthening the Chinese economy? Surely, an improvement on the 28th stratagem – “Lure the enemy onto the roof, then take away the ladder”!³ It can now read, “Lure the enemy onto the roof, and he will bear in mind that you can always take away the ladder”!

The same holds for other countries. In 1992 when relations between the two countries were normalized, trade between China and South Korea was around \$ 6.5 billion. Within 8 years it had grown to *five times* that figure. A survey points out that between China and South Korea over a million and a half visitors go from one country to the other, that there are over 150 round-trip passenger flights between the two, that by 1999 over 1,500 South Korean firms were operating in China, that there were around 60,000 registered long-term South Korean residents in China, 13,000 of them students. An engagement between China and India would be some distant

¹For the relevant figures see, for instance, Joseph P. Quinlan, “Ties that bind,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 81, No. 4, pp. 116-26.

²*ibid*, p. 126.

³Stefan Verstappen, *The Thirty Six Strategies of Ancient China*, China Books and Periodicals, San Francisco, 1999.

trouble that South Korea would be loath to get involved in. If it had to choose, with which of the two would it be predisposed to line up?

And in the coming decade, as the ASEAN countries get even more closely intertwined with China through a free trade area, will the same sequence not be repeated in that vital region? Recall Strategy 31: "The strategy of beautiful women: Send your enemy beautiful women to cause discord within his camp. This strategy can work at three levels. First, the ruler becomes so enamoured with the beauty that he neglects his duties and allows his vigilance to wane. Second, other males at court will begin to display aggressive behaviour that inflames minor differences hindering cooperation and destroying morale. Third, other females at court, motivated by jealousy and envy, begin to plot intrigues further exasperating the situation"¹ Replace "beautiful women" by "encoiling others into China's own economic development," and read the stratagem again!

Or consider just one, indirect consequence of the progressive integration of the Taiwanese economy with that of Mainland China, a subject to which I shall revert later. In a typical passage the US-China Commission points out,

The integration between Taiwan and China in the high-technology goods supply chain creates a triangular relationship with the United States that presents both economic benefits as well as strategic challenges.... Through this triangular relationship, the US high-technology industry is becoming increasingly reliant on Mainland production, heightening the economic stakes of any cross-strait hostilities. Any disruption in this supply chain could reverberate through the US economy *via* a slump in the technology sector. To illustrate this point, Merritt Cooke of the AIT told the Commission that when a severe earthquake hit Taiwan in September 1999, the tech markets in New York dropped more in percentage terms than in Taipei. Tellingly, news reports indicate that representatives of Dell Computers, a U.S. firm that is the largest buyer of laptop computers from Taiwan companies, have been pressuring Taiwan officials to establish direct trade and transportation ties with the Mainland. This may be indicative of a larger trend of U.S. businesses joining many in the Taiwan business community in pressuring Taiwan's leaders toward more economic integration with the Mainland.²

¹ *ibid.*

² China Security Review Commission, *The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China*, July, 2002, Chapter V.

As against these firms and funds, what lobbies can we deploy? The occasional scholar, half a dozen legislators?

In a word, insularity does not spell independence – as many in India seem to rail. Economic ties – put to use – can aid security.

Public issues and investments, and their magnitudes, the setting up of production facilities are all-important. But there is an even more elementary consideration: that is, just being alert to such potential sources of strength, and opportunity. In Southeast Asia, in the US and elsewhere, Indians are among the top professionals managing pension and other funds. Their advice influences investment decisions worth billions. Their assessments colour perceptions of the most influential decision-makers. Have we done anything to network with them? Even for information, to say nothing of altering perceptions through them? And yet that even a little effort will pay rich dividends is evident: that NRIs in the US on occasion, and spontaneously, bombard their Senators with emails and cables leads the latter to factor in the other side of the picture.

But to get back to the advantage that the country that is better integrated into the world system acquires. Precisely because it is better integrated into the world economy; precisely because it is so much better intertwined with the economies of the US, Japan, Southeast Asia; precisely because Chinese leaders are now in that select group because of which they have frequent, personal, working relationships and interactions with businessmen, leaders and opinion makers of these countries, in a crisis – say, a skirmish in our Northeast – involving China and a country, India, which is not as closely intermeshed with them, the leaders of an ASEAN country, say, are liable to be predisposed to believing the version of China than of the latter.

The focus on China's economic modernization obscures what it is doing about its armed forces

In India, there is growing realization about the strides China is making in achieving the "economic modernization" part of its agenda. Newspapers carry accounts of its achievements in this sphere. The contrast between our 6-7 per cent rates of growth and the 8-10 per cent of China finds occasional mention even in our Parliament. Alas! The contrast is mentioned, only to be drowned in the *bull* of the day.

But what is *not* mentioned is even more significant. There is next to no discussion, to say nothing of real knowledge about the modernization of China's armed forces. Indeed, talk of economic modernization obscures the fact that China is simultaneously putting in as much effort into strengthening its armed forces. It is almost as if we were in denial: I was dumbfounded when, at a very important meeting, a high personage, who has himself been directly associated with our defence efforts, remarked in all seriousness, "But isn't it a fact that the Chinese leadership has affirmed that for the next twenty years China is going to focus on economic growth? Does that not mean that they will not do anything that might provoke or threaten their neighbours during this period?"

Economic strength is itself a vital constituent of "comprehensive national power". It provides the basis for much else: as engineering industries, as microelectronics in a country expand, they do not just add in the abstract to the Gross Domestic Product; they constitute the wherewithal for manufacturing military hardware; the growth of units producing IT hardware, the vast software industry, much of which works in the closest cooperation with, is indeed an adjunct to the PLA, the capacities that China has acquired in embedded software, equip the country for Information Warfare; they enable it to manufacture and deploy sophisticated "RMA-weapons"; progress in metallurgy doesn't spell just steel for dams, it also yields alloys for missiles; the enormous progress China has made in producing computer hardware, as has been correctly observed, enables it to receive, transmit, process the mountains of data that the espionage satellites it has put up send; its dazzling strides in communications are not confined to mobile handsets – they signify a capacity for precision targeting of bombs and missiles.... Outlays on the new railway line into and across Tibet do not just notch up the GDP; they do not just "develop a backward region"; they make a Tibet an even more formidable military base, in particular a base for force projection into South Asia. In a word, much of what we see as "economic development" *per se* is itself an essential component of *military* strength. Second, the ability to make the enormous amounts of investment that are required – for ground sensors, for satellites, for the telecom network, to continue with just this single example, for the vast array of weapons: from its missile force to stealth aircraft

to its space tracking network – is itself enhanced by more rapid growth. There is an even more elementary consideration: many of the technologies that China has used for building its Information Warfare capability are available commercially. The more resources one has as a consequence of more rapid growth, the more one can set aside for acquiring what is available.

For such obvious reasons, the Chinese leadership most certainly looks upon the current focus on economic growth as a *means* to greater national strength. Moreover, greater economic strength, reflected for instance in the higher share that the country acquires in international trade, means that its voice shall carry greater weight in fora where rules of the international economic order are being settled. For the same reasons, differential rates of growth cannot but result in differential military strength and other components of power between India and China. At the least, the gap will multiply the temptation to slap India and, thus, deflect it from pursuits that would enhance its “comprehensive national strength” – by undermining its morale; by intensifying mutual recrimination and discord in the political system; by forcing it to go in for levels of military spending which, at those lower rates of growth, it cannot afford; by deepening its dependence on, say, the USA or Russia – that is, by forcing it to depend even more on sources that are ever so uncertain.

A porcupine or a peacock?

In many instances, India has taken steps disregarding likely international reactions: the integration of Goa and Sikkim; the 1971 action in East Pakistan; the way the Chinese were rebuffed when in 1967 they again needled Indian forces; the way nine years later they found Indian forces well prepared *and* willing to take them on when they tried to test them at the Sumdorong Chu in the area they claim – Arunachal; the atomic tests in 1974 and 1998. But there is another set of inactions which paint another image – that of a soft State which will ultimately reconcile itself to unfavourable developments, of a State that will, of its own accord, rationalize inaction:

- ❑ Which other country, with over 64,000 of its citizens having been killed by terrorists over the past two decades, would for this

extended period have desisted from taking out the source and sustainer of those killers?

- ❑ Have we not reconciled ourselves to the Chinese occupation and assimilation of Tibet? Would China not notice that we make sure not to say a word about the fact that China has completely overturned the demographic composition of Tibet?
- ❑ Have we not reconciled ourselves to the territory that the Chinese took over in the 1950s and early 1960s?
- ❑ Have we not written-off Pakistan Occupied Kashmir?
- ❑ Even when we denounce the way Pakistan has acquired nuclear weapons and missiles, do we not bend backwards *not* to mention who is passing on these weapons and technology to the Pakistanis?
- ❑ A plane drops arms and ammunition in Purulia; and we bend backwards to find plausible explanations for releasing those who had been arrested in that connection – as to disclosing who was behind the arms drop, to whom the arms were being funneled, for what purpose, we do not dare open our mouths.
- ❑ On 25 October 2000, three Indian Army personnel are killed by the Myanmar Army on the Nagaland-Myanmar border, and nothing happens.
- ❑ On 18 April 2001, a weakling like the Bangladesh Rifles kills 16 BSF personnel at Pyrdiwah, just 85 kilometers from Shillong on the Meghalaya-Bangladesh border, and nothing happens.
- ❑ Insurrectionists from the Northeast are captured by Myanmar; they are Indian citizens; yet India is denied even Consular access to them.
- ❑ ULFA terrorists set up camps in Bhutan, and it is only after years that they are flushed out.
- ❑ The ULFA terrorists – as well as terrorists of other hues – move about freely in Bangladesh, their leaders live in protected houses, they run businesses, and we are seen to be unable to do anything.
- ❑ *One and a half to two crore* infiltrators walk over from Bangladesh, they take over lands from our own people, they come to determine the outcome of elections in vast tracts of the country, and yet we do nothing.
- ❑ In December 1999 a plane is hijacked; it lands at the Amritsar

airport; the Crisis Group meets in Delhi; the aircraft is surrounded; the Group continues in session; the aircraft is allowed to take off.

- ❑ A plane is said to have been hijacked; it lands at the Delhi airport; ministers, officials, crack teams rush; hours pass; the curious thing is that passengers in it are able to use their mobiles to talk to TV stations; and to go on talking; even the lay viewer wonders, "What kind of terrorists are these who allow their hostages to go on talking so freely?"; eventually it transpires that there is no terrorist on board; there hasn't been even a hoax call; someone misheard something....
- ❑ For none of these lapses is anyone ever brought to book.

Our visage as seen by the Task Force on Internal Security

The Task Force on Internal Security – one of four set up in the wake of the Kargil war – drew attention in passage after candid passage to the fatal consequences that would follow once the impression got around that the country, in particular the leadership and administrative structure, were indifferent to the security of the country. It wrote:

An important aspect which has not been factored into any planning for safeguarding the country's unity and integrity relates to the unfortunate reality that the political leadership of the states does not adequately recognize the profound importance of 'security' and, consequently, are unmindful of the devastating consequences of any failure to maintain it. Their day to day interests and involvements lie elsewhere. The Chief Ministers, even of states facing serious disturbances, have been running their administrations in a manner which shows that, notwithstanding the continuing economic and human losses which result from the ongoing insurgencies, they are determined to pursue their narrow and short term political objectives even if, in this process, vital national security interests are jeopardized. They express their ignorance or helplessness when reports are placed before them to show that political and bureaucratic elements in their governmental apparatus are providing support, encouragement and safe havens to the leaders of the very insurgent groups against which operations are being carried out by the Security Forces. And they respond with equal indifference and helplessness to the manifest corruption in governmental functioning and to the organized extortions and loot carried out by the militant outfits, some of which have, for years now, been siphoning off significant portions of the Central grants for the implementation of developmental programmes. Thus, the funds

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earmarked for executing vital social and economic development schemes, and even those meant for implementing poverty alleviation programmes, continue to be extorted for supporting the activities of militant and insurgent groups. The net result is that despite the thousands of crores allocated by the Government of India over the years, little or no development at all has taken place in the remote and difficult areas of the disturbed states. The deprived and neglected people understandably foster feelings of having been alienated. And alienation provides fresh and added

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impetus to the insurgent movements. The Union of India has ample Constitutional powers to enforce compliance by the states. It would be unacceptable if internal security management continues to be viewed essentially in terms of tackling disorders through the deployment of Central armed forces and altogether ignoring the gross failures of governance, corruption, collusions and compromises which lie at the root of the problems sought to be dealt with. In this context, we are of the considered view that, within its overall approach to safeguarding the country's internal security, MHA [the Ministry of Home Affairs] must devote very special attention to see that there is visible improvement in the governance of the disturbed and vulnerable states. And this shall not be possible unless any and every failure in this regard is met with decisive Constitutional action by the Centre....

Otherwise, one need hardly add, both consequences will follow – insurgents will get the wherewithal for their assaults both in money and disaffected population; and the enemies of the country will conclude that India need not be taken seriously. Both consequences *are already upon us*. Has that induced the political class or the civil service to alter conduct? "In this context we would like to emphasize the high importance of ensuring against the emergence of a public perception that our polity is indifferent to national security concerns," the Task Force warned again. "Such an impression permeating our society would generate cynicism and despair, breed disloyalty and spread chaos. Arising from the aforesaid concern we have been disturbed to see two recent news reports: one on the Assam Chief Minister's statement that senior Congress Party leaders have been supporting ULFA; the other on the HVP's allegation that a Rajasthan Cabinet Minister is mixed up with the ISI. It is necessary, in all such cases, that the country is informed about the true facts and the action being taken to enforce the rule of law. Secrecy or silence would strengthen the public perception that the Centre is unconcerned or

incapable of curbing lawlessness in the country and that politicians are above the reach of law." Any effect of even explicit warnings of this kind? And would the impression – and therefore the consequences – be confined to our society at home? Would an external adversary not be drawing inferences?

The image of the Ministry in charge of internal security spoke to the same inference. Reviewing the functioning of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Task Force observed as politely as it could,

We would like to reiterate that MHA's image, influence and capacity to maintain internal security shall be most adversely affected if it does not let the states and the country at large know how it views serious infringements of the law and how it is likely to respond in dealing with them. MHA cannot any longer afford to pursue a reactive policy or approaches which are compelled by the need to retain the support of the coalition parties supporting the Central Government. For several years now we have been hearing that the Centre is evolving a coordinated plan to counter ISI's activities in India. While, obviously, the details of any such plan cannot be made public it is necessary to ensure against an impression gaining ground that we are incapable of taking timely decisions and the required actions even for safeguarding national security. The manner in which the Karnataka and Tamil Nadu states have recently capitulated to the threats and demands of Veerapan, who has been facing numerous serious charges of looting, kidnapping, smuggling and killing, is yet another example of populism and politics negating the rule of law. There has been no report to indicate the manner in which MHA expects the two states to respond in this case. We feel that MHA would not be able to secure the states against serious internal disorders if it shows the slightest hesitation or delay in issuing the required directives to the concerned governments to ensure that they discharge their Constitutional responsibility for maintaining peace and public order and enforce the rule of law....

Would insurgents, would enemies of the country not have learnt from their own run-ins with our apparatus what the Task Force noted?

Another extremely worrying aspect, which came to our notice during discussions with Home Secretary, is the growing indifference of certain states to even furnish meaningful monthly reports on security related matters, a practice which has continued uninterrupted ever since 1947. We noticed this unconcern even in our working – a large number of states, and even UTAs, failed to furnish the information required by us, despite

the repeated reminders issued by MHA. *Prima facie*, it may appear even to furnish simple information is a serious reflection on the indifferent manner in which the states are inclined to deal with security related issues....

The image China has fostered

Contrast the perception that China has engendered about itself:

- ❑ Clinton started to make a little noise about the human rights record of China. He had to swiftly give up.
- ❑ Tibet? Not a squeak of any consequence from any country that deals with, or plans to deal with China.
- ❑ Analysts as much as leaders routinely proceed on the premise that everyone just has to recognize Chinese sensitivities over Taiwan. That we feel as strongly about Kashmir or Arunachal deters no one from advancing his brilliant ideas about what we should be doing in regard to these areas.
- ❑ If you utter a word about Chinese forays in the Pacific Islands, if you even suggest that China may pose a threat to its neighbours in the coming decades, you are certain to be denounced at once as pathologically anti-Chinese, as one who is wrecking the painstaking effort of decades to improve relations between our two countries, as a tool of those who are out to encircle China, to extend the hegemony of the US.
- ❑ If Japan amends its textbooks, if the Japanese Prime Minister goes to a shrine honouring those who died in the War – the country must reckon with a fusillade from China.

We in India have direct experience of these fusillades. His statements are “utterly outrageous”, he is using “the most malicious language vilifying China,” he is “slandering China noisily,” “he has also tried in the most despicable sinister way to sow dissension between China and other countries” – all this and more, as Pillsbury’s volume recalls, about Pandit Nehru in the wake of the 1962 invasion across Indian territory by Chinese troops! Chinese official media plucked an isolated sentence from Panditji’s *Discovery of India* – a book he had written in 1944! – and an innocuous sentence at that – “With its current position, India simply cannot play a secondary role in the world. India should either be vigorous or disappear from the scene” – and waved it as

proof positive of India's hegemonistic designs! And not just the media. Recall Chou En-lai's conversations with Kissinger that we encountered earlier. Chinese official media picked up another sentence from his *Autobiography* – a book written even earlier, in 1934/35! – and an innocuous sentence at that – “Though not directly a Pacific State, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there” – and hurled this about as conclusive proof of India's hegemonistic plans!

All this was repeated in 1998 after Vajpayee's letter to Clinton was printed by *The New York Times*. Indian leaders “thought spreading the theory of a China Threat was very useful,” the official handouts proclaimed. “However, since they could not find any factual basis, they wracked their brains to come up with some age-old events in an attempt to confuse public opinion....” Vajpayee's letter was particularly disgusting, they declared as “it wrecked in a single day the results of improving relations between the two countries over the past ten years and more....” The *Liberation Army Daily* added to the pile of adjectives: “Unexpectedly, just as Sino-Indian relations are improving continually, the Indian authorities have insolently jumped out and raised a hue and cry about the China Threat Theory, openly regarding China as an obstacle to India seeking regional hegemony in an attempt to land China in a difficult position and boost its own morale.” Would anyone have been so foolish as to “openly” announce that it aimed at being the regional hegemon, and that another country was the obstacle?! “If this is not regional hegemonism, what is it then?” the *Liberation Army Daily* analyst demanded! India thinks of itself as a natural inheritor of Britain's imperial position in the region, Chinese analysts insist. It will resort to “wantonly engaging in making a show of force,” they forecast. “Its fond dream of regional hegemony is a nightmare to the world....”¹

While India takes its forbearance so far that it is bound to be taken for weakness by others, China has assiduously fostered the contrary image – that it will tolerate no nonsense, that it *will* pursue its interests, that it will *not* countenance any interference – be that no more than a statement – in its internal affairs. Imagine staff in

¹For the relevant Chinese sources, Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 2000, from which the examples above are taken.

embassies posted in Beijing visiting spots within China where trouble has broken out; imagine them demanding that they be allowed to see for themselves whether elections in some part of that country are free and fair! But they did so over the troubles in Gujarat. They did so over the elections in Jammu and Kashmir. Imagine, then, that a skirmish has suddenly erupted between China and India over some tract in our Northeast. To start with, as we have seen, countries the world over have enough problems of their own, they would rather not get involved in the quarrels of others. More important, countries like the US or blocs like the European Union and ASEAN are much more intertwined with China than with India: they would, therefore, be predisposed to believe China's version rather than ours'. And, as they would also have experienced China's bristles, if they speak up at all, would they rather risk the reaction of a porcupine or of a peacock?

China has carefully cultivated this reputation – of being hypersensitive, of one that bristles easily. The results are evident already. Every analyst cautions everyone to remember that China is very sensitive about Taiwan, about Tibet, that for it these are internal issues on which it will not brook any interference. But on Kashmir, we must realize that it is an international issue! Every analyst reminds us that Chinese leaders feel deeply about the humiliations to which their people and country were subjected in the past. But if we so much as mention the humiliations to which Indians were subjected during the British rule, we are pounced upon for still living in the past!

As the March 2000 Presidential election approached in Taiwan, China issued a White Paper. It declared,

[I]f a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, *sine die*, the peaceful settlement of cross-straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese Government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill the great cause of reunification.¹

Everyone thinks it but natural for China to issue such a stern and explicit warning. Everyone has internalized the notion that China

¹c.f., *China Review 2000*, Lau Chung-ming and Jianfa Chen, eds., The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 2000, pp. 86-87.

feels strongly about the issue, and that one day or the other it *will* use force if Taiwan does not join it voluntarily. The occupation of Aksai Chin by China, of POK by Pakistan has already breached our territorial integrity. But what would be the reactions if India issued a warning even remotely resembling China's?

Edward Friedman remarks,

Beijing is imagined in much of the Asia-Pacific region as a bully whom no one should provoke. One cannot even say accurately that the bully is a bully without being called a provocateur. Whatever pretext China's rulers invoke for military action is treated within the region with the greatest respect lest the bully be angered.¹

Another analyst reports the ASEAN mood as follows:

In practical terms, the ASEAN states would strive as much as possible to ensure that the notion of "the China threat" does not become a self-fulfilling prophesy. For example, the ASEAN states have not been publicly critical of those dimensions of Chinese security policy which have implications for the rest of the region. This kind of statecraft has more to do with the enlightened self-interests of ASEAN member-states than any suggestions of doctrinaire inclinations. As Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew has put it: "Small Asian nations are too prudent to express their fears [about China] publicly." Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed has on occasion criticized those observers who have engaged in inflating threats to East Asian security, and by so doing souring atmospherics. In May 1996, for instance, he assailed "undeterred balance-of power enthusiasts" for exaggerating threats to regional stability and consequently deliberately minimizing "what Asia has been able to accomplish over the last generation."

Derek da Cunha recalls a telling incident to illustrate how these countries have come to internalize "caution" when dealing with China:

This need to keep regional atmospherics good, even in the face of disquieting developments, was best exemplified in March 1996, during the exercises conducted by the PLA in and around the Taiwan Strait. These exercises, intended to bring the political leadership of Taiwan into line,

¹Edward Friedman, "Post-Deng China's right populist authoritarian foreign policy," in *China Review* 2000, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-25, at p. 4.

were an instructive experience for the countries of Southeast Asia. Beijing's saber-rattling, though the result of Mr. Lee Teng-hui's attempts to create international space for Taiwan, was also seen by the region as occurring at a time of steady accretion in China's economic, diplomatic and military power. As such this was a moment of truth for ASEAN.

During this episode, the countries of Southeast Asia were largely muted in their response to Beijing's military actions, no matter how egregious they seemed. Beijing's saber-rattling had led to the diversion of international air traffic and shipping, and sent shivers through the Taiwan, Hong Kong and other regional bourses. The stance of the Southeast Asians appeared to have two dimensions, one largely apparent, the other far more real. The largely apparent dimension is premised on the fact that the states of Southeast Asia accept that Taiwan is a domestic Chinese issue. Consequently, during the "crisis" in the Taiwan Strait they did not feel that it was their place to be seen interfering in the domestic affairs of another country - an avowed ASEAN principle of longstanding. (But a principle that, as recent events show, can get modulated in the context of Myanmar!) *The Southeast Asian states are only too aware of the proximity of growing Chinese power, and being pragmatic they have apparently decided that the best course of action is to reconcile themselves to that fact and to accommodate China's rise. (An old Asian saying sums up this attitude: "Do not knock your head against a brick wall; best to go around it for profit.")* Even well before the crisis in the Taiwan Strait, the tongue-tied nature of the governments in Southeast Asia, when witnessing Chinese assertive-ness, caught the imagination of one observer: "Regional reaction has been relatively subdued, reflecting more a desire not to upset China and miss commercial opportunities offered by its huge and growing market than by any confidence in Beijing's intentions." By this essentially expedient stance, the ASEAN states incur few costs, at least in the near-to-medium terms. The longer term is, of course, another matter.¹

And not just the Southeast Asian countries, countries of Central Asia, as well as Russia would just not be willing to be seen to be part of a "contain-China" arrangement, indeed they would not want to be seen to be part of any arrangement that *China may take to be a "contain-China" arrangement.*

¹Derek da Cunha, "Southeast Asian perceptions of China's future security role in its 'background'," in Jonathan D. Pollock and Richard H. Yang, *In China's Shadow, Regional perspectives on Chinese foreign policy and military development*, RAND, 1998, at pp. 121-22. Italics added.

We do not need to look farther than India itself. Have we not silenced ourselves? Have *we* not adopted, as the Tibetans ask, a "See no Tibet – Speak no Tibet – Hear no Tibet" policy ourselves?

The way all countries – including India – have bent backwards "out of regard for Chinese sensibilities," so to say, reinforces the central lesson – that India must rely overwhelmingly on its own resources, its own economic, technological, military strength for shielding itself. And that unless it acquires that strength, others will heed the interests and possible reactions of a neighbour like China, not our interests or reactions.

A lesson to remember

In planning their operations, in deciding whether to press a point on the borders or not, other countries would naturally be influenced by this record. The lesson is well brought out by Ernest May in his riveting book, *Strange Victory: Hitler's conquest of France*.¹ May shows that "Overall France and its allies turn out to have been better equipped for war than was Germany, with more trained men, more guns, more and better tanks, more bombers and fighters"; that countries like France had networks of spies even in the higher levels of German Government – even in Germany's intelligence apparatus; that exceptions like Rommel apart, French field commanders were a match for the German commanders; that "even when losing, most French military units showed gallantry...." Yet, "On June 22, not quite seven weeks after the first German soldiers had crossed into Luxembourg, German cavalry clattered down the Champs-Élysées in Paris in a victory parade, with their Führer, Adolf Hitler, looking on."

May's narrative pinpoints key reasons for this outcome – all of them have to do more with general governance, the general habits and predispositions of rulers rather than with military strengths. May documents how Hitler focused on the habits of mind of the rulers of France and the rest, that by his diabolic instinct he correctly guessed that the habits were so deeply ingrained that these effete systems would react in the way he was saying they would rather than in the

¹Ernest R. May, *Strange Victory: Hitler's conquest of France*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2000.

way his advisors were apprehending they would. May shows that it was precisely because Hitler insisted on planning the lunge his way that the Germans scored such lightning success.

The sequence that ensued was as predictable from Hitler's point of view as it was astonishing to France and the rest – to persons who, precisely because they were sunk in the system, could not see themselves and their bog. Knowing that their armies were stronger, rulers of France and England just refused to believe that Hitler would be so irrational as to attack; the elaborate counter-plan they prepared did not contemplate that he may use an alternative thrust; the dilatoriness of France's governmental machinery.... "In sum," May writes, "the essential thread in the story of Germany's victory over France hangs on the imaginativeness of German war planning and the corresponding lack of imaginativeness on the Allied side. Hitler and his generals perceived that *the weakness of their otherwise powerful enemies resided in habits and routines that made their reaction times slow. They developed a plan that capitalized on this weakness.* French and British leaders made no effort to understand how or why German thinking might differ from theirs. They neglected to prepare for the possibility of surprise, and, as German analysts and planners predicted, they could not react promptly once events began to be at odds with expectations." Indeed, it wasn't even the German General Staff as a whole that out-guessed the French. In a vital sense it was the irrational insistence of Hitler of doing something others couldn't contemplate that carried the day – and his insistence was based on the opinion he had formed of how the French rulers and planners would think when he made his first moves.

May's
*Strange
Victory*

Multiple lessons for us: a system's habits – its ways of arriving at decisions, its inability to carry through the decisions it has taken – cannot be rectified when the danger bursts upon it; the ones who are least able to see these habits – of the system, of the minds of rulers – are the ones who are *in* the system, the ones who are able to see it the least are the ones who control the system: in addition to everything else, being in control brings yet another set of blinders – *for them*, the system works; this conditions those in control not to believe reports that occasionally reach them that things are grinding down. On the

other side, these habits, the sclerosis of the administrative system, the mental habits and conditioning of the rulers are precisely what the adversary detects. And he crafts his assault accordingly.

Paranoia?

By clutching on to the corpse of "Socialism", by remaining encoiled in the "license-quota *raj*" we have fallen behind China by 15/20 years. An enormous gap has developed between India and China, a gap, unless it is closed swiftly, will result in irreversible danger for us.

In just 1982, India's per capita income was actually higher than China's. Today China's is double that of India. Today China produces 260 million tonnes of steel. We produce about 40 million tonnes. China consumes about 1,900 billion KW of power. We consume about 540 billion KW. Our foreign exchange reserves are about \$ 130 billion. China's are around \$ 670 billion.

This enormous difference in magnitudes enables China to act on a scale that we just cannot envisage at present. When the Chinese President visited Latin America a while ago, he announced that over the next decade China would give *one hundred billion dollars* worth of foreign aid to Latin American countries. While we have still not been able to settle our debates on whether to allow foreign investment in universities, or even Indian private investment in them, China has announced that in the next few years it will build one hundred Confucius Colleges in Western Europe and other parts of the world with a focus on Chinese language and culture.... The Confucius College in South Korea was opened in 2004. The Confucius College at the Stockholm University in Sweden was opened in February 2005. The Confucius College in Poitiers, France will be built in June 2005.... Talk of "soft power".

It is entirely true that China has several problems. There is a growing realization that, as has been the case with every closed society, Chinese growth figures may be exaggerated. That in fact China is liable to face gargantuan problems in the coming years. That it already has over a hundred million floating around for work. That 55 per cent of the loans of its banking system are bad debts. That it is having enormous difficulties turning its state owned enterprises around. That while they have built massive buildings in Shanghai, a high proportion of the built up space is unoccupied. That there has

been a precipitate decline in the share of government revenues in GDP. That there have been reports of provincial authorities dragging their feet in remitting revenue receipts to Beijing. That with the 1-child family norm having been enforced for a generation, soon one working Chinese will have to be maintaining three to four retired elders. That China's stock exchanges are rudimentary. That operations in them are still a lottery. That its pattern of development is inflicting immense damage to China's environment. That the education and health infrastructure are near breakdown in several provinces, in particular in their rural areas. The fact that over 10,000 die every year in just mining accidents points to the real condition of vast parts of the economy. Even the PLA is reported to suffer from the all-too-familiar problems: antiquated weaponry; institutional inertia; personnel who are not attuned to the newer technologies; financial constraints. These can hobble the Chinese forces as much as they would any other army....

All true, and yet.

We are so comforted counting the problems of others! "Hasn't what you call progress caused untold damage to the environment in the West?" – that the rivers and lakes in Europe have been cleaned up somehow escapes our notice! "Didn't those whom the world was hailing as the 'Asian tigers' get mauled in the financial crisis?" – that, barring Indonesia, they have recovered, that South Korea today has once again got foreign exchange reserves of \$115 *billion*, that almost all of them are implementing many a lesson from that breakdown escapes our notice!

Indeed, confronted with accounts of China's achievements, many personages in India have gone into a denial-mode! Few have been as reassured by articles in *Newsweek*, etc., casting doubts on Chinese data as these persons. It is a fair guess that, as was the case in closed societies that have preceded it, the data from China is exaggerated. But what about what can be seen? Is the infrastructure not visible to the eye? Can trade figures not be cross-checked against the figures of countries with which China is trading? Is the figure of their foreign exchange reserves – of *six hundred and seventy billion dollars* – also fake? Do our exporters not testify to the hard time that Chinese goods are giving them in European and American markets? The production that is being sourced from China is beyond doubt – the briefest

conversation with Japanese policy makers and businessmen will dispel all doubts in this regard. The production facilities that have been set up – for instance, by Taiwanese, South Korean, Japanese, European and American firms – are present for all to see: entire townships testify to the massive inflow of capital, and its consequence.

True, China has many problems. But would it be prudent to plan on the premise that these problems will overwhelm it? If circumstances keep the gap between China and India from becoming wider, all to the good. But it would be foolish, if not suicidal to proceed on the assumption that China's problems will in effect do our job – of protecting India – for us.

And, as we noted above, who can guarantee what China's response to these looming problems will be? The country has always been sternly nationalist – seldom more so than under the Communist Party. If economic problems mount, and as ideology is progressively less potent for legitimizing its rule, will the ruling elite not enflame nationalism even more energetically? After all, democracy is not about to break out in China. Decisions will continue to be taken in the foreseeable future by a small band. Who can be certain which way this small group will decide?

In a word, at the least, we must keep the closest watch on the way these problems develop, and their likely impact on Chinese policies – including the prospect about which observers caution: that the problems, if they mount, would make future choices of Chinese rulers more unpredictable and uncertain.

"Confidence building" of the last few years

Again, there is no doubt that in the last few years India and China have been able to take a number of confidence building measures: the agreement that border problems have to be solved through negotiations; that both sides will strictly respect the Line of Actual Control; that there will be joint inspections of segments that have been in dispute; that military presence at the border will be kept to a minimum; that major military exercises will not be undertaken near the border without giving prior notice to the other side; that neither side shall support separatist movements in the other; that while

solving the border problem will take long, other steps to improve relations should proceed apace. Several rounds of border talks have been held. Guidelines for future talks on the border have been agreed.

These are very substantial steps forward. But they also imply that India has reconciled itself to the area that the Chinese have already taken; that China will continue to build Tibet as a base for military operations should these become necessary; that while we will have to spend years locating who is supplying arms to terrorists in the Northeast lest China take offence at anything we might say, we will not so much as sigh over Tibet because that would amount to giving succour to a separatist movement in China.... Most important, that China will continue to furnish the kind of military aid it has been giving to Pakistan. The consequence is not difficult to foresee: to quote Pervez Musharraf, capacity having been built, intentions can change at any time!¹

How well the dictum of Raymond Aron fits what has happened in regard to the territories that China has taken in Aksai Chin?

Men know that in the long run international law must bow to fact. A territorial status invariably ends up being legalized, provided it lasts. A great power that wants to forbid a rival from making conquests must arm and not proclaim in advance a moral disapproval....²

And the border dispute is incidental compared to the real issue at hand: China's determination to be the dominant power – in the world, and certainly in this region; and the consequences this quest will spell for our security and other national interests.

In accordance with policy!

A good example of this kind of thinking is in a substantial paper, "On Sino-Indian relations in the new Century," by Cheng Ruisheng, the former Chinese Ambassador to India, and, at the time of writing,

¹"Remarks by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf," 12 February, 2002, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://www.ceip.org/files/events/2002-02-12-musharraf-tscript.asp>.

²Raymond Aron, cited in Robert D. Kaplan, *Warrior Politics*, Random House, New York, 2002, p. 36.

Senior Adviser, China Institute of International Studies. Relations between States depend as much on the policies they follow as upon immutable factors like geography, he writes. China and India swung into conflict in 1962. The same China and India are mending their relations today. The two have many common interests, he says – “to create a long-term peaceful and stable peripheral environment for the economic and social development of both countries.” Both desire multi-polarity, both are against terrorism, he writes.

All true, but look at the further propositions he advances. He says that both countries have recognized that solution to the border problem will take a long time. The other side of this is that the longer the time the border remains the way it is, the more India would have reconciled itself to having lost what has been taken from it. Better still, look at what his response is to Indian concerns on China’s continuing assistance to Pakistan for nuclear weapons and missile technology. India, he counsels, should be satisfied with the fact that “China has already made important adjustments in its policy towards South Asia in the past decade and more” – it is precisely in this decade that transfer of missile and nuclear technology from China to Pakistan has been maximum. The test, Ruisheng says, should be the policy of China towards India itself, not what China is doing *vis-à-vis* Pakistan. And when what it is doing *vis-à-vis* Pakistan impacts India’s security?! But it is his response to the question of Chinese arms supplies to Pakistan that takes the cake: he says this is being done in accordance with policy, that conventional weapons and technology are being transferred in accordance with well-defined principles, that as far as nuclear weapons and missile technology are concerned, as China is a signatory to international agreements, we must take him at his word that China does not export these at all! This is how he puts the matter:

As to China’s arms sales to Pakistan, these sales are made within the framework of relevant policies of the Chinese Government. As far as the transfer of conventional military equipment and technologies is concerned, China observes the following principles: the export of weapons must help the recipient enhance its capability for legitimate self-defense; it must not impair peace, security and stability of the relevant region and the world as a whole; and it must not be used to interfere in the recipient state’s internal affairs –

the implication being that as weapons and technologies are said to be given in accordance with these principles, they must in fact be in accordance with these stated criteria! He continues,

Regarding nuclear exports, China, a signatory to the NPT, has pursued a policy of not supporting, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and not assisting any other country to develop such weapons. It has laid down three principles regarding nuclear exports: they should serve peaceful purposes only; they should accept the safeguards of the IAEA; and they should not be retransferred to a third country without China's consent. Regarding the transfer of missiles, the spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry, in his talk of November 21, 2000, pointed out that China had no intention to help any country in any way to develop ballistic missiles which could be used to carry nuclear weapons (i.e., capable of reaching a range of at least 300 kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms). These policies of China lead to the result that China's arms sales to Pakistan are very limited both by quantity and quality.

We need not turn to information that Indian intelligence agencies may have acquired. Testimony of US agencies to the US Congress flatly contradicts these assertions of Ruisheng – and the evidence that the US had come by was sufficient for it to impose sanctions on both China and Pakistan for the transfer of nuclear weapons and missile technologies! And to renew the sanctions in spite of the protestations of innocence!

Self-fulfilling?

Little purpose is served by blaming China for any of this. It is just pursuing its interest as it perceives it. We have to safeguard our interest. That is the cure.

Nor is the point that the Chinese leadership has been omniscient, that it has always known what should be done, nor even that today it sees everything clearly. On the contrary, it has often been convulsed by fierce debates about the course that should be adopted – in its relations with other countries as much as in domestic affairs. Indeed, the policies it has pursued have often been reversed – completely, abruptly. The point is that for some time it has been following a steady set of policies – one that is well on the way to making it a strong power, one that has already given it a major say in affairs of the world,

and for that reason we cannot afford to fail in gearing up to counter the consequences which that set of policies spell for us.

Nor is the point that China has succeeded in everything. Not even that it has been particularly skillful. On the contrary, its relations with almost each of its neighbours – with the exception of a client like Pakistan – have been strained to the limit from time to time. With USSR – over leadership of the Communist world, over the correct approach to building a Socialist society, over territorial claims....; with South Korea – over China's assistance to the North Korean regime; with Japan – over a range of issues: islands over which both have claims, over Japan's defence pact with the US, over American bases in Okinawa, over Japanese textbooks, over visits of the Japanese Prime Minister to the shrine honouring those who laid down their lives for Japan during the War, over Japanese rearmament; with Taiwan of course – over its very existence; with the USA – over Korea, over its presence in East and Southeast Asia, over Taiwan, over the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, over the Missile Defence Systems....; with Vietnam – over a range of issues including Vietnamese islands which China claims as its own, to the point of invading that small country "to teach it a lesson"; with the Philippines – over its association with the US, over Spratly Islands; with Indonesia – over islands that China claims, over ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, over Indonesia's relations with the US and Australia....; with India.... Indeed, China's relations with other countries – like its domestic affairs – are prone to swing to extremes as they result from the momentary assessment of a small clutch of individuals – and these assessments are often affected by faction fights among rulers in Beijing.

The point thus is not that China has the magic touch, that it has succeeded all round. The point is that we should learn from China the points on which it *has* succeeded.

"But this way of looking at everyone with suspicion, to arm ourselves because we suspect them is the surest way to goad others to act up to our suspicions."

That is surely a matter of judgment. It can equally well be argued that the way to avoid war is not to sing lullabies – that we are brothers, that the other fellow too has problems. The way is to acquire such capabilities – through strength, through clear sight, through

demonstrated will – that the potential adversary is certain that, should he injure us, he will be subjected to a cost he cannot bear. This is not instigating the other to war. It is the only way to avoid war, humiliation, subjugation, the suffering that war will certainly bring in its wake. If things turn out to be better, good: we must have the wit to take advantage of that circumstance too. That holds as much for the specific question of preparing to withstand an enemy. For while it is true that a country that is perpetually on edge, apprehensive that all are against it, that they are scheming and plotting against it, that this or that one among them is about to attack it, will dissipate its energies; the opposite, expressed in a Chinese aphorism, is just as true: "The country that has no enemy in mind will perish."¹

Nor is the argument that "all this is going to overwhelm us." Nor that the security environment around us is going to be so desperate that we better forget development, and just concentrate on defence. The point is that we have to grow *in spite* of this environment, that gearing for these challenges is inseparable from bringing peace and prosperity to our people, that the preceding should alert us to the scale of effort that is necessary. Most important, that if we do *not* prepare for these dire eventualities, we *will* be overwhelmed.

"The art of war," Sun Tzu counseled, "teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable."²

¹For the aphorism, Samuel S. Kim, "China's Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 1996, monograph.

²Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, James Clavell, ed., Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1981, p. 51.

The real threat

Jaanaami dharmam....

Several conclusions about what should be done leap at us from the foregoing. Here are a few of them, and I list them, as will become apparent in a moment, only for the sake of completeness, and to focus attention on the real problem – and that is that what we lack is not lists of things to do; the problem is that, knowing what needs to be done, being reminded again and again about what desperately needs to be done, we either don't or are unable to do it.

Jaanaami dharmam na cha me pravritti
Jaanaamyadharamam na che me nivritti

[It isn't that I do not know what is right – but I do not have the liking for it; It isn't that I do not know what is evil – but I am not able to rid myself of it.]

But first the illustrative list:

- ❑ We must be awake to what is going on in our neighbourhood. Nepal is in the news today. But the killings there have been going on since 1996. By now an estimated *ten thousand* have been killed. How many of us noticed the troubles as they swelled?
- ❑ Somnolent, we miss both – the danger that is swelling, as well as the opportunities that are at hand. How many of us know that today there is a strong tug in the Gilgit-Baltistan areas to break away from Pakistan? That the Chairman of the All Parties National Alliance – the organization that is leading this movement – is none other than Wajahat Hassan Khan – the son of the same Colonel Hassan Khan who imprisoned Ghansara Singh, the then Governor of Gilgit appointed by Maharaja Hari Singh, and who had proclaimed independence of Gilgit in November 1947, the son of the same Colonel Hassan Khan who had become one of the icons of Pakistan for these deeds? How many of us know

that Shaukat Maqbool Butt, the son of the very same Maqbool Butt who we had to execute for killing an Indian diplomat, is one of the important leaders of the All Parties National Alliance, that he today strongly opposes Pakistan's occupation of, and treatment of the people of POK?

- These two items point to a general deficiency that we must remedy. Where are the specialized groups studying the Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, China? Two or three individuals in some of the cases, perhaps. But surely we need, and have the resources to organize a legion of specialists on each country in our neighbourhood. Recall the account earlier of China's foray onto the Spratly islands. Samuel Kim records a tidbit of information that in itself bears a warning and a lesson for India. "It is reported that some 400 Chinese scholars completed 10 years of research on the Spratly Islands in late 1994 to prove historically that China discovered and developed the Spratly Islands."¹ Imagine Arunachal, and the "400 Chinese scholars completing 10 years of research" "to prove historically" that it has been Chinese territory. How long will it take us to galvanize "400 Indian scholars" to prove the contrary? Or consider a stark fact that Shambaugh records: "Given the dearth of direct access to PLA officers, reading PLA publications is vital to understanding the military's view. *Several hundred books are published by PLA publishers every year*, although they are never translated by foreign governments. PLA journals are also numerous (*more than two hundred*) but with the exception of a handful, the vast majority are classified and restricted in their circulation, and are thus not available to foreigners."² How many of these "several hundred books" put out every year, how many of these "more than two hundred" journals are our analysts following – even in the defence forces? One lesson is the urgent need to do more academic work on our neighbours. The other is illustrated by this

¹Samuel S. Kim, "China's Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 1996, monograph.

²David Shambaugh, "China's military views the world," *International Security*, Volume 24, No. 3, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 52-79, at p. 56.

example in a small, though vital way: defence costs talent and money, and we must spare them for it.

- ❑ Only those who have great strength, and who are perceived to be willing to unleash it – and that reputation cannot be acquired except by actually unleashing it on occasion – can protect their interests without use of force.
- ❑ The opposite reputation – that we are so wedded to peace, that we are so “international” in our thinking that we will always place the interests of humanity above our national interests; and, of course, the opposite reality – that we actually are weak – are open invitations to the adversary: Luttwak puts this precisely: “One-sided pursuit of peace and disarmament [is] a powerful incentive to the adversary to intensify its own pursuit of war.”¹
- ❑ The reluctant do not survive. A country that hesitates, that goes on analyzing, that goes on setting up committees in the face of outrages, in the face of occupation is set on a course that is as predictable as it is fatal:
 - It goes on narrowing its definition of its “vital interest” – to the point that the loss of a part of its physical territory (remember Panditji on Aksai Chin? “Not even a blade of grass grows there”), even the whole of it is rationalized as not to affect its “vital interest”: “We are a civilization, you see. Territories are not important. We survive, we flourish by pollinating other civilizations.”
 - It goes on rationalizing its weakness, its inability to strike back as “tolerance”, as “commitment to non-violence”, as patience and fortitude.
- ❑ Look at the way China reacted to, look at the reaction it *orchestrated* against the US for the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade. Look at the twenty million who have – spontaneously, no doubt – signed up to oppose Japan’s membership of the Security Council. It seized each opportunity to reinforce the conviction in all that it is not a State to be trifled with – even accidentally. Contrast that with our pusillanimity – a pusillanimity born out of actual inability – in the face of thousands upon thousands of killings over a twenty year period by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists, in the face of 1.5 to 2 crore illegal infiltrators

¹Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy, The logic of war and peace*, Harvard, 2001, p. 212.

from Bangladesh. China would have used such assaults and aggression as opportunities to "teach a lesson" to the offending State, as the occasion to enlarge its sphere of influence. When we lie down, and go into debating and analysis, others watch, they draw lessons of their own.

- Naturally, we must explore every prospect of peace. We must engage in "peace processes" and "confidence building measures". But these are not ends in themselves, they are means – means not to attain some absolute, a "peace at any cost"; they are means for advancing our national interest: that interest includes, as one of its ingredients, peace. And as a clue, one must always ascertain who is driving the "process" – our own leadership? Or some ventriloquist in Washington?
- We must be clear about Pakistan, and about China. We should go by their record, by their potential – not by our wishes. Pursue peace processes, build confidence. *Par unse aankh mat uthaiye.*
- In the case of a State like Pakistan, unless costs fall upon those who decide to deploy force against India, they will go on flinging violence at us.
- We must acquire the capacity to widen to breaking point the fault lines in Pakistan. Unless we can "do a Kashmir" in POK, in Gilgit-Baltistan, in Balochistan, in Waziristan, unless we have assets in Sindh and among the Saraiki, assets that Pakistan realizes we can, and will ignite, it will not desist from what it has been doing in Punjab, in Kashmir, across our cities, in the Northeast.
- We must be generous in dealing with the smaller neighbours. Especially so in five particulars:
 - We must always bear in mind that they are sovereign countries; that they are sensitive about their status and position; that, because of the disparity in size, and because of instances like the sudden and thoughtless termination of trade access facilities to Nepal, they are apprehensive of us.
 - We must set aside, we can afford to set aside ten-odd thousand crore as well as a bank of skills to help them develop faster.
 - We must cement a variety of links. A generation ago, to take one instance, many personal ties had been forged by the simple accident that many Nepalese who were later to become leaders of their country studied at the Benaras Hindu University. Ties of that kind have atrophied over the years.

- Breakdown of governmental authority in them directly affects our security. And – as the tragic events surrounding the IPKF in Sri Lanka showed – only their own forces can in the end preserve governmental authority in those States. For both reasons, we should assist them in every way to improve their military, and police forces, as well as their intelligence services.
 - With these smaller, non-inimical countries we must settle disagreements – swiftly and, more generously than seems reasonable at first.
-
- We do not have the luxury of choice. The question is not, “Development *or* defence”. We have to accomplish both. One reinforces the other. Correspondingly, the factors that keep us from growing as fast as our potential are precisely the ones that weaken our defences.
 - The same holds for constituents of defence: the choice is not, “Valour *or* high-technology,” “Cyber warfare *or* conventional warfare *or* nuclear capability” – but capabilities across the board.
 - The same holds for associations and alliances. The choice is not, “*Either* be with the US *or* against it”; “*Either* pursue closer relations with Central Asian countries *or* with ASEAN” We have to seek partnerships with one set as well as the other.
 - And partnerships in various dimensions, on the whole range of issues – trade negotiations *as well as* terrorism *as well as* restructuring of the United Nations *as well as* disarmament *as well as* arms acquisition....
 - Our policy has to be “omni-directional”. And under constant review – much as one surfing the waves in high wind.
 - And at each turn, at each interval, we must *think*. We must shun the slogan, the cliché. As we have seen, every country – say, the US – will act in its own interest as perceived by a handful at that moment. That teaches us to be alert to where *our* interest lies. It teaches us to act on our own. But *for that very reason* we should not fall prey to sloganeering – “The US must withdraw from East and Southeast Asia,” to take one instance. *We* need every possible counterweight to China, to mention just one consideration.
 - And while we think, a question we should ponder is one that was asked of one who has done so much to transform our foreign policy. What is the alliance system that you have in place? he was asked. Which are the countries that will stand up for India should

India run into difficulties? he was asked. He had to change the subject.

That is what others count. As Stalin inquired, "How many divisions does the Pope command?" And having counted, others plan what they can do to us.

The prerequisite

We can go on lengthening the list. Yet the basic requirement is not in any of these specific "things to do". The basic requirement is governance. In J&K, in the Northeast, in Bihar and a swelling host of other states.

And to *that*, our response is anything but reassuring. Confronted with breakdowns, with yet another breach in security, we set up committees. Then stamp their reports "Secret", and lock them in a drawer. We pass laws. Not implement them. Then pass a stiffer law. Then give in to the campaign that the stiffer law is being "misused", and scrap the law.... TADA yesterday. POTA today.

The reports of the Task Force on Border Management and the Task Force on Internal Security are textbook illustrations of this fatal sequence. What they found, and what happened to the recommendations they made point to the real threat that the country faces – China, Pakistan, etc. are of course threats, but the real problem is the palsy that today disables the State from doing the things that we all know must be done.

The Task Forces were among the four that were set up in the wake of the Kargil war. Each was headed by a distinguished civil servant – the one on Border Management by Mr. Madhav Godbole; the one on Internal Security by Mr. N.N. Vohra. Both of them, as well as each member of the Task Forces had extensive experience in national security. The Task Forces held detailed discussions with and received evidence from the most knowledgeable experts our country has on security. They submitted their reports in August and October 2000. The Task Forces had themselves urged that their findings be published – to use the words of the Task Force on Border Management: "...It has to be accepted that it is only through well-informed, alert and vigilant public opinion that national security can be strengthened. Excessive and undue secrecy in such matters can be

counter-productive. Against this background, the Task Force recommends that its report should be published as early as possible." Yet "Secret" was stamped on the reports, and the people still do not know what they must.

What did Task Forces find? What did they recommend? What do their reports tell us about the state of national security? About ourselves?

Overview

Both task Forces minced no words in portraying the situation that the country faces. In a representative passage, the Task Force on Border Management stated, "As one looks around, one is struck by the huge costs Pakistan is making us incur through the activities of ISI and by promoting international terrorism. These activities of ISI are expected to intensify. The J&K cauldron is expected to continue. Internal security problems are likely to become more severe. What China may do on the borders in this period is a big question mark...."

How are we dealing with these multiple challenges? The Task Force on Border Management remarked,

....Fourth, the paramilitary forces deployed on the border for guarding duties have been withdrawn in large numbers for internal security and counter-insurgency duties in various parts of the country. This has meant neglecting the borders. Fifth, whatever force was available, was not always fully alert and effective. The vigilance aspects were neglected unconscionably. Sixth, there has been too much *ad hocism* in deployment of forces from time to time. Battalions and even companies are often cannibalized while deploying, leading to dilution of command and control. As a result, best results could not be got from the forces. Seventh, maritime borders have practically been unguarded. Eighth, in respect of strengthening of forces, it has been a case of too little too late. It is not, therefore, surprising, that the proposals for augmenting the water-wing of the Border Security Force, for example, have been languishing for years together, leading to large inflow of illegal immigrants from riverine routes. While this penny wise, pound foolish policy was being pursued at one end for years together, the 30,000 strong force like the Special Service Bureau under the Cabinet Secretariat has been continued year after year without any worthwhile work or commensurate results.... Thus the border management scene presents a picture of shocking contrasts, indifference and lack of any consistent policy or focus....

With the withdrawal of large contingent of forces from the borders, the distance between the Border Outposts [which, in the estimate of the Task Force, must not exceed 3 or 4 Kms] has increased to as much as 10 to 40 Kms. This has made the borders porous. With such deployment, it is futile to have any force at the borders at all....

Against this background, it is not surprising that over 120-150 lakh Bangladeshi illegal immigrants have flooded this country, with an estimated 3 lakh illegal immigrants coming in each year. This has changed the demographic composition of several areas not only along the borders but also in places like Delhi. Unfortunately, the discussion on this subject invariably assumes [the wrong expression, if I may say so: the words should be '....is invariably given'] communal overtones, with political parties taking positions to suit the interests of their vote banks. As a result, even the urgent task of repeal of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act (IMDT) which is patently discriminatory and applicable only to Assam has remained to be accomplished....

A telling example

Writing in 2000, that is over fifty years after we had become Independent, the Task Force observed, "It needs to be noted that this is the first Task Force ever set up for maritime borders. While land borders received piecemeal attention of the Government from time to time, the same cannot be said of the maritime borders. As a result, a number of important policy issues have remained pending without any action in the concerned ministries and departments of the Government." In a word, maritime borders have not received sustained, comprehensive attention ever. And land borders have received "piecemeal attention".

It transpired that we did not have even a count of the number of islands we have in each archipelago.

How were we managing the security in them?

What the Task Force on Border Management found about Lakshadweep is typical. The Task Force noted,

The strategic location, isolation from mainland and remoteness strengthens the possibility of poaching, smuggling and storage/dumping of arms and narcotics. Instances of dumping smuggled silver and gold in Suheli Island have come to light. In addition, there have been instances of twin rotor Army helicopters landing at Suheli Island, and spotting of unidentified helicopters flying in the waters around the islands....

What holds for silver and gold and narcotics holds equally well for arms and explosives. This is exactly what the Task Force found from evidence garnered through interrogations:

A strategic amalgamation of all these activities [narcotics trafficking, smuggling silver and gold, *bawala* operations] and developed facilities have been worked out at the instance of the ISI of Pakistan. Drug couriers are allowed passage on condition of collecting and reporting trans-border intelligence. Trained saboteurs and terrorists are prevailed upon to carry drugs for sustenance and operational expenses from the sale proceeds. Passage to couriers of contrabands is often conditional to carrying and delivering arms and ammunition. Smugglers are often given assistance and facilities in exchange of organizing infiltration of terrorists and saboteurs and landing of explosives, arms and ammunition. The ISI has thus been eminently successful in utilizing the network and infrastructure developed by smugglers and drug traffickers to serve its own objectives.

Hence the extreme implications for national security of what happens in and around the Lakshadweep islands.

By what machinery are we keeping tabs on these activities? By what machinery are we pinpointing, to say nothing of chasing those unmarked helicopters? By what machinery are we tracking ISI's agents? The Task Force found:

The Lakshadweep police maintains police stations in the islands of Minicoy, Kalpeni, Andrott, Kavaratti, Agatti, Amini, Kadmat, Kiltan and Chetlat with an outpost at the island of Bitra. Intelligence gathering in the islands is carried out *by one Inspector, one Sub Inspector, one Head Constable and three Constables* working in the Special Branch at Kavaratti. Intelligence gathering in all other islands is carried out *by one Head Constable/Constable* who reports to the OIC [Officer in Charge] of the police station who in turn passes it on to the Inspector (Special Branch) at Kavaratti.

Realization had dawned once upon a time:

The ever perplexing security scenario of the Lakshadweep islands and the absence of any worthwhile surveillance had prompted the Director General of Coast Guard to moot the idea of a Marine Police Force as far back as 20 December 1996 during the Sixth Standing Committee meeting of the Island Development Authority.

That is, four years before the Task Force was examining the matter. And what had happened since?

The Lakshadweep Government has since put up a case for a Marine Police Force on the same lines as for the Andaman and Nicobar in October 1999....

That observation was made in 2000. Preparing for the debate in the Rajya Sabha on Internal Security towards the end of 2004, I made inquiries: Had even that Marine Police Force been set up? All this while it was said that the "case" put up by the Lakshadweep Government was "being processed". By end-2004, I found, even that was not being done. The entire question has got entangled in inter-ministerial tussles, I was told.

Are we serious about defending our country? One Inspector.... A proposal put up fifty years after Independence.... Four years later, a "case put up". Another four years, case "being processed". Then that processing buried...

Nor is that lugubrious pace exceptional. On matter after matter, the Task Forces found that, though the subjects required urgent action as they impinged on security, the pace of Government remained sedate!

"The need for setting up an organizational framework for inflow of intelligence/information on maritime activities and the need to set up a regulatory framework for the control of maritime activities was recognized by Naval Headquarters consequent to the investigation of the bomb blasts in Mumbai, which revealed landing of explosives and arms on the west coast of India by sea route," the Task Force reported.

So what happened?

Naval Headquarters accordingly, prepared a paper on Maritime Security Regulatory Framework in 1993-94 so as to avoid the occurrence of such incidents.

And what happened after that?

A meeting was chaired by Special Secretary (ISP)/MHA on 20 June 1996 wherein, the following decisions were taken:

- a. To examine the feasibility of making the existing Ship Reporting System compulsory for all ships, especially those traversing through the EEZ.
- b. Internal arrangement be made to provide the Navy and the Coast Guard with details of ships carrying dangerous cargo.

- c. To formulate proposals for Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS), in the waters close to our coasts.

That was in June 1996. After that?

Subsequently, a meeting was chaired by the Defence Secretary on 31 October 1996. The decisions that emerged from this meeting were:

- a. Regulations be drafted for making ship reporting mandatory for all vessels above 100 tons GRT.
- b. Promulgation of TSS in the areas of concern as agreed to by MOST [Ministry of Surface Transport] and NHQ [Naval Headquarters] and to pursue the issue with International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Ministry of External Affairs.
- c. MOST to prepare a Draft legislation on reporting of Dangerous Cargo similar to the one presently enforced by the United States in consultation with NHQ and to pursue the same with IMO.

Notice that three years had gone by, and nothing had as yet changed in the waters. In any event, that meeting took place in October 1996. After that?

Thereafter a series of inter-organizational meetings were held at Mumbai from January to July 1997 with the concerned agencies including DG (Shipping), so as to arrive at an action plan. The status of these issues is as listed in the ensuing paragraphs.

A more disheartening list one can scarcely imagine:

Ship Reporting System. Ship reporting has been made compulsory for all Indian flagged merchant vessels through the Indian Naval Ship Reporting System (INSPIRES), in accordance with the newly promulgated Safety of Navigation Rules in July 1997. The requirement to make the system compulsory for all the foreign flagged merchant ships still exists. However, prior to this, India would have to accede to the IMO Convention on Search and Rescue, 1979. This has not been done so far. A Draft legislation to cover mandatory Ship Reporting System (SRS), Carriage of Dangerous Cargo and Reporting of Sailing Vessels as part of the SAR Convention was also forwarded to the MOST in June 1998. MOST has now informed the Task Force that since the issue has a bearing on International Law, *the draft legislation along with comments of DG (Shipping) were sent to the Legal and Treaties Division of the MEA in December 1998, for examination and has been pending ever since.*

Reporting of Dangerous Cargo. Naval Headquarters had promulgated a

Navigational Area (NAVAREA) warning on 02 February 1998 to all mariners traversing the EEZ of India or heading for an Indian port, to report details of dangerous cargo carried on board. The warning has since also been included in the Indian Notices to Mariners which has international circulation. NHQ also intimated MOST in February 1998 to take urgent action to notify the same in the Official Gazette of India since due to absence of any legislation neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard had any authority to book non-complying vessels. *MOST has now informed the Task Force that since the contents of the Navigational Warning were objected to by the British High Commission and the Government of Pakistan, the objections along with navigational warning have also been sent to the Legal and Treaties Division of the MEA in December, 1998, for examination and has been pending ever since.*

Traffic Separation Schemes. Flag Officer Defence Advisory Group (FODAG) had forwarded the proposed TSS for Mumbai and the Gulf of Kachchh to the office of DG (Shipping) in May 1997. DG (Shipping) in consultation with Chief Hydrographer was to pursue the case with IMO. *The same is pending with DG (Shipping)/MOST.*

Ratification of the International Convention on Search and Rescue. This has been a long standing issue and as a responsible member of the IMO, it is only appropriate that India ratifies the convention at the earliest. In this regard, Naval Headquarters had forwarded a Cabinet note for the Committee of Secretaries for accession to the convention in August 1987 which when put to the Cabinet was withdrawn in September 1987. The Cabinet directed that the proposal be examined by the MOD, MEA and the Ministry of Finance. After detailed discussions a draft Cabinet Note was again circulated in September 1999 by MOST. In the light of the comments received, the Cabinet Note has now [that is, *eleven years after it was first put up to Cabinet*] been finalized and is awaiting the approval of the Minister.

*Task Force
on Border
Management*

Designation of FODAG as the Advisory Offshore Security and Defence to GOI. The Offshore Defence Advisory Group (ODAG) was established by the Government of India on 31 December 93, as a dedicated group devoted to the task of planning and advising the Naval Staff and ONGC on security arrangements in the offshore region. The task involves planning for offshore security and defence, formulation of regulatory measures and legislation, policy implementation, monitoring of data security and crisis management in sensitive areas. Subsequent to the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) announced by the Government, and JVs and private companies commencing exploration of offshore oil and gas, the case to designate FODAG as the Advisory Offshore Security and Defence to GOI was initiated in 1993 and again taken up in April 1996. A Draft

paper for the Committee of Secretaries was also submitted in June 1996. The case has been turned down for the time being by MOD on the ground that the charter is presently being looked after by the Oil Coordination Committee (OCC)....

Laws upon laws, Boards upon Boards

ISI operates through agents it smuggles across, through modules it has set up. And it has been devilishly successful. The Task Force on Internal Security pointed to an even more glaring device – an open source, broad daylight device, so to say. Alluding to this, the Task Force observed,

The asymmetry in the visa regimes of India and Pakistan poses an internal security threat which MHA [Ministry of Home Affairs] needs to review urgently. The ISI has been exploiting our unilaterally liberal visa policy and the inadequacy of our systems to ensure that Pakistani visitors do not stay beyond the period allowed in the visa, disappear and become untraceable. It may be recalled that the Pakistani nationals who had perpetrated the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar had entered India on valid visas, overstayed and carried out activities which culminated in the hijacking. As per information supplied to us by MHA, the cumulative number of Pak nationals who had overstayed till 1999 was 11,433; of these 8873 were overstaying and 2560 had gone underground.

Where were they? What were they doing? What were *we* doing about *them*? How many of them had been apprehended? How many were being traced? To its distress, the Task Force found,

MHA has no means of knowing how many, if not all, of those who are untraceable could possibly be engaged in espionage, sabotage and subversion and further extending ISI's networks in the country.

The Task Force persisted:

We had sent a questionnaire to MHA to seek information, *inter alia*, on the (i) working of the Foreigners' Regional Registration Offices; (ii) procedural safeguards being enforced to ensure that persons visiting India on Pakistani passports leave the country before the expiry of their visas; (iii) action taken to trace and deport those overstaying/going underground, etc. We sought this information after examining R&AW's reports and recognizing the high potential of such missing/untraced persons being engaged in subversive or other activities prejudicial to the security of the country.

The result of its efforts to get even such elementary information can be gleaned from the sentences that follow:

For want of the information sought by us we can do no more than reiterate our view that there should be symmetry between the visa regimes adopted by Pakistan for Indian visitors and that followed by India for Pakistani visitors. Further, the MHA should launch a time bound operation to trace the missing Pakistani nationals. The matter cannot be closed by merely reporting that about 11,500 of them have just disappeared.

Making them self-sufficient

The Task Force on Internal Security found that through smuggling of and trading in narcotics, the ISI has made the terrorism it orchestrates in India an almost self-financing operation. It observed,

Pakistan has been systematically promoting narco-trade to fund terrorism and insurgencies in India, with the determined objective of destabilizing our established systems and structures. Reports from the Central Intelligence agencies indicate that drug money has been and continues to be used by Pakistan for spreading militancy and insurgency in India. This has also been corroborated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA on the basis of firm evidence. As per an input made available by MHA, narcotics valuing about rupees 5,000 crores are being annually smuggled into India from the Golden Crescent countries – Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran (75% of all heroin supplied to Western Europe and 50% of that which goes to USA is from this region). Pakistan's National Development Finance Corporation estimated (August 1992) that the black economy of the nation gained US\$ 32.5 billion annually from the cultivation, production and smuggling of illicit narcotics from the Golden Crescent. These illicit gains provide enormous financial support to ISI for carrying out its subversive activities in our country.

The scale is indeed alarming, the Task Force found. The Northeast in particular is being devastated by the operation:

An indicator of the likely scale of the illicit narco-trade is the growing high incidence of drug abuse in Manipur and Mizoram, and parts of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh where it is spreading. Heroin is being smuggled undetected from Myanmar to cater to the drug addicts in these states. There has been an alarming growth in cases of AIDS in Manipur. It is reported that most of the drug trafficking is taking place through Moreh, in Manipur, from where heroin is moved to the other states.

Our response?

It is relevant to note that the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), the nodal national agency, has a regional office in Imphal which has jurisdictional responsibility for the seven NE states. The Imphal office, with a staff strength of 11, is *without any road-worthy vehicle and has no communication system*; the Regional Officer *does not even have a residential telephone....*

Of course, motions are gone through:

The NCB holds quarterly meetings with officers representing Customs, DRI, State Special Branches and other organizations connected with drug interdiction and rehabilitation programmes.

But the reality is very different:

We find that it is not playing a coordinating role of concerted strike action against the drug traffickers. Consequent to discussions with the officers of the NCB at the central and regional levels we found that there is *no institutionalized arrangement for the sharing of intelligence* between the NCB and other concerned agencies. Also there is *no arrangement for even exchanging information on matters of mutual interest.*

Nor is that the worst of it. The Task Force talked to defence personnel in the area. And reported,

We also found that the Army and CPMF [Central Para Military Forces] officers *were not even aware that any central agency responsible for taking action against drug traffickers was located in the NE states!* Our discussions with the Zonal and Regional level officers further revealed that the working of the NCB is severely handicapped for want of vehicles, the necessary equipments and gadgets and adequate Secret Service Fund to develop a proper network of sources of information. Thus, as presently structured and functioning, the NCB does not have the capacity to play the role of an apex central coordinating agency for carrying out interdictions and strike actions against the syndicated operations of drug traffickers. Consequently, it has failed to satisfy the primary objective for which it was created. Such a state of affairs provides the ISI easy entry points.

But a law – with the sternest provisions. A Board – with wide representation. Quarterly meetings....

Another funnel, another law

Money generated through the drug trade is channeled into India –

through "laundering" operations, often as "gifts" and "donations" to "voluntary organizations". As the Task Force summarizing the intelligence inputs it had received said,

The drug money acquired from direct shipments abroad by the ISI and its cohorts is collected from the foreign drug-pushing outlets, and is laundered through varied "placements" in order to disguise its origin and, thereafter, made available in very large amounts to the Gulf and other countries. From these countries the drug money moves, through banking channels, to various individuals and associations of Muslim organizations in India ostensibly for supporting religious, cultural and educational activities as are covered under the FCRA [Foreign Contributions Regulation Act]. The recipients usually utilize the contributions for investment-oriented activities and the profits accruing therefrom, which are legitimate, can be employed to further expand and diversify. Such funds, at the secondary or tertiary stage, which are beyond the regime of controls of the FCRA, are made available to the Muslim organizations, which may include fundamentalist groups, for supporting and spreading subversive activities. While it is indeed difficult to detect and prevent the diversion of foreign contributions for terrorist/subversive activities at the secondary or tertiary stage of the movement of funds, we apprehend that, considering the existing level of monitoring, such funds can be diverted to support unlawful activities even at the primary stage itself without any chance of detection....

If you go by the formal provisions of the law, they are as stern and watertight as you would want them to be:

It is relevant to note that under the FCRA no organization of a political nature, not being a political party, and no association, other than the aforesaid organization, having definite cultural, economic, educational, religious or social programme, can accept a foreign contribution without the prior permission of or registration with the MHA. The law provides for auditing/inspection of the donees' accounts and also punitive action for violations.

The volume of these "contributions" has been growing by leaps and bounds, the Task Force noted – between 1991/92 and 1997/98, it had more than doubled. The amount that had come in – officially, through formal banking channels – through this single funnel was more than Rs. *fourteen thousand crore*.

And what kind of surveillance is being exercised? the Task Force asked officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry without

the prior permission of which no contribution can be received. The answer?

A number of specific issues were raised with MHA regarding the enforcement of FCRA. *We could not get the requisite responses on the ground that the relevant information could be supplied after the ongoing computerization process is completed.* This law was enforced 24 years ago; by now at least the essential data should have been available in MHA. We also gathered the impression that the functionaries responsible for handling this important area of work were not adequately sensitive to what exactly is required to be monitored and how.

Further inquiries revealed that six years earlier, the Reserve Bank of India had in fact sent out an instruction to all commercial banks. The fate of the instruction is best told in the words of the Task Force itself:

At MHA's instance the Reserve Bank of India addressed a letter (No. BP.BC.88/21.01.023/94) dated 15th July, 1994 to all Commercial Banks in the country stating, *inter alia*, that:

- some of the banks are allowing credit to associations which have neither been registered nor have obtained prior permission for accepting foreign contributions; and
- that quarterly statements, giving details of foreign contributions received by various associations, are not being furnished to MHA.

The above-quoted RBI communication reflects MHA's passive approach in administering FCRA. In our view, in such cases penal action under the FCRA should have been initiated against the offending associations for receiving foreign contributions without prior permission or registration, and dealing with the defaulting banks for not regularly forwarding the prescribed quarterly statements to MHA. And this was over 6 years ago. *It is not evident whether MHA has since established effective mechanisms to enforce FCRA.* If this serious situation is not urgently brought under control, MHA would have no means of knowing how the growing and large number of recipient organizations/institutions are actually utilizing the funds received, some of which are reportedly supporting the spread of sabotage and subversion in the country....

The Task Force persisted. What has happened since the Reserve Bank sent its letter? it inquired. The result?

We were unable to get a confirmation about how the situation stands since RBI issued its aforesaid letter of July 1994. If it largely remains as it was 6 years ago the actual quantum of foreign receipts could be very much larger. In this context, we share R&AW's observation that most of the

foreign contributions received under FCRA are being diverted for funding terrorist organizations....

The Task Force turned to the other organization that, if description of duties is to be any guide, would be tracking down *hawala* transactions, as well as doubtful "contributions" – the Directorate of Enforcement. To what effect?

In response to our queries, the DE reported that *they are unable to detect linkages between the activities of Hawala operators and subversive elements as no mechanism exists for this Directorate to be provided the required intelligence* by the IB, R&AW, State Special Branches and CPMEs....

As a result, the Task Force was compelled to record,

We were most concerned to find that there is no concerted system for the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of economic intelligence, or for launching a coordinated strike action against economic offenders in cases requiring multi-agency involvement. Each organization is working in its own watertight compartment and exchanging information at subsequent stages only in respect of cases which were detected earlier. This is a major drawback on account of which the economic offenders escape the full and timely rigours of the obtaining economic laws....

And to urge what must have been urged times without number:

We recommend that MHA should urgently move to organize the required coordination between all concerned agencies. Urgent steps would also need to be taken to ensure that DRI and DE work with the required efficiency and effectiveness....

Money laundering? The situation turned out to be no different:

We have had discussions with the concerned officers of the various wings of the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, about the mechanism established for detecting money laundering. *We find that no such system exists; none of the officers we met appeared to be aware of or specifically concerned about the problem.* The Income Tax Department concerns itself with the collection of tax where leviable, irrespective of the source/origin of the taxable money. The inward remittances through banking channels, whether by way of "gifts" and/or trade accounts are tax-free. The Enforcement Directorate has no cause to be concerned as the laundered money is received through banking channels; they get interested only

if there is a specific case suggesting linkage with outward *hawala* transmission of a particular inward remittance. The Revenue Intelligence and Customs Department officers are also not concerned unless there is a link-up with invoice manipulation. And worse still, as of now, no law has been promulgated to specifically deal with money laundering which goes on unchecked....

The Task Force also inquired about another device that the ISI is using doggedly – sending fake currency to unsettle the economy, and no doubt to pay some of its operatives! Its finding?

In an attempt to destabilize our economy, the ISI is pumping in large amounts of Fake Indian Currency (FIC) notes of 500 and 100 rupee denominations. FIC is being smuggled across Pakistan's land borders with J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat as well as across the Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Nepal borders. Carriers from Gulf countries, particularly from Dubai and Sharjah (who travel by air to Ahmedabad, Mumbai, Kozhikode, Thiruvananthapuram and Chennai) carrying FIC have been apprehended by the Customs authorities. FIC smuggled from Bangladesh has been seized while in circulation in the NE states, particularly in Assam. The staff of the Pakistan Embassy at Kathmandu, who were subsequently apprehended, had been acting as the conduits for pumping in FIC from Nepal into Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Seizures of FIC have also been made from Pakistanis and Indian Muslims coming from Pakistan by the Samjhauta Express at Attari (Amritsar). Recently (29th July, 2000) the follow up investigations of the so far single largest seizure of FIC.... have brought out the existence of a wide spread network in Gujarat and Maharashtra which pumps FIC into the Indian economy....

What are we doing to blunt this device?

Our discussions with the concerned Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, have revealed that, regrettably, *there is so far no system for all seizures of FIC being reported to a designated central agency.* Consequently, a validated statement on the total seizures of FIC made so far is not available. However, the reported seizures made by the various agencies indicate that FIC valuing crores of rupees has been inducted into the Indian markets....

In a word, even the system to get just the information about how much has been seized has yet to be put in place. Some way to deal with the effort of a determined and hostile agency "to destabilize our economy"!

Those two features – the lackadaisical attitude to matters that spell life and death, and the shameful absence of even elementary coordination between different limbs of Government – hit the Task Forces again and again. After reporting the woeful state of management of maritime borders, the Task Force on Border Management had this to say in a representative case:

The coastal belt is almost totally ungarded on the shoreline, except in certain stretches of Tamil Nadu and Gujarat where certain measures have recently been initiated.... A particular loop-hole is the system of seamen's passes that the merchant marine establishment issues to sailors. These have almost as much validity as a passport, but the system of issue and renewal has been rather lackadaisical, leaving much room for improvement. With the fast increase in the number of minor ports, increase in sea faring population, thriving marine fishing and easy access across the Arabian Sea from Pakistan and West Asia, infiltration by hostile foreign agents with fraudulently procured seamen's passes is a possibility which must be prevented. *The Task Force could not discuss this and many other related issues with the officials of the concerned Ministry in spite of repeated efforts, for sheer lack of response.*

Coordination between ministries and departments? In instance after instance, the Task Force was constrained to record the criminal lack of it. Thus, we read,

Our economic development is dependent on energy which comes from oil and gas transported by sea from the Gulf region. Our energy routes are focusing on to a high concentration in the Gulf of Kachchh. *Regrettably the MOD, MHA, Naval Headquarters and Coast Guard HQ are not even kept informed* of the policies, plans, programmes and the thought processes of the Government Ministries connected with maritime related activities. Development of the extensive oil infrastructure off Bombay High and the Gulf of Kachchh, and extensive development of minor ports in the Gujarat region are also such examples. Clearly such functioning will be detrimental to security and management of our maritime zones. This once again highlights the need for a separate Department of Border Management for border management within the MHA....

The laying of Single Buoy Moorings (SBMs), pipelines, setting up of oil dependent industries and power plants *have all been carried out in an exclusive manner with MOD/Navy/Coast Guard coming into the picture post facto.* This was also found to be so in many cases when some specific requirements needing their assistance arose. This is clearly an unacceptable state of lack of coordination.

EEZ can also be referred to in Indian context as the new industrial and economic territory which remains unregulated and unadministered. It is becoming the scene of increasing lawlessness in that it is being used for routes of subversive activities, poaching and intrusions. The EEZ is also emerging as an area for data collection related to missile and undersea warfare against Indian interest in times of war. *Vessels hired by other departments/ministries carry out research in our EEZ without MOD/Navy/CG being informed because these departments/ministries do not either know that they have to seek MOD permission or, even if they know, choose to ignore the rules.* In brief, all types of vessels ply in our coastal waters and in the EEZ without the main agency concerned about safety and security knowing about these vessels. This is primarily because one department/agency does not feel responsible or obliged to inform the other.

How much easier can we make things for the country's enemies?
As for seriousness:

The forces available to address the requirements of maritime zone management are the Indian Navy, the Coast Guard and Merchant Marine Organization. The present system of maritime administration primarily under the MOST [Ministry of Surface Transport] with DOD [Department of Defence] playing a role has not even touched the bare dimensions of the problem areas. This was amply demonstrated by the reactions of MOST & DOD to a request by the Special Secretary, MHA [Ministry of Home Affairs], to interact with this Task Force on issues relating to maritime borders and the seas. *Both MOST and DOD stated that they had nothing to do with the subject* which was surprising to say the least. Subsequently two letters were addressed to MOST to get their responses to maritime issues which were pending with the Ministry. Replies were asked for by 14 July 2000 *but none came*. Then again on 24 July, the MOST was requested to interact with the Task Force on 27 July. Although it was understood that a representative of MOST would come at 1630 hrs on 27 July, *none came*. No one had the courtesy of informing the Task Force of the reasons thereof. Further informal interaction resulted in a Note being received on 10 August 2000.... This reinforces the view that has been expressed by various maritime agencies about the lackadaisical attitude of these two important departments/ministries in resolving long pending issues as brought out above.

When this is how a Task Force set up by the Prime Minister, and set up not just at any odd time but in the wake of a war is treated, how things are handled day to day needs no imagination.

"Communal," "Communal"

Surveying the theatres that are being used to trans-ship arms, to orchestrate propaganda against India, the venues that are being used as staging points for agents, the Task Force on Border Management remarked,

The Task Force has noted with concern the rapid spread of *madrassas* and mosques in border areas on almost all borders. Most of these constructions have come up without any formal approval of the competent local authorities....

Pause right there for a moment, and imagine the hue and cry that will be raised against the local Collector should he move to demolish these "religious structures" on the ground that they have come up "without any formal approval of the competent local authorities...." But to continue with what the Task Force sets out:

In several cases, considerable foreign funds have become available to these institutions through non-banking institutions. Efforts at Arabization of Muslims and their education are a matter of concern which should not be dismissed light-heartedly. Bringing the educational curriculum of *madrassas* into the mainstream by the inclusion of subjects such as physics, chemistry, mathematics, information technology and so on is a major challenge which must be accepted in the long term interest of the country....

The Task Force elaborated the danger that is swelling in these institutions later in its Report. "In *maktabs* and *madrassas*, young students are taught Urdu, Arabic and even Persian languages and imparted instruction in the teachings of Islam," it began. "Focus is on traditional religious teaching, and modern subjects like science, mathematics, social studies and modern languages are not taught. The students coming out of the *madrassas* are, therefore, not able to join mainstream education. At best, they gravitate from a *maktab* where primary level education is taught to a *madrassa* where secondary level traditional education is imparted. History if it is taught in a *madrassa* would be Islamic history and not modern history or world history. *Madrassa* students acquire good proficiency in Urdu and Arabic languages, but without other knowledge they find themselves quite ill-equipped to transact business in present day society."

A good grounding for both – separatism and bitterness.

"*Madrassa* education is exclusivist in nature," the Task Force emphasized, "with total emphasis on the study of Islamic education in utter disregard of other systems of education. This [instruction] relies on the worldview of managers or *maulvis* running these institutions that nothing valuable, worth assimilation, exists outside Islamic studies and beyond Urdu and Arabic languages. Due to this reason, syllabi of *madrassas* remain static while knowledge outside advances and multiplies exponentially...."

The Task Force recalled the various schemes that had been initiated since 1980 to modernize *madrassas*, and how they had evoked little response even from state governments, to say nothing of the *maulvis*. Yet *madrassas* and mosques have mushroomed, and this has ominous implications for national security, the Task Force stressed:

There has been mushrooming and visible growth of mosques and *madrassas* all along our international borders. *The intriguing thing is that these have come up where there is very small or no population of the minority community and that madrassas and mosques have sprung up on both sides of the border as if in unison.* These institutions could be construed as Islamic infrastructure and have a potential for intelligence encirclement of India. Concerted efforts are being made for Arabisation of Indian Muslim tradition by promoting the Arabic or Salafi brand of Islam among Muslims living in border areas....

The Task Force proceeded to provide specific figures of *madrassas* and mosques that had suddenly sprung up along our borders with Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. It reported,

On the Indo-Bangladesh border, growth of *madrassas* and mosques is taking place along with a shift in demographic composition due to illegal immigration of large number of people from Bangladesh into the border districts in India. Increasing crowding out of economic opportunities for the local population and the shift towards Islamization create potential for future strife. This is likely to put pressure on the strategic Siliguri corridor.

Turning to the Indo-Nepal border, the Task Force found developments that were equally ominous:

On the Indo-Nepal border, *madrassas* and mosques have sprung up on both sides in the Terai region, accompanied by four-fold increase in the population of the minority community in the region. There are 343 mosques, 300 *madrassas* and 17 mosques-cum-*madrassas* within 10 Kms

of the border on the Indian side. On the Nepal side, there are 282 mosques, 181 *madrassas* and 8 mosques-cum-*madrassas*. These mosques and *madrassas* receive huge funds from Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Managers of various *madrassas* and *ulema* maintain close links with the Embassy officials of those countries located at Kathmandu. Financial assistance is also channelised through the Islamic Development Bank (Jeddah), Habib Bank of Pakistan and also through some Indian Muslims living in Gulf countries. Pakistan's Habib Bank, after becoming a partner in Nepal's Himalayan Bank, has expanded its network in the border areas including Biratnagar and Krishna Nagar. It is suspected that foreign currency is converted into Indian currency in Nepal and then brought to India clandestinely.

The Task Force went on to emphasize in this regard:

Madrassas and mosques on the Indo-Nepal border are frequently visited by prominent Muslim leaders, Tableegh Jamaats and pro-Pak Nepali leaders. Officials of Pak Embassy have come to notice visiting Terai area of Nepal to strengthen Islamic institutions and to disburse funds to them. Pro-Pak elements in Nepal also help in demographic subversion of the Terai belt.

Pause for a moment and put this mushrooming of mosques and *madrassas* along side the two further facts to which the Task Force on Border Management was led by Intelligence inputs it received. The Task Force emphasized:

The northern border with Nepal, being open, porous and with extensive cross-country links, has, with the strengthening of western land borders and following entrenchment of Dubai based smugglers in Nepal, now become most volatile for smuggling of gold and general commodities, and also for arms and explosives, and infiltration by hostile elements.... As regards narcotics, Nepal has long been a major producer of cannabis. Herbal cannabis in particular and also some quantities of cannabis resin have been frequently brought through and seized near the India-Nepal border. Heroin transited from Pakistan or processed in India, and some other Indian pharmaceutical narcotics and psychotropic substances, have also been seized in Nepal from time to time....

The Mumbai blasts of 1993 and the Purulia arms dropping of 1995 demonstrated that the strengthening and fencing of any hitherto sensitive segment of our border would not deter smugglers and infiltrators. They have their wide-spread bases and contacts in different areas of India and now, with motivation, guidance and assistance of the ISI of Pakistan, they

possess a much greater degree of initiative and maneuverability. The entire coastline from the Sir Creek to the sand-heads and the land borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar and also Nepal are within their access. The Daud gang is well entrenched in hotel, banking and construction activities in Nepal. The long borders in most sectors are now dotted with new settlements of immigrants, mosques and *madrassas* built during the last decade with liberal remittances from unidentified, foreign sources. These are reminiscent of border and coastal towns and villages of smugglers' accomplices and also of smugglers, along our entire western border from Kashmir to the Gulf of Khambat.

A complete and lethal combination:

- ☐ Established routes and infrastructure of smugglers;
- ☐ The new network of mosques and *madrassas*;
- ☐ The extension into Nepal of the operations of Dawood Ibrahim and other dons based in the Gulf, with their intimate links with the agencies of Pakistan;
- ☐ Huge finances from Islamic governments.

To resume the narrative of the string of mosques and *madrassas* that the Task Force found had suddenly come up along our borders: The Rajasthan border?

In the Rajasthan sector of the India-Pakistan border, there are 129 *madrassas*... registered with the Wakf Board. There are a large number of unregistered *madrassas* in the border belt. The growth of *madrassas* in this belt has been higher than in other places in the state. *Madrassa Islamia* (Pokharan), *Madrassa Anwarul Uloom* (Jaisalmer) and *Madrassa Able Sunnat Rizvia* (Jaisalmer) have become centres of fundamentalist activities in this area. *Tableegh Jamaats* from Maharashtra and Gujarat have been creating pockets of their influence in Barmer district where 14 *Deen-e-Talim madrassas* have recently come up.

Further to the Southwest,

In the Gujarat Sector of the border, there are 34 *madrassas* in Kachchha district (1995) and 28 in Banaskantha district where their number increased by 55% during 1991-1995. They receive large sums of money from locals as well as from outside.

"Both in Gujarat and Rajasthan, there has been mounting pressure on local cultural tradition of minority community from the Pak-Islamic

identity thrust," the Task Force noted – something that should surprise no one: for the very essence of the Tableegh movement has been to compel converts to shed all syncretistic practices and beliefs. "These areas are also experiencing high growth rate of minority population."

The Task Force then turned to the India-Bangladesh border. It warned that right across this region "demographic invasion is taking place from across the border." Observing that in the border districts the magnitude of this invasion is "much more startling", that it is even "more menacing" than elsewhere, the Task Force noted that the "Indo-Bangladesh border has seen the most rapid growth of *madrassas* and mosques." Furnishing state-wise figures, the Task Force recorded that on the Indian side, in close proximity to the border, there are now 905 mosques and 439 *madrassas*. And that on the Bangladesh side, there are 960 mosques and 469 *madrassas*.

The figures that the Task Force set out, and even more so the deliberate planning that had gone into stringing these institutions along the border should shake us out of our stupor. What the Task Force said about "some worrisome developments relating to *madrassas*," should alarm us. It listed these as follows:

- a. Talibanisation of *madrassas* is taking place due to spread of fundamentalist ideology in these institutions. In J&K, growth of *madrassas*, fundamentalist teaching and consequent Talibanisation preceded growth of insurgency.
- b. Imparting of religious instruction in Arabic in place of Urdu is alienating Muslim children from their Indian Muslim moorings and pushing them towards Arabisation. This is happening even in more liberal Muslim society such as in Kerala.
- c. *Madrassas* in some places are reported to be sheltering ISI agents and subversive elements.
- d. With the increasing enrolment of children in *madrassas*, *maulvis* are acquiring greater centrality in community life, increasing their vote-delivering capacity and political clout.
- e. Indoctrination of young children and planting of fundamentalist strains in their minds in *madrassas* would pose serious problems to our polity in future.
- f. Presence of *madrassas* and mosques along the borders on both sides could facilitate trans-border movement of arms and agent provocateurs aided and abetted by ISI.
- g. Economic backwardness of the local Muslim community easily falsifies the claim of construction of these *madrassas* and mosques

with local support and gives credence to the apprehensions of outside support for their construction.

Demographic invasion

The IB has documented, Governors like General S.K. Sinha and T.V. Rajeshwar have warned that Bangladeshis are usurping extended tracts of India. The Census figures show that the magnitude of the invasion in fact far exceeds the apprehensions expressed by even these knowledgeable authorities. Apart from the direct economic consequences of such occupation, it changes – it has already changed, and dramatically so – the demographic composition of the region. Moreover, the fact that hundreds of thousands are able to creep in and settle down, makes it that much easier for Pakistani and Bangladeshi agencies to send across some of their own personnel and agents as “normal infiltrators”.

As committees upon committees had done before it, the Task Force on Border Management drew attention to the danger this inundation from Bangladesh spells – of the subversion that will come through “democracy” itself. So serious did it find the problem that it devoted a separate chapter to it. Drawing on intelligence reports, and studies based on them, the Task Force reported:

Studies have indicated that in 18% of the Assembly constituencies in West Bengal and 32% Assembly constituencies in Assam, Bangladesh migrants can influence the poll outcome one way or the other. A study showed that about 96% Bangladesh immigrant respondents took active part in electoral politics in Kishanganj district in Bihar.... *They have thus been able to impact on law-making and running of administration including police through their legislators. They are already looming large in the fragile polity of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. One can easily see the emerging contours of future subversion of the Northeast....*

The Task Force urged a series of steps, steps that have been urged so many times: registration of citizens and non-citizens living in India should be compulsory; all citizens should be given a multi-purpose National Identity Card; non-citizens should be given identity cards of a different colour and design; a “Work Permit” should be introduced for foreigners; the IMDT Act should be repealed and action against illegal foreigners should be taken uniformly under the Foreigners’ Act; Residence Records of villages in the border districts should be

prepared and regularly updated; primary data collected during the Census should be used to detect illegal foreigners; financial rewards for information about illegal foreigners should be instituted; border fencing....; Joint Working Group with Bangladesh....

The problem is not that we cannot think up what needs to be done. The problem is different: the political class knows precisely what must be done, but, because it is splintered and because large chunks of it benefit from the evil, does nothing.

The other day, I myself became the occasion for an illustration of this. Recall what the Task Force had found about Forces that had been posted at the borders to guard it: so many of the personnel had been withdrawn for sundry tasks that the gap between border outposts had become as great as 10 to 40 kms, and that "with such deployment, it is futile to have any force at the borders at all." The Task Force had then pointed to the inevitable consequence: porosity of the borders enables infiltrators to enter in such large numbers that the demographic composition of not just the border districts but places such as Delhi has got ominously altered. "Unfortunately," the Task Force, concluded, "the discussion on the subject invariably assumes communal overtones, with political parties taking positions to suit the interests of their vote banks."

Exactly that happened in the Rajya Sabha in the debate on Internal Security. I had been asked to initiate the debate, and was reading from this very report. The Congress spokesman denounced me for giving the discussion "a communal colour"! Are the IB, R&AW, the current Governor of J&K, General S.K. Sinha, the current Governor of U.P., T.V. Rajeshwar, the members of these Task Forces – are all of them "communal"? Yet the canard to once again dodge the facts.

As for scrapping the ruinous IMDT Act, the new Government has declared that the Act will continue....

But we are second to none in our determination to safeguard our borders, and the security and integrity of our country, its spokesmen shout....

Any mystery?

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has been organized, trained, equipped as a specialized force for mountain warfare. Whenever it has been deployed, it has given an excellent account of itself,

reported the Task Force on Internal Security. It is being used for routine guard duty outside banks and the like, the Task Force found.

The National Security Guard is a specialized commando force. It is being used to guard VIPs.

The principal task of the Central Reserve Police Force is to combat insurgencies. In fact, found the Task Force:

Though 83% of the Force is deployed in areas facing internal security situations, only 32% is actually utilized for combating militancy/insurgency. The remaining strength is assigned routine policing duties in the disturbed areas, and more often than not, utilized as "extra manpower" by the district Superintendents of Police as per their perceptions, which are invariably in conflict with the pre-deployment operational priorities given to the Force Commanders who, anxious to be seen as "being helpful", are unable to assert their mandate. Thus, the Force virtually places itself "at the disposal" of the State Police. Lack of assertion by MHA and the ready acquiescence by the local Commanders also lead to deployments in disaggregated formations which result in the loss of effective control and monitoring of operations. CRPF deployments in penny packets in widely dispersed areas, under the command of a Naik/HC [Head Constable], militate against the achievement of operational objectives and the lack of guidance and control generates a variety of other problems.

As against the increasing sophistication of terrorists and criminals, as against the up-to-date arms and communication equipment at their command, the Task Forces found state police forces ill-equipped and ill-trained. As against the ever-new and changing character of crimes the police must tackle, as against the more and more inventive tactics of terrorists, only 1 per cent of the police budget is spent on training, the Task Force on Internal Security found. As a result, a policeman who is in theory to go for retraining every five years, the Task Force found, gets to look in on such a programme *once every twenty years or so*. As for the living and working conditions, a representative passage from the report of the Task Force will suffice:

The studies carried out by BPR&D [Bureau of Police Research and Development] in regard to the living and working conditions of State Police Forces reveal an alarming picture:

- 25% of the Police Stations and 50% of the Police outposts do not have regular buildings.
- Over 37% Police Districts work from make shift Police Lines.

- Over 70% Police Districts do not have a proper Control Room.
- Superintendents of Police in over 34% Police Districts do not have official accommodation.
- 70% of the constabulary is without residential accommodation whereas, according to the laid down norm, there should be 100% satisfaction on this count.
- The mobility deficiency of Indian Police is approximately 43%.
- The weaponry available with the police forces is outdated and inadequate.
- There is dire need for the upgradation of the obtaining communication systems....

On the other hand, the criminal and the mafia gangs are in possession of weapons and communication systems which are far more sophisticated than those available to the State Police, and even to the CPMFs [Central Para Military Forces]. This has enabled the criminals to freely carry out their depredations. The Mafia bosses, who live abroad, control and direct "operations" in India and the terrorist groups master-mind IED explosions through remote controlled devices. On the other hand, the police forces, which are required to tackle threats to internal security, are a hapless lot, whose essential requirements and welfare have been long neglected by the state governments....

Action taken!

What happens to recommendations that are "accepted", that are "implemented"? In states such as those in the Northeast and J&K that are facing insurgencies, after much effort and after countless committees and task forces had urged that this be done, apex bodies have been set up to coordinate counter-insurgency operations. Thus, "action" has been "taken" on this recommendation. The coordination committees are to be presided over by the Chief Minister, and have the senior-most officers of each security force in the state as members. When it looked into how these were functioning, what the Task Force found led it to state,

....It is altogether unacceptable that when a state is facing a serious disturbance, and the assistance of the Central armed forces has been called in, the Chief Minister cannot find the time to chair meetings of the apex body, and to also ensure that these are held at regular intervals, to keep himself fully informed about what is happening in his state....

As one incident after another reminded everyone that ISI and its

agents had been able to set up nets across states, a Committee – headed incidentally by the same Mr. N.N. Vohra who was now heading this new Task Force – recommended that a Nodal Group be set up. The recommendation was “accepted” and “action” was taken on it. The result?

Following upon the serial bomb blasts in Bombay in 1993, perpetrated by the ISI acting through the Dawood Ibrahim gang, the Government had appointed an inter-ministerial committee under the chairmanship of the then Home Secretary. The Vohra Committee Report (1993) had concluded that crime syndicates and mafia organizations have established themselves in various parts of the country; and that these organizations have developed significant muscle and money power and established linkages with governmental functionaries, political leaders and others to be able to operate with impunity. Consequently, MHA had established a Nodal Group under the Home Secretary to review, examine and pursue all criminal nexus related cases. *Despite the passage of several years the Nodal Group has still to achieve any headway....*

While undertaking the suggested review MHA should specially keep in mind the realizations which may have so far been gained from the functioning of the Nodal Group (under Home Secretary's chairmanship; specially set up to pursue the politico-criminal-bureaucratic nexus related leads, consequent to the Supreme Court's direction on the implementation of the Vohra Committee Report) which, in our perception, *has not made any headway on account of there being no reliable mechanism for criminal-nexus related leads/clues being passed on to Home Secretary by every concerned agency which comes across such information even in the course of its normal functioning.* The continuation of such a situation is hazardous, to say the least. MHA must organize an urgent stocktaking followed up with effective remedial measures. We gather that the Home Secretary has forwarded his suggestions to the Independent Review Committee (IRC) regarding the measures required to be taken to make the functioning of the Nodal Group effective. We trust that there shall be no delay in the IRC taking the requisite decisions....

The underlying reason

That is the fate of recommendations that are *accepted*, on which action is *taken*! Others do not get even that far. The report is received. It is filed. With that the recommendations are lost – till the next Task Force is appointed. They are then exhumed, and put into the next report. Why are we put through this sequence again and again? Is

there an ailment that accounts for both – that things have come to this pass as well as the fact that even the obvious things do not get done?

Indeed. And both Task Forces were explicit in pinpointing it.

"While the failures of the civil police can be attributed to varied factors," the Task Force on Internal Security observed, "the most vitiating among them is the persistent political interference in its functioning...."

"The foundation of administrative control in the police organization is discipline," it pointed out. "The disruption of the laid down chain of command and control by extra-constitutional factors and influences has had a debilitating effect on the supervisory echelons. During our interactions with the senior-most police officers in the states, most of them explained that undue political pressure in the matter of recruitments, transfers, postings, and promotions had most adversely affected discipline, efficiency, loyalty and morale in the police forces. Transfers are no longer governed by tenure policies. In most states, as per the standing orders, transfers and postings of subordinate staff up to the rank of DySP [Deputy Superintendent of Police] are to be made by supervisory officers within the Department. However, in actual practice, these are decided by the Chief Minister or one of his Ministers on the basis of political expediency and, worse, on considerations of caste and community. In some states, key and important positions, referred to as 'lucrative posts' are filled virtually through auction, the highest bidders being nominated to fill up the vacancies. Officers are retained at their posts as long as they remain 'loyal' or 'useful' to their political patrons. What earlier used to be a 'request' from the political quarters has since taken the form of 'desire', which has the in-built element of unequivocal orders. Thus, decisions in regard to matters relating to recruitments, transfers, investigations, etc. are adversely influenced by political interference. In such an environment subordinates flout the authority of their superiors and indiscipline permeates the entire Force. No uniformed Force managed in this manner can be expected to remain a trustworthy instrument to enforce law and order...."

And yet again – "Unceasing political interference has eaten into the very vitals of the police," the Task Force warned. "The malaise is further compounded by poor leadership within the state police

cadres. In the absence of a known promotion and tenure policy, the officers seeking to secure the top jobs resort to various unhealthy practices. The whole process thus gets further politicized and, in many cases, officers of inadequate standing, and even uncertain credentials, get appointed as the state police chiefs." What could be more explicit? Or more fraught with peril?

The rot begins right at the beginning. From recruitment at the lowest level to promotions at the highest level, the same virus has disabled Security Forces. As the Task Force put it,

The promotion policies have also been virtually liquidated by the continuing interference and the DGP's proposals being brazenly rejected on political considerations. Resultantly, promotions are not invariably based on seniority, proven merit and integrity....

Recruitment of the constabulary is not a periodic exercise; it continues throughout the year. It is most unfortunate that for the past many years continuing political pressures and interference have liquidated the erstwhile time-tested procedures relating to recruitments. This has led to a situation where, in many states, the designated recruiting authority is given a list of the candidates who should be enlisted, irrespective of their falling short of the prescribed educational and physical standards....

There is no difficulty in transposing all this and listing buffers that should be built. The Task Force listed many of them. Indeed, they have been listed countless times by dozens of Committees and Commissions and Task Forces. "Two decades ago, the NPC [National Police Commission] had recommended a detailed procedure for the selection, appointment and tenure of the state Police Chief," the Task Force recalled. "It had also recommended the establishment of a state Security Commission." Only to add, *"None of the states has agreed to accept the aforesaid recommendations."* "The tenure policy should not be infringed under any circumstances and the tenures, once laid down for posts at various levels, should be reduced only in cases of established misconduct or failure in performance," it recommended – reiterating what has been urged times without number. "In UP, in the last 5 years, the average tenure of the SP has been 6 months; the state capital had 14 changes at the level of SsP [Superintendents of Police] and 7 changes at the level of DsGP [Directors General of Police]. In such a situation, it is not possible for the police to remain a disciplined

and effective force." Recalling what it mildly characterized as the "mess" that had been created by the current practice of promoting "favourites" who would be "useful", the Task Force observed,

The consequential mess can be cured only if all transfer, posting, promotion, reward, suspension and punishment cases relating to officers up to the level of SsP are decided by a state level Police Establishment Board chaired by the DGP who should be held fully accountable for the efficient functioning of the force under his command.

Has anything happened as a consequence of these sharp observations and the straightforward, obvious recommendations? And is the reason any mystery? That the recommendations go to the very persons and groups who are the beneficiaries of the way things are?

Worse, the nature of those doing the interfering is changing by the day. "An extremely disturbing factor is that the organized criminal/mafia elements have penetrated into our polity and society and, consequently, dangerous criminals enjoy the patronage and protection of the most influential persons in the country," the Task Force on Internal Security observed. "Even our judiciary has been corrupted and tainted." "Information is invariably available about the involvement of the political executive and the bureaucracy with criminal and anti-national elements," it continued: as I write, we see evidence in what is happening in the Telgi case every week. "It is a matter of grave concern that action to promptly and ruthlessly deal with such cases is hardly ever taken. In most cases, the unwillingness to act arises largely from an exaggerated view of the 'political fall out' of effectively enforcing the Constitution and the rule of law."

The Task Force stressed that this criminalization of public life had come to infect every aspect of administration and security. What it said in the context of the Northeast applies to vast swathes of the country – from Bihar, Jharkhand, UP to coastal areas of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Kerala, Tamil Nadu:

The support base of the NE insurgents has shifted from the rural to the urban areas from where they extort collections from the government employees, business community and even the state governments. The insurgent groups gain considerable strength from their close links with political leaders and government officers, many of whom have known

sympathies for the subversive elements. The politician-bureaucrat-elite-insurgent nexus in the Northeast will, unless ruthlessly dealt with, continue to sustain the ongoing insurgencies. The growing linkages between the ISI, Islamic fundamentalists and the insurgent groups have added serious dimensions to the security threats in the region, which need to be countered through a concerted action plan and not through the sporadic deployment of SFs [Security Forces] in the troubled states....

These webs of linkages and partnerships cripple security operations at every turn. Telgi could not have flourished but for the closest association with politicians and policemen. As they had been his partners and co-beneficiaries, when he was caught, ministers and influentials of the Karnataka Government used their control to deny permission for the CBI to take over the investigation. When the cases were at last filed because of public pressure, all concerned ensured that they would proceed at a snail's pace. And all sorts of red herrings would be thrown across the trail....

And what is happening in the Telgi case is but a typical sequence. On occasion those working against the country are caught. On the much rarer occasion cases are instituted against them. What happens next? The cases are allowed to fall "for want of evidence". Often they are just withdrawn. Why? The Task Force's conclusion:

More often than not, the compulsions dictating withdrawals are not based on the principle that closing the cases would subserve the administration of justice. In most cases they are politically motivated. David H. Bayley, who has made a very perceptive study of Indian policing has observed: "In India today a dual system of criminal justice has grown up. With respect at least to the police, decisions made by the police officials about the application of law are frequently subject to partisan review or direction by elected representatives.... This is not only true of law and order situations. People accused of crimes have grown into the habit of appealing to political figures for remissions from sanctions of law.... *Altogether then, the rule of law in modern India, the frame upon which justice hangs, has been undermined by the rules of politics. Supervision in the name of democracy has eroded the foundations upon which impartiality depends in a criminal justice system.*"

This is the real problem. The decision to change things for the better rests in the hands of the very ones who prosper from the way things

are. And it gets worse by the day. The sorts of persons the Security Forces used to be put to chase are the ones to whom they are today put to "provide security".

And how do the political and bureaucratic classes get away with all this? Is it because something is wrong with our laws? Or because of what is evident from another observation of the Task Force on Border Management? I am not on the specific recommendation which the passage advances – that should be implemented, of course. I am on the attitudes that have ensured that even so elementary a step is not taken. Please read what the Task Force said:

Attention may be invited to yet another disconcerting aspect of our national life. It is amazing to see that though over five decades have elapsed since Independence, we have not been able to implement a National Identity Card scheme nor the scheme for a National Citizenship Register. Crores of rupees have been wasted on issuing election cards in a few states. The Income Tax Department is now issuing its own PAN cards to income tax assesses. All such expenditure could have been avoided by issue of an all-purpose identity card to all citizens of the country. In the absence of such a card, irrespective of the legal niceties, passport, election card and ration card are treated as evidence of citizenship. And all these are easy to get by providing an illegal gratification of just a few hundred rupees to the concerned functionaries in government departments. *How much more can the citizenship of a country be devalued?*

That devaluation is the problem. And few things have contributed more to devaluing citizenship – and to thereby letting the State structure slip into undeserving hands – as has the debasement of discourse in our country.

A football

Terrorists had taken over Punjab. Magistrates and judges would just not take up cases. Witnesses would not testify. Administration had broken down. Police were in complete disarray. A few brave individual policemen began to fight back. Eventually, inch by blood-stained inch, the state was wrenched out of the vice of terrorists. By that time terrorism had spread to several other parts of the country. A Prime Minister had been killed. A former Prime Minister had been blown up. "*Something* has got to be done," everyone agreed. Debates commenced. Articles, editorials, columns. But no decision. The classic illustration of what the distinguished police officer, P.R. Rajgopal used to call "paralysis by analysis". Eventually, a decade after terrorism had struck Punjab, in 1991, section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended. It now provided that "no court" shall take cognizance of any accusation of an offence made against a judge or a public servant acting or purporting to have been acting in discharge of his official duties without the permission of the Central Government if his duties related to the affairs of the Union, or the state Government if his duties related to the affairs of the state. If at the time at which the infraction was said to have been committed, the state was under President's Rule, the sanction would have to be that of the Central Government. The section also provided that the relevant government "may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held."

The amendment bore testimony to the state of affairs: for a magistrate to conduct the trial of one of these terrorists was to risk his life, and that of his family; for someone to depose to the facts – even of the murder of his own child or brother, a murder which he had seen

with his own eyes for the simple reason that they had been deliberately killed in front of him to "teach him a lesson" – was to risk the lives of his remaining relatives.... Hence, for instance, the provision that the government could determine by whom, where, by what procedure the trial would be held.

Once terrorism had been defeated in Punjab, a concerted campaign was launched – "file FIRs and writs against 'X', 'Y', 'Z'...." Over *two thousand and four hundred writs were filed against the bravest of police officers*. The surprising thing was that these were entertained – by the highest court, no less. Prior sanction of the Central Government? The Court as good as bulldozed the Government into "granting sanction". The very ones who had saved the country were put to running from court to court. They had the greatest difficulty in even finding lawyers to defend them. Every policeman who has stood up to Naxalite terror in Andhra is now in danger of the same fate.

An essential instrument

The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act was one of the few weapons in the armoury of law. Its principal value was in that it drove fear into those who were harbouring terrorists. And this because the bail provisions in it were stringent. From 1990, entirely predictably, out-of-work "leaders of minorities," as well as "civil liberties" groups zeroed in on this law, in particular on its bail provisions. The law is draconian, they declared. What is the point of fighting terrorism if the State is itself made into a terrorist State? they demanded. The law is being misused, they charged. It is being used to target Muslims, they charged.¹ In 1993/94, the campaign for scrapping the law reached such a pitch that as astute a Prime Minister as Mr. Narasimha Rao felt helpless.

A meeting was called of Chief Ministers in May 1995. Terrorism was on everyone's mind. Home Ministry officials were asked to prepare a note on TADA. They pointed out that till then, 77,500 persons had been booked under TADA. Its biggest misuse had taken place in 1990-92. The Congress-I's own Chief Minister, Chimanbhai Patel had used the Act to crush a farmers' movement and thrown about 19,000

¹I have set out the sequence in *Courts and Their Judgments*, Rupa, 2001, pp. 240-46, from which the following is taken.

of them into jail. The agitation had been led by the Bharatiya Kisan Union: as it was affiliated to the RSS, the secularists had naturally seen nothing wrong in the use to which the Act was put.

Since then, the Act was being used very little. By the time of the meeting, the Home Ministry was able to secure information from ten states. This showed that in these ten states in the entire year of 1994 *only five hundred and thirty five persons had been booked under TADA*. Of these, 333 had been booked in Assam, 142 in Andhra, 42 in Maharashtra. Each of these states was wracked by terrorism – Assam by ULFA; Andhra by the Naxalites; Maharashtra had just been dealing with the aftermath of the Bombay blasts. Each had a Congress Government at the time.

In the first two months of 1995, the only ones for which the Ministry was able to secure figures before the meeting, *only thirty three persons* had been booked under TADA.

“But it is being used to arrest Muslims,” the charge went. In Kashmir the overwhelming proportion who had been detained under the Act were in fact Muslims – not because they were Muslims but because they were out to break our country. In Gujarat, everyone agreed the Act had been misused – and not just against Muslims. Once these two states were excluded, Muslims constituted *only four point six per cent of the total number who had been detained under TADA*.

Yet the clamour: “Act is being misused.... It is being used to harass and torment Muslims....”

No one disputed any fact set out in the Home Ministry note. The Chief Ministers hardly referred to it. They delivered themselves of their set speeches.

The campaign continued. “Once the police throw you in under TADA, you are gone. You can’t get bail,” the campaigners shouted. In fact, *ninety eight point three per cent* of those who had been held under TADA in Gujarat had been granted bail. All over the country, *seventy six point five per cent had been granted bail*.

But the fulminators could not be bothered by such trivia as facts....

The Prime Minister met the Home Ministry officials a few days later. The officials once again went over the facts to show that the charges of these “leaders” were baseless. Two of the officers who attended the meeting told me that Rao said to them, “You are right, but you see the impression has seeped into the minds of Muslims that it is being used

against them. Whether the facts are one way or the other does not matter as much, as the fact that they are convinced this is so. We have to continue the fight against terrorists, of course. But you must fight them without this particular instrument."

And the Act was scrapped.

Out and out fabrications

In 2001, the instrument had to be forged again. Terrorism was everywhere. Thousands had been killed. Security personnel were being blown up every other day. Kashmir was in the grip – more of terrorists and their controllers in Pakistan than of the Government of the state or of Delhi. The NDA Government promulgated the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance in October 2001. The campaign started again. All the old fabrications were there, and a number of new ones.¹

"But the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance can be misused," the usual lobby, and the commentators said. *"In fact, given the nature of our governments and police, we can be certain it will be misused."*

The Income Tax Act is misused, it is often said, the Customs and Excise regulations are misused to extort money. Does that mean that we should do away with these laws and regulations as well? Politicians routinely say, their lawyers say even more frequently that the leaders have been framed, that false cases have been foisted on them by using the Prevention of Corruption Act. Many assert that they have been implicated falsely by their rivals even in murder cases. On that reasoning the anti-corruption laws, Section 302 of the IPC dealing with murder – all these should be thrown out too.

"But under section 21(2) of the Ordinance, governments, actually sundry policemen too can arrest even journalists who have just gone to interview a terrorist," editorialists and those spurring them maintained.

In fact, section 21(2) was designed actually ensure the *opposite*. It stated, "A person commits an offence if he arranges, manages or assists in arranging or managing a meeting which he knows is (a) to support a terrorist organization, (b) to further the activities of a

¹The following deals with the nature of public discourse in India and its terrible effects on public policy, not with what happens in the courts – which is just as debilitating: for the latter, see my *Courts and Their Judgments*, *op. cit.*

terrorist organization, or (c) to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to a terrorist organization." How did a journalist doing his work as a journalist come under any of these provisions?

"But section 14 makes it obligatory on everyone to furnish information," these commentators and propagandists insisted, *"and if a journalist who has obtained information during his visit or interviews, etc., refuses to comply with the demand of the police, he will be liable to be punished with imprisonment up to three years."*

A miasma. Under ordinary law – section 39 of the Criminal Procedure Code – it is the bounden duty of *every person* to furnish information that he may come across about a crime that has been committed or about the intention of anyone to commit a crime. Failure to do so makes one liable for punishment under section 187 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 39 actually lists the sorts of crimes providing information about which is the duty of everyone. These include not just such grave crimes as those against the State and those affecting public tranquility. They include illegal gratification, adulteration of food and drugs, robbery and dacoity, mischief against property, trespassing a house, "lurking house-trespass".

The distinguished lawyer, Ashok Desai pointed out that this provision had been around for 130 years. How often had journalists been asked to furnish information under it? No one answered. Second, could it have been anyone's case that, while it is appropriate that everyone be obliged to furnish information about the intention of someone to commit a robbery, to trespass into a house, or to intend to commit "lurking house-trespass", it is *not* right to ask him to narrate what he knows about the plan of a terrorist to cause mass slaughter by blowing up a building?

"But under the pretext of obtaining information, can the policeman not compel a journalist to disclose the sources of his information?" a civil libertarian demanded at a seminar.

The fact well known to lawyers was that the point had come up before the courts on several occasions. Their verdict had invariably been that, while the press, etc., are a vital limb of a free society, as far as preventing a crime from being committed, investigating one that has been committed, or nabbing a criminal, etc., are concerned, journalists have no higher rights than those of ordinary citizens. That

was the case even in countries like the U.K and U.S.A. which had not had to contend with the sorts of problems that we have been facing for the last twenty years.

The courts had held that neither the right to publish nor the right to keep one's sources confidential was absolute. The least reflection would lead us to concur. Pakistan was continuing to shell across the Line of Control. Touring the area as a journalist, I learn about the disposition of our patrols and forces. Is it my unfettered right to publish the information and thereby endanger the lives of our soldiers? Assume that a journalist goes to interview terrorists in their hideouts. There he learns of a huge cache of weapons of mass destruction. Can we maintain that his right to keep his sources and their whereabouts confidential overrides the imperative that defence forces eliminate the danger?

In a word, it was evident that in a given situation different components of the public interest have to be balanced. The right not to reveal sources is based on the premise that media are the eyes and ears of the public. If sources are revealed, they will dry up, and the public would stop getting the information it needs. But, as the examples show, in other situations, the opposite may be true.

That is why our Constitution, as every journalist knows, while guaranteeing free speech, circumscribes it. Through Article 19(2), it gives the State the power to levy reasonable restrictions for certain purposes. In the context of journalists reporting or writing on terrorists and terrorism, four of these grounds are relevant: the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, public order, and incitement to an offence.

"But who will judge where the interest of the public lies?" the opponents demanded – among them persons who routinely used to demand that a matter be handed over to a retired judge for determination!

But how could there be any doubt? The judges, of course. And in India, in particular as far as journalists are concerned, we can feel entirely confident and secure with this arrangement. Our courts have been, in particular the Supreme Court has been among the most vigilant in the world to ensure that governments do not misuse a provision such as Article 19(2) to impose unnecessary and

unreasonable restrictions on free speech. And every government that has raised a hand against the press – Jagannath Mishra's Press Bill, Rajiv Gandhi's Defamation Bill – has had its hand burnt. Everyone in the press, everyone even in public life knows this, and bears it in mind. Yet colleagues in the press, and of course in the Opposition, acted as if this were not the case, and conjured up miasmas to frighten themselves and others.

In any event, the short point was that the Ordinance did not have a single word about journalists; it did not have a single word that could put them at risk.

"But there is a basic question," the opponents declared, shifting ground. *"When we already have so many laws, why do we need yet another law to fight terrorism?"*

Rajiv Gandhi and a host of others along with him were blown up by terrorists – by members of one of the best known, most lethal terrorist organizations. He was assassinated not because of some personal quarrel. He was assassinated because of the policies he had pursued as the Prime Minister of the country. Yet, in convicting the conspirators the Supreme Court had to hold the conspirators to have been guilty – not of a terrorist act but of an ordinary murder. Was that not argument enough for a special law?

There was also the pace at which things proceed. Conviction in that case had taken eight years. The Bombay blasts case was still in the very first stage. Did these instances not establish that we needed special, truncated procedures for terrorist crimes?

One had only to consider the weapons the terrorists used. One had only to consider their reach. One had only to consider their ability to silence witnesses. One had only to recall that those who blew up Rajiv Gandhi had died on the spot, that those who had carried out the attack on the J&K Assembly were killed in the fire-fight that had ensued; and that in such a circumstance the kind of evidence one is liable to get is of a completely different order than is the case in an ordinary crime. One had only to consider the terrorist himself: thoroughly indoctrinated, he is not liable to furnish information in response to means that would work in your case and mine. Could we hope to get anywhere if we relied on rules of evidence, on procedures, on methods of gathering information, on methods of

interrogation that we had devised for normal crimes and criminals? Indeed, some of which had been devised 130 years earlier for a much simpler world?

"But this Ordinance completely reverses the basic rule of our jurisprudence" the civil libertarians declared. *"Under it a person accused by the police is presumed to be guilty till he proves his innocence. The onus of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the accused."*

But no provision of the Ordinance said this. The case against the accused was to proceed as others did and be ultimately decided by the courts. But there *was* a difference, and it told us much – not about the law, but about the critics. They were confusing – the point was so obvious that surely the words had to be, they were "deliberately confounding" – TADA with the new Ordinance.

Under section 21 of TADA if the prosecution was able to prove that arms, explosives, etc., had been recovered from the accused, and if it had been able to establish that those arms, etc., had been used in committing the offence, or if it had been able to prove that the fingerprints of the accused had been found on the scene of the crime, the Court was to presume, unless the contrary was proved, that the person had committed the offence. The same presumption could be made if a co-accused had stated in his confession that this person too had been involved in committing the crime. Similarly, the police could request the Court to allow it to secure the handwriting, photographs, blood, saliva, etc., of the accused to match those that had been recovered from the scene of the crime. If the accused refused to furnish these, the Court would presume that he was guilty. Those were the provisions of TADA.

In the new Ordinance, much to my dismay, I must confess, the provisions had been deliberately diluted. Under it in those kinds of circumstances – for instance, in the event of the accused refusing to furnish samples of blood, saliva, etc. – the Court was *not* to presume that he was guilty. It was to do the much lesser thing: it was only to draw an adverse inference.

Moreover, in contrast to what these critics were shouting about the basic premise of Indian jurisprudence having been overturned, etc., the fact was, and to this day the fact *is* that in several of our *existing* laws the onus of proving that he is innocent *in fact lies on the*

accused. Take the Customs Act. Section 123 provided and provides that where any goods to which it applies are seized, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods have been seized. Could it have been anyone's case that while it was all right to require a person on whom some computer hard disks had been found to prove his innocence, it was wrong and diabolic to require him to do so if RDX and AK-47s had been found? The Prevention of Corruption Act provided and provides that if assets are found on a person that he cannot explain as having come from his income, etc., he shall be presumed to have secured them illegally unless he proves to the contrary. The Foreigners' Act provided and provides that if a person complains that "X" is not an Indian citizen, the onus is on "X" to prove that he is in fact an Indian. If a bonded labourer or a Vigilance Committee claims that a debt is a bonded debt, section 15 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act provided and provides that "the burden of proof that such debt is not a bonded debt shall lie on the creditor." If a person is prosecuted under the Essential Commodities Act for doing an act or being in possession of a thing without the requisite authority or documents, section 14 specified and specifies that "the burden of proving that he has such authority, permit, license or other document shall be on him." Section 8 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators, etc., Act provides that "in any proceedings under this Act, the burden of proving that any property specified in the notice served under section 6 is not illegally acquired shall be on the person affected." The Income Tax Act; the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act; section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act – it relates to the presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman; section 113B of that Act – it relates to presumption in the case of a dowry death; section 114A – it relates to presumption as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions, each and every one of them contained at the time the Ordinance was promulgated and to this day contains provisions to the same effect.

"But terrorist organizations could be banned and dealt with under the already existing Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act," the critics said. *"What was the need for another law?"*

Another charge that had been flung without reading the corresponding provisions in the two. The grounds on which an

organization could be proceeded against under the Unlawful Activities Act were too restricted to deal with the kinds of organizations that had become a menace to the country. Indeed, the provisions of that law bore the stamp of the time when it was enacted: 1967. The nature of the menace that the country had to combat had transformed completely since then. Under the 1967 Act, only those individuals or organizations that aim at disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country could be proceeded against. The terrorist don sitting in Dubai, exercising murderous control over the film world, was not threatening the sovereignty of the country. Many of the gangs that were, and are today kidnapping persons, blowing up trains, etc., in the Northeast, many of the gangs operating in Andhra and Bihar were not, and are not – at least not formally – aiming at breaking the country. And yet they are terrorist organizations. Under the old Act, they could not be banned.

Moreover, the procedures that the 1967 Act provided were so dilatory that they were bound to – if they were prescribed in a law enacted today, one would have to say, “they are designed to” – thwart the kind of action – swift, certain – that was needed in the new circumstances. One had only to ask someone to spell out what the authorities are required to do under that Act to block and seize the finances of a terrorist organization, and one would see how inadequate the law was.

The point, therefore, was not that, as we had the Unlawful Activities Act, there was no need for the new provisions. Rather the opposite: the earlier Act should have been amended, or better still replaced, so as to bring provisions and procedures in line with what confronted the country at this time.

The next “argument” was an even more brazen fabrication, and yet it was shouted down from podium after podium: *“Terrorist and unlawful organizations apart,”* the champions of the working class proclaimed, *“the provisions of the Ordinance will give governments and police a handle to suppress trade unions and their activities.”*

How? Section 3 of the Ordinance set out with great specificity the actions that came under the purview of its provisions. A person or organization could be acted against only if its actions threatened the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the country; if they aimed at striking terror in the people; and/or if they were executed through the use of

bombs, dynamite and other explosive substances. Which trade union activity fell in any of these categories?

"But this new Ordinance is just TADA in a new garb," it was said. *"That law was notoriously abused. In the end it had to be scrapped."*

Wrong in general. Wrong in every particular. Provision after provision in this Ordinance was, it had been consciously designed to incorporate safeguards that did not exist in TADA. The two provisions that were alleged to have been abused the most – against persons alienating a section of the people or those creating disharmony among them, and those conducting disruptive activities aimed at undermining the sovereignty and integrity of the country – had both been deleted. The bail provision too had diluted: under TADA, before granting bail, the court had to come to a *prima facie* conclusion that the person was innocent *as well as* that he was not likely to commit the same sort of crime if he were let free on bail; the latter requirement too had been deleted; furthermore, upon the expiry of a year normal bail provisions were to apply. Police remand had been reduced from 60 days under TADA to 30 days, and the period of judicial custody had been halved from a year under TADA to six months. Under TADA, the person could appeal against the order of the trial court only to the Supreme Court. Under the Ordinance, he could appeal to the High Court also. Unlike TADA, the lawyer could meet the accused during interrogation. And so on.

"But look at Chapter V of the Ordinance," the critics heckled. *"It allows the police, the intelligence agencies to listen in to and intercept communications between any of us whatever means we use: electronic, wire, oral, paging devices, tracking devices. This wasn't there in the Law Commission draft. It is a clear license to police, IB, CBI, anyone the Government fancies to invade our privacy."*

First, about the Law Commission. While arguing that provisions on a particular matter were not in its draft, critics obscured the fact that the entire question – of having or not having a special law to deal with terrorist crimes and organizations – had been referred to the Law Commission, and that the Law Commission did not just endorse the proposal for having such a law, it provided a detailed draft also – entitled, "Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2000."

Second, recommendations of the Law Commission are just one of the inputs that go into the final outcome: it is ultimately the

Government's job, it is not just its power but also its responsibility to forge the instrument that is required. In this instance, the Government had before it, in addition to the Law Commission's report, the laws in other countries – the UK, the USA, Canada, among others; it had before it the law as it was being administered in Maharashtra; the laws that had been passed by the Assemblies of Karnataka and Andhra. Indeed, provision after provision of the Ordinance was a verbatim reproduction of these earlier laws – with just the nomenclature altered: what was the "Appeals Commission" in the UK law became the "Review Committee" in the Ordinance, what was "proscription" of an organization for being a terrorist organization became "declaration of an organization as a terrorist organization" in the Ordinance. Just as the provisions on interception, on seizure of assets were as if they had been lifted from the laws of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra. The provisions for declaring organizations to be terrorist organizations, of appeals against that declaration, provisions relating to the offence of being a member of such an organization, those relating to the support someone may be rendering to such organizations, those concerning possessing or holding property or other proceeds arising out of terrorism; or raising funds for terrorist organizations, those about confiscating such property, etc., were based on – to the point that the very words had been used – on the corresponding provisions in UK's Terrorism Act of 2000.

The Law Commission draft did not have anything on intercepts. Did this mean that – even though ever so often it was only through intercepts that the contacts between a controller sitting in Pakistan and his agents and instruments here could be proven – no provision about intercepts should be included? Were we not bound to take account of the experience we had gained in Maharashtra, for instance? That it was precisely through intercepts that the Government there had been able to nail the exchanges between dons in Dubai and their agents in Mumbai? The provision in the Law Commission draft relating to financial dealings of terrorists and their organizations was found on examination to be inadequate. Should the Government have stuck to the draft even when it had reason to believe that a more effective provision was required?

The next "argument" shut its eyes to the tragedy that had struck the very person to whom they used to genuflect every day. *"But what*

about confessions being declared to be evidence admissible in courts?" these critics asked. *"People can be made to confess to all sorts of deeds by methods that our police uses."*

True, under ordinary law confessions made to a police officer are not admissible as evidence. And to gauge the result one did not have to look far even in those days: one just had to notice what had happening in even high-visibility cases in Delhi and Mumbai themselves, in the Jessica Lal murder and the Gulshan Rai murder cases – several persons had seen the victims being murdered; one eye-witness after the other had subsequently gone back on what she or he had told the police. When conviction in even an ordinary murder could be thwarted by such a simple device, what would a terrorist organization – one that could bring to bear pressures infinitely more frightening than an ordinary criminal – not be able to ensure? [Since then; of course, the hypocrisy of many of these commentators came into vivid display on more occasions than one. Recall how eagerly they splashed the "confession" of the Kanchi Shankaracharya, rather the selective, and it turned out wholly twisted "leaks" put out by the police.]

Arun Jaitley led me to a telling illustration: not one of the persons who were eventually convicted for Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, he said, could have been convicted had confessions not been admissible.

I looked up the judgment in the case. In the case of every single accused, the Supreme Court's pronouncement begins by recounting that the person has recorded a confessional statement. Next the Court sets out the averments in that confession which are incriminating. It then sets out some ancillary material which leads it to believe that the confession is true. The truth of the confession established, the Court pronounces the person to be guilty.

Thus, *Accused-1, Nalini*: "The principal item of evidence available in this case is her own confessional statement recorded on 9.8.1991...." Ancillary factors are then listed, and the Court concludes that this corroborative evidence establishes the truth of the confession. *Accused-2, Santhan alias Raviraj*: "His confessional statement was recorded on 17.9.1991.... The incriminating admissions contained in (it) are the following...." Corroborative evidence establishes the truth of the confession. *Accused-3, Murugan*

alias Das: His confession was recorded on 9.8.1991. Confessional statement of Nalini and other corroborative evidence confirms Murugan's confession to be true. "The active and positive involvement of A-3 (Murugan) in the conspiracy for assassinating Rajiv Gandhi looms large in the said confession. We have, therefore, no doubt that A-3 was also one of the conspirators." A-4 to A-8, confessions not recorded, and/or acquitted. *Accused-9, Robert Payas*: confession recorded. Ancillary factors "have rendered the confessional statement made by A-9 in Exhibit P-85 as wholly true. We, therefore, concur with the finding of the Special Judge that A-9 (Robert Payas) was very much involved in the conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi." A-10, A-12, A-18.... In each instance the same sequence is repeated: confessional statement, ancillary factors confirm this as true, therefore guilty.

Nor was the point confined to what the Supreme Court had held in regard to these particular individuals. The judgment had pronounced on the law in this regard. The Court had specifically held that confessions are admissible as evidence; that even if the police officer has forgotten to obtain the signatures of the accused on the statement, it is admissible; that even if the statement has been given just before police remand was about to expire, it is admissible; that, and this is a point to which I shall revert later, the confession of one person can be used against a co-accused.

Indeed, the Court had held that if an accused has been charged under one law, and is acquitted under it, he can be convicted under a *different* law on the basis of the confession he had made under the law under which he was originally charged. As will be recalled, the persons accused in the conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi had been charged under TADA. The Court held that the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi could not be taken to have been an act of terrorism. It convicted them for having been party to a run-of-the-mill murder – under section 302 Indian Penal Code. But the confessions had been made under TADA. The Court held that the confessions made under TADA were valid for charges under another statute, in this case the Indian Penal Code.

That the fulminations were a put-on, was also evident from what the corresponding provisions were under the law that was in operation in Maharashtra, as well as the bills that had been passed

in Andhra and in Karnataka – *each* of them provided that the confessional statement *shall* be admissible as evidence against the person who had made the confession, that it *shall* be admissible against a co-accused, that it *shall* be admissible against the abettor as well as against the co-conspirator.

It just so happened, and this is the point to which I shall revert, that the Ordinance was far more restrictive than these laws, indeed than what had been specifically upheld by the Supreme Court even in regard to confessions. To take one specific: under the Ordinance, confession made by a person was *not* to be admissible in a proceeding against a co-accused.

"But the fellow will be tortured and made to confess to whatever the police want," went the "argument".

Under TADA, the accused could be kept in police custody for 60 days, and in judicial custody up to a year. Under the Ordinance, the limits had been cut down to 30 days and 180 days respectively. The family of the person was to be informed immediately upon his arrest. Before he was interrogated, the person was to be informed *in writing* that he was not bound to make a confession. The confession could be recorded only by an officer of or above the rank of Superintendent of Police. It had to be recorded before a court within 48 hours. The court was to inquire of the accused whether he had been tortured or maltreated. If he so much as alleged that he had been maltreated, the court was to record the allegation, and direct an immediate medical examination. Most important, the lawyer of the accused was to be allowed to meet him during interrogation.

One had only to step back a few weeks. The terrorists from Pakistan had caused that murderous explosion outside the J&K Assembly building. Three of them had made their way inside. The gun-battle had lasted for hours. Eventually, the Forces had to fight their way room by room to dislodge them. In this case all the terrorists had been killed. But imagine that one of them had been captured. Imagine that he was brought to a police station.

What will be the outcome if we now proceed as follows?

The law of the land

First, the police officer who arrests him must "prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest." This memo must be "attested by at least

one witness, who may either be a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made." Moreover, the arrest memo "shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the date and time of arrest."

The moment he is arrested, the terrorist must be informed that he has the right to ensure that the police inform his next of kin within 8 to 12 hours of his arrest.

Next, within 8 to 12 hours of the arrest the police station of the area must by telegraph notify the time and place of arrest and the place at which he is being held to the terrorist's next-of-kin if he is from the same locality as the police station, or through the Legal Aid Organization in the district if the relatives live elsewhere.

The place and time of his arrest, the name of the next-of-kin who has been told about the arrest and the time at which he has been informed, the names and particulars of the policemen in whose custody he is, shall all be entered in the diary.

Furthermore, should he demand this, the terrorist shall be medically examined at the time of his arrest and any injuries that he may have shall be recorded at the time in an "inspection memo". This "inspection memo" must be signed by both – the terrorist and the police officer carrying out the arrest. A copy of this memo must be given to the terrorist.

These steps having been gone through, the terrorist is brought to the police station. From now on, the police officials who meet him or come to secure information from him must have on them "accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags" – indicating their names as well as designations.

All these particulars about the policemen who meet him or seek information from him must be recorded in a register.

Though the lawyer of the terrorist may not be present throughout the interrogation, the lawyer shall be allowed to meet the terrorist "during interrogation".

Not just that, a trained doctor must conduct a medical examination of the terrorist every 48 hours during his detention. Panels of such doctors must be prepared for every *tehsil* and district.

Each of the foregoing memos and points of information must be submitted at each stage to the Magistrate of the area. And all the information must be submitted to and be available in police control

rooms that shall be created for the purpose in each district and state capital.

Failure to comply with any of these steps shall result in departmental action against the concerned policemen. Indeed, they shall also be proceeded against for contempt of court. And, the case for contempt may be filed in any High Court of the country having territorial jurisdiction over the matter.

Do these sound as if they are arrangements deliberately designed to ensure that government would not be able to get information out of the terrorist? That they are arrangements designed to enable the terrorist to pinpoint the officers who are questioning him so that they can be "taken care of" by his cohorts outside the prison? Do they seem to be arrangements designed to ensure that one police officer after another is bogged down in defending himself in courts?

But these are the requirements that the Supreme Court had made mandatory in *D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal*.¹

The judgment aimed at preventing deaths in custody. Now, deaths in custody must be prevented. But we must also be alert to the danger that in ensuring that objective we do not disable the country – and that too in its fight for survival, no less – as the steps that the Supreme Court had made mandatory clearly do *vis-à-vis* terrorism.

My quarrel with the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance was that it bent too far back to incorporate "safeguards" prescribed in judgements such as *D.K. Basu*.

As debilitating as the specific requirements that the Court had mandated was the purple prose that accompanies such judgments. Thus, in *D.K. Basu*, the Supreme Court had observed,

- Custodial violence, including torture and death in the lock-ups, strikes a blow at the rule of law, which demands that the powers of the executive should not only be derived from law but also that the same should be limited by law. Custodial violence is a matter of concern. It is aggravated by the fact that it is committed by persons who are supposed to be the protectors of the citizens. It is committed under the shield of uniform and authority in the four walls of a police station or lock-up, the victim being totally helpless. The protection of an individual from torture and abuse by the police and other law-enforcing officers is a matter of deep concern in a free society.

¹(1997) 1 SCC 416.

- "Custodial torture" is a naked violation of human dignity and degradation which destroys, to a very large extent, the individual personality. It is a calculated assault on human dignity and whenever human dignity is wounded, civilization takes a step backward – flag of humanity must on each such occasion fly half-mast.
- In all custodial crimes, what is of real concern is not only infliction of body pain but the mental agony which a person undergoes within the four walls of police station or lock-up. Whether it is physical assault or rape in police custody, the extent of trauma a person experiences is beyond the purview of law.
- Experience shows that worst violations of human rights take place during the course of investigation, when the police with a view to secure evidence or confession often resorts to third-degree methods, including torture, and adopts techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the arrest or describing the deprivation of liberty merely as a prolonged interrogation. A reading of the morning newspapers almost every day carrying reports of dehumanizing torture, assault, rape and death in custody of police or other governmental agencies is indeed depressing. The increasing incidence of torture and death in custody has assumed such alarming proportions that it is affecting the credibility of the rule of law and the administration of criminal justice system. The community rightly feels perturbed. Society's cry for justice becomes louder.

*The
Supreme
Court*
- Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in a civilized society governed by the rule of law. The rights inherent in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution require to be jealously and scrupulously protected. We cannot wish away the problem. Any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the inhibition of Article 21 of the Constitution, whether it occurs during investigation, interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of the Government become law-breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become a law unto himself, thereby leading to anarchism. No civilized nation can permit that to happen. Does a citizen shed off his fundamental right to live, the moment a policeman arrests him? Can the right to life of a citizen be put in abeyance on his arrest? These questions touch the spinal cord of human rights' jurisprudence. The answer, indeed, has to be an emphatic "No". The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, undertrials, detenus and other prisoners in custody, except according to the procedure established by law by placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted by law.

You tell a person day in and day out how evil he is, how ineffective he is, how corrupt he is, how his habitual conduct is a disgrace to civilized existence, how it is a blow at the very foundation of social existence – that is the rule of law, how he and his colleagues are just “criminals in uniform.” And then expect him to fight terrorists! Every manual on man-management predicts the outcome: once a person or group has been conditioned to believe that it is evil, that in any case others regard it as evil, it has no incentive left to attempt to be anything better: either it will just sit back and not do its assigned duty, or it will act as the evil monster it has been proclaimed to be.

The judgment did allow ultimately that there was another side to the matter. It noted,

- There is one other aspect also which needs our consideration: We are conscious of the fact that the police in India have to perform a difficult and delicate task, particularly in view of the deteriorating law and other situation, communal riots, political turmoil, student unrest, terrorist activities, and among others the increasing number of underworld and armed gangs and criminals. Many hardcore criminals like extremists, terrorists, drug peddlers, smugglers who have organized gangs, have taken strong roots in the society. It is being said in certain quarters that with more and more liberalization and enforcement of fundamental rights, it would lead to difficulties in the detection of crimes committed by such categories of hardened criminals by soft peddling interrogation. It is felt in those quarters that if we lay too much of emphasis on protection of their fundamental rights and human rights, such criminals may go scot-free without exposing any element or iota of criminality with the result, the crime would go unpunished and, in the ultimate analysis, the society would suffer. The concern is genuine and the problem is real. To deal with such a situation, a balanced approach is needed to meet the ends of justice. This is all the more so, in view of the expectation of the society that police must deal with the criminals in an efficient and effective manner and bring to book those who are involved in the crime. The cure cannot, however, be worse than the disease itself.

Two points are worth noting in regard to a passage such as this. It is the exception – nods such as this towards the reality that Security Forces have to contend with are far, far outnumbered by passages that set out how callous the police, etc. are.

Second, the operational counsel that the Court ultimately gives tilts

the balance completely in favour of the terrorist who may have been taken into custody. From those passages about cruelty of the police, etc., the Court draws the string of specific requirements that we have seen above. On the other side, from that solitary acknowledgement about what the Forces have to contend against – organized crime, terrorism – the Court concludes that “a balanced approach” is necessary.

On the one hand, specific, crippling requirements. On the other, the general counsel to adopt a balanced approach! Moreover, where the balance will lie when the Forces have to secure information from a trained, fired-up killing machine – *that* the Court, as usual, does not specify.

Too lax

The provisions of TADA had been much more stringent than those of the new Ordinance. The constitutionality of those provisions, of TADA itself had been challenged in the courts. The Supreme Court had specifically upheld TADA, and declared its provisions – the much more stringent provisions – to be in accord with the Constitution.

In spite of this, and solely because of the din that had been raised, the Ordinance bent too far back to accommodate human rightists, and that includes some impractical judgments too – like that of the Supreme Court in *D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal* that we have noticed above.

Under TADA, as we just saw, the accused was allowed only one appeal – that to the Supreme Court. Even with that restriction, the judgment in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case had taken all of eight years. By allowing another intermediate appeal – to the High Court – the Ordinance was ensuring that the period would be not eight but a multiple of eight years!

Similarly, recall the provision that was inserted allowing a lawyer to meet the accused while he is being interrogated. Imagine that the police had nabbed a terrorist sent across by the *Lashkar-e-Toiba*. He was certain to have been saturated with poison to the point that he was nothing but a killing machine. Was he going to give information over a cup of tea? And if lawyers were going to be meeting him from

time to time during interrogation, was there the slightest chance that police would be able to extract information – information about the plans of his group, about its networks? And yet that information was literally a matter of life and death for our people and our country.

But such was the condition of public life and public discourse, and so far removed from reality are some of our judgments that a provision like that one about lawyers had to be incorporated in the Ordinance.

Based on their experience in dealing with organized gangs of criminals, the states of Maharashtra, Andhra, Karnataka formulated laws. Why should the law for combating terrorists be more circumspect than the laws required for neutralizing gangsters? But that is what the Ordinance came to be. To give just one example, the state laws provided that the Review Committees – to consider orders passed by the Home Department – shall be headed by the Chief Secretary, but the Ordinance required that the corresponding Committee for terrorists must be headed by a High Court judge. What entitled terrorists or their agents to greater solicitude?

Similarly, consider the deletion of “disruptive activities” from the Ordinance. TADA had provided that any action that questions or disrupts the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or is intended to do so, or which is intended to bring about or supports a claim for the secession of any part of India from the Union shall be a crime under TADA. Imagine how far we have fallen when even such a provision had to be jettisoned – even from a law the specific purpose of which was to thwart terrorists out to break our country.

Consensus?

As substantive arguments turned out to be unsustainable, the commentators latched on to sequence and procedure: *“But what was the need for an Ordinance?”* they demanded. *“Should the Government not have first evolved a consensus on the matter?”*

Is there never to be finality? Not even in a matter relating to the security of the country? The efforts to bring about a consensus on this law had been going on since May 1995. TADA was allowed to lapse because opportunist politicians looking for issues that would curry favour with the Muslim vote bank saw an opportunity. That itself was

a crime – an instrument vital to the security and defence of the country was sacrificed to the crassest political calculation. Then had begun the long march.

A Criminal Law Amendment Bill was drafted and circulated in 1995. It was abandoned.

Consultations continued with all and sundry.

The matter was eventually referred to the Law Commission in 1998. That Commission deliberated on the question for two years – giving its report and draft Bill in April 2000.

That draft was considered at meetings of Directors General and Inspectors General of Police, of Chief Secretaries and Home Secretaries of state governments. It was considered at the Chief Ministers' Conference on Internal Security in 2000. It was sent to the Human Rights Commission for observations. It was sent to the state governments for their comments.

Should the process have gone on indefinitely? And what are the prospects of "evolving a consensus" when it has become an article of faith of everyone who is out of office that his job is to block everything a government does? That his job is to block even what he was doing when he was in office, in fact even what he is at that very time doing in the states in which he is in office?

The comments that the states sent to the draft Bill themselves told the tale. The Congress-I was opposing the Ordinance. In fact, when the Law Commission's draft was circulated, the (Congress-I) Government of Delhi supported the enactment of the law *in toto*. The (Congress-I) Government of Karnataka supported the enactment of the law *in toto*. The (Congress-I) Government of Nagaland supported the law *in toto*. The (Congress-I) Government of Madhya Pradesh, the (Congress-I) Government of Rajasthan, and the (Congress-I) Government of Maharashtra supported the enactment of the law – they sent suggestions about a few specific clauses.

The CPI(M) Governments of Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura sent their usual "principled" opposition. That Government in Kerala was soon gone. The one in West Bengal was trying to cover up its embarrassment for having finalized its own version of the Maharashtra Act. The Government of Tripura, after some initial show of reluctance because of "the party's stand", had begun using

corresponding provisions from other enactments relating to national security.

Not just those governments in the states, representatives of those parties at "the national level" had in general endorsed the need for a law to deal specifically with terrorists and their organizations. The leading figure in Parliament from the CPI(M) had gone so far as to counsel Government that it should study what Israel was doing in the matter. One of the most highly regarded leaders of the Congress-I in Parliament had stated that the Indian Penal Code was inadequate for combating terrorism, that a special law was needed, that in fact the draft Bill itself was not adequate. Nailing the falsehood that was being circulated, he had said that the Bill did *not* shift the onus of proof on to the accused, that the provisions only sought to raise a presumption in certain circumstances. He said that there were many loopholes in the Bill, and for that reason it should go to the Select Committee or Standing Committee of the House....

This process had been going on for *six years*. In the meanwhile terrorists had continued to maim, kill, blow up, burn....

By then more than *five times* the number we had lost in the 1962, 1965, 1971 and Kargil wars had been killed by terrorists. And we were still stalled – awaiting a "consensus" before getting even a law in place to deal with terrorism.¹

The shameful sequence

The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance was issued on 24 October 2001. It could not be taken up and passed in the ensuing session of Parliament.

Accordingly, the Ordinance had to be issued a second time – on 30 December 2001.

The same "principled" denunciations followed. It was clear that, even though it was desperately needed, the Bill converting the Ordinance into law would not be allowed to pass through the Rajya Sabha – where the Government was in a minority.

¹For further points in law and fact, see, Vijendra Singh Jafa, "Insouciance in the face of terror," *Faultlines*, Volume 5, May 2000, pp. 23-56; Saji Cherian, "Terrorism and legal policy in India," *Faultlines*, Volume 15, February 2004, pp.127-160; Solil Paul, "The Supreme Court on confessions," *Faultlines*, Volume 16, January 2005, pp. 29-61.

A joint session of the two Houses had to be called; the Government had to risk its very survival. Only on that basis could the Ordinance be converted into law. On 26 March 2002.

The usual half-truths, the even more usual fabrications continued. Stray cases of patent misuse were picked up, and it was made out that they were typical. The critics did nothing but nothing to bring to book those officials, politicians or state governments that had misused the Act in those cases. For the purpose clearly was not to prevent misuse. The purpose was to paint the Act black. Even that was incidental. The purpose was to use the Act – whatever the implications for national security – to paint black the Government that had brought in the Act.

We will scrap POTA when we come to power, leaders of the Opposition declaimed. It is being used against minorities....

They did come to power.

And they introduced measures to scrap the Act, and simultaneously to amend the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

The hypocrisy was plain to see.

On item after item, the words of POTA were sought to be put into the 1967 Act! The definition of terrorism. The punishment for funding terrorism. The confiscation of the proceeds from terrorism. The banning of terrorist organizations. The provisions on interception about which so much noise had been raised.... The very words had been lifted verbatim.

But, "something had to be done" to make a show. Accordingly, as Arun Jaitley set out at the time, on two matters the provisions of POTA were diluted.

Recall that POTA itself had softened the provisions of TADA in regard to bail. Under TADA, till the trial was completed, the person arrested under it would not be granted bail. It is this provision, more than any other, that had been a deterrent to those who may have harboured thoughts of aiding or harbouring terrorists. This provision had been diluted in POTA. A person arrested under POTA would not be granted bail for just the first year without hearing the Public Prosecutor. After that period, the normal provisions of bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply. Even so, the presumption would be against granting bail till the Court was satisfied that *prima facie* the accused had not committed the crime. Under the new amendment, bail was made easier still. Indeed, a terrorist would wish

that if he was to be arrested he should be arrested under this amended law rather than under any of the other Acts! Jaitley showed that the provisions for bail of terrorists would now be more liberal than for drug dealers under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Drugs Act, 1985; that they would be more liberal for terrorists than for black marketeers and hoarders under the Essential Commodities Act, 1981; that they would be far more liberal than the provisions under the laws against organized crime in Karnataka, Andhra, Maharashtra and Gujarat!

What was the rationale for this? It is just our commitment!

The same sort of mindless dilution was done in regard to confessions. Under POTA, confessions made to police officers were admissible as evidence. A safeguard had been built in – that, within 48 hours of making the confession, the person had to be produced before a Magistrate. And in case he said that he had not made the confession voluntarily, the Magistrate was to immediately have him examined, and record another, fresh statement in his own presence. As I have mentioned earlier, I believe that such solicitude for persons out to kill and be killed, out to break our country was a symptom not of solicitude but of weakness in the face of din and criticism. But even this kind of safeguard was not enough for the new Government and its props. They ruled confessions out of court altogether.

The result was ridiculous. Under the Customs Act, under FERA, under the Narcotics Act, under the Central Excise Act confessions are admissible as evidence. But a confession by a terrorist is not!

That with each round provisions get diluted is bad enough.

That each dilution further fans the atmosphere of permissiveness is worse.

That political parties and leaders make themselves available for making national security a football is even worse.

That those who dominate public discourse can be so easily launched on a “campaign” is worst – for when public discourse becomes so uninformed, the country is left with nothing by which those in office may be brought to do right by the country’s security.

Yet the sequence from the Unlawful Activities Act to TADA to POTO to POTA back to the Unlawful Activities Act, and in each case the inability to use such law as existed well – all this is but one of scores of sequences and examples that can be recalled.

The lever to move all else

In the month and a half in 2004 when Manipur was in turmoil, the month and a half during which Ministers from Delhi could not even visit the capital of the state, the two principal papers of Delhi were seized by two issues. Why should residents of Delhi not be able to shop 24-hours a day? Why should liquor shops and drinking places not remain open till midnight and beyond?

The IAC plane had but to be hijacked to Kandahar, and our television channels started beaming hour after hour the wailing and cursing of relatives of the passengers. I can report first-hand that this wailing and cursing had great effect on those who had to take decisions in those vital hours. The moment an exchange was agreed upon – terrorists in our jails for the passengers – the media were at the Government – “Abject surrender.... Why can’t our Government behave like the governments of Israel and US? Why can we also not have a clear-cut policy, ‘India does not negotiate with terrorists?’”

Throughout the eighties, whenever anyone pointed to the faster rate at which Muslims were growing, and what effects this will eventually have, he was denounced: “Just RSS propaganda.... Where is the proof?....” The 1991 Census confirmed that the facts were actually worse than the apprehensions that had been expressed. The denouncers looked the other way.

An even more glaring diversion was enacted when the religion tables of the 2001 Census were released. The data are computerized. Three years had gone by. The tables should have been available much earlier. None of our secular commentators seemed eager for them. When they came out, and showed once again that Muslims were indeed growing much faster, the Census Commissioner was pounced upon. The poor man was removed from office. Facts about the way the demographic balance had been over-turned in states like Assam, in border districts of West Bengal, in districts of Bihar – these were totally but totally buried out of sight.

December 13, 2001: terrorists entered the premises of Parliament. Guns, grenades, RDX – it was a massive assault. The next day, *The Hindu* carried on its front page, in bold type, the statement of Syed Salahuddin, the chief of *Hizb-ul-Mujabideen* from Pakistan: the attack has been engineered by Indian intelligence agencies, the

paper reported him saying, so as to pressurize Parliament into passing the Anti-terrorist Ordinance, and to pressurize the international alliance against terrorism "to bracket the Kashmir freedom struggle with terrorism"! In which country would such falsehood – that too by an agent of the enemy – get such prominent play? The same day, opposite the edit-page that paper carried a dispatch – again in bold type – from a conspicuous commentator-correspondent: Who called in the Army? he demanded; had the "well established procedures" been followed for this "entirely irregular requisitioning of Army units?" he demanded. What an occasion for Constitutionalism!

Till he was alive, as National Security Advisor, J.N. Dixit was quite the darling of the media. He had decades of experience in foreign affairs. He was regarded as "tough". As he had written a number of books, he was looked upon as a strategic thinker. Most important, he was always accessible. He had but to die, and one paper after another carried stories alleging that he had become too large for his boots, that he had started using his office to interfere in the work of other ministries, that he had started pursuing his own policies and agenda, that even the Prime Minister, in whose office Dixit ostensibly functioned, often did not know what Dixit was directing others to do. So bitter and divisive had the experience of having him – and before him, Brajesh Mishra – as National Security Advisor been that Government was thinking of abolishing the post altogether.... M.K. Narayanan was appointed National Security Advisor. The stories suddenly ceased. Were the stories about Dixit's throwing his weight around, about the post itself being a tailbone the result of some inquiry by the journalists? Or were they plants?

After delays and delays, after committees upon committees, the Army at last settles on a weapons system. Immediately, write-ups appear why some rival system is better – write-ups that require the most expert knowledge about weapons systems. Is it that the correspondent has some secret method of rapid-learning? Or that he is just putting out what some commercial rival has fed him?

Take Cricket. The Indian team loses a few matches. "Ganguly should retire," "Indians lack the killer instinct," "The Indians can win only on home ground".... And then they win. Hosannas: "Masterly captaining by Ganguly...."

Consider the way Lalu Yadav's misrule – misrule that has reduced

Bihar to anarchy, and cleared the way for enemies of the country – has been buried by write-ups celebrating his “communication skills”, the “earthy humour”, the “common touch” of this “man of the masses.”

Examples of this kind are daily fare. They illustrate traits that have become as deep as they are injurious:

- ❑ Manipur *versus* shopping and drinking hours: superciliousness as the reigning ideology.
- ❑ Kandahar: the sudden switch. Everything a spectator sport. Distancing oneself from whatever is happening. Disowning all responsibility for everything. Just the smart question.
- ❑ Rate of growth of Muslim population, and Lalu Yadav: the craven slavishness to intellectual fashions – in this case that of “secularism”, of standing by the “backward”.
- ❑ Salahuddin on the terrorist assault on Parliament: being perfectly neutral between the arsonist and the fire-fighter.
- ❑ The terrorist assault and Constitutionalism: throwing away all sense of proportion.
- ❑ Dixit and weapons systems: plants flourish.
- ❑ Cricket: everything a spectator sport; distancing oneself from failure, appropriating success.

Both the examples and the traits can be multiplied. Each of them has major consequences for national security:

- ❑ With superciliousness as the reigning ideology, how will the reader’s attention be kept focused on issues that require years of sustained, unremitting, detailed toil? How will he even be awakened to what is vital?
- ❑ Will instant clamour leave room for toughness?
- ❑ When *anyone* can say *anything* and get equal exposure, indeed when he will get *greater exposure* if what he is saying is shocking, if what he is saying is against the country, if in particular it smears our Security Forces, will the national resolve not be dissipated?
- ❑ When a mere bureaucratic rival, weapons suppliers, corporate rivals can plant stories, can foreign governments not do so?
- ❑ When the “men of the masses” of the Bihar type are lionized, who will value better governance in time?

- Every conflict has ups and downs. Unless we learn to embrace defeat, how will get through protracted and major wars? Recall that in just a few years, images from battlefields will be beamed to our television sets in real-time by private channels, by channels of other countries. Imagine the effect that visuals of seeing corpses of soldiers strewn across a field will have on their relatives, and, therefore, on the morale of the forces. What will the predisposition that our electronic media exhibited during the Kandahar episode do at such a time to the task of conducting the war?

Shutting our eyes

There is first of all the almost total absence of scholarly work on security issues, on what our neighbours are doing. The quantum of our scholarly work on China, for instance, to say nothing of its quality is woeful. How many studies would we have in the public domain that educate us to the implications for India's security of what China is building in Tibet? On other countries that are vital to our future – Japan, Australia, Vietnam – intellectual and scholarly work is as good as non-existent. Even for the most elementary information and analysis one has to go to European or American sources. Indeed, we have scarcely equipped ourselves for such work. Just find out how many persons RAW has who are fluent in Farsi, Chinese, or Japanese. Far from doing original scholarly work on those countries, can such a trifling number even keep up with the translation work that is required every day? An average reader of newspapers, an average legislator, of course, has next to no knowledge of developments in these countries, of the perceptions and predispositions of their leaders, to say nothing of strategic debates in their higher leadership.

And then there is the even more disabling feature. Such studies as we have – say, on Islam – are so inhibited by “political correctness” that they can have but one effect: to further lull the reader.

But there is a deeper problem. Recall the inundation from Bangladesh. The mushrooming of mosques and *madrassas* on our borders. The dogma that is being taught in the *madrassas* and “religious seminaries”. The progressive Islamization of Bangladesh. What do all these have in common?

Islam for one. The design of Pakistani agencies for another. But there are other things that are even more central to these develop-

ments: that the facts about each of them are well known, that they have been documented repeatedly, but that, each time attention is drawn to them, the State apparatus, indeed our society itself just looks the other way.

Why do we look away? In part, of course, for the factors we just enumerated: superciliousness, cowardice in the face of intellectual fashions, absence of detailed examination of any subject. But beneath these is another factor: noticing any of those dangers would require us to give up our easy ways, to change our conduct. *That* is what we do not want to do. It is not that Indians don't want freedom, one who knew us inside out said. They want freedom. It is just that they don't want to pay any price for it. And would be happier still if, in the bargain, they made some money out of getting it. An exact description of our stance on national security.

On several matters – the inundation from Bangladesh, for instance – I fear there is an even more disheartening reason. It isn't accidental that the country does not face facts. It has concluded that it cannot do anything about many of these threats. And *for that reason* it shuts its eyes.

Indeed, unable to act, the State, and society do more than shut their eyes. They *actively deny the facts*, they strain to minimize them.

The onus, thus, shifts on to the one who is drawing attention to the facts, and what they spell for the country: *he* is the one who is now required to keep coming up with proof! Proof that would pass muster with the ones who, because they are not going to act on them, do not want to believe that the facts are what they so obviously are.

Truth is buried by cowardice. It is as if presspersons and others in media – even in matters relating to the security of the country, even in the midst of a war – take contrariness to be independence, as if even in those situations they feel that, by printing something negative, they prove that they are independent; that, conversely, were they to say, or even report anything positive they would be damned as having “sold” themselves, as having become *chamchas*. Indeed, so pervasive is this habit that it seems that they are afraid not just that *others* will conclude that they have “sold out”, but that *in their own eyes* they would have done so.

The moral is as straightforward, as pedestrian as it is vital: we must open our eyes, we must face the facts, we must report them.

And act on them.

And acting means that we must stop examining the matter at some stage!

And it isn't just that we analyze. Through analysis we are always able to conjure up uncertainties, possibilities, imponderables, dangers, pitfalls that we may run into, should we act.

And then there is that other curse: brilliant ideas! We have but to settle on a course of action, and someone thinks up some brilliant alternative – why not do it that other way?

The action is once again postponed. We are back to examination!

Thus, we must face the facts.

And put Nelson's eye to possible alternatives.

The real debility

But even this unwillingness to act is not accidental. It is not something that has just dropped out of the sky. It is the result of fifty years of perverse discourse.

For fifty years – till the middle of the twentieth century – nationalism was the *mantra* of public discourse. Since then it has been devalued. Today it is a dirty word. A word that is used with slashes joining it to other pejoratives: "nationalism/chauvinism/communalism/fascism."

The result is a string of *presumptions*.

The *presumption* that India cannot be right – whether on terrorism in Punjab, or in combating the assault on Kashmir, or in regard to the demographic invasion from Bangladesh. The *presumption* that leads commentators to see virtue in someone else doing something, and when India, in particular the majority of the Indian people does the same thing – when it even attempts to do same thing – it makes our commentators detect fascism, communalism, evil. Indian liberals are awestruck when they see Muslims go through the postures of *namaz*: "What devotion, what surrender," they exclaim as ten thousand Muslims in the local Jama Masjid bend and rise in unison. But when Hindus flock to their temples in thousands or three crore of them gather at the *sangam* for the Kumbh *mela*, the very persons sneer, "Look at those ignoramuses, steeped neck deep in superstition. How will you ever get these people to develop?" When Bill Clinton was not able to get two of his nominees to be appointed as Attorneys General

because they had employed an unregistered alien for the briefest of times, that was taken as evidence of the great respect the American system has for law. Here, whenever a government has made some effort – however small – to send Bangladeshis back, a howl has been raised, so great a howl that governments have given up making even an effort to deport illegal immigrants.

As India cannot be right, the *presumption* that everyone who speaks up for the country, everyone who stands up for it, who risks his life for it cannot be right. Recall the total fabrications that were put out about “atrocities committed by the Army” in Kashmir – fabrications nailed in the Press Council report, *Crisis and Credibility*.¹ Recall the way self-serving, backdated letters of a Brigadier were used by the press to put the armed forces in the wrong during the Kargil war.

As India cannot be right, the *presumption* that it is up to India to keep coming up with “solutions” – with formula after formula till one meets with the approval of the adversary.

From this, it is but a short step. A newspaper is a “product” like soap. Persons in the media are in the “infotainment business”. Being bothered about the country is to be hysterical. Examining a matter in detail is to be a bore. The smart question, the sound-byte – and on to the next “story”.

Beneath the presumptions lies indoctrination of a hundred and fifty years: the notions that we have taken in from the elder Mill, Macaulay, Marx, and the missionaries. Our commentators are hybrids of these forbears. India is not a country, Indians are not a nation. It is a zoo, to recall Girilal Jain’s description of their view. There are monkeys in it, zebras, elephants, the whole lot. But each of these is a separate species. When a Vivekananda or a Gandhi looks at the people, what strike him are the myriad common elements. But when these persons see the very same people, what strikes them on the other hand is what is different! India is not real, they declare, it is but a geographical expression. It was never one country. It was put together only recently – and that too by the British. Not one country? Ever heard of a group of pilgrims who were stopped in ancient times as they crossed from one “kingdom” into the next one? India is not real, they declare; caste

¹Lancers International, New Delhi, 1991.

is real, being Hindu or Muslim, being Tamil or Bengali – *that* is what is real.

As India is not one, its position on Kashmir is automatically open to question – how can any segment be an inalienable part of India when India itself is a figment put together recently? When the country itself is but a geographical expression, what can be the use of wasting hundreds of crores on a frozen desert like Siachin – another stretch on which “not a blade of grass grows”? How natural to ask, “Have you ever thought of how many schools and primary health centres we could build with that kind of money?” The country naturally has no right to throw out Bangladeshis on the ground that they are “outsiders”. Everyone here is an “outsider” – but woe upon you should you even think that the Mughals were “outsiders”. How predictable the incident that put me to shame! Dr. Abdul Kalam was delivering the first lecture in the *Ideas that have worked* series that I had started under the auspices of the Administrative Reforms Department. He had just given a gripping account of what it had been to work under Vikram Sarabai, Satish Dhawan and Brahmaprakash, of what it had been to participate in projects to build rockets that would carry satellites into space, of what it had been to be present at the launching of those satellites, of being present for Pokharan-II. “So, we have a rocket,” a member of the audience began. “But what has that done for the common man?” Kalam had to justify rocket research by recalling how it had helped develop the Kalam-Raju stent for heart patients!

When the Pakistani Government, having financed, patronized, controlled *madrassas* for decades, at last announces moves to regulate them, that announcement, though just an announcement, becomes proof positive that the Government is taking a giant step towards secularism, that it is taking a bold step towards modernizing that country, that it is giving up the past and is ready to establish peace with India. If an Indian Government were but to require the same of *madrassas* here, why that would be a violation of the guarantee given to the minorities by the Constitution that they can run minority institutions without interference. If, in spite of Musharraf’s many announcements, peace does not come about, that is only because the Indian Government, indeed India itself has not liberated itself from

phobias it has conjured up about the past. First of all, Muslims are not growing faster. If they are, the fault naturally is that of the Hindus: in India the Muslims have been neglected, educational and health facilities have not been extended to them; that has left them poor; and *that is why* they are growing faster....

This disengagement from our past, from our country, from our people, from our very being has become so extreme that anything alien is the fashion of choice. And the more alien, the more fashionable. Advocating what in fact is the adversary's line on an issue – even when that issue is one that concerns our defence forces, even when it concerns our territorial integrity – establishes the commentator's "independence".

Having made nationalism a dirty word, having made it synonymous with "fascism", the natural reaction of many of our commentators is to *strike a pose* – and *that pose* which will advertise the fact that they are *not* "nationalist/chauvinist/communal/fascist"!

How vulnerable all this leaves us! Where do we have the time or concern to ensure that recommendations of Task Forces are implemented? How are we to be alarmed at the security consequences of a gangster-legislator? Why will we wake up to the opportunity that a corrupt and inefficient ruler provides to an enemy?

And the even greater danger: when national security, indeed the nation itself have been so devalued, when intellectual life is as derivative and superficial as it has become, how easy it is for the enemy to insinuate disabling ideas into our discourse, our minds!

There is a reason specific to defence why we should be alert to this danger. The role of deception, subterfuge, disinformation is well recognized in warfare. But all too often, in this context deception, etc. are associated with the actual conduct of battles – to lead the enemy to believe that you are going to land at Calais, and actually land off Normandy.... But the even more lethal deception is to steer the adversary in the preceding decades on to a line that leads him to believe that he is in the wrong. By the time the war is joined, he will be the enemy you want – the enemy who has already been defeated, the enemy, as Sun Tzu counsels, who takes *your* purposes to be *his own*.

For the sure way to defeat an enemy is to undermine his belief in himself, in the righteousness of his cause. "In war, it is paramount," declares *The Wiles of War*, "to hold on to the pivot. The pivot of war is

nothing but name and righteousness. Secure a good name for yourself and give the enemy a bad name; proclaim your righteousness and reveal the unrighteousness of the enemy. Then your army can set forth in a great momentum, shaking heaven and earth and sweeping across the four corners. Wherever your command banner points, your troops will dash ahead in high spirits and break the will of the enemy."¹

It is to this danger that we have opened ourselves.

And it is from here that the turn-around in regard to security must begin.

¹*The Wiles of War, op. cit.*, pp. 126-27.

The image to bear in mind

A country's security is a *multiplicative* function, not an additive one – not $(x+y+z)$, but $(x.y.z)$. If any one of the constituents is below par, the entire function is brought down by a multiple. The expression the Chinese use is indeed apposite – “*Comprehensive National Strength*”. Among the pillars on which it is built is economic strength:

- ☐ Does the US need armies today to bend Argentina and Brazil?
- ☐ Of the ones who keep counselling us to open a dialogue with Pakistan, how many counselled Bush to open a dialogue with Saddam Hussein?
- ☐ Why is it that Russia can be bent today on cryogenic engines, on Iraq, on nuclear disarmament – and China cannot?

Economic strength and independence make all the difference.

Today economic levers are routinely used to achieve political and diplomatic ends. To safeguard our freedom of action, our sovereignty, the first requisite is that we are strong enough not to have to succumb to economic pressures.

Nor is it enough that “Our fundamentals are strong”. Nothing happened to the “fundamentals” of Southeast Asian countries in 1997. The “fundamentals” of Japan continue to be as strong as they were 12 years ago – but the political stalemate has ensured that it has not been able to lift itself out of a bog for a decade. The “fundamentals” of Mexico, Argentina, Brazil did not collapse overnight – but their economies did, and with that their freedom of action.

Therefore, when we do anything that slows economic progress, when we block the reforms that are necessary for that growth, we weaken the country. We literally expose it to danger: should we, for instance, have to turn to the IMF today, we would be squeezed not in spite of our atomic weapons, but *because of them!* And how easy it is to slip: two years ago when we were losing almost a billion dollars

every month, a single wrong decision – for instance, that the value of the Rupee must be protected “at all cost” – could have resulted in a run.

Nor is it that when we thwart a reform – for instance, by blocking steps needed to contain governmental deficits – or by bringing work, by bringing trucks and trains to a halt, all we do is to slow down economic progress. That is not the only consequence. The worst of it is that we confirm the perception that India is not able in the end to carry through its announcements. That perception itself is temptation to an enemy.

National will

The same lesson is implicit in the expression we so often use, “Anything is possible. What one needs is political will.” We use the word as if what matters is that the person at the top has the will to carry through a venture. That is, of course, true in a sense: at times an individual makes all the difference – Gandhiji during the Independence Struggle, Sardar Patel in the integration of princely states. But the more enduring significance of the expression “political will” is not as the will of an individual. It is as the ability of a political system to deliver.

And every day we are reminded that our system is just not able to deliver. It has become dysfunctional – labour reforms, privatization, reforms of the financial sector, reforms in the power sector, setting up Special Economic Zones.... What have we not announced in the last decade? For which of them have we not pledged ourselves to “time-bound” targets? Yet on everything, a 20-metre sprint, and inertia overwhelms us.

That is why our central weakness – general governance – is one that, unless remedied – as of yesterday – will overwhelm.

For one thing, Defence Forces cannot remain an island forever: the inertia, the vices that come to infect general governance cannot but infect the armed forces – and that sooner rather than later. Can it be that the political class will interfere in every sphere but leave defence forces alone? What has become of the police in the states should be answer enough.

Second, in our system the higher command remains in the hands of the ones who have come up through the same political system. And I

don't mean just the final decisions – of going to war or not, of returning Haji Pir or not. Day to day decisions – budgetary allocations, postings and transfers, even such minor things as awards and decorations – also affect morale, and, therefore, the fighting ability of the defence forces. And these remain in the domain of the political and administrative establishments.

Third, in the end, everything turns on one person – the one at the top. In the end, his decision alone counts. The advice he will receive will often be contradictory. There will be no way to quantify and weigh factors which will affect the outcome. Many imponderables will enter the fray. He will not have time for elaborate analysis. His past experiences and the instinct that they have honed, they will determine the decision he takes. True, the advice he receives will play on his mind. But at that level, not everyone can get a word in to him, especially not when the country is seized by a crisis. In a word, there is no substitute for having well-seasoned timber at the top. A political system that selects persons on collateral considerations – caste, money, muscle, demagoguery; a political system in which a person who has next to no base beyond a few districts can, because of splintered legislatures become the Deputy Prime Minister, even the Prime Minister – is placing the country at peril.

Fourth, even if leaders occupying the highest offices are of the highest calibre, their decisions are bound to be affected by the general level of persons in public life: which Prime Minister or Defence Minister will shut out from his awareness the clamour in Parliament or the media? And so, the calibre of *the generality of the political and administrative class*, indeed of the entire lot that is in public life and public discourse is certain to affect the formulation and conduct of security policy. And this is our Achilles' heel today.

This is what we have to remedy today.

Time to return to the beginning of the book:

Back to the beginning

Consider again the case of Bihar. A population of 90 million, that is a population one-third larger than that of Britain, of Italy, a population equal to that of Germany, and an area 40% as extensive as Britain. In the next twenty years, almost 40 per cent of the increase in our population is going to take place in UP, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, and

the Northeast – to take just a few of the states that are today falling off the map of governed portions of the country. Twenty years from now the population of this swathe is going to be around 500 million. In this vast area, over this huge population governance has evaporated. If you were running the ISI, would you waste lives in Kashmir? Or would you just smuggle ten-fifteen thousand AK-47s through Nepal into the state? Is UP not a Bihar already? How many kilometers beyond Ranchi does the writ of the State in Jharkhand run?

When the horizon of the political class is the *bull* of the day in the legislature, or the debating point that can be extracted from the headlines of the day, or the next bout of elections, how can the policies and strategies that alone can enable us to deal with Pakistan and China be sustained and implemented for 20-30 years?

Will the growing economic strength of China not get translated into military strength? Will the growing economic *distance* between China and India not get translated into a greater *distance* between their capabilities at force-projection and ours at warding off such projection?

Can it be that general governance will slacken but portions of the same apparatus relating to defence will work efficiently? That corruption will come to pervade the entire body of the State but affairs relating to defence will be handled with honesty and dispatch?

For, Defence Forces are to a country what an iron railing put around it is to a tree: in the end, howsoever strong the railing, howsoever sturdy and well-polished it looks, it cannot protect a tree that has been hollowed by termites from within: the storm shall fell it.

It is when we have rid the tree of termites that India will be secure.

And only then.

It is only when we have made such questions redundant that India will be secure.

And only then.

It is only when governance in general is retrieved that India will be secure.

And only then.

It is only when we begin to think, and to think for ourselves, when we shed cowardice in the face of intellectual fashions that governance will begin to be retrieved.

And only then.

It is only when we again begin to take affairs of State, in particular of national security, seriously that the retrieval will begin.

And only then.

And we will begin to take affairs of State and security seriously only when we once again make nationalism our religion.

And only then.

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The art of war teaches us to rely
not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming,
but on our own readiness to receive him;
not on the chance of his not attacking,
but rather on the fact that we have made
our position unassailable.

— Sun Tzu